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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Paripoornan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the defendant in O.S. No. 12 of 1976 from a decree of the Sub Court, Alleppey. The plaintiffs (three in number) sued for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property known as "Kannitta" (a drying yard for copra) together with arrears of rent/compensation. The suit property comprised 74½ cents of land in Sy. Nos. 826/5 and 829/8 in Alleppey village, with buildings (sheds) appurtenant thereto. The monthly rent was Rs. 440/-.

Key factual points asserted in the plaint and examined by the courts: the tenancy expired on 30-4-1974 (Ext. B8 dated 11-1-1972 is cited); the plaintiffs' mother sent a notice dated 22-10-1974 purporting to terminate the tenancy on 30-11-1974; properties were gifted to the plaintiffs by Ext. A20 dated 22-1-1975; further notices (including Ext. A1 dated 1-1-1975 and Ext. A2 dated 26-9-1975) called upon the defendant to surrender possession, which it did not do.

The lower court held that the demise was of the "Kannitta" (land) and not of a building covered by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, and therefore the suit was maintainable; it decreed recovery of possession and awarded arrears at specified monthly rates (Rs. 440/- from 30-4-1974 to 31-8-1974, and Rs. 550/- from 1-9-1974 until surrender). The defendant appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit is barred because it concerns eviction under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (i.e., whether the demise was of a building within the Act or of land/appurtenances).
  2. Whether the tenancy was validly terminated (including whether S.116 read with S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act apply).
  3. Whether, by subsequent notices claiming enhanced rent, the earlier notices were waived and a fresh tenancy came into existence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The lease related to buildings (and appurtenant land) and therefore the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction due to the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
  • There was no valid termination of tenancy.
  • By sending subsequent notices demanding enhanced rent the earlier notices were waived and a fresh tenancy arose; Exts. A1 and A2 support that position.

Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The demise was of "Kannitta" (drying yard) — i.e., the land with appurtenant sheds — and not of a building covered by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act; hence the suit is maintainable.
  • The tenancy expired on 30-4-1974; thereafter no rent was paid or accepted and no assent by the landlord to continued occupation was proved, so there was no holding over or fresh tenancy.
  • No valid agreement to enhanced rent was proved; notices terminating tenancy (including 22-10-1974 and subsequent notices) were either surplusage or sufficient; plaintiffs were entitled to possession and arrears.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nanu Nair v. Krishnan Nair (1957 KLT. 286) The factors to be considered in determining whether a lease concerns a building (and site) or is primarily a lease of land with an appurtenant building — e.g., extent and nature of the land, nature of the building, income from the land, probable rent of the building. The court applied this factual test (size of land, small building area vs. large yard, and correspondence between the parties) and concluded the demise was of the Kannitta (land) and not of a building within the Rent Control Act.
Thressia v. Saraswathi Amma (1960 KLJ. 258) The lease must be essentially a lease of a building before the Kerala Act can be invoked; mere presence of a building does not by itself bring the lease within the Act. The court relied on this principle to hold that the main object of the transaction was lease of land (Kannitta) and thus the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act did not apply; hence the civil suit was maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in logical steps anchored to the pleadings, documentary evidence and relevant legal principles:

  1. Nature of the demise: the court examined physical dimensions and documentary correspondence. Ext. A21 showed the total area of the plaint schedule property was 74½ cents (about 29,450 sq. ft.), with the building portion occupying only 1,920 sq. ft. and the Kannitta (drying yard) about 27,000 sq. ft. The communications between the parties (Exts. A3–A9 and A11) indicated that what was demised was the Kannitta (land used for drying copra) and that the sheds were merely appurtenant.
  2. Application of precedent: applying Nanu Nair and Thressia, the court emphasized that determining whether a lease is of a building is a question of fact to be resolved by factors such as extent and nature of land and building. The court concurred with the cited authorities that the existence of a building alone does not bring a lease within the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act; the transaction's main object must be a building lease. On the factual matrix here, the main object was land (Kannitta).
  3. Maintainability: as the lease was held to be of the Kannitta and not of a building under the Kerala Act, the civil suit for recovery of possession was maintainable and not barred by the Rent Control Act.
  4. Termination of tenancy: the plaint averred the tenancy expired on 30-4-1974 and that no rent was received or paid thereafter. The written statement denied this. The lower court found no rent was received after 30-4-1974. The appellate court observed there was no material to invoke S.116 read with S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act because there was no proof that the tenant continued in possession with the landlord's assent or that rent was paid/accepted after expiry. Notices dated 22-10-1974 (terminating on 30-11-1974), Ext. A1 dated 1-1-1975, and Ext. A2 dated 26-9-1975 were held to be sufficient in law even assuming a notice was required.
  5. Waiver and fresh tenancy: the court addressed the contention that subsequent notices seeking enhanced rent amounted to waiver of earlier notices and created a fresh tenancy. It noted (and the parties agreed) that there was no acceptance by the tenant of the enhanced rent demand; there was therefore no agreement to altered terms. Quoting Hill & Redman's Law of Landlord and Tenant, the court pointed out that mere demand for rent without tenant's promise or payment/acceptance will not create a tenancy; payment and acceptance will only operate to create a new tenancy if intention to create one is shown. The facts lacked any such concurrence or intention; hence there was no waiver and no fresh tenancy.
  6. Conclusion on issues: each of the appellant's three principal contentions failed on the facts and law as examined above. The court affirmed the lower court's findings and decree.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effects and practical consequences:

