Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 8(1) of the Cocoanut Husks Control Order read with Ss. 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act
  • S. 7(1)(b) of the Essential Commodities Act
  • provisions of sub-section (1),
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 8(1) of the Cocoanut Husks Control Order read with Ss. 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act
  • S. 7(1)(b) of the Essential Commodities Act
  • provisions of sub-section (1),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged Ext. P1, an order of the Assistant Excise Commissioner (the 4th respondent) confiscating an Ambassador car (K.L.Q 5432) under S. 67B of the Abkari Act. An Excise party had detected the car carrying 260 litres of toddy packed in 11 plastic cans; the car and the material objects were seized. The driver's case was compounded. The petitioner asserted that the car was garaged for repairs and had been taken out by the driver (Sasi) without his consent or knowledge. Although the vehicle was not registered in the petitioner's name, the 4th respondent accepted that the petitioner was the owner and found that the key and records were with the driver and that the vehicle was used to transport toddy at the instance of a toddy shop contractor.

The learned single Judge dismissed the Original Petition. The 4th respondent (Ext. P1) concluded, notwithstanding findings sympathetic to the owner (that the owner was not responsible, lacked knowledge or connivance, had taken some precautions, and that the offence was technical), that S. 67C(2) did not permit release of the vehicle and ordered confiscation. The appellate authority (Ext. P2) confirmed confiscation, finding that the owner failed to take reasonable and necessary precautions and that the law was clear. The revisional authority (Ext. P3) affirmed, noting no point of law had been pleaded and referring to the circumstance of the owner leaving the key with the driver.

The present opinion addresses the writ appeal challenging these orders and the correct interpretation and application of Ss. 67B and 67C of the Abkari Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether S. 67B of the Abkari Act mandates confiscation of a conveyance once an offence and use of the conveyance are established, or whether it confers discretion on the authorised officer to order confiscation.
  2. What is the relationship between S. 67B(2) and S. 67C(2) — specifically, whether S. 67C(2) is the sole ground upon which confiscation may be avoided, or whether S. 67B independently permits non-confiscation on relevant considerations.
  3. Whether the petitioner (owner) satisfied the standard in S. 67C(2) that the conveyance was used without his knowledge or connivance and that all reasonable and necessary precautions had been taken.
  4. Whether the appellate and revisional authorities correctly applied the statutory provisions and properly considered the factual findings made by the authorised officer (the 4th respondent).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's contentions (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The vehicle was garaged for repairs and was taken out by the driver without the owner's consent or knowledge.
  • The petitioner, although not the registered owner, was accepted by the 4th respondent as the owner.
  • The owner had no knowledge of the offence nor had he connived in it; the driver had the key and records; the owner had taken certain precautions.
  • Given the owner's innocence, the technical nature of the offence and the disproportionate value of the vehicle compared to the toddy, the owner deserved sympathetic consideration and release of the vehicle.

Excise authorities' position (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The 4th respondent found that although the owner appeared innocent on facts, S. 67C(2) did not permit release of the vehicle and therefore ordered confiscation.
  • The appellate authority held that the driver was involved in the offence, that the owner's role was immaterial, that the law required confiscation, and that the owner had failed to take reasonable and necessary precautions.
  • The revisional authority noted no point of law was pleaded before it and relied on the circumstance of the owner leaving the key with the driver instead of instructing that it be lodged with the workshop.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bat Pal v. State of Haryana, (1979) 3 SCC 322; AIR 1979 SC 1767 Illustration that a statutory provision framed in mandatory terms may be read with a discretion (or a proviso) permitting the court to refrain from confiscation in suitable cases; the court declined confiscation where special circumstances existed (no opportunity to show cause, high value of property, no evidence of owner’s concurrence). The court cited Bat Pal as an illustrative authority supporting the proposition that confiscation is not always inevitable: special circumstances may justify declining confiscation and the exercise of discretion must consider relevant facts to avoid serious injustice.
Crl. R.P. No. 451/79 (this Court) Authority where this Court refused to order confiscation of a lorry used to transport coconut husks of small value, holding the owner was not concerned or aware and confiscation would be disproportionate. The Court relied on this decision as a local illustration that where the conveyance is of substantial value and the offence is technical and the owner innocent, confiscation need not be ordered; the facts of the present case were compared to this example to justify interference with the confiscation order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

(Presented step-by-step, following the structure of the opinion.)

