AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sub - rule (a) of r. 5
  • r. 5 (a) that rule
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sub - rule (a) of r. 5
  • r. 5 (a) that rule
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revision Petition — Application to Sue In Forma Pauperis)

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant in O.P. No. 80 of 1974 before the Sub Court, Quilon, applied for permission to sue in forma pauperis and is the revision petitioner in this matter. The lower court conditioned registration of the plaint as an original suit upon payment of the ad valorem court fee because it concluded that the petitioner had not mentioned all his movable assets in the schedule annexed to the pauper application. The petitioner amended the pauper application to include a schedule describing immovable property and encumbrances and stated that his only movable asset, a fishing boat, was ruined and abandoned. During cross-examination the petitioner admitted there were some furniture items in the house, with an estimated value of Rs. 500. The plaint was valued at Rs. 57,030 and the ad valorem court fee payable was computed at Rs. 4,783. The petitioner challenged the lower court's conditional order by filing this revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether omission of certain movable items from the schedule annexed to an application to sue in forma pauperis amounts to an application "not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by" Order XXXIII, Rules 2 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, thereby justifying rejection under Order XXXIII, Rule 5(a).
  2. Whether an omission of assets disclosed during enquiry should be treated as a ground to reject the pauper application without further inquiry, or whether such omissions should be investigated under Rule 5(b) to determine pauperism on the evidence.
  3. Whether an omission of assets in the schedule is a deliberate/mala fide suppression that would warrant dismissal of the application (and, specifically, whether the lower court acted within jurisdiction in directing payment of court fee on the basis of the omission found).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The lower court acted without jurisdiction in holding that the pauper application was not framed and presented as required by Order XXXIII, Rules 2 and 3, after the petitioner had amended the application to include a property schedule.
  • The pauper application, as amended, contained the particulars required by Rule 2 (including a schedule of movable and immovable property with estimated values, signed and verified) and was therefore framed and presented in the prescribed manner.
  • Omissions discovered during enquiry (such as small movables shown in cross-examination) do not mean the application was not framed and presented; such omissions are to be investigated under Rule 5(b) to determine whether the applicant is, in fact, a pauper.
  • The only movable expressly alleged in the schedule was the fishing boat, described as valueless; the furniture disclosed in cross-examination (estimated Rs. 500) does not establish deliberate suppression or materially affect pauperism.
  • Decisions of various High Courts support treating non-inclusion of some items as a matter for investigation and not as automatic non-compliance warranting rejection.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended that if the applicant is not frank and true about his assets, the petition to sue as in forma pauperis should be dismissed; the lower court relied on authorities (for example, Kuppuswami v. Varadappa, Durga Prasad v. Srinivas, MT Chamela Kaur v. Purushotam Das) to justify rejection where the applicant failed to state assets with utmost good faith.
  • The respondents specifically relied on later cases cited to show that a lack of frankness would require dismissal or denial of permission to sue as a pauper.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sundari Devi v. Rivers Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1934 Calcutta 640 Omission of a solitary item from the schedule does not amount to non-compliance with Order XXXIII, Rule 2; an application having the required particulars and a schedule is not defective in form by omission of one item. Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the petitioner's omission of some movables did not render the application improperly framed or presented under R.2 and R.3.
Biajr Ballab Lallji v. Benoy Krishna, A.I.R. 1928 Patna 28 Authority cited in Sundari Devi supporting that omission of a solitary item is not a non-compliance with Order XXXIII, R.2. Referenced by the court via Sundari Devi to show consistent earlier authority that omission of a single item does not destroy the formal sufficiency of the application.
