Judgement
ANANTANARAYANAN, C.J. :- The essential facts of this appeal, from the judgment and decree of Kunhamed Kntti J. in C. S. 77 of 1960 before the learned Judge, may be briefly set forth as follows : V. V. Shanmuga Nadar and Bros. (plaintiffs) sued the defendant, Gopal Chettiar, who is the appellant, in respect of dealings said to be due upon certain accounts relating to the business of the defendant at Pollachil Coimbatore and Kumbakonam. According to the case in the plaint in respect of orders placed by the defendant with the plaintiffs for purchase and supply of goods, the plaintiffs advanced moneys and were entitled to repayment of the moneys with interest. The dealings took place between 26th August 1953 and 15th March 1959, on the basis of a mutual, open and current account, according to particulars furnished along with the plaint. Very briefly stated, the defendant put forward, as his main plea, a plea of limitation. According to him the dealings were not on the basis of a mutual, open and current account, and, many of the transactions were thus time-barred, particularly in relation to the Coimbatore account. The plaintiffs were not entitled to make appropriations of payments in the manner that they had done, nor were they entitled to charge interest on outstanding advances. Of the issues framed in the suit, the main issues that concern us are : -
1. Whether there was a mutual, open and current account between the parties?
2. Whether the suit was in time, and
3. Whether there was a contract to pay interest at certain rate?
2. In view of the order that we propose to make in this appeal, remanding the suit for further and full determination in the light of our observations, since it appears beyond controversy, in our view that certain vital aspects have not been tried out at all we think that we should not proceed into the merits in any great detail. But indisputably, we feel constrained to record our reasons why we consider this remand of the case for further trial essential in the interest of justice. Our observations must not be regarded as any pre-judgment of the merits, since the suit is now going to have a more extensive and adequate trial, covering all issues in controversy between the parties, and, all vital aspects of such issues.
3. Firstly, the very procedure of trial is the suit has inevitably given rise to some difficulty. What of course, cannot be a matter for which the learned Judge could be regarded as responsible, in any view. The plaintiffs adopted the somewhat curious procedure of producing all their books of accounts, but actually not marking those books as evidence; on the contrary, schedule of entries, which is Ex. D.1, and which, in fact, forms the main document in the case, was extracted from the plaint schedule, and marked by the defendant. It must immediately be conceded that the defendant (appellant) far from objecting to this course, of the failure to exhibit the original account books, based his defence upon Ex. B.1 itself, with the result that neither the court nor the party had the advantage of a scrutiny of the original accounts, ledgers and cash books. In our view, that has handicapped the trial, in the sense that it has not been possible to focus attention on certain vital aspects of the controversy between the parties. Another lacuna or defect in the trial has been that the oral evidence in the entire trial consists exclusively of the testimony of Dorai Pandian (P. W. 1), a partner of the plaintiff firm. The defendant did not get into the box and did not throw light, by means of testimony, upon the defences that he sought to raise in contesting this suit. Further, as we shall presently show certain vital aspects of the material impinging on the main plea of limitation have not been brought forward and elucidated at all during the trial, or, apparently even during the arguments before the learned Judge.
4. As the plaint was filed, it sought to do this : there were dealings between the parties relating to three places or branches, of the defendant, viz., Coimbatore, Kumbakonam and Pollachi, of which it is conceded by Sri Thiruvenkatachari for the defendant (appellant) that the accounts relating to the Pollachi branch do form an open, mutual and current account within the meaning of Art. 85 of the original Limitation Act, now Article 1 of the Schedule to Act 36 of 1963. But with regard to the other two branches, and the Coimbatore branch in particular the appellant strenuously contended that there were no open, mutual and current accounts. The further plea was that there was a distinct jural relationship between the parties in respect of the accounts of each branch. They were separable, and should be regarded separately. But admittedly, when the plaint was filed, the plaintiffs brought forward the account of the Pollachi branch into the schedule, thereby converting the accounts of the Coimbatore and Kumbakonam, branches into a consolidated credit account in favour of the plaintiffs. One important argument of Sri Thiruvenkatachari for the defendant (appellant) is that this is not justified and that this pressing into service of the account of the Pollachi branch, on the very eve of the suit, was merely to create a semblance of an open, mutual and current account which was not actually the same with regard to the Coimbatore and Kumbakonam branch accounts. In other words, and now stressing the Coimbatore account in particular, many items would be time barred, according to the appellant but for this expedient.
5. It thus became essential to consider whether the three accounts could be consolidated in that manner, as the plaintiffs did, or whether each account should be regarded separately, as furnishing a distinct jural basis of obligation between the parties. On this, we find that there was not even a clear and distinct issue, nor can we find any discussion of this aspect, as such, in the judgment of the learned Judge. Apparently, in the manner in which the suit was presented, tried and argued, this essential aspect was lost sight of. We must, therefore direct that this should be framed as a separate issue, and tried out now both parties being at liberty to adduce oral and documentary evidence on this aspect.
