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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — V.P. Gopalan Nambiyar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was a Lecturer in Mathematics at Government College, Calicut. By an order dated 13-6-1968 (Ext. P1) he was deputed as Principal of the M.E.S. College, Ponnani, an institution run by the Muslim Educational Society (M.E.S.). The deputation terms were further detailed by a G.O. dated 25-9-1968 (Ext. P2), fixing the deputation at two years and referring to Chapter XI, Part I of the Kerala Service Rules for other terms.

The deputation term was extended by order dated 7-7-1970 (Ext. P3) for three years, and the M.E.S.'s transfer of the petitioner from Ponnani to Mampad was ratified. By order dated 18-7-1972 (Ext. P4) the petitioner was recalled from deputation before the expiry of the period, on grounds including complaints that he had collected funds for M.E.S. institutions and issued press statements. A later order dated 26-7-1972 (referred to in Ext. P12 but not produced) posted him to Government College, Kasaragod.

The M.E.S. sought to intercede (Ext. P5 dated 25-7-1972). The petitioner sent a letter dated 1-8-1972 (Ext. P6) stating that M.E.S. had offered him permanent appointment as Principal and resigning from Government service with effect from 1-8-1972. An appointment letter from M.E.S. to the petitioner is Ext. P7 (2-8-1972). The Government, by Ext. P8 (6-9-1972), informed the college correspondent and the petitioner that a preliminary enquiry by the Director of Collegiate Education was ongoing and suggested the resignation appeared intended to escape enquiry and disciplinary action.

The petitioner replied (Ext. P9, 21-9-1972) denying awareness of any preliminary enquiry and asserting that a complaint dated 6-5-1972 had been examined by M.E.S. and found baseless. He later wrote (Ext. P10, 14-10-1972) presuming the resignation had been accepted. The Government, by letter dated 9-11-1972 (Ext. P11) to the college manager, stated that the management was abetting disobedience of orders by a deputed Government officer and requested the Principal be relieved to join his new post. Ext. P12 (22-11-1972) warned the petitioner that his continuous disobedience of Government orders was viewed gravely and threatened disciplinary measures.

The petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking certiorari to quash Exts. P4, P8, P11 and P12 and a declaration that he was no longer a Government servant and that respondents had no jurisdiction to take disciplinary action, or alternatively, a direction to accept his resignation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner’s resignation (Ext. P6 dated 1-8-1972) operated to terminate his Government service without formal acceptance by the competent authority.
  2. Whether Ext. P4 (recalling the petitioner from deputation) and subsequent communications (Exts. P8, P11 and P12) were amenable to quashing under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether the Government's omission or delay in accepting the resignation was motivated by mala fide conduct intended to harass the petitioner or to enable disciplinary proceedings.
  4. Whether the Government could legitimately withhold acceptance of the resignation pending consideration of disciplinary proceedings, and whether acceptance prior to such consideration would stultify contemplated disciplinary action.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that sending Ext. P6 (resignation dated 1-8-1972) sufficed to terminate his service "irrespective of whether the letter of resignation [was] accepted or not." He pressed for a declaration that he had ceased to be a Government servant.
  • Reliance was placed upon Rule 2(9) of Part I of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, which defines a "member of a service" as a person who has not resigned; the petitioner argued this supported his position that his resignation took effect on sending.
  • The petitioner contended that the Government's failure to accept the resignation was mala fide, motivated to spite him. He pointed to factual matters (complaints, press coverage, alleged hostility by political organs) as showing improper motive.
  • Counsel for the petitioner also relied on Pratap Singh's case (AIR 1964 SC 72) as supporting his position (though the opinion later states this reliance was misplaced).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Government/respondents maintained that a resignation of a public servant becomes effective only when accepted by the appropriate authority; until acceptance the public servant has locus poenitentiae (ability to withdraw), as articulated in Rajkumar v. Union of India (AIR 1969 SC 180).
  • The Government contended that a preliminary enquiry and possible disciplinary proceedings were in progress and that accepting the resignation before deciding whether to institute disciplinary action would stultify those proceedings.
  • Counter-affidavits filed by the respondents and by Sri C.H. Mohammed Koya, Minister for Education, contested the petitioner's factual allegations regarding press reports and political motives.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajkumar v. Union of India (AIR 1969 SC 180) Resignation of a public servant normally takes effect only when accepted by the appropriate authority; until acceptance the public servant has locus poenitentiae; undue delay in intimating acceptance may justify an inference that resignation has not been accepted. The court applied this principle to hold that the petitioner's mere sending of Ext. P6 did not terminate his service; the resignation required acceptance and therefore the petitioner was not entitled to a declaration that his Government service had ended by mere dispatch of the resignation letter.
Pratap Singh (AIR 1964 SC 72) Stated principle that an officer cannot be continued against his will beyond the period of superannuation for purpose of continuing disciplinary proceedings (as relied upon by petitioner). The court held that Pratap Singh's case was not applicable to the facts before it and that reliance on it by the petitioner's counsel had no application to the question whether resignation had taken effect without acceptance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first noting a limitation on the scope of Article 226: Ext. P4 (recall of deputation before expiry) could not be quashed under Article 226 insofar as any remedy might be contractual for breach of term; accordingly, the petition seeking quashal of Ext. P4 could not succeed on civil-contractual grounds under writ jurisdiction.