  • The judgment and decree of the Sub Court, Alleppey (decreeing recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property) are confirmed.
  • The decree as passed below awarded arrears at Rs. 440/- per mensem from 30-4-1974 to 31-8-1974 and thereafter Rs. 550/- per mensem from 1-9-1974 until surrender of possession; this decree stands confirmed by the appellate court.
  • Conditional relief to the appellant: the court directed that if the appellant-defendant files an unconditional undertaking in the court below within 15 days agreeing to give vacant possession on or before 30-4-1985, the appellant shall not be dispossessed until that date.
  • The court refused to grant a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court of India, holding the case did not raise a substantial question of law of general importance requiring the Supreme Court's decision.
  • Costs: the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The opinion does not announce any new legal principle; it applies established tests and authorities to the facts and confirms the lower court's decree.

    Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Abraham Mathew

    Paripoornan, J.:— The defendant in O.S No. 12 of 1976 of the Sub Court, Alleppey is the appellant. The plaintiffs (three in number) are the respondents. The suit was laid for recovery of possession of plaint schedule property “Kannitta” (drying yard for copra) with arrears of rent. The suit property is 741/2 cents of land in Sy. No. 826/5 and 829/8 in Alleppy village together with the buildings (sheds) appurtenant thereto. The monthly rent was Rs. 440/-. The defendant was holding under the mother of the plaintiffs. It could be seen from Ext. B8 dated 11-1-1972 that the tenancy expired on 30-4-1974. The deceased mother of the plaintiff sent a notice dated 22-10-1974 terminating the tenancy on 30-11-1974. Even after the expiry of the tenancy the defendant is continuing in possession. Repeated requests and demands to vacate the premises were of no avail. At one stage plaintiffs' mother demanded the defendant to paya sum of Rs. 750/- per mensem. This was not acceded to. A suit notice. Ext. A1 dated 1-1-1975 was sent. By Ext. A20, dated 22-1-1975, the properties were gifted to the plaintiffs. On behalf of the plaintiffs Ext. A2 notice dated 26-9-1975 was sent to the defendant, calling upon it to surrender possession. The defendant did not accede to the request. Finally the suit was laid for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property with arrears of compensation at Rs. 1000/- per mensem from 1-11-1975, the last date fixed for surrender of possession as per Ext. A2 being 31-11-1975.

    2. The defendant resisted the suit. It was contended that the suit is barred since it relates to eviction of the defendant from, the buildings as defined under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The requirement of the plaintiffs is not bona fide and they are not entitled to demand vacant possession. Even after the expiry of the tenancy on 30-4-1974 the plaintiffs accepted the rent for the property till 31-8-1974. The tenancy was not terminated by an appropriate notice. The claim for enhanced rent, Rs. 750/- was excessive. Exts. A1 and A2 notices are invalid and cannot enable the plaintiffs to demand possession of the property. There is no cause of action for the plaintiffs and so the suit should be dismissed. The court below held that what was leased out to the defendant is Kannitta’ (yard for drying copra) and the lease is not in respect of building. It will not come within the ambit of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The plaintiffs are entitled to get recovery of possession of the property from the defendant. Even if the suit is one for eviction from the buildings, the civil suit is not barred. According to the lower court, the evidence showed that the lease expired on 30-4-1974 and thereafter the plaintiffs or their mother, have not received any rent from the defendant. The tenancy is also terminated by sending notice to the defendant company. The plaintiffs have cause of action to institute the suit and the tenancy has been validly terminated. The defendant has no case that any rent has been paid after 30-4-1974 The defendant offered rent at Rs. 550/- per month when the plaintiffs' mother demanded the defendant to vacate the premises and claimed compensation at the rate or Rs. 750/- per mensem. The compensation payable after 31-8-1974 can be taken to be Rs. 550/- per month, which is reasonable. The plaintiffs are entitled to such amount from the defendant for the continued occupation of the premises after 31-8-1974. A decree was passed for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property with arrears of rent at the fate of Rs. 440/- per mensem from 30-4-1974 to 31-8-1974 and thereafter from 1-9-1974 till surrender of possession at the rate of Rs. 550/- per mensem for use and occupation. The defendant has come up in appeal.