Kuppuswamy Iyyar v. Muthuswamy Ayyar, A.I.R. 1915 Madras 652 Authority cited in Sundari Devi as supporting similar principle regarding omission from the schedule. Referenced by the court as part of the line of authority showing that omission of a single item does not amount to non-compliance with R.2.
Nirmal Kumar v. Manoanjan, A.I.R. 1955 Calcutta 192 Non-inclusion of a property in the schedule does not entitle rejection under Rule 5; an application is "framed and presented" if it contains the required schedule, is signed and verified; omitted items should be investigated subsequently and valued to determine pauperism under R.5(b). The court expressly adopted this reasoning and held that omitted movables should be valued and considered under R.5(b) rather than treated as a defect in framing/presentation under R.2/R.3.
Madan Mohanlal v. Fhalman Singh, A.I.R. 1954 Calcutta 89 Similar view to Nirmal Kumar that non-inclusion does not automatically amount to violation of R.2 and R.3. Used by the court to reinforce the conclusion that non-inclusion of movables does not automatically invalidate the framing/presentation of the application.
Kuppuswami v. Varadappa, A.I.R. 1943 Madras 11 Earlier decision relied on by lower courts to justify rejection where assets were not stated with utmost good faith; interpreted as requiring careful application. Court noted that later authorities limited this rule to deliberate and mala fide suppression; used to show the correct, narrower scope of the earlier decision.
Durga Prasad v. Srinivasa, A.I.R. 1930 Patna 368 Decision earlier relied upon to reject pauper applications where assets were not disclosed with utmost good faith. Court cited subsequent explanations (MT Chamela Kaur) showing the decision must be read to require mala fide omission that materially affects pauperism; used to limit its scope.
MT Chamela Kaur v. Purushotam Das, A.I.R. 1932 Patna 308 Explained Durga Prasad: omission of small items of trifling value does not warrant rejection; omission must be mala fide and materially affect the question of pauperism. Court relied on this explanation to conclude that omissions of trifling value (or that do not materially affect pauperism) should not lead to rejection for non-compliance.
Ramakrishna Chetti v. Govindammal, (1954) 1 MLJ 26 Considered Kuppuswami v. Varadappa and held the rule must be limited to deliberate suppression, not bona fide omissions. Adopted to support the proposition that only deliberate and mala fide omissions justify rejection; bona fide omissions require inquiry into value and effect on pauperism.
Murugan v. Sivaraman, (1955) 2 MLJ 638 Followed Ramakrishna Chetti and articulated a test for mala fide omission: whether the intention was to conceal an item which, if included, would cause the court to find the petitioner had means to pay the court fee. Cited by the court as a workable test to determine whether an omission was deliberate and mala fide.
Pokkan Gorain v. Bengali Gorain, A.I.R. 1941 Patna 621 Explained that omission does not necessarily mean bad faith; rejection under the earlier decision was for cases where omission indicated lack of utmost good faith. Used to show that courts have interpreted prior authority as not imposing automatic rejection for every omission.
Chinnaswamy v. Anthonyswamy, A.I.R. 1953 T.C. 614 Held that mere non-inclusion of trifling assets cannot be characterised as deliberate and mala fide and would not warrant dismissal. Relied on to support the conclusion that small items of trifling value (such as movables valued at Rs. 500) should not automatically lead to dismissal for non-frankness.
Ramnnikalal v. Mathurlal, A.I.R. 1965 Gujarat 214; Rajkumar Bhagwatsaran v. F. P. F. Rajan, (1971) 1 MLJ 510; Maluram v. Arjun Singh, A.I.R. 1972 Raj. 314 Authorities cited by respondents to contend that lack of frankness/truth in pointing out assets should lead to dismissal of the petition to sue as in forma pauperis. The court considered these authorities but held that Order XXXIII, R.5(a) only permits rejection where the application is not framed/presented as required or where the applicant is not a pauper; omission alone does not ipso facto lead to dismissal without inquiry under R.5(b).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by describing the procedural posture: the petitioner had amended his pauper application to include a schedule detailing immovable property and encumbrances and had stated that his only movable (a fishing boat) was valueless. At the enquiry the petitioner admitted the presence of some furniture in the house, estimated at Rs. 500. The lower court treated the non-disclosure of those movables in the annexed schedule as a failure to comply with Order XXXIII, Rules 2 and 3, and directed payment of the ad valorem court fee before registering the plaint.

