AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 25A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 25A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The management challenged the findings in exhibit P2, an award of the fourth respondent (the Industrial Tribunal), concerning Issue (1) referred to the Tribunal: “The seasonal closure of the copra purchase depot, Alleppey.” The Tribunal found that the management's intermittent closures of the Alleppey depot could not be considered just and reasonable and were not acceptable managerial functions. On that basis the Tribunal directed that the management grant continuity of service to the workmen from their date of entry into service, declared that the management was not entitled to close the Alleppey establishment intermittently as in the past, and directed that the management shall not impose seasonal closure with effect from the date of the award until the Government gave a decision to that effect.

Exhibit P3 (a statement of operating and closed periods of the Kannitta/depot from 1962 onward) was produced with the writ petition and showed intermittent closures over multiple years. The intermittent closing led to the reference of the issue to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal found as a fact that closures had occurred during certain months; it rejected the management's reasons for closure as not genuine, concluded that copra at Alleppey could not be treated as a seasonal business (relying on the existence of other Kannittas operating throughout the year), and held that the intermittent closures were deliberate acts with an ulterior motive to defeat workers' rights.

The petitioner (management) filed a writ petition challenging the Tribunal's findings on two points and sought relief from this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under S. 25A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the question of whether an industrial establishment is of a seasonal character (or whether work is performed only intermittently) is for the determination of the appropriate Government rather than the Industrial Tribunal.
  2. Whether it is within the managerial right of the employer to close down an industrial establishment intermittently (i.e., whether the management has the right to close down the depot at its discretion).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Management's) Arguments

  • The management argued that S. 25A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act vests the question of seasonal character of an establishment in the appropriate Government, and therefore the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to decide that question without referring it to the Government.
  • The management contended that it is within its managerial right to close down an industrial establishment intermittently; this argument was advanced on the assumption (without conceding) that the Alleppey depot was not a seasonal establishment.
  • The petitioner's counsel relied on the Division Bench decision in Dalmia International v. Industrial Tribunal [1974—II L.L.J 90] to support the proposition that where the seasonal-character question arises on the pleadings the Tribunal should refer the question to the appropriate Government or direct the parties to seek the Government's decision and postpone adjudication until that decision is obtained.
  • The petitioner further argued (by reliance on other authorities) that a Tribunal cannot properly probe the motive of management for closing an establishment where the fact of closure is established, and that managerial discretion to close an undertaking is protected.

