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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (for short the M.P.P.F Act),
  • S. 87 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (for short the K.L.R Act).
  • Assignment) Act, 1971 (for short the Act).
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (for short the M.P.P.F Act),
  • S. 87 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (for short the K.L.R Act).
  • Assignment) Act, 1971 (for short the Act).
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed an application before the Forest Tribunal seeking a declaration that 102.78 acres of land is not a vested forest under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 ("the Act"). The Forest Tribunal dismissed the application except in respect of 2 acres which it found not to be a private forest. The appellant appealed.

The appellant's material averments were that he purchased the land by an assignment deed dated 16-1-1972 (Ext. A1); the land formed part of a larger area planted with rubber under a 1961 Rubber Board licence granted in favour of predecessors-in-title; the area had been a rubber estate ("Mahe Malappuram Estate") until it was ravaged by successive wild fires immediately prior to Ext. A1; the appellant obtained a licence for replanting and carried out planting operations but labour unrest and neglect resulted in widespread loss of rubber plants; some scattered rubber trees remained; when labour disputes settled the appellant attempted replantation but was obstructed by forest officials who claimed the area had vested in the Government as private forest.

The Divisional Forest Officer, on behalf of the State and the Custodian of Vested Forests, countered that the property was part of a private forest under the repealed Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 and had vested in the Government on the appointed date. It was alleged that rubber trees grown before 10-5-1971 were burned and destroyed, and the rubber plants seen were planted after 10-5-1971; thus the Ext. A1 assignment of 1972 was of no legal validity.

The application was dismissed on 7-9-1977. The appellant filed M.F.A. No. 210 of 1977 in this Court; this Court, by judgment dated 13-6-1979, set aside the earlier order of the Forest Tribunal and remanded the matter for fresh disposal allowing both parties to adduce further evidence. After remand, both sides led additional evidence. The Forest Tribunal again found that there were only a few rubber trees "here and there" on 10-5-1971 and held that the land could not be treated as principally used for cultivation of rubber on the appointed date, and therefore the disputed area (except 2 acres) vested in the Government. The present appeal challenges that order, and the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the Forest Tribunal for fresh disposal with directions to permit further evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disputed land was a "private forest" vested in the Government under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971, or whether it was excluded from that definition as land "used principally for the cultivation of ... rubber" (S. 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Act) as on the appointed date (10-5-1971).
  2. Whether the intermediate absence or destruction of rubber trees prior to the appointed date (with replantation contemplated or undertaken thereafter) affects the characterisation of the land as principally used for rubber cultivation on the appointed date.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant purchased the land in 1972 (Ext. A1) and the land had been part of a large rubber estate planted under a 1961 Rubber Board licence.
  • Although wild fires and labour unrest caused destruction and neglect of rubber trees so that only scattered trees remained on 10-5-1971, the land had been converted into a rubber plantation long prior to the appointed date.
  • The land does not cease to be a rubber plantation merely because rubber trees were destroyed or removed for a period, provided replantation is contemplated or undertaken within a reasonable period; thus the land remained excluded from "private forest" under S. 2(f)(1)(i)(B).
  • The appellant relied on documentary evidence (Ext. A1, Ext. A13) and the historical licence and planting activity to show the land's plantation character and the intention/acts of replantation.

