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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a second appeal by defendants 4 to 7, who claim to be assigns of the mortgagee 1st defendant, challenging a decree for redemption. The defendants contend that the plaintiff has not proved that the sale deed (Ext. P. 2 dated 23-6-1118 M.E / 5-2-1943 A.D), under which the plaintiff claims title to redeem, was executed by the original mortgagor, Kaliamma Pillai. The courts below accepted the registration certificate as sufficient proof of execution, and the defendants appealed against that finding.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff proved the execution of the sale deed (Ext. P. 2) by the original mortgagor Kaliamma Pillai, given that the deed is a registered document not requiring attestation under law.
  2. The evidentiary value of the registration certificate under Section 53 of the Travancore Registration Act (corresponding to Section 60 of the Indian Registration Act) and the presumption under Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act in proving execution.
  3. The applicability and interpretation of Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act in relation to proof of execution of registered documents.
  4. Whether the defendants were denied sufficient opportunity to present evidence at trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants argued that the plaintiff failed to prove that the sale deed was executed by Kaliamma Pillai, the original mortgagor.
  • They contended that the registration certificate alone is insufficient to prove execution and that Section 68 of the Evidence Act should apply, requiring attestation and stricter proof.
  • They also claimed they were not given adequate opportunity to call evidence at trial.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff relied on the registered sale deed (Ext. P. 2), which is not required by law to be attested and thus does not attract Section 68 of the Evidence Act.
  • The plaintiff asserted that the certificate under Section 53 of the Travancore Registration Act, which records admission of execution by Kaliamma Pillai before the Registrar, is substantive evidence of execution.
  • The plaintiff argued that the presumption under Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act supports the admissibility and evidentiary value of the registration certificate.
  • The plaintiff noted the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, highlighting that the defendant witness was a child at the time of execution and had no knowledge of it.
  • Regarding opportunity to present evidence, the plaintiff supported the lower appellate court’s finding that the defendants had no valid complaint on this point.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gangamoyi Debi v. Troiluckhya Nath Chowdhury (I.L.R 33 Calcutta 537) Certificate of registration is evidence of execution where Section 68 Evidence Act does not apply. Supported the proposition that registration certificate, aided by Section 114 Illustration (e), is substantive evidence of execution.
Md. Ihtishan Ali v. Jamma Prasad (A.I.R 1922 P.C 56) Same as above. Reinforced the evidentiary value of registration certificates under the Evidence Act and Registration Act.
Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji (A.I.R 1943 P.C 83) Same as above. Supported the acceptance of registration certificate as proof of execution.
Vishvanath v. Rahibai (A.I.R 1931 Bombay 105) Acceptance of registration certificate as evidence of execution. Referenced as authority in line with Privy Council decisions.
Pandappa v. Shivalingappa (A.I.R 1946 Bombay 193) Same as above. Supported the evidentiary principle.
Kalu v. Bapurao (A.I.R 1950 Nagpur 6) Same as above. Reinforced the principle that registration certificate is substantive evidence.
Salimatul Fatima alias Bibi Mossini v. Koylashpoti Narayin Singh (I.L.R 17 Calcutta 903) Contrary view that registration certificate is only corroborative evidence. The court respectfully dissented from this view.
Marati Balaji v. Dattu (A.I.R 1923 Bombay 253) Contrary view to substantive evidentiary value of registration certificate. Dissent expressed against this view.
Bulakidas Hardas v. Chotu Paikan (A.I.R 1942 Nagpur 84) Same as above. Dissent expressed; court rejected the notion that certificate is only corroborative.
Ara Begam v. Deputy Commr. Gonds (A.I.R 1941 Oudh 529) Argument that acceptance of registration certificate alone may open way to fraud. Rejected; court held that better evidence can be required and presumption drawn against withholding party.
Ramanna v. Sambamoorthi (A.I.R 1961 Andhra Pradesh 361) Same as above. Used to address concerns about reliance solely on registration certificate.
Indernath Modi v. Nandram (A.I.R 1957 Rajasthan 231) Attempt to limit application of presumption under Section 60(2) Registration Act to cases where executant and witnesses are dead or cannot be found. Rejected the limitation; court held Section 67 Evidence Act does not prescribe mode of proof, so certificate evidence is admissible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the evidentiary value of the registered sale deed (Ext. P. 2) under the applicable law. It noted that since the document is registered and not required by law to be attested, Section 68 of the Evidence Act does not apply. Therefore, proof of execution under Section 67 can be by any mode authorised by law.