    3. Appellant's counsel Mr. E.R Venkiteswaran raised three points:

    (1) The lease in the instant case is of the plaint schedule building and the land appurtenant thereto. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.

    (2) There is no valid termination of tenancy.

    (3) The notice sent on the earlier occasion was “waived”. There was fresh tenancy. Exts. A1 and A2 notices would substantiate this

    4. On the other band, counsel for the respondents, Mr. T.S Venkateswara Iyer, contended that in the instant case, the demise is of “Kannitta”, (drying yard for copra) the land with the appurtenant building and so the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are inapplicable. The suit is maintainable. It is also contended that the tenancy expired on 30-4-1974 and thereafter no rent was received by the landlord, nor any payment made. Indeed, arrears from 30-4-1974 is claimed by the plaintiffs in the suit. This is not disputed. No notice, terminating the tenancy, was necessary. Even so, a notice was sent on 22-10-1974 terminating the tenancy on 30-11-1974. There were subsequent notices also terminating the tenancy. Sending of a notice terminating the tenancy is a surplusage in this case. The tenancy expired on 30-4-1974. Since after the expiration of the lease on 30-4-1974, no rent was received or accepted or paid to the landlord, and the landlord also did not otherwise assent to the tenant continuing in possession, there is no holding over. There was no fresh tenancy, either. It was neither pleaded nor proved. The claim for enhanced payment by the landlord was at no point of time accepted by the defendant-tenant. In such circumstances, there was neither holding over, nor a fresh tenancy. The court below correctly held that the suit is maintainable. The plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the plaint schedule property with arrears of rent.

    5. We beard counsel for the appellant, Mr. E.R Venkateswaran and counsel for the respondents Mr. T.S Venkateswara Iyer. We are of opinion that none of the contentions raised by the appellant's counsel are tenable.

    6. Ext. A21 is the sketch of the plaint schedule property. The total area is 74 ½ cents. It is roughly 29,450 sq. feet. The building portion occupies only 1920 sq. feet. The ‘Kannitta’ the drying yard is 27000 sq. feet. The demise is not evidenced by any deed. On a perusal of Exts. A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8 and A9, the communications addressed by the defendant to the plaintiffs' predecessor, it is evident that what was demised is only the ‘kannitta’—the land used for drying copra. The sheds existing then (building) are only appurtenant to the said ‘kannitta’. It is well-known that ‘kannitta’ is a yard used for drying copra. What was demised has to be understood only by reference to the correspondence between the parties. The said correspondence evidenced by Exts. A3 to A8 and A11 leave no room for doubt in our mind that what was demised was only ‘kannitta’, the vacant land used for drying copra. We are unable to hold that the demise was of the building. Delivering the judgment of the bench, in Nanu Nair v. Krishnan Nair (1957 KLT. 286) Varadaraja Iyengar J. observed as follows:

    “Now the question whether a particular lease concerns a building and its site together with the garden or land appurtenant thereto or it is the other way, viz., it is in respect of a land or garden with a building appertaining thereto, is ordinarily a question of fact depending upon various considerations viz., the extent and nature of the land, the nature of the building, the income from the land and the probable rent of the building…………………………….The land here is about 1 ½ acres in extent with a large number of yielding trees thereon and clearly a building attached to it does not turn the scale.”

    7. Vaidialingam J. in Thressia v. Saraswathi Amma (1960 KLJ. 258) at page 259, held:

    “In my opinion, before the provisions of Kerala Act XVT/1959 could be invoked by the party, that party must be able to establish that the main and sole object of the transaction relied upon by him and covered by any document relates to the lease of a building. The fact that in a particular lease or property, a building also is situated will not by itself bring the said lease within the ambit of Kerala Act XVI/59. The definition of ‘landlord’ as a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of a building and also of a ‘tenant’ as a person by whom and on whose account rent is payable for a building and also the various other provisions of the said Act clearly give an indication that before a lease can be brought within the ambit of the said Act, it must be essentially a lease of a building. No doubt, under the definition of ‘building’ it is also stated that it will include the garden, grounds, wells, tanks and structures, if any, appurtenant to such building. But the emphasis is in the main that it should be the lease of a building.”