The principal legal question addressed was whether the petitioner's resignation (Ext. P6) operated to terminate his Government service without acceptance. The court examined the relevant statutory provisions and service rules cited by the petitioner:

  • Rule 2(9) (definition of "member of a service") states, insofar as relevant, that a "member of a service" is a person who has not resigned — the court found this definition unhelpful in resolving when a resignation takes effect (on sending or on acceptance).
  • Rule 23 (ceasing to draw pay and allowances when ceasing to discharge duties) likewise did not specify when an officer is to be treated as having ceased duties for the purpose of resignation.
  • A Government decision referred to at the foot of Rule 23 was described by the court as unhelpful and not of compelling authority.

The court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Rajkumar v. Union of India (AIR 1969 SC 180), quoting its principle that termination of a public servant's employment by order of Government is not effective until intimated, and where an employee invites termination by resignation, services normally stand terminated from the date of acceptance by the appropriate authority; until acceptance the employee retains locus poenitentiae. That principle led the court to conclude the petitioner was not entitled to a declaration that his service had ended by mere sending of Ext. P6.

The court further observed that the petitioner himself treated the resignation as requiring acceptance: in Exts. P9 and P10 he either solicited acceptance or acted on a presumption of acceptance. This conduct reinforced the view that acceptance was required.

The court rejected the petitioner's reliance on Pratap Singh (AIR 1964 SC 72) as inapplicable (Pratap Singh concerned continuation of an officer beyond superannuation for disciplinary purposes and did not address the present issue).

On the mala fides allegation (that the Government kept the resignation pending to spite or harass the petitioner), the court undertook a fact-sensitive analysis:

  • The petitioner pointed to factual circumstances (complaint dated 6-5-1972, press coverage, allegations of political hostility) as indicia of mala fide conduct in withholding acceptance.
  • The respondents filed counter-affidavits and maintained that disciplinary proceedings were under consideration and that accepting the resignation before deciding on disciplinary measures would stultify those proceedings.
  • The court found no satisfactory proof of mala fides in the Government's delay to accept the resignation. The absence of reference to a preliminary enquiry in certain government communications (Exts. P4 & P5) was held not to be material. The court accepted the Government Pleader's statement that a decision to accept or not accept the resignation would be taken within a week of disposal of the writ petition.

On that basis the court was not convinced that the withholding of acceptance was for the purpose of harassment; rather, the Government's position that acceptance was being withheld pending consideration of disciplinary action was plausible and not shown to be mala fide on the record before the court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to a declaration that his Government service had terminated by mere dispatch of his resignation letter (Ext. P6); resignation requires acceptance by the appropriate authority in accordance with applicable rules and the principle laid down in Rajkumar v. Union of India (AIR 1969 SC 180).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner did not obtain the declaration he sought and remains, for legal purposes in this judgment, a Government servant until his resignation is accepted; the Government retains the ability to decide whether to accept the resignation and to pursue disciplinary proceedings. The court recorded the Government Pleader's statement that a decision on acceptance would be taken within a week of disposal of the petition.
  • No broader precedent was announced by this opinion beyond applying the established Supreme Court principle in Rajkumar's case to the present facts; the court explicitly found Pratap Singh inapplicable to the issue before it.

