Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was selected as an apprentice in Cochin Shipyard Ltd. (first respondent) in the trade mechanical (diesel) under a two-year apprenticeship agreement. The apprenticeship contract expired and was terminated pursuant to exhibit P 1. Apprentices were advised under exhibit P 1 to register with the Employment Exchange for consideration against future vacancies. The petitioner completed his training in November 1981 but was not absorbed permanently; seven persons from his batch, including the petitioner, were not taken on permanently. Respondents 3 to 5, who were trained in a later (eighth) batch, were appointed as fitters structural grade I under exhibit P 2. The petitioner filed an original petition seeking: (a) to quash exhibit P 2 insofar as it related to respondents 3 to 5; (b) a writ of mandamus forbidding further appointments without reference to the Employment Exchange; and (c) a direction to absorb the petitioner consistent with his qualifications and training in the trade.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner, as an apprentice who completed training under a contract of apprenticeship, had a legal right to be appointed by the employer on completion of training (including the relevance of S.22 of the Apprentices Act, 1961 and the presence or absence in the contract of any clause obliging the employer to offer employment).
  2. Whether the appointments of respondents 3 to 5 without reporting the vacancies to the Employment Exchange violated S.4(1) of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959, and if non-compliance with S.4(1) renders such appointments invalid.
  3. Whether the action of appointing later-batch apprentices amounted to arbitrary or hostile discrimination violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted that respondents 3 to 5 were appointed despite the petitioner having prior claim by virtue of his earlier completion of apprenticeship training; this amounted to hostile discrimination in breach of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
  • At the stage of argument, petitioner relied on the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959, contending that the first respondent was obliged under S.4(1) to notify vacancies to the Employment Exchange and that the failure to do so made the appointments illegal. The petitioner had registered with the Employment Exchange and alleged denial of an opportunity to be considered because vacancies were not reported.
  • Petitioner relied on authority (Narender Kumar v. State of Punjab) to the extent that a contract containing an express absorption provision creates a right to appointment subject to availability of vacancies.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Second respondent (Manager, Personnel) and others submitted that the petitioner was appointed and trained under the Apprentices Act and that neither the Apprentices Act nor the apprenticeship contract obliged the employer to offer employment on completion of training. The contract expressly stated no obligation to offer employment, consistent with S.22 of the Apprentices Act, 1961.
  • Respondents explained that during earlier years the shipyard absorbed many apprentices due to larger vacancy availability; by the sixth batch (petitioner) vacancies were few and petitioner was not absorbed for lack of vacancies. Vacancies arose later (in 1983) when the eighth batch had just completed training and three of them were appointed under exhibit P 2. This practice, respondents argued, was consistent with earlier practice and did not amount to discrimination or arbitrariness.
  • Respondents also recorded a submission (undertaking) that, in future, the first respondent would report vacancies to the Employment Exchange and make appointments through it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narender Kumar v. State of Punjab [1985-I L.L.N 245] Where a contract of apprenticeship expressly stipulates absorption on successful completion (subject to availability of vacancies), the apprentice has a contractual right to appointment and the management is committed to appointing him subject to vacancy availability. The Court accepted the principle but distinguished the present case on the ground that the petitioner's contract did not contain any such provision obliging absorption; therefore Narender Kumar did not help the petitioner to establish a right to appointment here.
Narasimhamurthi v. Director of Collegiate Education [1967-II L.L.J 606] (Mysore High Court) Authority cited in support of the interpretation that S.4(1) of the Employment Exchanges Act is not mandatory in the sense of invalidating appointments made without complying with S.4(1). The Court relied on this decision to strengthen its conclusion that non-compliance with S.4(1) does not automatically render subsequent appointments invalid.
Sambhu Nath Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1975) 2 S.L.R 636] (Allahabad High Court) Authority cited in support of the proposition that non-compliance with S.4(1) of the Employment Exchanges Act does not necessarily invalidate appointments. The Court relied on this decision, along with Narasimhamurthi, to reinforce the view that S.4(1) is not to be treated as mandatory with the consequence of invalidity for non-compliance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the statutory and contractual framework governing apprentices and the scheme of the Employment Exchanges Act, 1959, and applied those provisions to the facts set out in the petition and counter-affidavits.

