1. The three authorities under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short ‘the Act’) - Rent Control Court, Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority have held in one accord that the need of the landlord is bona fide and that the tenant is liable to be evicted from the building on the ground under Sec. 11(3) of the Act. The landlord stated that he requires the landed space covered by the tenanted building to be used as a passage to the new multi storied building constructed by him behind the tenanted premises. Such use can be made only by demolishing the tenanted building. The eviction order was passed by holding that the aforesaid need of the landlord is bona fide. This Original Petition is hence filed by the tenant under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the said order of eviction passed against him. The contention urged during the time of argument is that the use of landed space covered by the building, after demolishing the building is not what is envisaged in Sec. 11(3) of the Act. Counsel is aware that the decision of this Court is Sarada v. Kumaran (1969 K.L.T 133) is against the said contention. Hence learned counsel for the petitioners made a forceful plea for reconsideration of the ratio laid down in Sarada's case.

2. The principle laiddown in the said decision is this: “Under S. 11(3) a bona fide need of the landlord need not be of the identical building as the purpose of the occupation is immaterial. If occupation by a landlord in the reconstructed building after demolishing the existing building is sufficient ground within the meaning of S. 11(3) the question would arise whether the need to provide a passage through the site on which the original structure stood after its demolition will attract S. 11(3).

3. The word ‘occupation’ does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence. An owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. The fact that the pathway is intended for the customers of the landlord to go to the lodging house and a restaurant belonging to him does not mean that the landlord will not be in occupation of the same.” Counsel contended that the Supreme Court decision relied on by the learned single Judge in Sarada's case pertains to the provisions confined in the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 in which the word “premises” has been given a meaning which is much different from the definition of the word “building” in the Kerala Act. In support of the plea for a reconsideration of the ratio laid-down in Sarada's case, learned counsel invited my attention to two other decisions, one by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court and other by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court. (Vide Mahabir Prasad v. Bibhuti Mohan, AIR 1973 Patna 83: Sadhana Ausadhalaya v. Moningi Nookamma, 1973 R.C.R 622). It was pointed out that the Rent Control Statutes dealt with in those two decisions contained provisions which are very similar to the words used in Sec. 11(3) of the Kerala Act.

4. In the Patna decision, sec. 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control) Act, 1947 was considered which reads like this: “where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord”. The Division Bench held that “it is manifest from the language of this clause that if the landlord does not require the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by him, he cannot get the tenant evicted on the ground of personal necessity”. In the Orissa decision cited above the scope of Sic. 7(4) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 was considered. The said provision is not different from the relevant provision of the Bihar Act quoted above. The Division Bench of the Orissa High Court was not obviously inclined to consider the decision of this Court since a mention is made by the said Bench that the Kerala State Law on the subject is not pari materia with the Orissa Act. The Division Bench expressed doubt whether a landlord can legitimately bring an eviction proceeding for demolishing a building so as to use the vacant surface. No doubt, the above two decisions support the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. On the other hand Sri. Krishna Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the principle laiddown in Sarada's case is based on a pragmatic approach and that a departure therefrom would bring about undue hardship to the owners of the building in certain situations hence the courts should hesitate to place such a construction on the provision. I shall now examine the position in the light of the rival contentions.

5. Sec. 11 of the Act imposes the ban against eviction of tenants from buildings “except in accordance with the provisions of the Act”, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract. The material portion of such-section (3) reads thus:

“A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him”.

6. The scope of the said sub-section is restricted or regulated by four provisos. Those provisos do not have much bearing on the question to be considered in this case and hence it may be unnecessary to refer to them in detail. The following words in Sec. 11(3) “needs the building for his own occupation” are sought to be interpreted as the need of the landlord to occupy the building as such. It is true that the restriction contained in the first proviso is to the effect that if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village, the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to put the landlord in possession. Sub-section (12) provides remedies for the tenant, if the landlord does not occupy the building without reasonable cause within one month of the date of obtaining possession, or if he vacates it without reasonable cause within six months of such date. In such cases, the tenant has a right to apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing that he be restored to possession of the building. These provisions, according to the learned counsel, would indicate that the legislature never considered the question of permitting a landlord to make use of the space after demolising the building itself.