Tribunal's Findings / Position

  • The Tribunal found as a factual matter that intermittent closures of the Alleppey depot had occurred in various months each year (as supported by exhibit P3).
  • The Tribunal concluded that copra cannot be considered a seasonal business at Alleppey, noting that several other Kannittas in Alleppey operate year-round.
  • On that basis the Tribunal treated the management's closures as unjust and unreasonable managerial action, done deliberately to defeat workers' rights, and directed continuity of service and a prohibition on intermittent (seasonal) closures until the Government decided otherwise.
  • The Tribunal did not accept the reasons put forward by the management for intermittent closures, finding those reasons not genuine.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dalmia International v. Industrial Tribunal [1974—II L.L.J 90] Where the question of seasonal character arises on the pleadings, the matter is for the appropriate Government; the Tribunal should either refer the question to the Government or direct the parties to obtain the Government's decision and postpone adjudication under S.25A(2). The Court held that the Tribunal should have followed this approach and either referred the question to the appropriate Government or directed the parties to move the Government; the Tribunal's failure to do so was an error.
Workmen of Straw Board Manufacturing Company, Ltd. v. Straw Board Manufacturing Company, Ltd. [1974 II L.L.N 102] Once a closure has in fact taken place, the motive of the employer for closure is ordinarily irrelevant; exceptions exist where the closure is a sham or business is carried on in some other form. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the Tribunal should not have gone into the management's motive once the fact of intermittent closure was established.
Kalinga Tubes v. Their Workmen [1969—I L.L.J 557] The Tribunal/Court must consider the entire set of circumstances to determine if there has been a closure; once a factual closure is found, motive is not a relevant inquiry for invalidating the closure. The Court used this authority to support the proposition that motive is not relevant once factual closure is established and to criticize the Tribunal's focus on alleged ulterior motives.
Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1002] Once an employer has closed its factory as a matter of fact, the Tribunal need not examine the motive behind the closure; such a closure does not necessarily give rise to an industrial dispute. The Court cited this decision to reinforce that the Tribunal should not have gone into motive after finding closures and that closure, once established, is decisive for certain purposes.
Andhra Prahba, Ltd. v. Madras Union of Journalists [1968—I L.L.J 15] Used among the authorities establishing limits on inquiry into motive once closure is found. Referenced as part of the body of authority indicating that motive is immaterial where closure is factual; the Court relied on this line of authorities.
Workers of Pudukottah Textile Mills v. Pudukottah Textile Mills (Civil Appeal No.1005 of 1963) (unreported) Authority for the proposition that Tribunal should not inquire into motive once closure is established; cited and followed in later cases. Used in the chain of authorities to support the Court's conclusion that motive is ordinarily irrelevant where closure has in fact occurred.
Excel Wear v. Union of India [1978 II L.L.N 482] Management has a fundamental right as part of carrying on business to close down an undertaking; provisions unduly restricting that right (e.g., S.25-O) may infringe Art. 19(1)(g). The Court relied on Excel Wear to emphasize that the decision to close an enterprise is a managerial right and that Tribunals cannot interfere with bona fide managerial decisions to close.
Workmen of Indian Leaf Tobacco Dev. Co., Ltd., Guntur v. Indian Leaf Tobacco Dev. Co., Ltd. (1970 L. & I.C. 755) Closure is an act of management within its discretion; a Tribunal in a reference under S.10(1)(d) cannot direct a company to continue a part of the business it has decided to shut down. The Court cited this authority to support the principle that the Tribunal lacks power to compel continuation of parts of a business against managerial decision.
Parry & Co., Ltd. v. Judge, Second Industrial Tribunal (1970 L. & I.C. 1071) Management's discretion to organize and arrange business is protected; a Tribunal should not question bona fide managerial reorganization decisions except where victimization or unfair labour practices are shown. The Court relied on this case to underline that tribunals cannot inquire into managerial business decisions (such as closure) so long as they are bona fide and not actuated by victimization.
Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Company, Ltd. [1979 I L.L.N 336] A Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of the reference; where the reference presumes a closure and asks whether closure is proper and justified, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to inquire whether there was in fact a closure or whether the closure was a pretence. The Court referred to this decision to discuss limits on a Tribunal's inquiry when the reference is premised on an assumed fact of closure; it was used in considering whether the Tribunal needed to decide the seasonal-character question when it had found a factual closure.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a step-by-step manner informed by the facts found by the Tribunal and existing authority:

  1. The Court noted the Tribunal's factual finding that the depot at Alleppey had been closed intermittently in various months of multiple years (as supported by exhibit P3) and that the Tribunal concluded copra at Alleppey was not a seasonal business.
  2. Addressing the petitioner's first point, the Court observed the Division Bench decision in Dalmia International v. Industrial Tribunal and agreed with the petitioner's contention that where the question whether an establishment is seasonal arises on the pleadings, that question falls within the province of the appropriate Government under S.25A(2). The Tribunal should either have referred the question to the Government or directed the parties to seek the Government's decision and postponed adjudication until the Government had decided.
  3. The Court emphasized established Supreme Court authorities which hold that once the fact of closure is admitted or established, a Tribunal is not entitled to go into the employer's motive in effecting closure (citing Workmen of Straw Board Manufacturing Co., Indian Hume Pipe Co., Kalinga Tubes, Andhra Prahba, and related decisions). The Court quoted para.19 of the Straw Board decision to show the settled rule that motive ceases to be relevant once there is factual closure, except where closure is a sham or the business continues in another form.
  4. The Court accepted the petitioner's submission (supported by authority such as Excel Wear, Workmen of Indian Leaf Tobacco, and Parry & Co.) that it is a managerial right to decide whether to close an industrial establishment and that Tribunals cannot interfere with bona fide managerial discretion to close or reorganize business. The Court highlighted that interference with that right may impinge on fundamental rights to carry on business and reiterated that tribunals lack power to compel continuation of a business operation decided by management to be shut down.
  5. The Court considered the submission based on Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat that, insofar as the reference was premised on the fact of closure and the Tribunal found intermittent closures, the Tribunal need not have proceeded to decide seasonal-character in a manner that displaced the appropriate Government's role. The Court noted it was unnecessary to delve further into whether the closure was a pretence or for victimization in resolving the impugned portion of the award.
  6. On these combined bases — the statutory allocation of the seasonal-character question to the appropriate Government (per S.25A(2) and Dalmia) and the limits on Tribunal inquiry into motive and managerial discretion (per cited Supreme Court authorities) — the Court concluded that the Tribunal erred in its approach to Issue (1).

Holding and Implications

Holding:
The award made by the Industrial Tribunal on Issue (1) (the question of seasonal closure of the copra purchasing depot at Alleppey) is set aside.

Immediate consequences and directions:

  • The Court directed the Industrial Tribunal to reconsider Issue (1) afresh in light of the principles of law stated in this opinion and the authorities of this Court and the Supreme Court to which the Court adverted.
  • The Court indicated that, consistent with Dalmia, the appropriate Government (under S.25A(2)) has the jurisdiction to decide whether the establishment is of a seasonal character; the Tribunal should either refer the question to the Government or direct the parties to move the Government for its decision and postpone determination until that decision is obtained.
  • The Court made clear that where the fact of closure is established, the Tribunal should not ordinarily go into the motive of management for the closure (except in cases where closure is a sham or pretence to circumvent law), and emphasized the managerial right to decide to close an establishment.
  • The writ petition was allowed to the extent indicated (i.e., setting aside the award on Issue (1) and directing reconsideration). There was no order as to costs.

Broader legal impact:
The opinion applies and reiterates existing principles from earlier decisions regarding the division of functions between Tribunals and the appropriate Government under S.25A(2), and the limits on Tribunal scrutiny of managerial decisions to close an undertaking. The Court did not purport to create new precedent beyond applying these established principles to the facts of the case.

    Tata Oil Mills Company, Ltd. v. Workmen Of Kannitta Establishment

    1. The management impugns the findings in exhibit P2 award of the fourth respondent, Industrial Tribunal, so far as it concerns issue (1) referred to the said Tribunal. The said Issue reads:

    “(1) The seasonal closure of the copra purchase depot, Alleppey.”

    The finding thereon, entered by the Tribunal is that:

    “This action of the management can never be considered to be just and reasonable and can never be accepted as one of the managerial functions.”

    On that basis, the Tribunal passed an award directing that:

    “the management shall grant them (workmen) continuity of service from the date of their entry into service.”

    The Tribunal, also, by exhibit P2 award declared that:

    “the management is not entitled to close their establishment at Alleppey intermittently as they have been doing in the past,”

    and on that basis further directed that the management

    “shall not impose the so-called seasonal closure with effect from the date of this award till they get the decision of the Government to that effect.”

    2. Exhibit P3 produced along with this writ petition shows that the management used to close down the copra purchasing depot at Alleppey intermittently. It will be advantageous to extract exhibit P3 herein:

    “Statement showing the periods during which the Kannitta functioned and remained closed each year from 1962 onwards.