Final Disposition: Petition dismissed, but without costs.

    Abdu Salam (Petitioner) v. State Of Kerala And Ors. (S).

    V.P Gopalan Nambiyar, J.:— While serving as Lecturer in Mathematics, in Government College, Calicut, the petitioner was by Ext. PI order dated 13-6-1968 deputed as Principal of the M.E.S College, Ponnani, an Institution run by a private agency, namely the Muslim Educational Society (M.E.S for short). The detailed terms and conditions of deputation followed by Ex. P2 G.O dated 25-9-1968, which stated the period of deputation to be for two years, and that the terms and conditions other than those specified therein were to be governed by the provisions of Chapter XI, Part I of the Kerala Service Rules. By Ext. P3 order dated 7-7-1970, while extending the period of deputation for a further term of three years, on the same conditions, the action of the M.E.S in having transferred the petitioner from the College at Ponnani to the College at Mampad was ratified. By Ext. P4 order dated 18-7-1972, the petitioner was recalled from deputation before the expiry of the period. The ground stated for the action was that complaints had been received against the petitioner that he had collected funds from the public as well as from students for the benefit of the M.E.S institutions and that he issued press statements which were given prominence in most of the leading Malayalam dailies published from Calicut. By a subsequent order dated 26-7-1972 (not produced but referred to in Ext. P12) he was posted to Government College, Kasaragod. The Muslim Educational Society interceded by Ex. P5 dated 25-7-1972 to get Ex. P4 recall. The petitioner himself sent the original of Ext. P6 dated 1st August 1972, stating that the M.E.S had offered him a permanent appointment as Principle in the service of its institution, and that in the circumstances he was resigning from Government service and that the communication may be treated as his resignation with effect from 1-8-1972. Ext. P7 dated 2-8-1972 is a copy of the appointment order the M.E.S of the petitioner as Principal on quite favourable terms. Ext. P8 communication dated 6-9-1972, from the Secretary to the Government Education Department to the correspondent of the M.E.S College Committee, with copy to the petitioner, stated that a preliminary enquiry by the Director of Collegiate Education on the allegations against the petitioner was afoot, and that the resignation of the petitioner was to escape enquiry and further disciplinary action. To this, the petitioner replied by Ext. P9 dated 21-9-1972 that he was unaware of the preliminary enquiry and that if the complaint petition recited as No. 4 in Ext. P4 was the foundation of the enquiry the same had already been enquired into by the M.E.S and found to be false and baseless. This was followed by Ext. P10 letter dated 14-10-1972, from the petitioner calling attention to Ext. P9 and presuming that the resignation had been accepted by the Government. By Ext. P11 letter dated 9-11-1972 to the Manager, Mampad College, the Government stated that the Management of the college was abetting the disobedience of orders by a Government Officer deputed for service in a private institution, and requested that the Principal be relieved to enable him to join duty in his new post. Ext. P12 Hated 22-11-1972 is the copy of a further communication from the Government to the petitioner, viewing his continuous disobedience of Government orders gravely, and threatening disciplinary measures.

    2. The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to quash Exts. P4, P8 and P11 and P 12; and a declaration that he is no longer a Government servant and that the respondents had no jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against him, or, in the alternative a direction to the Government to accept his resignation from Government service.

    3. It is plain that Ext. P4 order cancelling the petitioner's order of deputation before expiry of the term cannot be quashed under Art. 226 as the petitioner's remedy, if any, must be purely for breach of a contractual term. But the prayer for a declaration that the petitioner had ceased to be a Government servant was pressed. It was stressed that once the petitioner had sent Ext. P6 letter of resignation dated 1-8-1972, the petitioner's service under the Government had tome to an end quite irrespective of whether the letter of resignation was accented or not. The definition of a ‘member of a service’ in Rule 2(9) of Part I of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules was relied on. The same only states, to the extent relevant, that a member of a service' means a person who has not resigned. That does not help to resolve the controversy as to when the resignation takes effect, when the letter is sent or when it is accepted. Nor does Rule 23 of Part I of the Kerala Service Rules afford any help or guidance. To the extent relevant, it only states that an officer shall cease to draw pay and allowances as soon as he ceased to discharge the duties attached to the post. When he so ceases is not provided by the rule; and the Government decision No. 1 referred to at the foot of the rule, is unhelpful, and of no compelling authority. The position of law was enunciated in Rajkumar v. Union of India (AIR 1969 SC 180). It was observed?