6. Another vital aspect, concerning which again, there is difficulty in the finding of the learned Judge (page 17 of the printed papers) that the account was open, mutual and current because
"the plaintiffs had sold the defendants goods on commission basis, and credited him with the sale proceeds of such goods"
. Indisputably, if there were such mutual obligations the account would be open, mutual and current. But Sri Thiruvenkatachari contends that, apart from the Pollachi branch, this observation of the learned Judge is factually incorrect, if it is intended to apply to the Coimbatore and Kumbakonam accounts. This again is a matter on which evidence is essential, and, it is equally essential that the original accounts should be produced and marked for this purpose. The truncated schedule marked as Ex. D. 1 cannot at all suffice for this purpose.
7. Concerning the legal elements of an open, mutual and current account, the matter is now well-settled, in view of two recent decisions of the Supreme Court, and we think it is sufficient to refer to them. The first of these decisions is Hindusthan Forest Co. v. Lalchand, AIR 1959 SC 1349 and it refers to the prior case-law including Tea Financing Syndicate Ltd. v. Chandrakamal, ILR 58 Cal 649 : (AIR 1931 Cal 359). That Calcutta decision, the judgment wherein was delivered by Rankin, C. J. refers to two precedents. The first of these is Hirada v. G. Muddappa, (1870-71) 6 Mad HCR 142, where Holloway, Ag. C. J. probably laid down the earliest formulation of the cannon on the subject. The learned Judge said that, for the purpose of such an account,
"there must be transactions on each side creating independent obligations on the other, and not merely transactions which create obligations on one side, those on the other being merely complete or partial discharges of such obligations."
Watson v. Aga Mehedee Sherazee, (1874) 1 Ind App 346 (PC), may also be instanced as another application of the principle to the given facts. In referring to the judgment of Rankin C. J. their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that this canon has not been subsequently departed from and that though it is a question of fact in each case whether the account is open, mutual and current, the account must fulfil the requirements of reciprocal demands involving transactions on each side creating independent obligations on the other, and not merely transactions which create obligations on one side those on the other being merely complete or partial discharge of such obligations. In other words, reciprocity of dealings is essential and the decision in Kesharichand v. Shillong Banking Corporation, Ltd., Shillong, AIR 1965 SC 1711 may be taken us another instance of the application of the same principle to the given facts.
8. In the present case, we have been taken in great detail through the data available as Ex. B.1 Sri Thiruvenkatachari strenuously contended that these do not evidence reciprocal demands and obligations of the character specified in the precedents on the contrary, those are purely unilateral transactions, the demand in every case relating to a specific item of account, which is met by a Hundi which has been honoured by the defendant (appellant). As we stated earlier there is an admission that there are reciprocal demands and obligations in the Pollachi account, but it is strongly denied that the Coimbatore and Kumbakonam accounts fulfil the criterion. On this aspect, the learned Judge seems to have been somewhat misled, because of two considerations. Firstly, he thought that there were entries with regard to sales by plaintiffs of defendants goods, on a commission basis for which the plaintiffs had credited the defendant (appellant) in respect of the sale proceeds. We have already quoted this extract from the judgment, and according to learned counsel for the appellant, that applies strictly and exclusively to the Pollachi account, and not to the other accounts. Secondly, in considering the matter of the alleged implied appropriations, urged on behalf of the appellant, with reference to the principles of Sections 59, 60 and 61 of the Contract Act, the learned Judge, again seems to have thought that the accounts were open, mutual and current, because the Pollachi account was merged with the other two accounts, and hence that the question of any implied appropriations did not at all arise. As we pointed out the problem in this case is whether the accounts could be consolidated in this manner, on the eve of the plaint, as the plaintiffs sought to do. If such consolidation was not permissible or possible, it will be a question of fact and evidence whether the Coimbatore and Kumbakonam accounts should be properly regarded as open, mutual and current accounts.
9. Both with regard to this aspect, and with regard to the question of the implied appropriations urged on behalf of the appellant and stressed by Sri Thiruvenkatachari, on the principle of Section 59 of the Contract Act, we do not propose to make any pronouncement now in view of the order of remand. We think we have sufficiently elucidated that the matter is fairly intricate, and that adequate material has not been placed before court by either party or by both the parties. For this, of course, the parties are themselves to blame, but, we are unable to see how there can be a satisfactory adjudication of the rights in this matter, on such a truncated trial.
10. We do not think it is necessary to say anything more. The necessary issues will now be framed in the light of our observations, and the suit be tried, with liberty to both the parties to adduce fresh oral and documentary evidence, needless to say, we expect the defendant to examine himself, if he is really serious about his case that the Coimbator and Kumbakonam accounts did not involve reciprocal demands and obligations and, further, that these accounts were jurally distinct and that a consolidation was unjustified. The costs of this appeal will abide and follow the result of the remand. The court fee paid will be refunded.
Order accordingly.