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  • Section 13 of the Travancore-Cochin Public Safety Measures Act, V of 1950.
  • Sections 15 and 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act
  • Section 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act
  • Section 13 of the Public Safety Measures Act
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  • Section 13 of the Travancore-Cochin Public Safety Measures Act, V of 1950.
  • Sections 15 and 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act
  • Section 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act
  • Section 13 of the Public Safety Measures Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner holds an otti (usufructuary interest) over property described as S. Nos. 1255-A and B and 1256, Vanchiyoor Pakuthy, Trivandrum City, with buildings bearing door Nos. 980-A to D and 981. In 1945 the 1st Respondent, the Catholic Bank of India, acquired the mortgagor's right in the property and on 14-7-1945 entered into a registered lease-deed with the petitioner for three years at an annual rent of Rs. 732 payable in two half-yearly instalments.

On 1-10-1950 the petitioner applied under Clause 4 of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 (the Rent Control Order) for fixation of a fair rent. By order dated 27-6-1953 the Rent Controller fixed the rent at Rs. 110 per mensem. An appeal under Clause 15 failed. The 1st Respondent Bank then petitioned the Government under Clause 16 and, by Government order dated 4-1-1956, the Controller's and appellate orders were set aside and the petitioner's application for fixation of fair rent was dismissed.

The petitioner filed this writ petition for certiorari on 28-5-1956 challenging the Government order of 4-1-1956. The 1st Respondent raised a preliminary objection of unreasonable delay in filing the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petition was filed with unreasonable delay (i.e., whether the writ petition was barred by delay given the order dated 4-1-1956 and filing on 28-5-1956).
  2. Whether the Government had jurisdiction to entertain revision under Clause 16 of the Rent Control Order and whether Clauses 15 and 16 (providing for appeal and revision) of the Rent Control Order are validly made under the Public Safety Measures Act.
  3. Whether the Government's order suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record — specifically, whether the Government was right in holding that the transaction was a lease/mortgage arrangement outside the scope of the Rent Control Order (i.e., that it was not a landlord-tenant relationship covered by the Order).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner raised a preliminary objection asserting that the writ petition was timely filed; implicitly opposing the bank's contention of unreasonable delay.
  • The petitioner contended that the Government had no jurisdiction to interfere in revision (challenging the Government's exercise of jurisdiction under Clause 16) and maintained that Clauses 15 and 16 of the Rent Control Order are valid.
  • The petitioner further argued (or urged) that because the preamble to the Rent Control Order refers only to Section 13 of the Public Safety Measures Act, the omission of Sections 15 and 22 from the preamble meant those powers were not exercised — a point urged as a basis for referral to a Division Bench (this argument was addressed by the court and rejected).