The Court relied on the endorsements on the document certified under Section 53 of the Travancore Registration Act, which showed that Kaliamma Pillai admitted execution before the Registrar, was identified by witnesses, and received consideration. This certificate, supported by the presumption under Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, was held to be substantive evidence of execution.

The Court considered and respectfully dissented from contrary views that the registration certificate is only corroborative evidence. It emphasized that the certificate is admissible and substantive evidence of the facts it certifies.

Addressing concerns about potential fraud if certificate alone suffices, the Court clarified that courts are not bound to accept the certificate as conclusive and can require better evidence if available, drawing adverse presumptions against parties withholding such evidence. In the present case, the better evidence (the executant’s testimony) was not produced by the defendants, despite the executant being alive.

The Court rejected the defendants’ contention that they were denied opportunity to call evidence, agreeing with the lower appellate court’s finding that the complaint lacked substance.

The Court also addressed a procedural rule (R. 46(2) of the Travancore Registration Act) regarding thumb impressions, finding that it was dispensed with due to the executant’s condition as a leper, and proper notation was made as required.

In sum, the Court found no error of law in accepting the registration certificate as sufficient proof of execution and dismissed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED THE APPEAL WITH COSTS.

The direct effect of this decision is the affirmation of the decree for redemption in favor of the plaintiff based on the registered sale deed. The Court upheld the evidentiary value of the registration certificate under the Travancore Registration Act and the presumption under the Evidence Act, clarifying that such certificates constitute substantive evidence of execution unless rebutted by better evidence. No new precedent was set beyond reinforcing existing principles regarding proof of execution of registered documents.

    Sumathi Amma v. Kunjulekshmi Amma & Another

    Raman Nayar, J.:— The only point taken in this second appeal by defendants 4 to 7 (who claim to be the assigns of the mortgagee 1st defendant) against the decree for redemption they have suffered, is that the plaintiff has not proved that the sale deed, Ext. P. 2 dated 23-6-1118 M.E (5-2-1943 A.D), under which she claims title to redeem, was executed by the original mortgagor, Kaliamma Pillai, by whom it purports to be executed. But, Ext. P. 2 is a registered document; it is not a document required by law to be attested; therefore, it does not attract Section 68 of the Evidence Act; and the proof required by Section 67 can be in any mode authorised by law. The endorsements on the document, duly certified under Section 53 of the Travancore Registration Act, 1087 (corresponding to Section 60 of the Indian Registration Act) show that the document was presented for registration by Kaliamma Pillai who admitted execution before the Registrar and signed an endorsement to that effect, that she was identified by two witnesses who signed an endorsement in token thereof, and that she received the consideration in the presence of the Registrar and also signed an endorsement to that effect. Under sub-sec. (2) of S. 53 of the Travancore Registration Act (corresponding to sub-sec. (2) of Section 60 of the Indian Registration Act) which says that the certificate (which, it is not disputed, complies with the requirements of the section) shall be admissible for the purpose of proving that the facts mentioned in the endorsements referred to in Section 51—among such endorsements being the endorsement of admission of execution by the executant of the document under Section 50(1)(a) have occurred as therein mentioned, aided as it is by the presumption in Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, the certificate is evidence of admission of execution by the executant, Kaliamma Pillai, and, therefore, as against her and persons claiming under her, evidence of execution. And if, as against Kaliamma Pillai, it could be proved that the sale deed was executed by her, the mortgagee defendants, who are only setting up her title and none of their own, would be bound to accept the plaintiff's title. There was no evidence of any kind to the contrary the bare assertion of D.W 1 (the 6th defendant) who was only seven years old at the time of the document, and has no knowledge whatsoever of its execution, that it was not executed by Kaliamma Pillai is not evidence—and the courts below accepted the evidence furnished by the registration certificate as sufficient proof of execution. I not think that it can be said that in doing so they committed an error of law.