    “Termination of employment by order passed by the Government does not become effective until the order is intimated to the employee. But where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation alter it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus paenitantiae, but not thereafter. Undue delay in intimating to the public servant concerned, the action taken on the letter of resignation may justify an inference that resignation has not been accepted.”

    4. It is also not without significance that the petitioner himself in Exts. P9 and P10 proceeded on the basis that his resignation required acceptance, and either solicited acceptance of the resignation (Ext. P-9) or presumed that the Government had accepted his resignation (Ext. P-10). The decision in Pratap Singh's case (AIR 1964 SC 72) on which the petitioner's Counsel placed reliance has no application.

    5. It only stated that an officer cannot be continued against his will beyond the period of superannuation for purpose of continuing disciplinary proceedings. In the light of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajkumar's case (AIR 1969 SC 180), the petitioner is not entitled to a declaration that his service under the Government has come to an end by mere sending of Ext. P-6 letter.

    6. It was contended that the Government's omission to accept the resignation was mala fide and to spite the petitioner. It was Sited out that Ext. P-4 recited a complaint petition dated 6-5-1972 from one Seethi Haii, that the same had been enquired into by the M.E.S authorities and found to be baseless and false (as stated in Ex. P9 communication of the petitioner), and that despite Seethi Haji's complaint dated 6-5-1972, there was no mention at all of a preliminary enquiry against the petitioner by the Director of Collegiate Education either in Ext. P-4 dated 18-7-72 or in Ext. P5 dated 25.7.1972 In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the petition it is alleged that the ‘Chandrika’ daily, the official organ of the Muslim League was hostile towards the Muslim Educational Society and that the Kerala State Muslim league itself by its resolutions had regarded the Society as opposed to the Shariat. In paragraph 13 the petitioner has stated that President and Secretary of the College Committee (and not himself) stated at a press conference that Sri C.H Mohammed Koya, Minister for Education of the State had made speeches that himself and his collegues had collected Rs. 1,75,000.00 for the Mampad College Bombay, that the accounts of the College revealed only an amount of Rs. 50,505.00 handed over to the College, and that the accounts of the collections made by the Muslim League Leaders were not submitted to the College Committee. The petitioner has alleged that this news item was prominently featured in all the important daily papers and that this had infuriated the Muslim League leadership. These allegations have been controverted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st Respondent and also in a separate counter-affidavit filed by Sri C.H Mohammed Koya, Minister for Education. 1 note that there is no denial of the allegations in paragraph 13 of the petition. But I am not satisfied about the plea of mala fide. Mala fides is now alleged only in not accepting the letter of resignation, and not in respect of any disciplinary proceedings which are yet to be started against the petitioner. Having sent Ex. P12 on 22-11-1972 the Writ petition was filed by the petitioner on 29-11-1972. It has been alleged in the counter-affidavit and stated in the course of arguments that the Government are considering the question of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, and if before that is decided the resignations were to be accepted, the contemplated disciplinary proceedings would be stultified. I see no ground not to accept this statement. The fact that Ext. P-4 & P-5 contain no reference to the preliminary enquiry into the complaint against the petitioner is not material; and I am not satisfied that the reason for having kept the letter of resignation pending was to harass the petitioner rather than to decide whether the proceedings should be started against him. In that view I cannot accept the plea of mala fides. I record the statement made by the Government Pleader that a decision to accept or not to accept the resignation will be taken within a week of the disposal of the O.P I dismiss this writ petition but without costs.

    7. Petition dismissed.

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    Abdu Salam (Petitioner) v. State Of Kerala And Ors. (S).
    (Mar 7, 1973)