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  • S. 101(1)(d) of the Kerala Municipalities Act.
  • Kerala Municipalities Act and the Rules.
  • S. 99 of the Kerala Municipalities Act.4.
  • S. 101 of the Kerala Municipalities Act.
  • sub-section (1)(d)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 101(1)(d) of the Kerala Municipalities Act.
  • Kerala Municipalities Act and the Rules.
  • S. 99 of the Kerala Municipalities Act.4.
  • S. 101 of the Kerala Municipalities Act.
  • sub-section (1)(d)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner operates a hospital located in Muvattupuzha Town and claims to be a charitable trust established by a trust deed dated 12 August 1976 (Ext. P1) and related settlements (Exts. P2 and P3), under which the hospital property was settled in favour of the trust. In the year 1978–79 the petitioner first claimed exemption from property tax under S. 101(1)(d) of the Kerala Municipalities Act.

The Commissioner of Muvattupuzha Municipality rejected the exemption claim by Ext. P5 order dated 22-3-1984. Ext. P5 recorded that the accounts showed charges were collected from patients (including room rent), treatment was not given free, and therefore the building was not used exclusively for charitable purposes. Ext. P5 stated that out of total collections of Rs. 4,28,646.10 a sum of Rs. 6,787.50 only was given for free treatment; it was also noted that Rs. 97,789/- was spent on salaries (inclusive of trustees' expenditure) and that there were no receipts shown under donations or voluntary contributions.

The petitioner had an appellate remedy under the Kerala Municipalities Act and the Rules, but the appeal required deposit of the entire amount before instituting the appeal. Instead, the petitioner invoked S. 45 of the Act and applied to the Government for cancellation of the Commissioner's order. The Government dismissed the petition by Ext. P8, finding that the petitioner was a family trust (not a society registered under the Charitable Societies Act), that the hospital charged all patients, and therefore the hospital building was not eligible for exemption under S. 101 of the Kerala Municipalities Act.

The petitioner challenged both Ext. P5 (Commissioner's order) and Ext. P8 (Government order) by filing the present original petition. The court ultimately quashed Exts. P5 and P8 and directed the 1st respondent to reconsider the matter afresh; the original petition was disposed of accordingly.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's land and building are "exclusively occupied and used for a charitable purpose" within the meaning of S. 101(1)(d) of the Kerala Municipalities Act.
  2. Whether the proviso to S. 101(1)(d) is satisfied — specifically, whether the society or body is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions, applies its profits or other income in promoting its objects, and does not pay dividends or bonuses to its members.
  3. Whether charging fees (including room rent and other charges) and paying salaries (including to trustees) precludes classification as a charitable institution for the purpose of property tax exemption under S. 101(1)(d).
  4. Whether the administrative orders (Ext. P5 and Ext. P8) denying exemption should be quashed and the matter remitted for fresh consideration in light of the statutory test and accounts.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Position

  • The petitioner asserted that it is a charitable trust created by the trust deed dated 12 August 1976 (Ext. P1) and related settlements (Exts. P2 and P3), and that the land and building are settled in favour of the trust.
  • The petitioner claimed the hospital was established, maintained and run for charitable objects set out in Ext. P1, which include running charitable hospitals, providing free medical aid to the poor, and giving financial help to people in penury.
  • By implication, the petitioner contended that the hospital building was exclusively occupied and used for charitable purposes and therefore entitled to exemption under S. 101(1)(d).

Commissioner / 1st Respondent (as recorded in Ext. P5)

  • The Commissioner found from the accounts produced that charges were collected from patients (including room rent) and that treatment was not given free to patients.
  • Ext. P5 recorded that out of total collections of Rs. 4,28,646.10 only Rs. 6,787.50 was given for free treatment (as stated in Ext. P5), and that Rs. 97,789/- was spent on salaries (inclusive of trustees' expenditure).
  • The Commissioner also observed that the income and expenditure statement did not show any receipts under donations or voluntary contributions, and concluded the proviso to S. 101(1)(d) was not satisfied and refused exemption.