The court analyzed the relevant provisions of Order XXXIII. It noted that Rule 2 prescribes the particulars to be stated (including a schedule of movable and immovable property with estimated values, signed and verified) and Rule 3 prescribes presentation by the applicant in person. The court emphasized the textual distinction in Rule 5(a): rejection is mandated if the application is "not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by R.2 and R.3" or where the applicant is not a pauper. The court observed that "framed and presented" refers to the form and presence of required particulars and a signed/verified schedule, not the infallible accuracy of every particular.

Turning to authority, the court reviewed multiple High Court decisions. It accepted the Calcutta High Court's view (and related authorities) that omission of some items from the schedule does not necessarily mean a failure to frame/present the application as required by R.2; rather, omitted items discovered in enquiry should be valued and considered under Rule 5(b) in determining pauperism. The court accepted the test articulated in later cases for determining mala fide omission: an omission is deliberate and mala fide if there was an intention to conceal an item whose disclosure would likely have shown the applicant had means to pay the court fee.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded:

  • The non-inclusion of certain movables (furniture) in the schedule did not amount to a violation of Order XXXIII, Rules 2 and 3, because the application as amended contained the required particulars and schedule and was signed and verified.
  • The items disclosed in cross-examination were of limited value (estimated at Rs. 500), and there was no evidential basis showing those movables belonged to the petitioner; at most there was a presumption that things in the house belonged to him, which is insufficient to establish deliberate suppression.
  • The lower court had not found that the petitioner was not a pauper; instead it required payment of court fee solely because of the omission. Given the law and precedents, such an omission should have been investigated under Rule 5(b) (valuing the newly disclosed items and determining pauperism on evidence), not used as a basis to deny framing/presentation under Rule 2 or to require immediate payment of the ad valorem fee.

On that basis the court held the lower court erred in directing payment of the court fee and intervened to allow the revision.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision petition is allowed; the order of the lower court is set aside and the application to sue in forma pauperis filed by the petitioner in the lower court is allowed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The lower court's conditional order requiring payment of the ad valorem court fee (Rs. 4,783) before registration of the plaint is set aside.
  • The petitioner is permitted to sue in forma pauperis on the plaint valued at Rs. 57,030.
  • In the nature of the case the parties shall bear their own costs (the court directed that the parties shall bear their costs).

Broader implications:

The opinion applies established authority to clarify that omission of some movable items from a pauper schedule does not automatically render the application improperly framed or presented under Order XXXIII, Rules 2 and 3; such omissions should be assessed in an evidentiary inquiry under Rule 5(b) unless they are deliberate and mala fide and of a character that would materially affect the question of pauperism. The opinion does not purport to set a new legal precedent beyond the application of these principles to the facts of this petition.

    Kunjuraman v. The United India Fire And General Insurance Co. Ltd., Madras And Others

    1. The applicant in o. P. No. 80 of 1974 (pauper) on the file of the sub court, Quilon, Is the revision petitioner. He applied for permission to sue informa pauperis. But on the ground that the petitioner did not mention all his movable assets in the schedule to the pauper application the lower court passed a conditional order that if the court fee payable on the plaint is paid on or before 2nd january 1976 the petition will be registered as an original suit. Dissatisfied with that the petitioner has filed this revision petition.