  1. Statutory context: The Court first noted S. 65 establishes that a conveyance used in carrying liquor in respect of which an offence is committed is liable to confiscation; in the present facts an offence was established and the conveyance was used for carrying the liquor.
  2. Textual interpretation of S. 67B(2): The Court extracted S. 67B and emphasized that the provision uses the word "may" — hence the authorised officer is not obliged in every case to order confiscation. The officer must be satisfied that an offence was committed in respect of or by means of the property and that it is liable to confiscation, but even then the officer must exercise discretion whether to order confiscation.
  3. Limits on discretion: The Court explained that the discretion is not arbitrary; although the statute does not prescribe detailed guidelines, the discretion must be exercised on proper and relevant considerations and not according to whims. A view that confiscation is mandatory whenever an offence is proved would be erroneous and unsustainable.
  4. Relationship between S. 67B and S. 67C: The Court held S. 67C to be independent. S. 67C(1) prescribes procedural safeguards (notice, opportunity to represent and to be heard). S. 67C(2) provides a specific exception to confiscation for animals/carts/vessels/conveyances where the owner proves lack of knowledge or connivance and that reasonable and necessary precautions were taken. But S. 67C(2) is not the sole basis for avoiding confiscation — S. 67B independently confers discretion not to confiscate after taking relevant facts into account.
  5. Application to the present facts: The Court reviewed the factual findings of the authorised officer (4th respondent) — that the owner was not responsible, had no knowledge or connivance, took some precautions, the driver was not acting in course of employment, and that the offence was technical (transport without permit). The 4th respondent nonetheless stated confiscation was "a must" because S. 67C(2) did not permit release.
  6. Critique of appellate and revisional decisions: The appellate authority affirmed confiscation without addressing the 4th respondent's findings or holding them unsustainable; it simply concluded the owner had failed to take precaution. The revisional authority focused on one circumstance (the owner leaving the key with the driver). The Court found these approaches to be inadequate because they did not properly appreciate the scope of S. 67B and S. 67C and did not apply the discretion on relevant considerations.
  7. Guidance from precedents: The Court cited Bat Pal and the Court's own Crl. R.P. decision to illustrate that courts have declined confiscation in suitable cases where confiscation would cause disproportionate hardship and the owner lacked knowledge or concurrence.
  8. Outcome of analysis: Considering the authorised officer's factual findings that showed the owner to be innocent and the technical nature of the offence, and noting that the authorised officer himself said confiscation was being ordered only because he thought it mandatory, the Court concluded that this was a case where it should interfere with the confiscation order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the writ appeal and interfered with Ext. P1 as confirmed by Exts. P2 and P3. There shall not be any confiscation of the vehicle; the order Ext. P1 as confirmed is vacated and the vehicle shall be released to the petitioner‑appellant forthwith. No costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's vehicle is to be released immediately; confiscation ordered under Ext. P1 (and confirmed by Exts. P2 and P3) is set aside; the petitioner is not to bear costs in this proceeding.
  • Statutory clarification contained in the opinion: The Court construed S. 67B(2) to confer discretion (indicated by the word "may") on the authorised officer to order confiscation or not, and clarified that S. 67C(2) operates as an independent exception (a specific statutory route to avoid confiscation on proof of lack of knowledge/connivance and reasonable precautions). The authorised officer must therefore exercise discretion on proper and relevant considerations; confiscation is not mechanically mandatory whenever an offence and use of the conveyance are established.
  • Scope of precedent: The Court applied and cited prior decisions (Bat Pal and a local criminal revision petition) as illustrative authorities showing that confiscation may be refused where special or disproportionate circumstances exist and the owner lacks knowledge or concurrence. The opinion applies those principles to the facts before the Court to justify interference with the administrative confiscation orders.