Apprenticeship contract and the Apprentices Act (1961)

  • The Court noted the petitioner's apprenticeship was governed by a contract registered under the Apprentices Act. It observed that the contract expressly stated it would not be obligatory on the employer to offer employment upon completion of apprenticeship, nor obligatory on the apprentice to accept employment.
  • The Court referred to S.22 of the Apprentices Act: S.22(1) states there is no obligation on the employer to offer any employment to an apprentice upon completion of apprenticeship; S.22(2) provides that if the contract contains a condition requiring the apprentice to serve the employer after successful completion, the employer is bound to offer suitable employment as per contract terms. The Court concluded that where the contract does not contain such an express obligation, S.22(1) applies and no right to appointment arises.
  • Applying this to the present facts, since the petitioner's contract did not contain an obligation to absorb him, he had no legal right to compel appointment under the contract or the Apprentices Act.

Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 — mandatory or directory?

  • The petitioner contended that S.4(1) of the Employment Exchanges Act required the public sector employer (first respondent) to notify vacancies to the Employment Exchange before filling them, and non-compliance would render appointments invalid.
  • The Court undertook an interpretive exercise to determine whether the provision was mandatory (with invalidating consequences) or directory. The Court identified relevant interpretive factors: the nature, design and scope of the statute; consequences of treating the provision as mandatory; related provisions that might mitigate mandatory effect; existence of penalties for non-compliance; and whether declaring the provision mandatory would serve or defeat the legislative object.
  • The Court analyzed the Act's scheme: S.3 (inapplicability in certain establishments), S.4(1) and (2) (notification obligation), and crucially S.4(4), which provides that nothing in S.4(1) or (2) imposes any obligation on the employer to recruit any person through the Employment Exchange merely because the vacancy has been notified.
  • The Court gave special significance to S.4(4): it shows that notification does not constrain the employer to recruit persons advised by the Employment Exchange. If compliance with S.4(1) does not obligate the employer to recruit Exchange-advised candidates, the Court reasoned it would be difficult to hold that non-compliance with S.4(1) must invalidate appointments made otherwise.
  • The Court also considered S.5 (returns/information to Exchanges), S.6 (inspections/access to records), S.7 (penalties for failure to comply), S.8 (cognizance), and S.10 (rule-making power). It concluded that the presence of penal provisions did not by itself prove that S.4(1) was intended to be mandatory with the consequence of invalidity, especially given S.4(4).
  • Relying on practical reasoning and public convenience, and supported by earlier High Court decisions (Narasimhamurthi and Sambhu Nath Tewari), the Court held that S.4(1) is not mandatory in the sense that failure to comply renders subsequent appointments invalid.

Application to the facts and constitutional claim

  • Given the contractual position (no obligation to absorb) and the statutory interpretation that S.4(1) is not automatically mandatory to invalidate appointments, the Court found no illegality in appointing respondents 3 to 5 when vacancies were available after the eighth batch completed training.
  • The Court did not find anything unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory in the first respondent's action as alleged under Articles 14 and 16.

Relief and recording of undertaking

  • The Court recorded counsel for respondents 1 and 2 agreeing that, in future, the first respondent would report vacancies to the Employment Exchange and make appointments through it.
  • On the basis of the above analysis, the Court concluded that the petitioner's claimed right to compel appointment was not established.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The original petition is dismissed. The Court held that the appointments of respondents 3 to 5 are not invalid.

