K.Narayana Kurup, J.:-

10. Heard counsel for both sides.

11. Learned counsel appearing for the tenant brought to our notice definition of the word "business" occurring in various dictionaries and lexicons and based on that asked us to hold that the word "business" takes within its fold the practice of medical profession.

12. In words and phrases - permanent edition vol. 5 at page 998, The word "business" is defined as meaning almost anything which is an occupation as distinguished from a pleasure - any thing which is an occupation or duty which requires attention as a business. According to stroud's judicial dictionary "business" has a more extensive meaning than the word "trade". According to black's law dictionary, The term "business" has no definite or legal meaning. According to wharton's law lexicon the word "business" in the registration of business names act, 1916 includes "profession". In bourier's law dictionary "business" means that which occupies the time, Attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit, But it is not necessary that it should be the sole occupation or employment. It embraces everything about which a person can be employed. It is a word of much indefinite import, And the legislature could not well have used a larger word. According "to the chamber's twentieth century dictionary, "business" means: (a) employment; (b) trade, Profession or occupation; (c) a task or errand incumbent or undertaken; (d) matter requiring attention; (e) dealings, Commercial activity, A commercial or industrial concern. The word "business" in the oxford english dictionary means; (a) a task appointed or undertaken; a person's official duty, Part or province; function; occupation, (b) a person's official or professional duties as a whole; stated occupation, Profession or trade, (c) a pursuit or occupation demanding time and attention; a serious employment as distinguished from a pastime, (d) a particular occupation; a trade or profession; commercial transactions or engagement. According to ramanatha aiyar's law lexicon, The word "business" is of a large signification and, In its broadest sense, Includes nearly all the affairs in which either an individual or a corporation can be actors. It is further stated that the word has no definite technical meaning, But it is to be read with reference to the object and intent of the act in which it occurs.

13. The word "business" is not without its definition by courts also. In smith v. Anderson, 15 ch. D. 258 jessel m. R., After citing definitions of "business" from several dictionaries said, "anything which occupies the time and attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit is business". "business" has no definite technical meaning, But is to be read with reference to the object and intent of the act in which it occurs. Ex pane breull (1881) 16 ch. D. 481 (james, L. J.).

14. It will thus be seen that the word "business" has been described as a word of flexibility or much signification and very comprehensive and has been variously defined by lexicographers and courts. In the broad sense it has been held that it denotes not only all gainful occupations, But all occupations or duties in which men are engaged. It is a word in common use to describe every occupation in which men are engaged and embraces every employment or occupation and all matters that engage a person's attention or require his ca re without the least regard to trade or business. In fact everything that occupies the time, Attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit is taken to mean "business". In its wider sense it has been said that a mother of several children is engaged in the business of rearing of

future citizen. See ga - snow v. Johnston, 28 s. E. 2nd 270,277,197 ga. 146.

15. In a narrow sense the word "business" is confined to commercial activity.

16. On a consideration of the various definitions placed on the word "business" by - lexicographers and courts we are afraid that the same will not be of any assistance to the tenant - revision petitioner to advance his case before this court in the instant proceedings. We cannot lose sight of the fact that we are construing the word "business" as occurring in a legislative enactment and hence its meaning must be held to depend upon the context, The facts of the particular case, The intention of parties or upon the purposes of legislation. The word "business" has no technical meaning but has to be read with reference to object and intent of the ac t in which it occurs. The argument of learned counsel for the tenant would have been entitled to great weight had the word "business" occured in the second proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act in isolation without being coupled with the word "trade". The difficulty arises because of the fact that the expression used in the second proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act is "trade or business".

17. The constitution bench of the supreme court in krishnakumar v. J. & k stale (air 1967 sc 1368) while interpreting the phrase "trade or business" occurring in art. 19 of the constitution, After posing the question what is "trade or business" held that "though the word "business" is ordinarily more comprehensive than the word "trade*, One is used as synonymous with the other". The result therefore is that once the word "business" is. Used along with the word "trade" the former must take its colour from the latter. So construed, The word "business" in second proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act must be given a restrictive interpretation confining it to purely commercial activity like buying and selling and excluding from its purview the practice of "profession" which is purely personal, Depending on the specialised skill or ability of the individual in a particular field of learning which has been acquiring through a systematic training and collegiate discipline, That has a base in technical, Specialised knowledge and that has a service rather than profit orientation enshrined in its code of ethics in contrast to commercial activity in which earning of profit is the dominant object. Viewed in the above perspective we have no hesitation in holding that the word "business" in the second proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act has to be given a narrow and restrictive interpretation consistent with the meaning of the word "trade" - as buying and selling of merchandise - whose company it keeps taking outside its purview the practice of profession where learning and skill and collegiate discipline and absence of profit motive is a sine - qua non as already noticed.