1st Respondent (Catholic Bank of India) and Government

  • The 1st Respondent (the Bank) argued before the Government that the transaction (the lease-deed dated 30-11-1945) was really a lease (or more accurately a mortgage with lease-back) and not a rent arrangement, and therefore outside the purview of the Rent Control Order.
  • The Bank advanced the contention that the otti transaction had been converted into a simple mortgage so that the Bank's possession was as owner, not tenant.
  • In its written materials the Bank also advanced an alternative argument (later relied upon by the Bank in submissions) that the lease related primarily to the land (with buildings as appurtenances) rather than to buildings as such — contending the transaction was not a letting of buildings for residential or non-residential purposes.
  • The Government accepted the Bank's contentions in substance, concluding that the transaction partook more of mortgage and lease-back than of a landlord-tenant rent arrangement and that the Rent Controller's and Collector's orders were not maintainable in law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahadeva Iyer v. State, 1954 Ker LT 427 : AIR 1954 Trav-C 469 Authority cited for the proposition that a reasonable time to file this kind of petition would be three months; used to support a delay objection. The court considered the decision but held the petition was not unreasonably delayed because the three-month period expired on a vacation day and the petition was filed on reopening; the preliminary objection on delay was overruled.
Swaraj Motors Ltd. v. Municipal Council, Alwaye, 1954 Ker LT 443 : AIR 1954 Trav-C 468 Also cited in support of the three-month reasonable filing period principle for delay objections. Used in tandem with Mahadeva Iyer to assess delay; the court rejected the delay objection on the facts.
Gangadhar Motor Transport Society v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 Bom 202 Principle that a party who submitted to the jurisdiction cannot later raise an objection to that jurisdiction. The court relied on this authority (and John v. State) to hold that because the petitioner submitted to the Government's jurisdiction in the revision proceedings, he could not now challenge the Government's jurisdiction to entertain the revision.
John v. State, 1955 Ker LT 568 Similar principle as above — bar to raising jurisdictional objection after submission to jurisdiction. Applied with Gangadhar Motor Transport to deny the petitioner the right to challenge jurisdiction that was not raised before the Government.
Sippora v. Gopalan, 1954 Ker LT 706 Decision (Division Bench) holding that Sections 15 and 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act read together enable Government to confer the right of appeal on any authority while reserving a right of revision for themselves. The court regarded this decision as concluding that Clauses 15 and 16 of the Rent Control Order are valid and followed it, stating agreement with its conclusion.
Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 Principle that a quasi-judicial order can be quashed by certiorari if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The court invoked this Supreme Court authority to frame the test for interference by certiorari and to justify examining whether an error of law apparent on the face of the record existed in the Government's order.
R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw, 1952-1 All ER 122 Definition of "the record" for certiorari purposes: that the record must contain initiating documents, pleadings if any, and the adjudication but not necessarily evidence or reasons unless the tribunal supplies reasons; if reasons are supplied and are wrong in law certiorari lies. The court relied on Denning L.J.'s formulation to determine what may be examined as part of the record and to decide whether reasons given by the Government, being wrong in law, made the order susceptible to certiorari.
Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, 1954 Ker LT 385 : AIR 1954 SC 526 Commentary distinguishing Denning L.J.'s narrower view of "the record" under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC; discussed in the context of what constitutes the record for certiorari. The court noted the case and explained that it did not widen Denning's dictum in certiorari cases but that it bound the court to follow the Sippora decision re Clauses 15 and 16. The court treated Denning's formulation as applicable to the present inquiry into the record.
Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, Quilon District Court, 1953 Ker LT 110 : AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 205 Authority relied on by the 1st Respondent (in argument) to contend that a lease of garden land together with buildings may not amount to letting of buildings separately. The court noted the Bank invoked this decision in an affidavit to argue that the lease related to land (with buildings as appurtenances); the court treated that affidavit as argument contrary to the pleadings and did not accept it as overcoming the written statement and pleadings that treated the Bank as tenant of the buildings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of legal determinations reflected in the opinion:

  1. On delay: The court considered the preliminary objection that the writ petition was filed with unreasonable delay relying on Full Bench decisions that suggested three months as a reasonable period. The three-month period expired on 4-4-1956 while the Court was on vacation and the petition was filed on the reopening day. On that basis the court held that there was no unreasonable delay and overruled the preliminary objection.
  2. On jurisdiction and validity of Clauses 15 and 16: The petitioner had not raised the objection to the Government at the time of the revision hearing but submitted to the Government's jurisdiction. Citing authorities (including Gangadhar Motor Transport and John v. State), the court held that the petitioner cannot now raise a jurisdictional objection which was not taken earlier. The court further concluded, following the Division Bench decision in Sippora v. Gopalan, that Clauses 15 and 16 of the Rent Control Order are valid (the court expressed agreement with that conclusion).
  3. On the preamble/Section issue: The court addressed the petitioner's contention that the Rent Control Order's preamble refers only to Section 13 of the Public Safety Measures Act and not to Sections 15 and 22, and that omission required reference to a Division Bench. The court rejected that submission, reasoning that if the Government had power under Sections 15 and 22 they must be presumed to have exercised it even if not expressly mentioned in the preamble; the omission did not invalidate the Order.
  4. On error of law apparent on the face of the record: The court accepted that the Government's order was quasi-judicial and therefore subject to certiorari where there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record (citing Hari Vishnu and the Shaw decision on the content of the record). The court examined the Government's order and the pleadings to see whether such an error existed.
  5. On examination of Government's reasons and pleadings: The Government's order accepted the Bank's contention that the transaction was more in the nature of a mortgage and lease-back and not a landlord-tenant rent arrangement. The court found difficulty with the Government's conclusion: it observed that the Rent Control Order applies to leases and that a transaction styled a lease (creating landlord and tenant) may still fall within the Rent Control Order. The court found the Government's stated reasons wrong in law.
  6. Specific record analysis: Because pleadings form part of the record for certiorari, the court examined the application before the Controller and the Bank's written statement. The petitioner's application repeatedly described the Bank as tenant; the Bank's written statement did not controvert that position (it primarily argued conversion to a simple mortgage and raised other contentions later abandoned). Thus, on the face of the pleadings there was no basis for the Government's conclusion that the lease was not of the buildings or that there was no landlord-tenant relationship.
  7. On attempted additional materials: The court observed that certain materials submitted later (lease-deed and an affidavit filed by the Bank after hearing but before orders) are not necessarily part of the record for certiorari purposes (following Denning L.J.'s observations). The court found nothing in the lease-deed inconsistent with its conclusion.
  8. Conclusion of analysis: The court determined that the Government's reasons were legally erroneous, that those reasons were not supported by the pleadings (which indicated tenancy), and that the Government's decision was therefore vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record, meriting quashing by certiorari.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed and the Government's order dated 4-1-1956 is quashed.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The Government order setting aside the Controller's and appellate orders and dismissing the petitioner's application for fixation of fair rent has been quashed.
  • The petitioner is entitled to recover costs from the 1st Respondent Bank; the Advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 150 (One hundred and fifty rupees).
  • The opinion does not state that it establishes any new legal principle or broader precedent beyond the application of established authorities; the decision's immediate legal effect is the quashing of the Government order in this particular case.

Note: This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add material beyond what appears in the text.

    (Madhava Iyer) Venkitasubramonia Iyer v. Catholic Bank Of India Ltd. And Others

    1. This petition is for a writ of certiorari to quash an order passed by the 3rd Respondent — Government under Cl. 16 of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Order), an Order made under Section 13 of the Travancore-Cochin Public Safety Measures Act, V of 1950. Before stating the facts it might be as well to consider a preliminary objection taken on behalf of the 1st Respondent to this petition, the Catholic Bank of India, Changanacherry. The order complained against was passed on 4-1-1956. The present petition was filed on 28-5-1956, and it is argued on the strength of the Full Bench decisions reported in Mahadeva Iyer v. State, 1954 Ker LT 427 : (AIR 1954 Trav-C 469) (A), and Swaraj Motors Ltd.… v. Municipal Council, Alwaye…., Alwaye, 1954 Ker LT 443 : (AIR 1954 Trav-C 468) (B), that the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of unreasonable delay.

    2. It was suggested in these decisions that a reasonable time to file a petition of this nature would be 3 months, the time allowed for a civil revision petition. This 3 months' period expired in the present case on 4-4-1956 when the Court was on vacation and the petition was actually filed on the reopening day. In the circumstances it cannot be said that there has been unreasonable delay, and the preliminary objection is therefore overruled.

    3. The facts are these: The petitioner holds an otti over the property in question, a piece of land 14 cents in extent forming S. Nos. 1255-A and B and 1256 of the Vanchiyoor Pakuthy in Trivandrum City and the buildings bearing door Nos. 980-A to D and 981 standing thereon. In 1945 the 1st Respondent Bank bought the mortgagor's right in this property and thereafter, on 14-7-1945 entered into a registered lease-deed with the petitioner by which it took a lease of the property for three years on an annual rent of Rs. 732 payable in two half-yearly instalments. On the 1st October 1950 the petitioner made an application under Cl. 4 of the Rent Control Order for fixing a fair rent for the property, and the Controller fixed the rent at Rs. 110 per mensem by an order dated 27-6-1953.