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The petitioner is not entitled to a direction compelling the first respondent to offer him employment because (a) his apprenticeship contract did not create an obligation to absorb him, and (b) S.22(1) of the Apprentices Act applies where no contractual obligation to absorb exists.
  • The appointments of respondents 3 to 5 (eighth batch appointees) remain valid despite the contention that vacancies were not reported to the Employment Exchange; the Court held S.4(1) of the Employment Exchanges Act is not mandatory in the sense that non-compliance automatically invalidates appointments.
  • The Court recorded that the first respondent's counsel stated that in future vacancies will be reported to the Employment Exchange and appointments will be made through it; the petition was dismissed without costs.

Note: The opinion relied on existing precedents to interpret the statute and apply principles; it did not purport to establish a novel precedent beyond its interpretation of S.4(1) in the context of the facts before the Court.

    Kuriakose v. Cochin Shipyard, Ltd., And Others

    1. Petitioner was selected as an apprentice in the Cochin Shipyard, Ltd. (first respondent), in the trade mechanical (diesel) for a period of two years as per agreement duly executed. The contract was terminated as per exhibit P 1 order at the expiry of the term of the contract. Under exhibit P 1 apprentices were advised to register their names in the Employment Exchange so that their cases could be considered for appointment against future vacancies in the company. Petitioner completed his training in November 1981. Among the apprentices in his batch, seven persons including petitioner were not absorbed permanently in the shipyard. It appears, apprentices who completed training in the subsequent batches (respondents 3 to 5) were absorbed under exhibit P 2 order. Petitioner has, therefore, filed this original petition seeking to quash exhibit P 2 in so far as it relates to respondents 3 to 5, seeking a writ of mandamus forbearing further appointments without reference to Employment Exchange and to absorb petitioner consistent with his qualifications and training in the trade.

    2. Petitioner was trained in the sixth batch of apprentices in the trade mechanical (diesel). Respondents 3 to 5 appointed under exhibit P 2 as fitters structural grade I were trained in the eighth batch. This job falls within the category of mechancial (diesel). According to petitioner, appointment given to respondents 3 to 5 overlooking his prior claim amounts to hostile discrimination violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Though in the original petition reliance has not been placed by the petitioner on the provisions of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 (for short the Act), learned counsel for the petitioner at the stage of arguments placed reliance on the same.

    3 Second respondent has filed counter-affidavit. On behalf of respondents 4 and 5, fourth respondent has filed counter-affidavit. Second respondent is the Manager (Personnel) under the first respondent. His counter-affidavit shows that petitioner was selected as apprentice under the Apprentices Act for training in the designated trade, mechanical (diesel). Petitioner had executed contract of apprenticeship which was duly registered with the Regional Director of Apprenticeship Training, Southern Region, Madras. Under the Apprentices Act, there is no obligation on the part of the employer to offer employment to apprentices on completion of apprenticeship training. The same is the position regarding the contract of apprenticeship also. Therefore, petitioner has no legal right to compel his appointment. During earlier years when the Cochin Shipyard was established, there were large number of vacancies in different trades. There were not enough suitable or qualified candidates available for recruitment. Therefore, first respondent had to appoint apprentices on completion of training. Apprentices in the five batches could be so absorbed for employment. Petitioner was an apprentice in the sixth batch. By that time vacancies available were few in number and only some of the apprentices could be absorbed. Petitioner could not be absorbed for want of vacancy. Subsequent vacancies arose only in 1983, long after petitioner left the shipyard. At that time, apprentices of the eighth batch had just completed training and three among them were appointed under exhibit P 2. This did not amount to discrimination against petitioner. This was done as per practice adopted earlier to appoint apprentices on completion of training subject to availability of vacancies. There was no discrimination or arbitrariness or violation of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution as alleged.