18. Learned counsel appearing for the tenant pressed into service the decision of the supreme court in s. Mohan lai v. R. Kondiah (air 1979 sc 1132) in support of his contention that the running of a nursing home is "business". The facts of the case are as follows: an advocate filed an application before the rent controller seeking eviction of the tenant from the premises in question on the ground that he required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an advocate. Application was resisted by the tenant. The filial court of fact found that the landlord bonafide required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an advocate and ordered eviction and the appellate authority confirmed that order. Before the high court in revision it was contended by the tenant that the practice of the profession of an advocate was not "business" within the meaning of s. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the andhra pradesh buildings (lease, Rent and eviction) control act, 1960 (for short the "andhra pradesh act) and therefore the landlord was not entitled to evict the tenant on the ground that he required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an advocate. It was contended that s. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the andhra pradesh act used the expression "business only" and not the expression "profession". The contention was negatived by the high court and in appeal by the tenant the supreme court on a consideration of the provisions of s. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the andhra pradesh act held that the expression "business" occurring in s. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the andhra pradesh act was used in a wide sense so as to include the practice of profession of an advocate. Relying on the aforesaid decision of the supreme court, Learned counsel appearing for the tenant, Submitted that the word "business" occurring in the act has to be similarly construed giving it a wide meaning so as to mean the conduct of a hospital as a "business". We cannot accede to the contention of the learned counsel for the tenant - revision petitioner. The decision of the supreme court in mo//ar/zz. Fl/v. 7?. Jk<9/?^fl// (supra) holding that the word "business" occurring in s. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the andhra pradesh act is used in a wide sense so as to include the practice of profession of an advocate cannot be treated as a decision of universal application. The said decision was rendered, As already noticed, In the context of s. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the andhra pradesh act in which the word "business" alone is used in contra distinction to the phrase "trade or business' in the act herein and therefore the said decision of the supreme court has no application to the facts of the present case. The supreme court mmohcmlal'scasc itself has held that it is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one act with reference to their use in another act; more so if the two acts in which the same word is used are not cognate acts. Neither the meaning nor the definition of the term in one statute affords a guide to the construction of the same term in another statute and the sense in which the term has been understood in the several statutes does not necessarily throw any light in the manner in which the term should be understood generally. On the other hand it is a sound, And indeed, A well - known principle of construction that meaning of words and expression used in an act must take their colour from the context in which they appear, So much so the wider meaning given by the supreme court to the word "business" occuring in andhra pradesh act cannot be adopted for the purpose of interpreting that word occuring along with the word "trade" in the act. There is yet another difficulty, Namely, Whereas the andhra pradesh act uses the expression "business" only in s. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the said act, The words used in the act is "trade or business" and not "business" alone. Viewed in the above light also it is not possible to accede to the petitioner's contention to give a wider meaning to the word "business" occuring in the act so as to include within its ambit the practice of the medical profession. In the above view of the matter, The decision of the supreme court in mohanlal's case is of no assistance to the tenant - revision petitioner.