    Vamadevan Pillai v. State Of Kerala & Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Subramonian Poti, A.C.J:— The learned single Judge dismissed the Original Petition challenging Ext. P1 order of the 4th respondent, the Assistant Excise Commissioner, ordering confiscation of Ambassador Car K.L.Q 5432 belonging to the petitioner in exercise of the power under S. 67B of the Abkari Act, as confirmed by Ext. P2 order passed in appeal by the Joint Commissioner of Excise and Ext. P3 order passed in revision by the 2nd respondent. The reason for the confiscation was that an Excise party detected an Abkari case involving the said car. At the time of detection the car carried 260 litres of toddy in 11 plastic cans. The car, along with the material objects, was seized. The case against the driver was compounded. The owner of the car, the petitioner, approached the Assistant Excise Commissioner seeking the release of the car contending that the car was garaged for repairs and that was taken out by the driver without his consent or knowledge. Though the car did not stand registered in the name of the petitioner, the 4th respondent accepted the petitioner's case that the petitioner was the owner of the car. The 4th respondent further found that the key of the car and other records were with the driver, Sasi. It was while so that the vehicle was used for transporting toddy at the instance of a toddy shop contractor. Appreciating the circumstances of the case the 4th respondent came to the conclusion that (a) the owner of the car, the petitioner, was not responsible for the commission of the offence (b) it was admitted that he had no knowledge about the offence nor was there any connivance by him (c) he had taken certain extent of precaution against the commission of the offence (d) the driver did not commit the offence during the course of the employment (e) the offence was only technical in the strict sense; had a permit been obtained the transport of toddy would not have been an offence under the Act (f) for the above reason the same yard stick cannot be applied here as in the case of a vehicle transporting illicit arrack which latter event adversely affects the revenue of the State (g) considering the technical offence involved in the case and also in view of the owner's innocence the owner of the car deserves a sympathetic consideration.

    2. Having found all these the 4th respondent followed it up by saying that S. 67C(2) does not permit release of the vehicle as requested by the owner of the vehicle. Consequently he imposed the order of confiscation. The appellate authority found that the driver was involved in the commission of offence, that the part played by the owner was immaterial, the law on the point was clear, that the appellant had failed to take reasonable and necessary precaution against the misuse of the car and therefore the confiscation order was right. For coming to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to take precaution, neither the finding of the 4th respondent nor the evidence on it was even adverted to by the appellate authority nor did the appellate authority hold that the finding of the 4th respondent was unsustainable for want of evidence. The revisional authority found that no point of law had been pleaded before it. It referred to one and only circumstance, namely the owner leaving the key of the car with the driver instead of instructing him to entrust it to the workshop authorities.

    3. Evidently the scope of S. 67B of the Abkari Act has Dot been properly understood by the 4th respondent. There has not been a proper appreciation of the scope of the provision by the Appellate and Revisional authorities. It would appear from the order of the 4th respondent, Ext. P1, that confiscation is assumed to be mandatory when once contravention is proved and there is no discretion in the authority considering the imposition of punishment to confiscate or not. It is this that should call for consideration in this Writ Appeal.

    4. S. 65 of the Act provides for confiscation in any case in which an offence has been committed under the Act. It deals with confiscation of liquor, drug, materials, etc. with which we are not concerned. So far as it is relevant for the purpose of this case it is sufficient to notice that the section, inter alia, provides that in any case in which an offence has been committed under the Act any conveyance used in carrying the liquor in respect of which the offence has been committed shall be liable to confiscation. That an offence has been committed under the Act in this case has been established. That the conveyance of the petitioner had been used in carrying the liquor in respect of which the offence was committed is also not in controversy. Hence the conveyance is liable to confiscation.