    Functioned Closed From To Period From To Period 9 2 62 12 10 62 0 8 3 12 10 62 15 2 63 0 4 2 15 2 63 28 9 63 0 7 13 28 9 63 16 1 64 0 3 18 16 1 64 2 10 64 0 8 17 2 10 64 22 2 65 0 4 19 22 2 65 16 10 66 1 7 24 16 10 66 27 1 67 0 3 10 27 1 67 10 6 67 0 4 14 10 6 67 26 3 68 0 9 15 26 3 68 31 10 68 0 7 5 31 10 62 4 3 69 0 4 3 4 3 69 14 9 69 0 6 10 14 9 69 1 4 70 0 5 14 1 4 70 31 7 70 0 4 0 31 7 70 17 2 71 0 6 16 17 2 71 4 1 73 1 10 23 4 1 73 12 3 73 0 2 7 12 3 73 24 11 75 2 8 12 24 11 75 continuing.

    It is such intermittent closing that led to the reference of the issue to the Industrial Tribunal. Discussing that issue the Tribunal found that, as a matter of fact there had been closures during certain months in the year. According to the Tribunal such closure by the management was on the plea that it was a seasonal closure. The Tribunal took the view that “copra cannot be considered as a seasonal business at Alleppey.” In support of the aforesaid view, the Tribunal relied on the fact that several other Kannittas in Alleppey are working throughout the year. On that basis the Tribunal was of the view that the closure as aforesaid by the management was a deliberate act purposely done with the ulterior motive of defeating the rights of the workers. On that basis and taking into account the fact that the workmen could not be entitled to wages during the period the depot is closed, it held that the closure of the concern intermittently was quite unjustifiable and opposed to natural justice. The Tribunal did not accept the reasons put forward by the management for the intermittent closures, in so far as in its view such reasons were not genuine or true. However, the Tribunal found, as a matter of fact, the management is closing the concern intermittently, though according to the Tribunal it was at the management's will and pleasure. The Tribunal did not accept the management's contention that it is within their right to close down the depot intermittently. In passing the award, the Tribunal appears to have been influenced by the fact that it will be a travesty of justice on the part of the management to close down the depot, throwing out the workmen without employment for months together in an year.

    3. The petitioner challenging the aforesaid findings of the Tribunal raised two points before me, that is:

    (1) under S. 25A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the question as to whether an industrial establishment is of a seasonal character or whether work is performed therein only intermittently is a question to be decided by the appropriate Government and not by the Industrial Tribunal; and

    (2) it is within the management's right to close down an industrial establishment.

    The second point is taken on the assumption, without conceding, that the copra purchasing depot at Alleppey is not an industrial establishment of a seasonal character. So far as the first point is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the Division Bench decision of this Court in Dalmia International v. Industrial Tribunal [1974—II L.L.J 90]. That decision, in my view, supports the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner-management. The Division Bench in that case said that where it is necessary for the Tribunal to decide the question as to the seasonal character of the industrial establishment because that is a matter that arises on the pleadings of parties before it, that is a matter to be decided by the appropriate Government and,

    “it would have been open to the Tribunal, either to refer the question for decision by the appropriate Government, or to direct the parties to move the appropriate Government to give its decision and postpone the decision of the question referred to the Tribunal till the Government had given its decision on the matter involved under S. 25A (2).”

    4. The question referred to the Tribunal related to the seasonal closure of copra purchasing depot at Alleppey. On the pleadings of parties the issue arose as to whether the industrial establishment at Alleppey was of a seasonal character or not. In that view the appropriate Government and that Government alone has jurisdiction to decide that question. The Tribunal should have adopted one or the other of the methods stated by this Court in Dalmia International v. Industrial Tribunal [1974—II L.L.J 197] (vide supra).