    4. An appeal by it under Cl. 15 or the Order having failed, the 1st Respondent Bank filed a petition before the Government under Cl. 16, and by their order dated 4-1-1956 the Government allowed the petition and, setting aside the orders of the Controller and the appellate authority, dismissed the petitioner's application for fixation of fair rent. It is against this order of Government that the present petition is directed.

    5. The first objection taken on behalf of the petitioner is that the Government had no jurisdiction to interfere in revision and that Cl. 16 of the Rent Control Order which purports to confer the jurisdiction as also Cl. 15 which provides for an appeal are valid. I think that, for more reasons than one, this objection is not to be countenanced. In the first place it was not taken at the hearing of the revision petition by the Government; the petitioner submitted to their jurisdiction and took the chance of obtaining an order in his favour; and it follows from the decisions reported in Gangadhar Motor Transport Society v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 Bom 202 (C) and John v. State, 1955 Ker LT 568 (D), that the petitioner cannot be heard to raise the objection here.

    6. That Cls. 15 and 16 of the Rent Control Order are valid is concluded by authority — see the (Division Bench ruling reported in Sippora v. Gopalan, 1954 Ker LT 706 (E), where it was held that Sections 15 and 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act read together enabled the Government to confer the right of appeal on any authority reserving a right of revision for themselves. Left to my own resources, uninformed by this decision, I might have been tempted to find that power not in Ss. 15 and 22 but in S. 13 under which the Rent Control Order is expressed to be made.

    7. For, it seems to me that the power to make an order providing for regulating the letting of accommodation necessarily implies the power to provide for the adjudication (inclusive of appeal and revision from an original decision) of the conflicting claims arising from such regulation just as the power to provide for adjudication, inclusive of appeals and revisions, in respect of any matter falling within a legislative entry as, for example, income-tax is to be found in that entry itself.

    8. Although the wording of Section 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act is wide enough to take in a power conferred on an officer by an order made under S. 13, it seems to me that the real purpose of S. 22 is to provide for an appeal from the decision of an officer in exercise of powers conferred by the Act itself, (for example by S. 8) as also from the decision of an officer in exercise of powers delegated to him by the Government under S. 15, in other words of powers conferred under the Act. It is however unnecessary to discuss the matter further in view of the fact that I am bound by the decision referred to earlier, and am, if I may say so with all due respect, unreservedly in agreement with the conclusion therein that Cls. 15 and 16 of the Rent Control Order are valid.

    9. It is nevertheless argued that the decision erred by reason of its failing to note that the preamble to the Rent Control Order refers only to Section 13 of the Public Safety Measures Act and not to Ss. 15 and 22, and that it purports to have been made under the former section alone. In this view it is suggested, that I should refer the present case to a Division Bench. I do not think that the argument is tenable.

    10. The intention to provide for an appeal and a revision is clear from the provisions made in the Rent Control Order in that behalf, and if the Government had the power to make provision for these matters, under Sections 15 and 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act, they must be presumed to have exercised that power notwithstanding that these sections are not expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Order. The failure to mention Ss. 15 and 22 does not mean that the, powers conferred by those sections were not exercised, any more than the failure to mention any provision at all would have led to the conclusion that no power at all was exercised and have thus invalidated the entire Order. Whatever a preamble to a statutory order or notification might say, the presumption is that it is made in exercise of all the powers conferred by the statute in question.