7. The legislature while framing Sec. 11(3) of the Act did not say that the occupation must be of the building as such. Though the need is of the building, the occupation is not confined to the building as such. The definition of “building” contained in Sec. 2(1) of the Act includes the garden, grounds etc., which are appurtenant to the building. It is important to note that the definition includes any building also besides part of a building. The controlling words in Sec. 2 direct that the definition is not meant to be exhaustive nor restrictive because even the items enumerated and included are subject to variations if “the context otherwise requires”. The definition provides sufficient play at the joints while fixing the parameters of the scope of the expression “buliding” in different situations. It enables the Rent Control, Authorities to mould the reliefs in accordance with the exigency in each case. The contextual flexibility permitted in Sec. 2(1) is meant to be used according to the particular need in different situations. If Sec. 11(3) of the Act is to be given a, narrow interpretation that it could be applied only if the building is kept up as such even after the eviction, such an interpretation is likely to bring about unjust consequences. Eg:— A person owning large vacant area behind an old or outmoded building abutting a main road in a commercially important locality of the town, is desirous of utilising the remaining vacant area for construction of a storied building complex or a big hotel or a cinema theatre. Can he not use the space occupied by the old building as car park, or as passage to the new building? If he cannot do so, the entire rear portion may become practically useless. This would be one of the hard consequences if Sec. 11(3) of the Act is given a narrow or strict interpretation. Such consequences can be averted if Sec. 11(3) is given a wider interpretation, as was done by Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. in Sarada's case, Legislative concern for common sense and justice must be presumed while interpreting statutes. “If the court is to avoid a statutory result that flouts common sense and justice it must do so by interpreting it in accordance with the judicially presumed parliamentary concern for common sense and justice “(In Re Maryon-Wilson's will Trusts, (1968) Ch. 268 - quoted in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes). If the language of the statutes is capable of more than one interpretation, the more natural meaning which leads to an unreasonable result must be discarded and an interpretation which leads to a reasonable and practicable result must be adopted, Lord Reid has observed like that on behalf of himself and five other lawlords in Gill v. Donald Humberstone (1963 W.L.R (1) 929). Supreme Court has observed in Dilip Kumar v. State of M.P ((1976) 1 SCC 560 : AIR 1976 S.C 133) that “if two constructions are possible upon the language of the statute, the court must choose the one which is consistant with good sense and fairness and eschew the other which makes its operation unduly oppressive, unjust or unreasonable or which would lead to strange, inconsistent results or otherwise introduce an element of bewildering uncertainty and practical inconvenience in the working of the statute”.

8. A Full Bench of the Orissa High Court has considered the scope of Sec. 7(4) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 which reads almost similar to Sec. 11(3) of the Kerala Act. (Vide Mohammad Sikandar v. Bodrunissa, AIR 1975 Orissa 130). The Full Bench did not approve the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Sadhana Ausadhalaya's case (cited supra). The Full Bench observed that Sec. 7(4) does not prohibit eviction from a house for dismantling the same for use as a vacant site if it is required in good faith, and the words do not restrict the operation of eviction from the building for use of the space on which the building stands as a vacant site. The Bench observed further that if the building is in a dilapidated condition, the owner is quite within his rights to dismantle it, and he is not bound to have a new building in its place nor is he bound to repair the same if it involves heavy work, and the protection to which the tenant is entitled is not an absolute one nor does it impose any restriction on the landlord's right not to have the building at all. The tenant is entitled to continue in possession of the building if the landlord does not require the building bona fide for his use. Therefore, the crux of the matter is “bona fide” need of the landlord. The eviction from the building need not always be for occupation by the landlord as a building. That was the rationale which persuaded the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court to take a different view from the Division Bench which decided in Sadhana Ausadhalaya's case. I am in respectful agreement with the reasoning adopted by the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court. I may say with great respect that I find it difficult to follow the reasoning adopted in Mahabir Prasad's case and Sadhana Ausadhalaya's case. In my view the ratio laid down in Sarada's case does not require reconsideration at all.

9. In the result, I dismiss this Original Petition. No costs.