    8. We concur with the above decisions. We affirm the finding and conclusion of the court below that what was leased out to the defendant is the ‘Kannitta’ (yard for drying copra) and the lease in question is not one in respect of a building coming within the ambit of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. We hold that the suit is maintainable.

    9. The 2nd point raised was that the tenancy was not validly terminated. In paragraph 2 of the plaint it has been categorically stated that the tenancy expired on 30-4-1974. It is also stated that no rent was received or paid to the landlord subsequent thereto. In paragraph 4 of the written-state-ment this is denied. It is stated, that the defendant continued to occupy the premises even after 30-4-1974 and the plaintiffs accepted the rent for the plaint schedule property till 31-8-1974. It is common ground that no rent was paid to the landlords or accepted by them after the expiry of the lease on 30-4-1974. In paragraph 11 of the judgment the court below has found that the lease expired on 30-4-1974 and thereafter the plaintiffs or their mother had not received any rent from the defendant. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the provisions of S. 116 read with S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, can be invoked in the instant case? There is no material to hold that after the expiration of the tenancy on 30-4-1974 any rent was paid to or received by the landlord. There is also no evidence to hold that the tenant was continuing in possession with the assent of the landlord. Indeed, the evidence in this case indicates the contrary, and that there was dissent by the landlord after the expiry of the term. The landlord sent a notice dated 20-10-1974 purporting to terminate the tenancy by 30-11-1974. This was followed up by subsequent notices evidenced by Ext. A1 dated 1-1-1975 and Ext. A2 dated 26-9-1975. In these circumstances, it is idle to invoke the provisions of S. 116 read with S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The question of termination of tenancy by sending a notice does not at all arise in this case. Even so, it is evident that by notice dated 22-10-1974 the tenancy has been terminated on 30-11-1974 as could be seen from the recitals in the suit notice. Ext. A1, dated 1-1-1975. There was even a subsequent notice evidenced by Ext. A2 dated 26-9-1975 terminating the tenancy by 31-10-1975. There is sufficient compliance with the provisions of law even assuming that notice terminating the tenancy is required. We are of opinion that no question of termination of tenancy by notice arose in this case. Even so, the notice sent on 22-10-1974, and the notice, Ext. A2, dated 26-9-1975 are sufficient in law.

    10. The last point raised was that by sending the notices on 22-10-1974, Ext. A1 dated 1-1-1975 and Ext. A2 dated 26-9-1975 whereby the landlord claimed enhanced rent, the earlier notices have been waived and there is a fresh tenancy. This plea was not put forward in the lower court. Even so, it is common ground that the demand for higher rent was never agreed to or accepted by defendant-tenant. The tenant never agreed. In such circumstances, it is futile to contend that the earlier notices have been waived. There is no waiver in this case. It is also futile to contend that any new tenancy came into existence. The parties never intended to bring forth a fresh tenancy. This is a matter for agreement. No such case was set up or proved. We may, in this connection, quote the observations from Hill & Redman's Law of Landlord and Tenant’, 17th Edn. (1982) Vol. I, at page 495:

    “A mere demand for rent in respect of a period after the expiration of the notice, not followed by a promise to pay by the tenant, cannot so operate for want of the tenant's consent, (c) Even payment and acceptance of such rent, which requires the concurrence of both parties, will only operate in favour of the tenant if it is shown that the parties intended that there should be a new tenancy.”

    11. The above observations are fully applicable to the instant case. None of the requirements stated above are present in this case. We reject the plea of “waiver” also.

    12. All the contentions urged by the appellant's counsel fail. The judgment and decree of the court below are confirmed. The appeal is without merit. It is dismissed with costs.

    13. Appellant's counsel Sri E.R Venkateswaran pleaded, that in case, we are not inclined to accept his contentions, and the appeal is dismissed, the defendant may be allowed time to vacate the premises. The suit is of the year 1976. It was decreed on 23-11-1977. The court below granted time to surrender, two months. The appeal, filed as early as 1979, was pending for nearly five years. However, we are inclined to give a direction that in case the appellant-defendant files an unconditional undertaking in the court below within 15 days from today, agreeing to give vacant possession of the land and building to the plaintiffs-respondents on or before 30-4-1985, the appellant-defendant, shall not be dispossessed till then. Ordered accordingly.

    14. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced counsel for the appellant Mr. E.R Venkateswaran prayed that the appellant may be given a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. We are not satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance which, in our opinion, needs to be decided by the Supreme Court of India. We reject the prayer. The prayer to grant a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court of India is rejected.

    15. Dismissed.

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    Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Abraham Mathew
    (Jan 30, 1985)