    11. The next objection taken is that the order assailed is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record, and this objection must, I think, prevail. That the order in question is a quasi-judicial order subject to correction by a writ of certiorari, is not disputed, and that an error of law apparent on the face of the record would be a sufficient ground for interference has been laid down in a number of cases of which it is necessary to refer only to the Supreme Court decision in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, (S) AIR 1955 SC 233 (F). What exactly is the record in such a case and in what circumstances, certiorari will lie to quash the decision, have been laid down in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw, 1952-1 All ER 122 (G), a decision followed in the Supreme Court case just cited. In the words of Denning, L.J:

    “The record must contain at least the document; which initiates the proceedings, the pleadings if any, and the adjudication, but not the evidence, nor the reasons, unless the tribunal chooses to incorporate them. If the tribunal does state its reasons, and those reasons are wrong in law, certiorari lies to quash the decision.”

    12. The observation at p. 414 (of Ker LT): (at p. 543 of AIR) of the report in the Supreme Court decision in Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, 1954 Ker LT 385 : (AIR 1954 SC 526) (H), that the phrase, ‘the record’ within the meaning of O. 47, R. (1) of the CPC is not to be construed in the restricted sense in which Denning, L.J, construed it in the case referred to does not mean that the phrase is to be construed in a wider sense in a case of certiorari for, the very ground on which the dictum of Denning, L.J, is distinguished is that it was made with reference to a case of certiorari.

    13. The question then is whether there is in this case an error of law apparent on the face of the record. I think there is. The impugned order shows that the contention raised by the 1st Respondent bank before the Government was that the transaction in question, namely, the lease-deed dated 30-11-1120, was a lease and not a rent arrangement and there fore did not come under the purview of the Rent Control Order. The Government accepted this contention. They said:

    “Both the lower tribunals (Rent Controller and the District Collector) have not considered all the salient features of the transaction and the intention of the parties to come to a conclusion about the nature of the transaction; whether it is a rent arrangement or a lease arrangement.”

    and after referring to certain facts proceeded to observe,

    “All these facts go to show that this transaction is more in the nature of a mortgage and lease-back than that of a rent arrangement with landlord-tenant relationship contemplated by the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950.”

    14. Then they go on to say that assuming as was argued, that the whole compound was covered with buildings, that was not conclusive evidence to show that the intention was a rent arrangement in view of the overwhelming circumstantial evidence to the contrary. The concluding portion of their order runs as follows:

    “On a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances of this case, Government have no hesitation to hold that the transaction in question partakes the nature of a lease-hold arrangement and that the parties are not having the landlord-tenant relationship as contemplated under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950. Government hold that the order of the Rent Controller an fixing the fair rent of the buildings in question in B.R.C 51/50 and the order of the District Collector in B.R.C Appeal 25/54 upholding the Rent Controller's order, are not maintainable in law. Therefore, they are set aside and the petition before the Hent Controller for fixation of fair rent stands dismissed. No order as to costs.”

    15. I must confess to some difficulty in understanding what exactly is meant by saying that a transaction is a lease and not a rent arrangement or that a lease cannot come within the purview of the Rent Control Order. I should have thought that the first requisite for the application of the Lease and Rent Control Order is, as its very name shows, that there should be a lease and consequently a landlord and a tenant. Nor am I able to appreciate why, if a transaction was in the nature of a mortgage and leaseback (in this particular case the lease, which was years after the mortgage, cannot be properly described as a lease-back) it cannot create the relationship of landlord and tenant or why it should not come within the purview of the Rent Control Order so long as the lease is of a building as defined in Cl. 2(1) of the Order.

    16. If I may presume to speculate as to what really the Government would have meant I think that they probably had in mind two things. First that, as was contended by the 1st Respondent bank before the Controller, the transaction in question although styled as a lease was really intended to convert the otti into a simple mortgage so that the possession of the bank was as owner of the property and not as a tenant under the lease-deed. This contention is obviously untenable, and it is hardly necessary to cite authority for the purpose of showing that by a mere intention, unexpressed in any document, the parties to an otti cannot convert it into a simple mortgage. The circumstance that the rent was arrived at by calculating interest on the mortgage money lends no support to this contention, and I have never heard it said that if a mortgagor takes a usufructuarily mortgaged property on lease his possession is not in his capacity as a tenant of the mortgagee but in his capacity as owner.