    4. Petitioner has not made out his right to compel first respondent to offer him appointment. His claim, such as it is, could only be on the basis that he was an apprentice trained under the first respondent in the sixth batch between 1979 and 1981. That was governed by a contract of apprenticeship. The contract did not confer on him any right to employment. On the other hand, the contract, as the counter-affidavit would show, clearly stated that it shall not be obligatory for the employer to offer employment to the petitioner after completion of the period of apprenticeship and it shall not be obligatory on the part of the apprentice also to accept employment under the employer. This part of the contract is consistent with the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961. Petitioner was appointed apprentice by virtue of the provisions of this Act. It is necessary only to refer to S. 22 of this Act. Subsection (1) of S. 22 states that it shall not be obligatory on the part of the employer to offer any employment to any apprentice who has completed the period of his apprenticeship training in his establishment, nor shall it be obligatory on the part of the apprentice to accept an employment under the employer. Sub-section (2) states that notwithstanding anything in Sub-sec. (1), where there is a condition in a contract of apprenticeship that the apprentice shall, after the successful completion of the apprenticeship training, serve the employer, the employer shall, on such completion, be bound to offer suitable employment to the apprentice, and the apprentice shall be bound to serve the employer in that capacity for such period and on such remuneration as may be specified in the contract.

    5. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Narender Kumar v. State of Punjab [1985-I L.L.N 245]. That was a case in which the contract of apprenticeship clearly stipulated that on successful completion of the training, the apprentice would be absorbed in the department if there were vacancies without any commitment. The Supreme Court held that by virtue of the contract, the apprentice had a right to be appointed subject to availability of vacancies and there was commitment on the part of the management to appoint him subject to availability of vacancy. By virtue of the contract, the case came within the purview of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 22 of the Apprentices Act. But where the contract does not contain any such provisions, it is Sub-sec. (1) of S. 22 which would apply. The employer is not obliged to offer employment to apprentice on completion of the period of training and the apprentice is not obliged to accept employment under the employer.

    6. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance on the provisions of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act to contend for the position that action of the first respondent in appointing respondents 3 to 5 without reporting the vacancies to the Employment Exchange was illegal. According to learned counsel, appointments could have been made only of persons advised by the Employment Exchange. Petitioner had registered his name in the Employment Exchange and there was every likelihood of his name being advised by the Employment Exchange for consideration for appointment. That opportunity was denied to him since the vacancies were not reported to the Employment Exchange.

    7. Sub-section (1) of S. 4 of the Act states that after the commencement of the Act, the employer in every establishment in public sector before filling up any vacancy in any employment in that establishment shall notify that vacancy to such Employment Exchange as may be prescribed. Sub-section (2) states that appropriate Government may by notification published in the gazette require that the employer in every establishment in private sector or every establishment pertaining to any class or category of establishments in private sector shall before filling up any vacancy in any employment in that establishment, notify that vacancy to such Employment Exchange as may be prescribed and the employer shall thereupon comply With such requisition. Establishment of the first respondent is an establishment in public sector. Therefore, it is contended that the first respondent had obligation to notify the vacancies to the Employment Exchange concerned and any appointment made disregarding the provisions of S. 4(1) of the Act should be treated as illegal.

    8. No doubt, by virtue of S. 4(1) of the Act, first respondent should have notified the vacancies to the Employment Exchange concerned. Question is whether the provision is mandatory in the sense that non-observance thereof involves consequence of invalidity of appointment. No doubt, the provision uses the expression “shall.” But that is not decisive of the intention of the Legislature to make it mandatory. In order to decide this question, the Court has to carefully study the nature, design and scope of the statute, the consequences which would follow from considering it one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provision is avoided or projected, provisions for penalty for non-compliance of the provision, serious or trivial nature of the consequences thereof and whether the object of the legislation would be protected or defeated and other relevant circumstances. It is not enough that the act required to be done is for public benefit so as to be regarded as mandatory. The controversy must be decided on the basis of practical reasoning and public convenience.

    9. The Act is to provide for compulsory notification of vacancies to Employment Exchanges. Section 3 makes the Act inapplicable in relation to vacancies in certain establishments. Sub-section (1) of S. 4 requires the employer of every establishment in public sector to notify vacancies to the Employment Exchange concerned before filling up the vacancies. Sub-section (2) enables appropriate Government to extend this provision to establishments in private sector also. Sub-section (4) states “Nothing in Sub-secs. (1) and (2) shall be deemed to impose any obligation upon any employer to recruit any person through the Employment Exchange to fill any vacancy merely because that vacancy has been notified under any of those sub-sections.”