Respondents' (State / Custodian) Contentions

  • The property formed part of a private forest under the repealed Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949, and vested in the Government upon the coming into force of the 1971 Act.
  • Rubber trees grown before 10-5-1971 were burned and practically destroyed; the rubber plants observed were planted after 10-5-1971, and therefore the land had vested and the 1972 assignment (Ext. A1) is invalid.
  • The Forest Tribunal relied upon the condition of the plantation on 10-5-1971 (only very few rubber trees) to conclude the land was not principally used for cultivation of rubber as on the appointed date.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.R.P. No. 2575 of 1976 (this Court) Whether land ceased to be rubber plantation when plantings had commenced before a notified date and continued thereafter; recognition that continued planting as part of activity begun earlier prevents defeating the statutory aim. The Court referred to the holding that if areas were planted with rubber soon after the notified date as part of an activity commenced earlier, it would be improper to treat them as converted; this analogy supported giving the appellant an opportunity to lead further evidence and addressing the nature/intention of planting.
Aleykutty John v. Taluk Land Board (1981 KLT 731) Clear-felling does not automatically make land cease to be private forest; the intention behind felling (to convert versus to replant) matters in determining continued character of land. The Court relied on the passage which emphasises intention and purpose behind clear-felling to hold that intermediate absence of trees is not necessarily decisive; this supported remanding for further evidence on intention/plan to replant.
Varghese v. Taluk Land Board (1982 K.L.T 72) The act of cutting down old rubber trees does not by itself prove conversion of plantation to dry land; whether cutting is part of a replanting scheme or conversion depends on earmarking, scheme, intention and attendant circumstances. The Court cited these observations to support the proposition that delay in replanting does not automatically convert the land's character and to justify remanding the matter to enable factual determination of intention and scheme for replantation.
M.F.A. No. 210 of 1977 (this Court, judgment dated 13-6-1979) Procedural direction: remand to Forest Tribunal for fresh disposal and opportunity for further evidence. The Court noted that this earlier order had set aside the Forest Tribunal's earlier dismissal and directed both parties to adduce further evidence; the present decision follows that course by allowing the appeal and remanding for fresh disposal with directions to admit further evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory exclusion for "private forest" in S. 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Act, which excludes lands "used principally for the cultivation of ... rubber." The Forest Tribunal had focused on the physical presence of only a few rubber trees on the appointed date (10-5-1971) and concluded that the land was not principally used for rubber cultivation and therefore vested in the Government (except 2 acres).

The Court analysed the appellant's evidence: Ext. A1 recitals, the 1961 Rubber Board licence, admissions (or lack of denial) by the respondents' witness R.W.1 about planting and destruction by fire, and Ext. A13 (application for registration of a rubber estate filed 5-3-1973 and registered 25-5-1973) showing replanting activity after the 1972 assignment. The Tribunal accepted the recitals in Ext. A1 regarding fires and the situation of rubber trees.

The Court explained the legal proposition that temporary removal or destruction of rubber trees does not automatically cause land to lose its character as a rubber plantation if there is evidence of earlier conversion to plantation and of intention or measures to replant. The Court stated that intermediate stages when no rubber plant exists are not decisive; duration of the intermediate stage alone should not lead to the inference that replantation was not contemplated.

To support that principle, the Court drew analogies to decisions under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (S. 87 and Explanation II and prior decisions), where similar issues about conversion and the effect of clear-felling or delay in replanting had been considered. Quotations and holdings from prior cases (C.R.P. No. 2575 of 1976, Aleykutty John, Varghese) were cited for the propositions that:

  • Clear-felling or cutting down old trees does not inevitably change the land's character; the intention behind the act (conversion vs. replanting) matters.
  • If replanting is part of an integrated scheme or activity that commenced before the notified date, subsequent planting soon after the date should not be treated as defeating the legislative purpose.
  • Whether cutting was part of conversion or part of a replanting scheme depends on intention, earmarking, scheme and attendant circumstances.

The Court found that the Forest Tribunal had not considered the facts in this perspective. Given the documentary materials and the factual complexities (fires before and after 1966, evidence of prior planting, admission by respondent's witness, and evidence of replanting activity after assignment), the Court considered it just to grant the appellant an opportunity to adduce further evidence on matters of intention and scheme to replant. The Court also allowed respondents to place further evidence in reply.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the Forest Tribunal, and remanded the case to the Forest Tribunal for fresh disposal in light of these observations and directions. The Court made no order as to costs and directed the Forest Tribunal to call the case on 28-4-1986.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court ALLOWED the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the Forest Tribunal, and remanded the matter to the Forest Tribunal for fresh disposal with directions to permit the appellant to adduce further evidence and to allow the respondents to place evidence in reply. There was no order as to costs, and the case was to be called by the Forest Tribunal on 28-4-1986.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Forest Tribunal's finding that the disputed area (except 2 acres) had vested in the Government is set aside and the matter must be reconsidered after further evidence on factual questions (notably intention, scheme and timing of planting/replanting). The Court reiterated and applied existing principles (from earlier decisions) that temporary absence of rubber trees does not necessarily change the character of land previously used as a rubber plantation if there is evidence of replantation plans or if planting had been part of an activity begun earlier. The opinion remands for factual determination and does not purport to lay down a new rule of law beyond applying and aligning with the principles in the cited authorities.

    Mohammed v. State Of Kerala

    Thomas, J.:— The appellant filed an application before the Forest Tribunal for a declaration that an extent of 102.78 acres of land is not a vested forest within the purview of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (for short ‘the Act’). The application was dismissed by the Forest Tribunal, except in regard to an extent of 2 acres which was found to be not a private forest. Hence this appeal.