Government / 3rd Respondent (as recorded in Ext. P8)

  • The Government found that the petitioner was a family trust run for the benefit of family members and not a society registered under the Charitable Societies Act.
  • The Government noted that the hospital charged all patients, however small the amount, and therefore held that the activity did not fall within the definition of "charitable purpose" for exemption under S. 101.
  • On that basis the Government dismissed the petition under S. 45 and refused to cancel the Commissioner's order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Re The Tribunal (7 ITR 415 (PC)) That the eleemosynary element (absolute free provision) is not essential for a purpose to be charitable; charging fees does not necessarily negate charitable character. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a hospital may charge paying patients and still be charitable; hence charging fees alone is not decisive against exemption.
CIT v. Breach Candy (27 ITR 279) Similar proposition that a hospital charging fees can still be a charitable institution; "charity" and "charitable purpose" are technical legal concepts, not limited to benefitting only the poor. Used to reinforce that fees charged and benefit to non-poor persons do not automatically disqualify an institution from being charitable for exemption purposes.
Williams v. IR (16 ITR Suppl. 41 (49) (HL)) Authority noting the complexity of defining "charity"; poverty is not a necessary element; trusts benefiting non-poor persons can still be charitable; trust may charge richer beneficiaries to finance charitable activities. Cited to explain that a charitable trust may lawfully charge richer persons and use income from such charges to further charitable objects; therefore charging does not ipso facto negate charitable status.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the statutory test under S. 101(1)(d) of the Kerala Municipalities Act: lands and buildings or portions thereof exclusively occupied and used for public worship or by a society/body for a charitable purpose are exempt, subject to the proviso that such society/body is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions, applies its profits or other income in promoting its objects and does not pay dividends or bonuses to members. The Explanation in the provision expressly includes medical relief within "charitable purpose."

The court examined the trust deed (Ext. P1) and summarized the declared charitable objects (running hospitals, providing free medical aid to the poor, educational and other charitable objects). It also described the powers given to the board of trustees (including raising funds and applying income) and noted the distinction between the objects of the trust and the administrative powers conferred on trustees.

The court reviewed settled law (as cited) that medical relief need not mean exclusively free treatment; a hospital may levy charges for certain wards or classes of patients and still be charitable. The court emphasized that the eleemosynary element is not essential; charging fees does not by itself defeat charitable character.

Turning to the administrative findings in Ext. P5 and Ext. P8, the court found that Ext. P5's denial of exemption rested on accounting figures showing collections and limited free treatment, payment of salaries (including to trustees), and absence of donations shown in the accounts. The court held that these findings were reached without a detailed examination of whether the amounts collected and expended were in fact applied to promote the trust's charitable objects and without proper consideration of whether the proviso to S. 101(1)(d) was satisfied.

The court identified specific factual inquiries that required examination: the purpose for which the income has been spent, the accounts for relevant years, whether the trust is supported wholly or partly by voluntary contributions, whether profits or other income have been applied to promote the trust's objects, and whether any payments to members in the nature of dividends or bonuses had been made. The court also noted that even if the trust deed did not contain an express clause prohibiting dividends or bonuses, the actual application of funds would need to be examined.

Because the Commissioner and the Government had not considered these matters in sufficient detail, the court concluded that an effective reconsideration was necessary and therefore quashed both administrative orders and remitted the matter to the first respondent for fresh consideration.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court quashed Exts. P5 and P8 (the Commissioner's order and the Government's order) and directed the 1st respondent to consider the petitioner's claim for exemption afresh. The original petition was disposed of.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the administrative orders denying exemption are set aside and the matter is remitted to the first respondent for a fresh, detailed consideration of the accounts and the statutory proviso under S. 101(1)(d).
  • The court instructed that the following be examined on reconsideration: the use of income (whether applied to charitable objects), the accounts across relevant years, whether the body is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions, and whether any dividends or bonuses have been paid to members.
  • The court did not lay down any new legal principle; it applied existing authorities to require a fact-sensitive reconsideration rather than endorsing the administrative findings. Therefore, no new precedent was created beyond the direction to reassess the factual and accounting basis for the exemption claim.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Nedumchalil Charitable Trust v. The Municipal Commissioner And Others

