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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provision in S. 3 of the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, 13 of 1955
  • sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of Clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S. 75.
  • S. 80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act)
  • S. 55 of the Indian Easements Act,
  • Kerala Land Reforms Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provision in S. 3 of the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, 13 of 1955
  • sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of Clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S. 75.
  • S. 80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act)
  • S. 55 of the Indian Easements Act,
  • Kerala Land Reforms Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Civil Revision Petition)

Factual and Procedural Background

The 1st respondent filed an application under S. 80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act claiming the right to purchase his alleged kudikidappu, stating he had been residing on the premises since 1952 as a kudikidappukaran. The 1st petitioner opposed the application, contending that the house had been entrusted to the 1st respondent's father (Neelakantan) and that after the father's death the 1st respondent alone could not maintain the application without other legal heirs. There were also disputes on the value of the building and on the identity of persons in possession (including an allegation that the paramba had been gifted to a son, Manu, and later occupied by his wife), leading to the impleading of that person as the 2nd petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition.

The Revenue Inspector assessed the building's cost at Rs. 702.50 with an estimated age of 25 years. The Land Tribunal accepted the report, declared the 1st respondent a kudikidappukaran, and allowed him to purchase 9 cents adjoining the kudikidappu. The Appellate Authority confirmed the Land Tribunal's order. The land owners then approached this Court by way of Civil Revision Petition challenging those decisions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the 1st respondent can be held to be a kudikidappukaran entitled to purchase adjoining land when the entrustment (permission) alleged by him was, according to petitioners, granted only to his deceased father.
  2. Whether the 1st respondent's claim fails for non-joinder of other legal heirs of the deceased father, if any, where the entrustment was allegedly to the father alone.
  3. Whether, under Explanation IIA to S. 2(25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and related authorities, occupation without the landowner's permission disentitles a person from claiming kudikidappukaran status.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (land owners') Arguments

  • The entrustment (permission to occupy) was only to the 1st respondent's father, Neelakantan; therefore the 1st respondent cannot claim kudikidappukaran status in his own right.
  • In the absence of proof of entrustment to the 1st respondent, the applicant (1st respondent) failed to establish the essential element of permissive occupation required for kudikidappukaran status.
  • The petition is not maintainable without joinder of other legal heirs of the deceased father (if any existed), so non-joinder would be fatal to the application.
  • There was a dispute as to the value of the building and potential competing possessory claims (alleged gift to son Manu and subsequent possession by his wife), making other persons necessary parties.