    2. The material averments in the application are as follows: He purchased the land described therein as per Ext. A1 assignment deed dated 16-1-1972 and the said land is part of an extensive area planted with rubber for which a licence was issued by the Rubber Board in 1961 in favour of the predecessors-in-title of the appellant. The whole area was enjoyed as a full grown rubber estate by name “Mahe Malappuram Estate”, until it was ravaged by successive out-breaks of wild fire during the period immediately prior to Ext. A1 assignment. The appellant applied to the Rubber Board and obtained a licence for replanting rubber in this area and on the strength of the said licence planting operations were again made in the land. But due to continued labour unrest in the Estate it was not possible for the appellant to maintain the rubber plantation efficiently. Due to the lack of attention and maintenance of the rubber plants for a long period, wild growths or shrubs spread over the area and consequently major part of the rubber plantation became extinct. However a few rubber trees remain even now in the property, though in a scattered manner. When the labour disputes were settled the appellant made arrangements to replant the whole area with rubber. But at this juncture the Forest Officials obstructed the appellant from carrying on the said work on the plea that the area forms part of vested forest. As his requests to the Forest Officials to desist from obstructing him did not yield favourable results, he filed the application under S. 8 of the Act for the declaration as aforesaid. In the counter statement filed by the Divisional Forest Officer on behalf of the State of Kerala and the Custodian of Vested Forests the following contentions, inter alia, are raised: The property described in the application was a portion of the private forest in Arakkurissi village of Mannarghat taluk, falling within the purview of the repealed Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (for short ‘the M.P.P.F Act’), and on the coming into force of the Act of 1971 the property has vested in the Government. The rubber trees grown in the area before 10-5-1971 were burned and practically got destroyed and the rubber plants now seen in the area are those planted after 10-5-1971. Since the area has vested in the Government on the said date, Ext. A1 assignment deed of 1972 has no legal validity.

    3. The application was dismissed on 7-9-1977 against which the appellant had preferred M.F.A No. 210 of 1977 in this Court and the case was remanded to the Forest Tribunal as per judgment of this Court dated 13-6-1979, setting aside the earlier order of the Forest Tribunal. The parties were allowed to adduce further evidence and the Forest Tribunal was directed to dispose of the application afresh. After remand both sides let in further evidence. As per the impugned order the Forest Tribunal held that since there were only few rubber trees “here and there” in the property on 10-5-1971 the land cannot be treated as principally used for cultivation of rubber as on the appointed date. Hence it was found that the disputed area has vested in the Government being a private forest within the purview of the Act (except in regard to 2 acres). Accordingly the Forest Tribunal passed the impugned order.

    4. The recitals in Ext. A1 assignment deed show that as per the licence dated 21-3-1961 granted by the Rubber Board rubber had been planted in an area or of 300 acres including the disputed land, that rubber trees were destroyed by fire which broke out before and after 1966, that no proper maintenance could be done for the upkeep of the estate and that rubber trees are standing only here and there in the property at the time of the assignment. Though the said document was executed only a few months after 10-5-1971 the Forest Tribunal held that the recitals therein about the condition of the rubber plantation can be accepted as true. Hence it was found by the Forest Tribunal that the property had been planted with rubber in 1961 and that several rubber trees were destroyed by fire before and after 1966. The Tribunal took note of the fact that even R.W.I, the only witness examined on behalf of the respondents had not denied the above facts, but on the other hand R.W 1 admitted that he had heard about the planting of rubber in this area and about their destruction by fire. Ext. A13 is an application for registration of a rubber estate filed by the appellant before the Rubber Board on 5-3-1973 for planting rubber in an area of 31.57 hectares. The Rubber Board made an endorsement in Ext. A13 treating the application as registered in the office of the Rubber Board on 25-5-1973. The Forest Tribunal also noted from Ext. A13 that the appellant had planted rubber in the said portion soon after the assignment in 1972. But the Forest Tribunal found it difficult to accede to the appellant's claim because there were only “very few rubber trees in the property on 10-5-1971” and as such the Tribunal could not hold that the land was used principally for the cultivation of rubber as on 10-5-1971.

    5. “Private forest” is defined in S. 2(f) of the Act. Lands excluded from the ambit of the said definition include the following class of land as contained in clause (B) to S. 2(f)(1)(i) of the Act.

    “Lands which are used principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, robber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of the same for the market.”

    6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the disputed land was principally used for the cultivation of rubber despite the fact that only few rubber trees remained in the property on 10-5-1971. His contention is that if the land was converted into a rubber plantation long prior to the appointed date, it does not cease to be rubber plantation merely because the rubber trees went out of existence during some period either due to felling or due to destruction of the trees by other causes and replantation is made within a reasonable period.