    2. I regard the Privy Council decisions in Gangamoyi Debi v. Troiluckhya Nath Chowdhury (I.L.R 33 Calcutta 537), Md. Ihtishan Ali v. Jamma Prasad (A.I.R 1922 P.C 56) and Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji (A.I.R 1943 P.C 83)—See also Vishvanath v. Rahibai (A.I.R 1931 Bombay 105), Pandappa v. Shivalingappa (A.I.R 1946 Bombay 193) and Kalu v. Bapurao (A.I.R 1950 Nagpur 6)—as authority for the proposition that, in cases where Section 68 of the Evidence Act has no application, the certificate of registration in the light of the presumption in Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act is evidence of execution and can, in lit cases, be accepted as proof thereof and with the contrary view expressed in Salimatul Fatima alias Bibi Mossini v. Koylashpoti Narayin Singh (I.L.R 17 Culcutta 903), Marati Balaji v. Dattu (A.I.R 1923 Bombay 253) and Bulakidas Hardas v. Chotu Paikan (A.I.R 1942 Nagpur 84)—neither what is said in the Privy Council decisions nor the wording of Section 60(2) of the Registration Act lends the least support to the statement in the last mentioned case that the certificate is only corroborative and not substantive evidence; the section says that the certificate is admissible for proving certain facts which can only mean that it is substantive evidence regarding those facts—I must express my respectful dissent.

    3. To the argument noticed in Ara Begam v. Deputy Commr. Gonds (A.I.R 1941 Oudh 529 at 548), Bulakidas Hardas v. Chotu Paikan (A.I.R 1942 Nagpur 84 at 85) and Ramanna v. Sambamoorthi (A.I.R 1961 Andhra Pradesh 361 at 369) that, if the certificate of registration were to be accepted as proof of execution, a party who is required to prove a document would, if it is registered, be relieved of the necessity of examining any witnesses to prove it and could rest solely on the certificate, thus opening the way to fraud and fabrication, the answer is obvious. It is that the court is not bound to accept the certificate as sufficient proof, and, where better evidence is available, can insist on better evidence, drawing the presumption in Illustration (g) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act against the party who withholds this better evidence. The better evidence in the present case, I might remark, would be the evidence of the alleged executant herself who it is not disputed is alive—there is no evidence to show whether the attestors or the execute or others connected with the document are alive or dead—and, in the circumstances of the case, I think it would be for the defendants rather than for the plaintiff to examine her. For, if, in truth, she did not execute the document; it would obviously be in her interest to come forward and deny execution; it would be against her interest to come forward and admit execution even if that be the truth; and her evidence should have been more readily available to the defendants than to the plaintiff.

    4. With great respect I think that the attempt made in Indernath Modi v. Nandram (A.I.R 1957 Rajasthan 231) to distinguish the Privy Council cases on the ground that those cases apply only, “where it is not possible to take recourse to the method provided in Section 67 because of the fact that the executant and the marginal witnesses are either dead or cannot be found” and that it is only in such cases that recourse can he had “to the presumption under Section 60(2) of the Registration Act” is vitiated by the assumption that Section 67 of the Evidence Act prescribes a mode of proof and requires the executant or the “marginal witnesses” to be examined. Section 67 says nothing of the kind. It only says that hat facts have to be proved, and, unlike Section 68, does not prescribe any particular mode of proof. The facts required to be proved under Section 67 can be proved by any kind of evidence, and there is nothing in the section to indicate that the evidence furnished by the registration certificate by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 60 of the Registration Act and by the presumption in Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, is to be excluded.

    5. It is pointed out that R. 46(2) of the rules made under the Travancore Registration Act, which requires that the thumb impression of an executant admitting execution who is not personally known to the Registrar shall invariably be taken in the document, has not been complied with in this case. But, the operation of sub-sec. (2) of Section 53 does depend on such compliance but only on compliance with the requirements of the section itself. Moreover, the evidence in this case shows that Kaliamma Pillai was a leper, and, in the case of lepers, R. 48 dispenses with the taking of the thumb impression and requires only a note to be made in the register of thumb impressions (not in the document itself) explaining why the thumb impression was not taken.

    6. It is said that the defendants were not given sufficient opportunity to call their evidence at the trial, but, the lower appellate court has shown that there is no substance whatever in this complaint and I am completely in agreement with it.

    7. In the result I dismiss the appeal with costs.

    8. Leave granted.

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    Sumathi Amma v. Kunjulekshmi Amma & Another
    (Sep 16, 1964)