Respondent's (applicant's) Position as Reflected in the Record

  • The 1st respondent stated he had been residing in the premises since 1952 as a kudikidappukaran (kudikidappukaran claim based on long occupation).
  • The application asserted permissive occupation (entrustment) and sought purchase of 9 cents adjoining the kudikidappu; the Land Tribunal and Appellate Authority accepted his claim and the Revenue Inspector's valuation report, leading to allowance of purchase.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Janardhanan v. Chinna (1972 KLT. 207) Cited as authority that a person whose occupation lacked the landowner's permission could not avail Explanation IIA to S. 2(25) to be deemed a kudikidappukaran. The Court relied on the principle to underline that permissive occupation (permission of the landowner) is essential; however, it distinguished the present case on its facts (rights devolving from a deceased kudikidappukaran to heirs).
Chinnan v. Gopinathan (1975 KLT. 50) Placed with other decisions indicating that occupation without landowner's permission disqualifies a person from taking advantage of Explanation IIA to S. 2(25). Used as part of the line of authority confirming the need for permission to invoke Explanation IIA; court considered these authorities in assessing permissive occupation arguments.
Mohamed Mytheen v. Sreedharan (1976 KLT. 919) Another decision cited to support the proposition that lack of the landowner's permission prevents reliance on Explanation IIA. Included among the decisions the Court cited to explain statutory interpretation of permissive occupation; helped frame the legal background though the Court found facts distinguishing application here.
Sankaran v. Kumaran (1977 KLT. 275) Cited with the other authorities to the same effect regarding the necessity of permission for Explanation IIA. Formed part of the jurisprudential context; the Court treated these cases collectively when discussing the scope of Explanation IIA.
Amjad Khan v. Shafiuddin Khan (1925 All. 203) Authority for the proposition that where a licensee erects a building in pursuance of a licence, the licence becomes irrevocable as between the original parties; such a right is heritable though not alienable. The Court invoked this authority to support the conclusion that a permission granted to the father (if acted upon by building) would devolve to heirs and not render the 1st respondent a person in occupation without permission.
Nasirul Zaman Khan v. Azimullah (28 All. 741) Cited (among others) as supportive jurisprudence regarding the nature of licences and their consequences when a licensee builds on land. Referenced as part of the group of cases that establish the licence/licensee principles; the Court relied on this group to explain that such rights may be irrevocable and heritable.
Motilal v. Kabi Mandar (19 C.L.J. 221) Listed among cases referred to by Katiar concerning licensee rights becoming irrevocable when acted upon. Used as part of the cited authorities supporting the general proposition about irrevocable licenses; the Court grouped it with similar cases in its analysis.
Surnomoyee v. Chandar (12 C.L.J. 443) Another case cited in the same series supporting the license/irrevocability principle. Included in the cluster of authorities relied upon to explain that a license followed by building works becomes irrevocable as between the original parties and is heritable.
Narayana Prabhu v. Ratna Bai (XVI CLR. 438) Decision where a judge equated the position of kudikidappukaran to that of a licensee and stated that the license is irrevocable when acted upon by construction of a permanent structure. The Court referenced this case to illustrate the judicial view equating kudikidappukaran status with an irrevocable licence when substantial work has been performed in reliance on the licence.
Gangadharan v. Mominic Gomes (1958 KLJ. 481) Discussed accessory licenses and their implication under S. 55 of the Indian Easements Act — that licenses necessary for enjoyment of an interest are implied and continue while the interest continues. The Court relied upon this decision (and its exposition of S. 55 principles) to explain that accessory licenses that are necessary for enjoyment of a homestead continue and can be enforced even against transferees in appropriate circumstances.
Butterly Co. Ltd. v. New Huck-wall Colliery Co. (1910 A.C. 381) Authority cited for the general principle that when the use of something is granted, everything necessary for enjoyment of that use is implied (supporting the accessory licenses concept). The Court cited this English authority to buttress the concept of accessory licenses that accompany an enjoyment right and persist while the principal interest continues.
CRP No. 1659 of 1976 (decision of this Court) Decision where a person residing with another (to whom permission had been given) was held not to have the landowner's permission in law for the purposes of the kudikidappukaran status; landlord's permission alone matters. The Court considered this decision, quoted it, but distinguished it on the facts — here the right was claimed as devolution from a deceased kudikidappukaran, not as a mere co-occupant without landlord's permission.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by analyzing both the factual record and the applicable legal principles as follows:

  1. The 1st respondent's application stated long-term residence since 1952 as a kudikidappukaran; the Land Tribunal accepted the Revenue Inspector's valuation and made an affirmative finding of kudikidappukaran status, which the Appellate Authority confirmed.
  2. The core legal contention before the Court was whether the 1st respondent could be regarded as a kudikidappukaran where, according to the petitioners, the original permission (entrustment) had been given only to the respondent's father and not to the respondent himself.
  3. The Court recognized the established principle (from Explanation IIA to S. 2(25) and cited authorities) that permissive occupation — occupation with the landowner's permission — is an essential element of kudikidappukaran status; a person whose occupation did not commence with the landowner's permission would not be entitled to rely on Explanation IIA.
  4. The Court then examined the legal consequences where permission had been granted to the father. It noted that if the father had been a kudikidappukaran who acted upon the permission (for example, by erecting a dwelling), then under general law such a license becomes irrevocable as between original parties and the right is heritable (though not alienable). The Court cited authorities (Amjad Khan, Narayana Prabhu, and others) to establish this proposition.
  5. The Court also discussed accessory licenses: when an interest or right is enjoyed, licenses necessary for that enjoyment are implied (reference to S. 55 of the Indian Easements Act and Gangadharan), and such accessory licenses continue while the principal interest continues. The Court cited Butterly Co. as supporting authority for the accessory-license concept.
  6. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that even if initial permission had been granted only to the father, the father's right (if he was a kudikidappukaran and had acted on the permission) would devolve upon his heirs (including the 1st respondent) under S. 78 of the Act. Thus the 1st respondent could not be said to be in possession without the landowner's permission.
  7. The petitioners' reliance on CRP No.1659 of 1976 and the line of cases that require landlord's permission were considered. The Court distinguished CRP No.1659 on the facts because that case dealt with a person merely residing with someone to whom permission had been granted (i.e., a co-occupant without landlord's permission), whereas in the present matter the applicant claimed succession from a deceased kudikidappukaran.
  8. Regarding the contention of non-joinder of other legal representatives, the Court observed there was no evidence in the record showing that the 1st respondent's father had left other legal representatives; consequently non-joinder was not shown to be fatal in this instance.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision Petition is DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • The impugned orders of the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority declaring the 1st respondent a kudikidappukaran and permitting purchase of 9 cents adjoining the kudikidappu stand affirmed by this Court.
  • The Court found no basis to interfere: it concluded that even on the petitioners' contentions the 1st respondent's claim could be sustained by devolution of the father's rights (if any) to the respondent and there was no proof of other heirs whose absence from the proceeding rendered the petition unsustainable.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle; it applies existing authorities on permissive occupation, irrevocability of licences acted upon, accessory licenses, and devolution of rights under the Act to the facts presented.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal conclusions beyond the text of that opinion.