    7. It is not unusual that old or non-yielding or less yielding rubber trees are removed from a particular area preparatory to replanting the area with rubber. Similarly when rubber trees are destroyed due to natural calamities, or otherwise, the owner of the plantation may resort to replantation of the area with rubber. In such instances, the intermediate period between the removal of rubber trees and actual replantation may vary in different cases depending upon a variety of factors and circumstances. It is improper and inadvisable to conclude definitely that the lands involved in such instances cease to be rubber plantations as soon as the rubber trees cease to exist therein. There can be no doubt that if the destruction or removal of rubber trees in a particular area takes place only after 10-5-1971 no vesting of that area could have taken place, as per S. 3(1) of the Act. On the same principle it can be said that if rubber trees had been destroyed prior to the said date the affected land would not go out of the purview of the exclusion clause contained in S. 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Act. If measures are in contemplation to replant the area with rubber, the intermediate stage, when the land does not contain rubber plants, is not decisive in determining the nature of the use of the land. Merely because the duration of that intermediate stage is prolonged, no hard and fast inference shall be drawn that the idea of replantation of the land did not exist.

    8. A situation almost similar to the above can be envisaged under S. 87 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (for short ‘the K.L.R Act’). As per that section, a person who acquires land after the date notified under S. 83 of the K.L.R Act and consequently the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, shall surrender such excess land to the authority prescribed. Explanation II to S. 87 provides that “where, after the date notified under S. 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under S. 81 is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.” The question came up for consideration in C.R.P No. 2575 of 1976 of this Court whether a land ceased to be rubber plantation in a case where planting process had admittedly begun before 1-1-1970 and was continued thereafter also, though the exact interval between clear felling and planting was not known. M.P Menon, J. who delivered judgment in the case held that “if as a matter of fact such extensive areas were planted with rubber soon after 1-1-1970 but as part and parcel of an activity which had commenced earlier, it will be defeating the aim of the K.L.R Act to permit the plantations being taken over and destroyed in the process of distribution.” In Aleykutty John v. Taluk Land Board (1981 KLT 731) one of us (Bhat, J.) had occasion to consider a similar question. It has been observed in that judgment as follows:

    “If clear felling was over and the land ceased to be private forest prior to 1-4-1964 if may have to be held that the exemption under S. 81(1)(d) is not available. Even then the intention with which the clear-felling was done will have a bearing on the decision of such question. Clear-felling, under all circumstances will not make the land cease to be private forest. If felling was done with the intention of exploiting the forest wealth and to leave it for degeneration the land will not cease to be private forest. If clear-felling was done with the intention of making the land, nilam or garden or plantation the land cannot be treated as continuing to be private forest”

    9. Again, in another case where rubber trees were slaughter tapped after 1-1-1970 as those trees became practically non-yielding but the owner of the land had an idea to replant, though replantation was not done till 1978, the question came up whether the land had been converted from one exempted category to a non-exempted category. The case was considered by Bhat J. in the decision reported in Varghese v. Taluk Land Board, (1982 K.L.T 72). The relevant observations in the said decision are the following:

    “The act of cutting down old rubber trees by itself cannot lead to the inference that the land is converted into other dry land. It may be so in certain circumstanncs. It may not be so in other circumstances. If there is a scheme for replantation, if the land has been ear-marked for the purpose or replanting and if the act of cutting rubber trees is in pursuance of the scheme and part of an integrated activity towards such an end, from the mere fact that there has been delay in carrying out the work of replanting, it cannot be said that the land has been converted from plantation into other dry land. The act of cutting rubber trees may be part of an act of such conversion or it may be part of the scheme of replanting. Whether it is one or the other depends upon the intention, earmarking, scheme and other attendant circumstances.”

    10. The principles stated in the above decisions are consistent with what we have stated earlier. The observation quoted above therefore supports the view taken by us. The Forest Tribunal has not considered the case in the above perspective. We consider that in the interest of justice it is only proper to afford the appellant an opportunity to adduce further evidence. In case the appellant adduces any further evidence it is open to the respondents also to place fur the evidence, if they so wish. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order. The case is remanded to the Forest Tribunal for fresh disposal in the light of the observations and directions made above. There will be no order as to costs. The case shall be called by the Forest Tribunal on 28-4-1986.

    11. Allowed.

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    Mohammed v. State Of Kerala
    (Mar 26, 1986)