19. It was then argued by learned counsel for the tenant that a place used for "thanneerpanthal" (distribution of drinking water) activity was held to be "business" by the madras high court by interpreting the word "business" in s. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the tamil nadu buildings (lease and rent control) act in p. Vairamani ammal v. Kannappa (1971 rcj 303). The learned counsel submitted that the words "trade or business" occuring in second proviso to s. 11 (3) should also be given a similar interpretation. For the reasons already stated the principle laid down in vairamani ammal"s case can have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case since in that case the court was construing the word "business" and no "trade or business". Learned counsel placed a decision reported m dr. Bashir uddin v. District judge but and shahremd others (1978 (1) rcj 199) wherein it was held that the word "business" used in 3rd proviso to clause (ii) of s. 21 of u. P. Urban buildings (regulation of letting rent and eviction) act, 1972 includes the practice of the profession of a dental surgeon. That again is a decision which has no bearing in the present case in as much as the court there was interpreting the words "business purposes" and not "trade or business" as in the act herein. Learned counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of the, Supreme court reported in bangalore water supply & sewerage board v. Rajappa and others (air 1978 sc 548) in support of his contention. Here again, It has to be observed that the principles of law laid down by the supreme court in the aforesaid case, Cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. In the sewerage case the supreme court has widened the concept of "industry" as defined in s. 20) of the industrial disputes act as according to it the definition is vague and the situation calls for same "judicial heroics' to cope with the situation raised. Under the said decision any organised activity involving co - operation between employer and employee resulting in rendering of services to the community or production of material goods shall be deemed to be an 'industry' irrespective of the fact that the activity has any profit motive, Hairing sovereign functions of the state strictly construed. Learned counsel took us through the judgment in detail. On a consideration of the discussion of the various aspects in the judgment, We are of the view that the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Quite a few other decisions were also brought to our notice by the learned counsel but we are not referring to them as, According to us, They are totally inapplicable to the facts of the present case. This court cannot as a general rule follow the old beaten track of precedents in total disregard of the reasons upon which it rests, The wording of the statutory provision under consideration and the backdrop and setting of the case in general.

20. Learned counsel appearing for the landlord on the other hand placed strong reliance on the division bench decision of this court reported in sethurama menon v. Meenakshi amma & others (1966 klt 665; air 967 ker. 88). The question for determination in that case was whether an advocate can be considered to carry on, "trade or business" within the meaning of that expression as used in the second proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act. Chief justice m. S. Menon in his inimitable style and diction has distinguished the expression "profession" from "trade or business". His lordship held that:

"the expression "trade or business' connotes a commercial activity. The expression profession' does not and is virtually at the other end of the scale. What is important in deciding whether a person is carrying on a profession or not, Is whether he is a member of an organised body with a recognised standard of ability enforced before he can enter it and a recognised standard of conduct enforced while - he is practising it. This is certainly not the test in deciding whether a person is carrying on a trade or business. "profession" is a vocation in which a professed knowledge of some department of science or learning is used by its practical application to the affairs of others, Either in advising, Guiding, Or teaching them, Or in serving their interests or welfare in the practice of an art founded on. Even assuming that the word "business" is a word of ambiguous import and that it takes its content from its context, It cannot be said that the word "business" in the expression "trade or business" occuring in the proviso will include the profession of an advocate".

21. According to us, The principles laid down in the above decision will apply squarely to the feels of the present case. The statutory provision under consideration before this court in sethurama menon (supra) was also identical, Namely, The second proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act. The decision still holds the field in as much as it has not been varied or overruled. Even in molia/ilal's case though the supreme court had occasion to refer to this case, There is nothing to indicate in the said decision that the principles laid down sethurama menon's case has been dissented by the supreme court. Their lordships of the supreme court did not overrule or distinguish sethurama menon. Therefore, We follow the principles of law laid down by the division bench of this court in sethurama menon v. Meenakshi amma & others (1966 klt 665: air 1967 ker. 88) as according to us, As already noticed the principles therein squarely apply to the feels of the instant case as the statutory provision under construction is the same.

22. Again, In krishnankuny menon v. A. P. Malatlii (1985 klt 6) a learned single judge of this court while interpreting the second proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act held that a member of the legal profession is not carrying on a "trade or business" to eke out his. Livelihood from the "business". It was held as follows:

"it is impossible to accede to the contention that a member of the legal profession is carrying on a "trade or a business', To eke out his livelihood from the "business, Of the practice of the profession. To equate a member of the learned profession as a businessman making out his livelihood from his profession would be to completely ignore the history and glory of noble profession. A concept that a member of the profession is depending for his 'livelihood' on the profession is supremely inapposite to the context of a profession which holds a high and hoary tradition".

23. The present discussion will be incomplete without reference to the decision of the supreme court in v. Sasidharan v. Peter and kamnakaran (1984 klt 1039 = (1984) 2 scc 30) and the decision of this court in c. R. P. 1686 of 1978.