    5. Now we turn to Ss. 67B and 67C. We extract these sections here:

    “67B. Confiscation by Abkari Officers in certain cases.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where any liquor, intoxicating drug, material, still, utensil, implement or apparatus or any receptacle, package or covering in which such liquor, intoxicating drug, material, still, utensil, implement or apparatus is found or any animal, cart vessel or other conveyance used in carrying the same is seized and detained under the provisions of this Act, the officer seizing and detaining such property shall, without any unreasonable delay, produce the same before an officer authorised by the Government in this behalf by notification in the Gazette, not being below the rank of an Assistant Excise Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as the authorised officer).

    (2) Where an authorised officer seizes and detains any property specified in sub-section (1) or where any such property is produced before an authorised officer under that sub-section and be is satisfied that an offence under this Act has been committed in respect of or by means of that property and that such property is liable to confiscation under this Act, such authorised officer may, whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the commission of such offence, order confiscation of such property and where such property consists of any receptacle or package, the authorised officer may also order confiscation of all contents thereof.

    (3) When making an order of confiscation under sub-section (2), the authorised officer may also order that such of the properties to which the order of confiscation relates, which in his opinion cannot be preserved or are not fit for human consumption, be destroyed.

    67C. Issue of show cause notice before confiscation under section 67B.—(1) No order confiscating any property shall be made under S. 67B unless the person from whom the same is seized—

    (a) is given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate such property;

    (b) is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation; and

    (c) is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter.

    (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), no order confiscating any animal, cart, vessel or other conveyance shall be made under S. 67B if the owner of the animal, cart, vessel or other conveyance proves to the satisfaction of the authorised officer that it was used carrying the liquor or intoxicating drug or the material, still, utensil, implement or apparatus or the receptacle, package or covering without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself, his agent, if any, and the person in charge of the animal, cart, vessel or other conveyance and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use”.

    6. S. 67B(1) deals with production before the Abkiri officers. It may not be necessary to advert to this sub-section here. Sub-section (2) deals with confisection. In order to enable confiscation to bi made the authorised officer must be satisfied that an offence under the Act had been committed in respect of or by means of the property detain id and that such property is liable to confiscation under the Act. If both these conditions are present irrespective of whether any prosecution has been institued or not the authorised officer may order confiscation (emphasis supplied). We have already seen what renders a conveyance liable to confiscation. S. 67B(2) applies in the case of a conveyance only if the conveyance is liable to confiscation and an offence has been committed in respect of or by means of that conveyance. It may be said that where the offence has been proved and the offending conveyance is seized the above conditions are satisfied so much so S. 67B(2) could be invoked. That could be said in this case also. But what remains to be noticed, in the face of the language employed in S. 67B(2). is that the authorised officer is not obliged in each and every case to order confiscation. He has to exercise discretion in ordering confiscation. The word ‘may’ indicates that he has a duty to consider the facts and circumstances of the case in determining whether it would be appropriate to order confiscation in the case before him. The power conferred on him to make such determination is not an arbitrary power. That could not be exercised by him according to his whims and fancies. No doubt in the absence of any guidelines indicated in the section itself as to the circumstances under which he would be justified in ordering confiscation the discretion is wide. But even so the exercise of the discretion must be on proper and relevant considerations. If an authorised officer takes the view that merely because commission of offence is proved and the conveyance is liable to confiscation under the Act he is obliged, irrespective of the facts of the case, to order confiscation such a view would be erroneous and unsustainable.

    7. S. 67C is independent of S. 67B of the Act. Sub-section (1) of S. 67C deals with the procedure to be adopted in passing an order of confiscation. S. 67C(2) is in effect an exception to S. 67B(2). Where an authorised officer may otherwise order confiscation under S. 67B(2) this could be avoided by the owner proving to the former's satisfaction that the conveyance was used for carrying the liquor without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself, his agent and the person in charge of the conveyance and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use.

    8. What is important and relevant to notice is that it is not as if the only ground for an order declining confiscation is the proof of matters mentioned in S. 67C(2). In other words it is not to be taken that when an owner does not invoke S. 67C there should be confiscation under S. 67B. Independent of S. 67C, S. 67B operates to confer a discretion on the authorised officer to confiscate or not to confiscate. He has a duty to exercise such discretion on relevant considerations. If the owner invokes S. 67C and he is able to prove the matters mentioned in the section irrespective of whether otherwise the conveyance would have been confiscated or not, no order of confiscation could be passed because of the operation of S. 67C(2) of the Act. That is the reason why we notice that S. 67C(2) is independent of S. 67B(2).