    5. The Tribunal has taken the view that the establishment at Alleppey is not of a seasonal character and thereafter proceeded to hold that the intermittent closure every year by the management of their depot at Alleppey was unjust and unreasonable. On this point, it should be noticed, that where the factum of closure is admitted or established, it is not for the Tribunal to go into the question as to the motive of the management to close down the establishment. This is clear from the decisions of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Straw Board Manufacturing Company, Ltd. v. Straw Board Manufacturing Company, Ltd. [1974 II L.L.N 102]; Kalinga Tubes v. Their workmen [1969—I L.L.J 557]; Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [A.I.R 1968 S.C 1002] and Andhra Prahba, Ltd. v. Madras Union of Journalists [1968—I L.L.J 15], as also the unreported decision of that Court in Workers of Pudukottah Textile Mills v. Pudukottah Textile Mills (Civil Appeal No. 1005 of 1963] referred to and followed in Kalinga Tubes v. Their workmen (vide supra). In the first of the decisions referred to above Workmen of Straw Board Manufacturing Company v. Straw Board Manufacturing Company) (vide supra), the Supreme Court pointed out as follows in Para. 19, at page 109:

    “…The workmen cannot question the motive of the closure once closure has taken place in fact. The matter may be different if under the guise of closure, the establishment is being carried on in some shape or form or at a different place and the closure is only a ruse or pretence. Once the Court comes to the conclusion that there is closure of an undertaking the motive of the employer ordinarily ceases to be relevant. No employer can be compelled to carry on his business if he chooses to close it in truth and reality for reasons of his own …”

    In Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (vide supra), also the Supreme Court said that:

    “…Once the Tribunal finds that an employer has closed its factory as a matter of fact it is not concerned to go into the question as to the motive which guided him and to come to a conclusion that because of the previous history of the dispute between the employer and the employees the closure was not justified.”

    It was further pointed out in that decision that,

    “such a closure cannot give rise to an industrial dispute.”

    To the same effect is the other decision in the same volume of the journal — Kalinga Tubes v. Their workmen (vide supra). After referring to the decision of the Court in Workers of Pudukkottah Textile Mills v. Pudukkottah Textile Mills (vide supra), the Supreme Court said as follows therein:

    “The discussion of the above decisions yields the result that the entire set of circumstances and facts have to be taken into account while endeavouring to find out if, in fact, there has been a closure and the Tribunal or the Court is not confined to any particular set of facts or circumstances. In one case the management may decide to close down an undertaking because of financial or purely business reasons. In another case it may decide in favour of closure when faced with a situation in which it is considered either dangerous or hazardous from the point of view of the safety of the administrative staff or members of the management or even the employees themselves to carry on the business. The essence of the matter, therefore, is the factum of closure by whatever reasons motived.”

    6. Learned counsel for the petitioner is also well-founded in his submission that it is the managerial right to decide as to whether it should close an industrial establishment or not and in the matter of exercising such right the Tribunal cannot interfere. In Excel Wear v. Union of India [1978 II L.L.N 482], considering the constitutional validity of S. 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Supreme Court pointed out as follows in Para. 34, at page 498:

    “Sri Desmukh's argument that a right to close down a business is a right appurtenant to the ownership of the property and not an integral part of the right to carry on the business is not correct. We have already said so. The properties are the undertaking and the business assets invested therein. The owner cannot be asked to part with them or destroy them by not permitting him to close down the undertaking. In a given case for his mismanagement of the undertaking resulting in bad relationship with the labour or incurring recurring losses the undertaking may be taken over by the State. That will be affecting the property right with which we are not concerned in this case. It will also be consistent with the object of making India a Socialist State. But not to permit the employer to close down is essentially an interference with his fundamental right to carry on the business.”