24. In sasidharan v. Peter and kamnakaran (1984 klt 1039 = (1984) 2 scc 30), Chief justice chandrachud refused to believe that legal profession in india was increasingly acquiring attributes of "trade or business". According to him, Whatever be the popular conception or misconception regarding the role of today's lawyers and the alleged narrowing of the gap between a profession on the one hand and a trade or business on the other, It is trite, That traditionally, Lawyers do not carry on a trade or business nor do they render "service" to customers. The above observation of the learned chief justice applies with equal force to members of the medical fraternity as well.

25. In c. R. P. 1686 of 1976 this court considered the question whether a doctor, Who carries on a dispensary and clinic in a rented building, Is entitled to claim the protection en visaged under the second proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act. The tenant there raised a con tent ion that since he is depending upon the income derived from that business for his livelihood is not liable to be evicted. This court after a detailed survey of decisions indian and english held as follows:

"i do not find any reason to differ from the observation made by the eminent judges who decided cases sethurama menon v. Meenakshi amma & others (1966 klt 665). With respect i agree with the view that was taken there that the expression "trade or business' should be interpreted as carrying a commercial activity and not the practice of "profession!"

the principle laid down in crp1686 of 1978 has not been distinguished or upset by any later decision of this court.

26. There is yet another reason why the tenant should fail in this civil revision petition. Even if it is accepted for argument's sake that the tenant is carrying on "business" in the petition schedule building can it be said that the benefit of second proviso extends to every such "business" irrespective of its nature and irrespective of the feet that the tenant does not belong to the weaker sections of the society. The answer is and must be in the negative. In' introducing proviso 2 to s. 11 (3) in the earlier rent control act of 1959, The law minister explained its objects as follows:

"a proviso is also added to sub - section (3) of this section to make it clear that in the case of buildings which are used for purposes of trade or business the tenant shall not be evicted from such buildings if the tenant mainly depends on the income derived from the trade or business for his livelihood and if no other suitable building is available in the locality. This house would kindly remember that with regard to sites and buildings on such sites used for petty business or commercial or industrial purposes, A provision has been introduced in the agrarian relations act also giving fixity of tenure to the holders of such titles"

in 1 %5. Act also this proviso was included without any alteration. This is a unique provision peculiar only to the kerala rent control act, Which al together takes away the landlord's right to get back possession of his own building for his own occupation, In order to protect what was considered a weaker section of the society. Therefore, The provision calls for such an interpretation so as to confine the benefit only to the weak section of the society. In case of any doubt as to whether the tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in the building from which he is sought to be evicted, This aspect viz. Whether he belongs to the weaker section of the society will assume importance. If he does not belong to the weaker section of the society, He will not be entitled to the benefit under the 2nd proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act. By no stretch of imagination it can be held that the tenant in this case belong to the weaker section of the society, (vide division bench decision of this court in crp 2081 of 1993 dated 22 - 12 - j 993.

27. Viewed in the above background also, We are of the view that the tenant is not entitled to the protection envisaged under the second proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act.

28. In the light of the above discussion we are of the view that the tenant who is running a nursing home in the petition schedule building cannot be said to carry on "business" within the meaning o f that expression " trade or business" occuring in the second proviso to s. 11 (3) of the act.

29. We do not find any illegality, Irregularity or impropriety in the finding of the court below and the same has only to be confirmed. We, Therefore, Confirm the order of eviction passed by the authorities below against the tenant.

30. However, Under the circumstances of this case we grant three months time to the revision petitioner (tenant) to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the petition schedule buildings to the respondent (landlord) on the following conditions:

the tenant shall file an affidavit in the execution court within one month from today unconditionally undertaking to vacate the premises within three months from the dale of this judgment. He should pay arrears of rent, If any, Along with the affidavit and continue to pay the monthly rent regularly during the period he is permitted to occupy the premises. He should not sublet the building or induct any other person in the building. The undertaking should contain a statement to this effect also. In case any of these provisions is not complied with, The landlord will be free to evict the tenant immediately thereafter and get vacant possession in accordance with the order of eviction in this proceedings.

c. R. P. Dismissed with the above directions. There will be no order as to costs.