    10. It appears to me that Sub-sec. (4) is ???o vital significance. It declares that the employer has no obligation to recruit any person through the Employment Exchange merely because the employer has complied with Sub-sec. (1). If a vacancy is reported to the Employment Exchange by an employer, under Sub-sec. (1), normally one would expect the Employment Exchange to submit names of persons registered in the Employment Exchange. Even so, because of Sub-sec. (4) the employer is not obliged to recruit anyone of the persons advised by the Employment Exchange. He could appoint any other person. That is not inhibited by the provision. Such action could not be illegal. If this is the consequence where an employer complies with Sub-sec. (1), it is extremely difficult to hold that this will not be the result where the employer has not complied with Sub-sec. (1).

    11. Section 5 of the Act requires that the employer in every establishment in public sector shall furnish such information or return as may be prescribed in relation to vacancies that have occurred or are about to occur to such Employment Exchanges as may be prescribed. Section 6 states that such officer of the Government as may be prescribed in this behalf, or any person authorised by him in writing shall have access to any relevant record or document in the possession of any employer required to furnish information or return under S. 5 and may enter at any reasonable time any premises where he believes such record or document to be and inspect or take copies of relevant records or documents or ask any question necessary for obtaining any information required.

    12. Section 7 provides for penalties. If any employer fails to comply with the provisions of Sub-sec. (1) or Sub-sec. (2) of S. 4, he shall be punishable in the manner stated therein. Section 8 deals with cognizance of offences. No prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be instituted except by, or with the action of, such officer of Government as may be prescribed in this behalf or any person authorised by that officer in writing. Section 10 gives the Central Government power to frame rules for carrying out the different purposes of the Act.

    13. Provision for imposition of penalties cannot be treated as decisive of the legislative intent to make Sub-sec. (1) of S. 4 mandatory particularly in the light of Sub-sec. (4) of S. 4. Object of the statute is to compel employers to notify vacancies in their establishments to the Employment Exchanges concerned. The statute does not prohibit appointment being made by employers to fill up vacancies occurring in their establishments. The statute does not contain any provision rendering invalid appointments made otherwise than through the Employment Exchanges and without complying with Sub-sec. (1) or Sub-sec. (2) of S. 4. There is a specific provision which declares that it is not obligatory on the part of the employer to appoint persons advised by the Employment Exchange.

    14. On a consideration of the scheme of the Act, object which it is intended to serve and in the light of Sub-sec. (4) of S. 4, I have to hold that Sub-sec (1) is not mandatory and appointments made by the employer will not be rendered invalid merely by reason of the employer not complying with the requirements of Sub-sec. (1) or Sub-sec. (2) of S. 4. I am strengthened in this view by a decision of the Mysore High Court in Narasimhamurthi v. Director of Collegiate Education [1967-II L.L.J 606] and a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sambhu Nath Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1975) 2 S.L.R 636].

    15. In these circumstances, I have to hold that appointment of respondents 3 to 5 is not invalid. They were trained in the eighth batch of apprentices. When the training programme was completed, vacancies were available and were offered to them. That was what happened when training programme of apprentices in the first five batches was completed. That was what happened when the training programme of the sixth batch in which petitioner was also trained, was completed. Unfortunately, at that time sufficient vacancies were not available to accommodate petitioner. I am unable to find anything unreasonable or arbitrary in the action of the first respondent. I may also advert to the submission made by learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 to the effect that hereafter first respondent will report all vacancies to the Employment Exchange and appointments will be made through the Employment Exchange. These submissions are recorded and the original Petition is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kuriakose v. Cochin Shipyard, Ltd., And Others
    (Mar 14, 1985)