    9. Naturally we have to consider what are the circumstances under which an authorised officer may exercise the discretion not to confiscate the conveyance. The very fact that the concerned provision has not chosen to define the circumstances should caution us not to attempt it, for, it would be restricting the scope of the discretion which the statute did not intend to. It would be the facts of each case assessed properly by the authorised officer that should determine whether the case is one where confiscation should be ordered or not. Instances where courts had occasion to consider that confiscation may not be called for may be illustrative and may guide the approach in applying the section. Reference may be made in this context to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bat Pal v. State of Haryana (1979) 3 SCC 322 : AIR. 1979 SC. 1767. That was a case of confiscation of a truck under S. 7(1)(b) of the Essential Commodities Act as it stood in 1979. The truck was seized because there was a clear attempt to export cattle fodder in contravention of a notified order passed by the Haryana Government prohibiting the export of cattle fodder. S. 7(1)(b) of the Essential Commodities Act provided that any property in respect of which the order has been contravened or such part thereof as the court may deem fit including any packages, coverings or receptacles, in which the property is found and any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance used in carrying the property, shall be forfeited to the Government. There is a proviso which enables the court to refrain from doing so for reasons to be recorded. This was understood as conferring a discretion in suitable cases for reasons to be recorded not to impose the penalty of confiscation. Referring to the facts of the case the Supreme Court said thus:

    “In the instant case there are special circumstances which clearly attract the application of the proviso and the order of confiscation ought not to have been passed by the Magistrate. To begin with, the appellant was not a party to the proceedings as to he was not given an opportunity to show cause to the court the circumstances under which the order of confiscation could be passed. Secondly, the truck of the appellant was a very valuable property and to order its confiscation merely because an attempt was made to export cattle fodder through it, would indeed be a very harsh order so as to work serious injustice to the appellant. Thirdly, there is no evidence to indicate that the truck which was used to carry the fodder was hired with the knowledge or concurrence of the appellant”.

    10. Having regard to these circumstances the Supreme Court found that the court ought to have exercised its discretion by declining the imposition of the penalty of confiscation. In a case where there was a charge of contravention of S. 8(1) of the Cocoanut Husks Control Order read with Ss. 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act this court had occasion to consider whether the conveyance which was involved in the offence of carrying cocoanut husks in contravention of the Cocoanut Husks Control Order ought to be confiscated. We are referring to the decision in Crl. R.P No. 451/79 decided by this Court. The contravention was by transport of coconut husks worth about Rs. 350/- and a lorry which worth Rs. 1,00,000/- was being confiscated. The owner was not concerned with the transport and was not aware that the vehicle was being used for that purpose. These circumstances were held to be sufficient not to order confiscation. The facts of the case have been dealt with in Ext. P1 order itself. If the authorised officer had any discretion not to confiscate, the facts indicate that the discretion would have been exercised in favour of the petitioner. In other words the authorised officer indicates beyond doubt that there is a case of an innocent party who had unfortunately to face the serious consequence of confiscation for a technical offence with which he was not personally concerned. The car is quite valuable and the value of the 11 plastic cans of toddy has no comparison with the value of the car. The owner of the car was found to be innocent and it was further found that the driver was using the car not during the course of the employment. The appellate authority only finds that the driver could have been instructed to give the key to the workshop in the evenings. Taking into account these facts and the view expressed categorically by the authorised officer in Ext. P1 that he is directing confiscation only because confiscation is a must, we think this is a case where we are called upon to interfere with Ext. P1 order as confirmed by Exts. P2 and P3. There shall not be any confiscation of the vehicle. The order Ext. P1 as confirmed is vacated. The vehicle shall be released to the petitioner-appellant forthwith. No costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Vamadevan Pillai v. State Of Kerala & Others
    (Jun 2, 1982)