    Mariam v. Choolan

    1. The land owners have approached this Court questioning the decision on an application initiated under S. 80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act) by the 1st respondent for purchase of his alleged kudikidappu. The 1st respondent in his application had stated that he has been residing in the premises from 1952 onwards as a kudikidappukaran. That application was opposed by the 1st petitioner herein, who was alone on the party array as the respondent. She contended that the house referred to in the petition had been entrusted to the father of the 1st respondent, one Neelakantan. After his death, the 1st respondent alone is not entitled to file the application without other legal heirs of deceased Neelakantan. Regarding the value of the building also there was some dispute. She had also contended that the paramba in which the building is situate had been gifted to his son, Manu, and after his death his wife was in possession of the property and she was a necessary party to the proceeding. Consequently that party was also impleaded, who now figures as the 2nd petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition. The Revenue Inspector estimated the cost of the building at Rs. 702.50 and estimated the old age as 25 years. Accepting this report, the Land Tribunal declared the 1st respondent as a kudikidappukaran and 9 cents was allowed to be purchased by him adjoining the kudikidappu. The matter was taken up in appeal and the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of the Land Tribunal.

    2. What was mainly contended before me in this Civil Revision Petition was that there was no entrustment of the house to the 1st respondent and therefore the 1st respondent cannot claim to be a kudikidappukaran.

    3. It was contended that the lower tribunals erred in holding that the 1st respondent is a kudikidappukaran, as the entrustment was only to his father. It might be useful in this connection to say how the appellate authority has discussed this question. What that authority states is that:

    “The case of the petitioner in the application is that he obtained the building in question about 45 years back. That the petitioner is in possession and occupation of the petition building is not disputed. That the entrustraent was to the father of the petitioner has not been established by the production of any document. As such the contention that the application is bad for non-joinder also cannot be upheld.”

    4. What Smt. Sumathi Dandapani, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended before me was that it is for the applicant to establish that he is a kudikidappukaran, as his allegation that he was entrusted with the building had been denied. In the absence of positive proof with regard to that the Tribunals below should not have allowed the application for purchase. She also contended that the applicant would not be entitled to take advantage of the Explanation IIA to S. 2(25) of the Act, which defines a kudikidappukaran. It is no doubt true that the permissive nature of his occupation is an essential element for claiming to be a kudikidappukaran. Though in Explanation IIA it had been stated that notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, a person, who, on the 16th day of August, 1968, was in occupation of any land and the dwelling house thereon (whether constructed by him or by any of his predecessors-in-interest or belonging to any other person) and continued to be in such occupation till the 1st day of January, 1970, shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran, a person whose occupation has not commenced with the permission of the land owner will not be entitled to take advantage of that explanation. The decisions reported in Janardhanan v. Chinna (1972 KLT. 207), Chinnan v. Gopinathan (1975 KLT. 50), Mohamed Mytheen v. Sreedharan (1976 KLT. 919) and Sankaran v. Kumaran (1977 KLT. 275) are to that effect. Then, here the question is, can it be said that even on the basis of the petitioners' contention the 1st respondent could be said to be a person who is in occupation of the building without the permission of the landowner. According to the petitioners, the permission was granted to the father of the 1st respondent to reside in the premises and it is also stated before me that permission had been granted to the respondent's father to have the use and occupation of the land for the purpose of erecting a homestead. There is no evidence in the case as to when the respondent's father died. If it is a case where the respondent's father died after the Act, then under S. 78 his right would have devolved on his heirs. S. 78 says that the rights of a kudikidappukaran in his kudikidappu shall be heritable but not alienable except to any person mentioned in sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of Clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S. 75. If he had died before the Kerala Land Reforms Act came into force, he was a kudikidappukaran in the nature of the permission granted to him under the general law and under the general law the position of the kudikidappukaran is more or less in the nature of a licencee who in pursuance of the licence had put up a building on a land. If a building had been put up in pursuance of such licence the licence had become irrevocable as between the original parties. It is well settled that the right of such a licensee is heritable though not alienable. (See Amjad Khan v. Shafiuddin Khan (1925 All. 203). It is useful to refer to Nasirul Zaman Khan v. Azimullah (28 All. 741). Motilal v. Kabi Mandar (19 C.L.J 221), Surnomoyee v. Chandar (12 C.L.J 443) etc. cases referred to by Katiar in his “Law of Easements and Licenses”, 3rd Edition, at page 405. In Narayana Prabhu v. Ratna Bai (XVI CLR. 438) an eminent Judge of the erstwhile Cochin Chief Court, Justice P. Narayana Menon, has equated the position of a kudikidappukaran to that of a licensee and said that his license is irrevocable, since even a mere license becomes irrevocable, when the licensee, acting upon the license, has executed work of a permament and substantial character and has incurred expenses in so doing though on the main question in the case, the other two equally eminent Judges did not agree with Justice Narayana Menon one of them Justice Varugis also stated that a license in pursuance of which a house was built on a land, is irrevocable as between the original parties. But then he said that it cannot be binding on a person who has purchased the grantor's right in court auction. A learned Judge of this Court had occasion to consider the position of a kudikidapdukaran under the general law. I am referring here to the decision of Justice Varadaraja Iyengar in Gangadharan v. Mominic Gomes (1958 KLJ. 481), where the learned Judge said:

    “According to the learned counsel, the only right claimable by the respondents was against eviction from the site of the house and reference was made to the provision in S. 3 of the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, 13 of 1955 that every “kudikidappukaran” in occupation of a “kudiyirippu” shall have a right of permanent occupancy in his kudiyirippu, which under the definition in S. 2(c) comprised only the site of a homestead. But this argument overlooks the rule as to accessory licenses, that when the use of a thing is granted, everything is granted by which the grantee may have and enjoy such use. That is to say, when a person is entitled to the enjoyment of any interest or to the exercise of any right, he is deemed to be entitled to do all acts which are necessary for such enjoyment or exercise, except it may be, to the extent of any express reservation requiring the grantee not to do certain acts. See S. 55 of the Indian Easements Act, which provides:

    “All licenses necessary for the enjoyment of any interest, or the exercise of any right are implied in the constitution of such interest or right.”

    So when the owner of that leaves it to a tenant for him and his family's residence he must be deemed to have given permission for what is reasonably necessary for the reasonable use and enjoyment of the flat for that purpose. Butterly Co. Ltd. v. New Huck-wall Colliery Co. (1910) A.C 381. And these accessory licenses continue so long as the interest or the right to which they are annexed continue. So if the original license cannot be revoked, e.g when the licensee acting upon the license has put up a permanent structure, the accessory licenses cannot likewise be revoked (i.e) they can both be enforced against all transferees of the property, whether or not a license is an appurtenance to the property transferred so as to run with it like any other appurtenance thereto, is always a question of fact which depends on the examination of all the relevant circumstances attending a particular case. The respondents cannot therefore be denied a right of action against the 1st defendant, if their accessory licenses are disturbed by any action of his.”

    5. The above discussion would lead to the conclusion that even assuming the petitioner's case is true that permission had been granted to the father of the respondents, the father's right as a kudikidappukaran had devolved on the 1st respondent and his other legal representatives. It cannot therefore be said that the 1st respondent was in possession without permission of the land owner. In this context the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision of this Court in CRP. No. 1659 of 1976 In that case a person began to reside with his brother to whom permission had been granted for occupying a hut. That person by himself had not got any permission. It had been contended in that case that by no stretch of imagination could it be said that the particular person who had been staying along with his brother till 1958 and thereafter without his brother could be characterised as a trespasser, and he would be entitled to take advantage of Explanation IIA in S. 2(25) of the Act. In meeting this contention, Justice Bhaskaran observed:

    “It may be that it was with permission of his brother that the revision petitioner was staying with him from 1943 onwards. All the same, in the eye of law, such occupation by him cannot be treated as with permission of the landlord, whose permission alone matters as far as the kudikidappu right is concerned as long as there is no evidence to show that permission was granted by the landlord.”

    6. The learned Judge there had quoted with approval the following observation of Justice Madhavan Nair in Janardhanan v. Chinna (1972 KLT. 207):

    “………A person in occupation by virtue of a right vested in another, e.g a wife, child, member of the family, or servant residing in a building or outhouse in virtue of a right in the husband, parent, manager of the family or master, cannot claim the status of a kudikidappukaran.”

    7. I do not think this decision would be applicable in this case. In this case the right is claimed by the legal representative of deceased kudikidappukaran. In regard to the contention of the petitioners that the petition is not maintainable in the absence of the other legal representatives, there is no evidence in this case to show that the 1st respondent's father had left other legal representatives. In the circumstances of the case, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

    8. Dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mariam v. Choolan
    (Mar 16, 1979)