    1. The Original Petition is to quash Exts. P5 and P8 orders passed by the 1st and 3rd respondents. Petitioner is running a hospital in a building situated in the heart of Muvattupuzha Town. Petitioner claims to be a charitable Trust formed by Ext. P1 Trust Deed and by Exts. P2 and P3 settlements, the property in question also was settled in favour of the Trust. The Trust Deed is dated 12th August, 1976. For the first time in the year 1978-1979, petitioner claimed exemption from property tax under S. 101(1)(d) of the Kerala Municipalities Act. The claim was rejected by the Commissioner of Muvattupuzha Municipality by Ext. P5 order dated 22-3-1984 stating that the accounts produced showed that charges have been collected from patients including - room rent and treatment is not given free. It was, therefore, felt that the building cannot be said to be used exclusively for a charitable purpose. It is also stated in Ext. P5 that out of the total collection of Rs. 4,28,646.10, a sum of Rs. 6,787.50 only is given for free treatment. It is also seen that a sum of Rs. 97,789/- is spent for salary which is inclusive of the expenditure for the trustees, and further that the income and expenditure statement does not show any receipt under donation or voluntary contributions from the public for charitable purpose. He, therefore, found that the proviso to S. 101(1)(d) of the Kerala Municipalities Act is not satisfied for granting exemption.

    2. There is an appeal provided under the Kerala Municipalities Act and the Rules. But before availing the remedy by way of appeal, petitioner has to deposit the entire amount. That, of course, will not be a ground for not exhausting the statutory remedy, and the requirement of predeposit will not be a ground to say that the alternative remedy is adequate or efficient. But the petitioner availed of another remedy under S. 45 of the Act. S. 45(1) provides that: the Government may, by order in writing, suspend or cancel any resolution passed, order issued or licence or permission granted. Petitioner invoked the power under S. 45 for cancelling the order passed by the Commissioner. The Government passed Ext. P8 orderly which the petition filed before the Government was dismissed. The Government found that the petitioner is a family trust run for the benefit of the members of the family and it is not a society registered under the Charitable Societies Act. The Hospital charges all patients however small the amount and hence it does not come under the definition “charitable purpose”. Therefore, it was held that the hospital building is not eligible for any exemption from payment of property tax under S. 101 of the Kerala Municipalities Act. It is these orders, viz. Ext. P5 order of the Commissioner of Muvattupuzha Municipality and Ext. P8 order of the Government that are being challenged in this petition.

    3. Admittedly, the petitioner owns land and building and, normally, property tax will have to be imposed under S. 99 of the Kerala Municipalities Act.

    4. Every building will have to be assessed together with its site and other adjacent premises occupied as an appurtenance thereto unless the owner of the building is a different person from the owner of such site or premises. S. 101 gives exemption to certain buildings and lands from property tax. Petitioner claims exemption under S. 191(1)(d) which is extracted herein:

    “(d) lands and buildings or portions of lands and buildings exclusively occupied and used for public worship or by a society or body for a charitable purpose:

    Provided that such society or body is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions and applies its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects and does not pay any dividend or bonus to its members.

    Explanation:— “Charitable purpose” includes relief of the poor, education and medical relief but does not include a purpose which relates exclusively to religious teaching.”

    5. Petitioner claims exemption under the above provision. According to the petitioner, the land and building are exclusively occupied and used by the body for a charitable purpose. The charitable purpose has been enumerated in Ext. P1 trust deed, which is extracted below:

    “1) To establish, develop, maintain and run charitable hospitals, and nursing homes and convalescent homes. II) To establish, develop and run homes and institutions for destitute persons. III) To establish, develop, maintain and run educational institutions which exist solely for educational purposes and not for profit. IV) To offer financial aid to any of the institutions of the aforementioned kind which are run by other charitable trusts or institutions. V) To award scholarships and financial aid to deserving students for their education. VI) To give free medical aid to sick persons who are poor and VII) To give appropriate financial help to people in penury.”

    6. As capital fund of the Trust, a sum of Rs. 1,000/- each was donated by the trustees. There is power to augment the trust fund by receiving further donation or by setting apart the income of the Trust as will be decided by the trustees to be appropriate in order to further one or another of the objects of the trust. The Board of Trustees was given power to frame rules for the purpose of administration of the trust. The Board of trustees is also empowered to dispose of, in any manner, any of the properties of the Trust and to make new investments in conformity with the objects of the Trust and also raise loans from any of the Trustees or other persons or any financial institutions on the security of the properties of the trust, the interest payable on such loans being not in excess of the existing rates charged by banks. But no action shall be Inconsistent with the objects of the trust. Further, on winding up of the activities of the trust, all assets are to be handed over to any other trust or institution or other trusts or institutions having similar or substantially similar objects. These, in short, are the provisions of the trust deed.