    Section 25-O discussed in the aforesaid decision required ninety days' notice to be given by the management of its intention to close down its undertaking and Sub-sec. (2) thereof enables the appropriate Government, if it is satisfied that the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking are not adequate and sufficient or the closure is prejudicial to the public interest, by order, to direct the employer not to close down such undertaking. The Supreme Court struck down the aforesaid provision for the reason that the same is violative of the management's fundamental right to carry on business enshrined in Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. To the same effect are the decisions of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Company, Ltd., Guntur v. Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Company, Ltd., Guntur [1970 L. & I.C 755] and Parry & Co., Ltd. v. Judge, Second Industrial Tribunal [1970 L. & I.C 1071]. In Workmen of Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Company, Ltd., Guntur v. Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Company, Ltd., Guntur (vide supra), the Supreme Court pointed out that the closure which may be treated as apart of the activity or business of the company, “is an act of management which is entirely in the discretion of the company carrying on the business.” It was further laid down therein that the Industrial Tribunal cannot, in a reference under S. 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, interfere with discretion exercised in such a matter and the Tribunal would have no power to direct a company to continue a part of the business which the company has decided to shut down. In Parry & Co., Ltd. v. Judge, Second Industrial Tribunal (vide supra), also that Court said that:

    “It is well established that it is within the managerial discretion of an employer to organize and arrange his business in the manner he considers best. So long as that is done bona fide it is not competent of a Tribunal to question its propriety. If a scheme for such reorganization results in surplusage of employees no employer is expected to carry the burden of such economic dead-weight and retrenchment has to be accepted as inevitable, however unfortunate it is. The Legislature realized this position and, therefore, provided by S. 25F compensation to soften the blow of hardship resulting from an employee being thrown out of employment through no fault of his. It is not the function of the Tribunal, therefore, to go into the question whether such a scheme is profitable or not and whether it should have been adopted by the employer.”

    The said decision also lays down that it is a matter of discretion for the management to decide whether a particular policy in running the business will be “profitable, economic or convenient” and said that there is no provision in the industrial law which confers any power on the Tribunal

    “to inquire into such a decision so long as it is not actuated by any consideration for victimization or any such unfair labour practice”.

    7. It is also necessary to refer to the decision in Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Company, Ltd. [1979 I L.L.N 336]. That decision is to the effect that the Tribunal cannot go behind the reference. The Supreme Court said therein as follows in Para. 11, at page 338:

    “…The very terms of the references show that the point of dispute between the parties was not the fact of the closure of its business by the respondent but the propriety and justification of the respondent's decision to close down the business. That is why the references were expressed to say whether the proposed closure of the business was proper and justified. In other words, by the references, the Tribunals were not called upon by the Government to adjudicate upon the question as to whether there was in fact a closure of business or whether under the pretence of closing the business the workers were locked out by the management. The references being limited to the narrow question as to whether the closure was proper and justified, the Tribunals by the very terms of the references, had no jurisdiction to go behind the fact of closure and inquire into the question whether the business was in fact closed down by the management.”

    The submission based on this decision is that the reference was made on the premise that there had been closure and the Tribunal, as a matter of fact, found that there had been intermittent closures every year. On that basis it is contended on behalf of the petitioner-management that in so far as the reference is on the premise that there had been closure and that fact has been found by the Tribunal, it was not necessary to embark upon the question as to whether the undertaking was of a seasonal character or not. Explaining further the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that irrespective of the decision on the question whether the undertaking is seasonal in character or not, it was perfectly within the right of the management to close down the depot intermittently. In that connexion the learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that there is no case that the closure was only a pretended closure or a rule in order to victimize the workers of the establishment. It appears to me that it is not necessary for me to go in to that question with reference to the impugned portion of the award, though issue (1) appears to be on the premise of intermittent closures of the depot every year and the Tribunal has, as a matter of fact, found that there had been intermittent closures.

    8. In view of what is stated above, it is necessary to set aside the award on Issue (I) referred to the Tribunal. I do so. I direct the Tribunal to go into that question afresh in the light of what is stated herein and with reference to the principles of law as laid down by this Court and by the Supreme Court to which I have adverted to. This writ petition is allowed to the above extent. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order regarding costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Tata Oil Mills Company, Ltd. v. Workmen Of Kannitta Establishment
    (Oct 15, 1979)