    2. Before passing the impugned order the applicant has been allowed to amend his pauper application by incorporating a schedule of his properties and accordingly a schedule of the properties owned by the applicant was incorporated in the pauper application. In that schedule the immovable property belonging to the petitioner and the number of encumbrances thereon were mentioned. It was also stated that the only movable property of the petitioner, Namely the fishing boat, Has been utterly ruined and the wreck has been abandoned in favour of the defendants and that the plaintiff has no present means to pay the court fee for the plaint claim. The objection or the respondents was that the petitioner even after getting an opportunity to amend the application failed to mention all his assets movable and immovable and therefore the application is liable to be rejected under order xxxiii r. 5 (a) of the code of civil procedure. Later the petitioner was examined in support of his application. In the course of his cross - examination he was asked whether there are any movables in his house like furniture. He admitted that there are some furniture in the house and that their value can be estimated at rs. 500. On finally hearing the matter the lower court held that the petitioner failed to disclose such movables in the schedule to the pauper

    application and therefore the application to sue informa pauper is has not been framed and presented in the manner required by r. 2 and 3 of order xxxiii. Hence the application is not a bona fide one and consequently the plaint can be registered and numbered as a suit only on payment of the ad valorem court fee payable on the plaint claim. The plaint is valued at rs. 57,030 and the advalorem court fee payable thereon comes to rs. 4,783.

    3. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the lower court acted without jurisdiction in holding that the application was not framed and presented in the manner required by r. 2 and 3 of order xxxiii. Order xxxiii. R. 2 specifies the particulars which should be stated in every application for permission to sue as a pauper. It should contain all the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits: a schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof should also be annexed thereto and it should be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings. R. 3 requires that the application should be presented to the court by the applicant in person unless he is exempted from appearing in court. After the amendment of the pauper application by the petitioner it may not be right for the lower court to hold that the application is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by the r. 2 and 3. It was stated in the application that the only movable asset namely the fishing boat is valueless and has been abandoned in favour of the respondents. If during the course of the enquiry some other movables are proved it is not a case where the application is not framed and presented as required by order xxxiii r. 2. The value of such movables will also be taken into account in finding out whether the applicant is a pauper or not and the application will have to be dealt with not under order xxxiii r. 5 (a) but under r. 5 (b). Decided cases on this point are in accordance with the above view. In sundari devi v. Rivers steam navigation co. Ltd. A. I. R 1934 calcutta 640 the calcutta high court had occasion to consider the effect of the omission to include some items in the schedule attached to the pauper application. In that case it was disclosed from the cross - examination of the witness examined in connection with the pauperism that the applicant had inherited some property from a deceased son of hers. This had not been included in the schedule attached to the application. But every other detail required by the rule to be complied with had been complied with. The lower court refused an application for an amendment of the pauper application to include this item in the schedule. On revision the high court observed as follows at page 641:

    "from what i have stated above it would appear that bagala's original application for permission to sue as a pauper had all the particulars that are required with regard to a plaint in suit, It had been duly signed and verified and it had attached to it a schedule containing the name of some immovable properties with an estimated value thereof. That being so, There was in my opinion no defect in the form or frame of the application and the omission to include one solitary item of property was, In my judgment, Not a non - compliance with the provisions of 0. 33, R. 2, Civil p. C. This view of mine is in agreement with the decision of the patna high court in the case of biajr ballab lallji v. Benoy krishna a. I. R. 1928 pat. 28 and also of the madras high court in kuppuswamy iyyar v. Muthuswamy ayyar a. I. R. 1915 mad. 652. I am therefore of opinion that the order of the learned subordinate judge by which he refused to consider the application for amendment simply on the ground that he had no other alternative than to reject the application of 16th tune 1933 cannot therefore be sustained."

    again, In nirmal kumar v. Manoanjan air. 1955 cal. 192 the same high court had occasion to consider the effect of non - inclusion of any particular property in the schedule annexed to the application for permission to sue as a pauper. Das gupta j. (as he then was) speaking for the bench which decided the case observed as follows at page 193:

    "in our opinion the non - inclusion of any particular property in the schedule annexed to an application for permission to sue as a pauper would not entitle a court to reject an application under r. 5 of 0. 33, Civil p. C. What is laid down in sub - rule (a) of r. 5 is that where an application is 'not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by r. 2' the court shall reject the said application. An application can be said to have been framed and presented in the manner prescribed by r. 2 if in fact it contains in regard to plaints, A schedule of the movable and/or immovable property alleged by the applicant as belonging to him with the estimated value thereof and is signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of plaints.