    7. Of course, there is distinction between the objects of the trust and the power of the Trust. This is now well settled and, therefore, the objects of the trust should not be confused with the powers of the Trust. What is stated in S. 101(1)(d) for exemption is that the land and building inorder to rank for exemption, has to be exclusively occupied and used for charitable purposes. The explanation says that the charitable purpose will include relief of the poor, education and medical relief, but does not include a purpose which relates exclusively to religious teaching. The proviso to sub-section (1)(d) says that the society or body will be ranked for exemption only if the Society or body is supported wholly or partly by voluntary contributions and applies its profit, if any, or other income in promoting its objects and does not pay any dividend or bonus to its members. Usually there will be a clause in the trust deed itself stating that the income from the trust fund, whenever derived, shall be applied solely for promotion of its objects set forth in the deed and no portion of the income or property shall be paid or transferred directly or indirectly, by way of dividend, bonus or by way of profit to persons who, at any time, are or have been members of the trust or to anyone or more of them or to any person claiming through anyone or more of them. In short, there must be a provision that the income of the trust will be used only for the advancement of the objects of the trust.

    8. It is wall established that medical relief does not mean free treatment or treatment at less than the ordinary price for all patients. A hospital may be established for a charitable purpose although, in order to provide itself with revenue apart from voluntary subscriptions, it may run special wards for patients who pay a full price. It is not necessary for charitable purpose that it should provide something for nothing or for less than its cost or less than its ordinary price. The elemosynary element is not essential. It was so held in Re The Tribunal (7 ITR 415 (PC) and CIT v. Breach Candy (27 ITR 279) A Division Bench of this Court, in the judgment produced by the petitioner as Ext. P4, which is also a case of building tax, held that elcemosynary element is not essential for a charitable purpose or in regard to the working of the charitable institution, and that the mere fact that fees are being charged will not lead to the conclusion that the hospital is not a charitable institution. The words ‘Charity’ and ‘Charitable purpose’ must be construed in their legal or technical sense which is different from their popular meaning Charity is a word of art, of precise and technical meaning. But it is much easier to say that a certain case does not come within the doctrine of charity than to define the limits of the doctrine affirmatively. As observed in Williams v. IR (16 ITR Suppl. 41(49)(HL) the cases in which the question of charity has come before the Courts are legion, and not all the decisions, even of the highest authority, are easy to reconcile. Poverty is not a necessary element in a charitable trust. A valid charitable trust may exist notwithstanding the fact that in its administration the benefit is not confined by the donor to the poor to the exclusion of the rich. A trust for the advancement of education is charitable though the education is not only for the poor. Therefore, the fact that rich persons are also benefitted is not a ground to deny the benefit. Further, a trust may charge more from the rich to finance the administration to run the trust. Only because the patients are charged, it cannot be stated that the trust is not charitable.

    9. It is stated in Ext. P5 that the total collection was Rs. 4,28,646.10 out of which Rs. 66,787.50 only was given for free treatment. If the other amount was spent for advancing the charitable object, the exemption cannot be denied. Similarly, if salary is paid to the employee of the hospital, charitable nature will not be denied. Therefore, the exemption has been denied to the petitioner without adverting to the relevant facts of the case. The purpose for which the income has been spent will have to be ascertained and the accounts for all the relevant years have to be considered in detail Further, whether the proviso to S. 101(1)(d) has been satisfied or not also will have to be considered. Whether the body is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions and applies its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects and does not pay any dividend or bonus to its members will also have to be considered. It may be that there is no provision in the trust deed restraining the trustees not to pay dividend to its members. In the absence of a specific provision, whether in fact the fund has been utilised for those purposes or not has to be examined. In order to enable an effective reconsideration of the matter, I feel it is better that the case is remitted to the first respondent.

    10. In view of the above, I quash Exts. P5 and P8 and direct the 1st respondent to consider the matter afresh.

    11. The original petition is disposed.

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    Nedumchalil Charitable Trust v. The Municipal Commissioner And Others
    (Jun 5, 1991)