    17. The second thing that Government might have meant was that the lease in question was of the land and not of the buildings as such, that the buildings must be regarded as only appurtenant to the land and not vice-versa, and that therefore the subject-matter of the lease does not fall within the definition of a building in Cl. 2(1) of the Rent Control Order. The 1st Respondent bank has tried to sustain the order of the Government by giving it this meaning which I might observe is nowhere indicated in the order but is a mere surmise. In paragraph 9 of its counter-affidavit the bank states:

    “Thus it can be seen that the lease deed in question on the basis of which the application for the fixation of fair rent was made by the petitioner relates to the lease of the land included in Survey Nos. 1255-A and B and 1256 as distinguished from any rental arrangements relating to buildings standing on such lands. It has been held that if there is a leasing out of a garden land together with buildings or huts standing thereon, the transaction cannot be said to amount to letting out of the buildings or huts separately for residential or non-residential purposes.”

    18. This, as I have already remarked, is to give a reason in support of the order of Government which Government themselves have not given, at least not in words capable of being so understood. Such reasons as the Government have given are, as I have shown, wrong in law and therefore their decision is liable to correction by a writ of certiorari.

    19. Since the pleadings also form part of the record for the purpose of determining whether an error is an error apparent on the face of the record, it is permissible to look into the application made by the present petitioner before the Controller and the written statement filed by the 1st Respondent bank in answer to it. The petition before the Controller states in more places than one that the 1st Respondent bank is a tenant of the buildings.

    20. Nowhere is this controverted in the very long written statement, running to eight pages, filed by the bank. The bulk of that statement is devoted to the untenable contention that, by the transaction of lease the otti became converted into a simple mortgage and that therefore the bank's position was as an owner and not as a tenant and to equally untenable contentions, now abandoned, of res judicata and estoppel. Nowhere is it stated that the lease was not in respect of the buildings. On the other hand the prayer in paragraph 19 that, if it is deemed necessary to fix the fair rent of the buildings the Controller may be pleased to consider the facts and circumstances stated thereafter, amounts to an admission that the lease was of the buildings.

    21. In the face of the pleadings there is thus no scope for holding that the lease appurtained to the land of which the buildings were only appurtenances and not the other way about. All this apart, from the stand point of ordinary common sense, it does not need much argument to show that a lease of property comprising 14 cents of land with buildings thereon bearing as many as six separate door numbers, situate in an urban area and reserving an annual rent of Rs. 732, must be primarily a lease of the buildings and not of the land as such.

    22. Mr. Koshi on behalf of the 1st Respondent hank has taken me through the lease-deed in question and through an affidavit filed by his client before the Controller after the hearing of the application by him, but before orders were pronounced. I do not think that these can form part of the record in a case like the present having regard to the observations of Denning L.J which have already been quoted. But I might observe that there is nothing in the lease-deed that leads to a conclusion contrary to that I have reached.

    23. The mere fact that the lease calls itself a pattom and refers to the rent payable as pattom and not as vadaka is no ground for holding that the lease was of the land rather than of the buildings. The schedule to the document shows that what was leased was the land with the buildings standing thereon. And as for the affidavit filed before the Controller it at best amounts only to an argument by which, in order to take advantage of the decision in Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, Quilon District Court, 1953 Ker LT 110 : (AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 205) (I), the 1st Respondent bank strove to make out, contrary to the pleadings, that the lease as such was of the land and not of the buildings. I allow the petition and quash the order made by the Government. The petitioner will be entitled to get his costs from the 1st Respondent bank. Advocate's fee Rs. 150/- (Rs. One hundred and fifty).

    V.R.B

    24. Petition allowed.

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    (Madhava Iyer) Venkitasubramonia Iyer v. Catholic Bank Of India Ltd. And Others
    (Mar 14, 1957)