    what sub - rule (a) of r. 5 insists upon is that the frame of the application must be in accordance with r. 2. It does not say that all the particulars given in the application must be correct. That question as to whether or not the particulars of the properties which are set out in the schedule to the petition are correct has to be investigated at a subsequent stage, And if on such investigation the court comes to the conclusion that some properties were omitted from the schedule annexed to the petition, Then the court should proceed to determine the value of these properties and taking the said value into consideration determine whether or not the applicant is a pauper. If the court finds on ascertaining the value of the said property and the other properties which are set out in the schedule that the applicant is not a pauper, Then the court should dismiss the application on that ground, I. E., He is not a pauper. "

    a similar view was taken in madan mohanlal v. Fhalman singh, Air. 1954 cal. 89. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by the calcutta high court in these cases and hold that the non - inclusion of the movables which were in the house where the petitioner was residing would not amount to a violation of r. 2 and 3 of order xxxiii cpc.

    4. It is, No doubt, A settled principle that an application for permission to sue should be filed with utmost good faith and if any asset belonging to the applicant is shown to have been intentionally and deliberately omitted to be included in the schedule annexed to the application that is a factor which the court will take into account in exercising its discretion to allow or not to allow the permission asked for to sue as a pauper. The lower court has relied on the decisions reported in kuppusmami v. Varadappa air 1943 madras ii and durga prasad v. Srinivas air. 1930 patna 368 and also mt chamela kaur v. Purushotam das air. 1932 patna 308 to come to the conclusion that the application to sue as a pauper should be rejected if it was revealed in the course of the hearing of the application that the applicant has not stated with utmost good faith the whole of his assets in the schedule to the application. Possibly the lower court overlooked the fact that the later rulings of the above high courts had occasion to consider the scope of the above decisions and to explain these decisions i will refer to the later decision where the above cases had come up for consideration.

    5. The decisions in kuppuswami v. Varadappa a i r. 1943 madras 11 was considered in ramakrishna chetti v. Govindammal (1954) 1 mlj 26. In the latter case justice venkatarama ayyar pointed out that the rule laid down in the earlier case must be limited to a case where a suppression is deliberate and not bona fide. This was followed by rajamannar, C. J. In murugan v. Sivaraman (1955) 2 mlj. 638. After referring to the decision of chandrasekhara ayyar, J. In air. 1943 mad. 11 and also the decision of venkatarama ayyar, J. The learned judge stated the test to find out whether an omission to include an asset in the schedule was deliberate and mala fide. His observation at the page 639 reads thus:

    "in my opinion, To find out whether an omission was deliberate and mala fide one test is to ascertain whether the intention was to conceal the omitted item, Because if that were included, The court would find that the petitioner had means to pay the court fee. To give a concrete illustration, If the court fee payable is, Say, Rs. 1,000 and the petitioner seeking leave to file the suit in forma pauper is has omitted to disclose some movable property worth rs 50 or rs. 100 it cannot be said that the omission was deliberate and mala fide for the obvious reason that even if he had mentioned it, He could still have easily maintained that he was not in a position to pay the court fee of rs. 1,000 and, Therefore, He was entitled to sue as a pauper."

    with respect, I agree with this dictum. It lays down a workable test to find out whether the omission is deliberate and mala fide. Similarly, The decision of the patna high court reported in durga prasad v. Srinivasa air. 1930 patna 368 was explained in mt. Chamela kaur v. Purushotam das air. 1932 patna 308 at page 309 thus:

    "the learned subordinate judge has wholly misapprehended the observations of this court referred to by me. It was never the intention of this court to lay it down that if one or two wooden almirah worth a few rupees be left out such an omission will have the effect of rejecting the application without determination on merits. It must be found that there was a mala fide omission from the schedule of properties which would materially affect the question of pauperism. As i understand it the object of prescribing that the pauper should set out a list of his properties is to help the government in ascertaining whether the applicant is in a position to pay the court fee payable on the

    plaint. It cannot be said that the omission of a few articles worth a few rupees which could in no way affect the decision of the court on the question of pauperism has the effect of throwing out the application on the ground that it does not contain a list of all the properties held by the petitioner. I am of opinion that there is nothing to show that the omission in the present case of the two trunks or the chaukis and the almirah was an act of bad faith on the part of the petitioner. It is rather difficult to say how the petitioner would have been benefited by a deliberate omission of these articles:"

    again in pokkan gorain v. Bengali gorain air. 1941 patna 621 rowland, J. Explained the dictum laid down in air. 1930 patna 368 thus:

    "i am referred to the decision in ii plt 567 (durga prasad v. Srinivas surckha) where a division bench of this court refused an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis on the ground that the applicant had not set forth his assets with the utmost good faith: it was said in such a case that it was open to the court to reject the application ab initio without ordering inquiry into the fact of pauperism and this court did reject the application; but it was not laid down that an applicant must necessarily be deemed to be acting in bad faith because there is an omission to specify in the application some particular item of assets"

    a similar view was taken by vithayathil, J. In chinnaswamy v. Anthonyswamy air. 1953 t c. 614. His lordship observed that the mere non - inclusion of some of the assets in the schedule which are of trifling value cannot be characterised as deliberate and malafide and an application should not be dismissed on that ground.

    6. In the light of the principles laid down in these decisions i hold that a mere non - inclusion of some assets which, If included, Would not have established that the applicant is not a pauper should not entail a rejection of the application. If any such item is subsequently disclosed in the course of the proceedings its value should also be taken into account and a finding recorded whether the applicant is a pauper or not under r. 5 (b) only.

    7. The counsel for the respondents referred me to the decision in ramnnikalal v. Mathurlal air. 1965 guj. 214, Rajkumar bhagwatsaran v. F. P. F. Rajan (1971) 1 mlj. 510 and maluram v. Arjun singh air. 1972 raj. 314 and contended that if the applicant for permission to sue as a pauperis not frank and true in the matter of pointing out his assets his petition to sue as forma pauperis should be dismissed. Such a conclusion is not warranted by the language of order xxxiii r. 5 (a) that rule only provides to reject an application for permission to sue as a pauper where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed in r. 2 and 3 or where the applicant is not a pauper. As stated earlier, If the application has been framed and presented the non - inclusion of some of the items will not affect the framing and presenting the application as required by law. The question whether an applicant is a pauper or not is a matter for enquiry and the decision on evidence. In evaluating the evidence not only the assets mentioned in the schedule but also the value of these disclosed during the course of the enquiry should also be taken into account in arriving at the decision whether the applicant is a pauper or not. The omission to include ipso facto does not entail the dismissal of the application.

    8. Further what has come out during the course of the cross - examination of the petitioner is only that there are some movables in the house where he resides and that the value of the movables comes to rs. 500. He is staying with his wife, Grown - up daughter and her husband. He did not say that these movables belonged to him there is no proof that these movables belonged to him excepting possibly a presumption that everything in the house belonging to him is owned by him. From this it does not follow that there was a case of suppression, And even if it is so assumed, It does not follow that it was deliberate and mala fide.

    9. Again the lower court has not found that the petitioner is not a pauper. The lower court directed the petitioner to pay court fee only because the petitioner did not disclose the movables in the house where he resides in the schedule annexed to the application. I have tried to show that that is not a ground in this case to call upon the petitioner to pay the court fee. Since he is not shown to be a pauper he should be allowed to sue informa pauperis, And i order accordingly.

    10. In the result, This revision petition is allowed. The order of the lower court is set aside and the application to sue informa pauperis filed by the petitioner in the lower court is allowed. In the nature of this case the parties shall bear their costs.

    allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kunjuraman v. The United India Fire And General Insurance Co. Ltd., Madras And Others
    (Jul 26, 1976)