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  • Order II, Rule 2 of the Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Rule 2 of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 66 of the present Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of section 294 of the Code of 1882
  • section 319 of the Code of Civil procedure
  • section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • section 294 of the Code of 1882
  • provisions of Article 168
  • Rule 2 of Order II.
  • Order II, Rule 2
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Order II, Rule 2 of the Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Rule 2 of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 66 of the present Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of section 294 of the Code of 1882
  • section 319 of the Code of Civil procedure
  • section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • section 294 of the Code of 1882
  • provisions of Article 168
  • Rule 2 of Order II.
  • Order II, Rule 2
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This litigation arises from a mortgage and a subsequent court sale. One Narayan and his brothers mortgaged a two-anna share in the Khoti Takshim to Vinayak Tilak. The mortgagee obtained a decree in Suit No. 194 of 1902, and the mortgaged property was sold in execution. The present plaintiff purchased at the court-sale on 16 June 1908 for Rs. 1,200; sale confirmation followed in July 1908 and possession of the main Takshim was recovered under section 319 of the Code of Civil Procedure then in force. The purchaser stated that some properties to which the sale certificate related remained in actual possession of certain defendants.

The plaintiff subsequently brought Suit No. 118 of 1910 for possession of certain survey numbers; defendants in possession contested and appeals followed. Later, in 1914 the plaintiff sued defendants Nos. 2 and 3 alleging that one defendant (No.1), a tenant of defendants Nos. 2 and 3, had been in occupation at the time of recovery of possession in 1908 and had later transferred possession to defendants Nos. 2 and 3. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 defended on multiple grounds: that the land in suit was not included in the sale certificate, that it was Khoti Kulargi land, that the plaintiff was a Benamidar for the original decree-holder, and that the present suit was barred by Order II, Rule 2 due to the earlier suit (No. 118 of 1910).

The trial Court held the plaintiff was not a Benamidar and decreed possession in his favour. The District Court (first appellate Court) reversed, holding that the plaintiff was a Benamidar for the original decree-holder, that the original mortgagee was a necessary party, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff appealed to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the original mortgagee/decree-holder is a necessary party to a suit brought by a Benamidar who purchased at a Court-sale (i.e., can a Benamidar purchaser sue in his own name?).
  2. Whether omission by the decree-holder to obtain leave under section 294 of the Code of 1882 (or corresponding provision) to bid or purchase at the sale renders the Benamidar purchase invalid or void.
  3. Whether the title of a confirmed Court-sale purchaser can be impeached by the defendants by pleading fraud, where no such plea was pleaded earlier and where the sale price was lower than a prior estimate.
  4. Whether the present suit is barred by Rule 2 of Order II (res judicata / estoppel by previous suit) because the earlier suit (1910) related to properties covered by the same sale certificate.
  5. Whether the proper remedy for recovery was an application in execution under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as opposed to a fresh suit for possession).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Plaintiff (as presented in the opinion)

  • The appeal was argued on the footing that the plaintiff is a Benamidar for the original mortgagee/decree-holder but, notwithstanding that status, can sue in his own name to recover property vested in him by the sale certificate.
  • The land in suit, though not expressly mentioned, is included in the sale certificate and the purchaser has title under that certificate as to those lands.
  • The cause of action in respect of lands in the possession of different persons (different defendants) is not the same as that in the earlier suit; therefore Order II, Rule 2 does not bar the present suit.
  • The proper remedy is not limited to execution proceedings when the purchaser is a third party (Benamidar) rather than the decree-holder himself; a suit for possession is maintainable by the auction purchaser.

Respondents / Defendants (as presented in the opinion)

  • The land in suit was not included in the sale certificate and, alternatively, it is Khoti Kulargi land.
  • The plaintiff is a Benamidar for the original decree-holder and therefore the decree-holder is a necessary party; in his absence the suit is not maintainable.
  • The decree-holder contravened the provisions of section 294 of the Code of 1882 by not obtaining leave to bid or purchase, rendering the purchase invalid.
  • The plaintiff's claim is barred by Rule 2 of Order II because he could and should have included the claim in the earlier suit (No. 118 of 1910).
  • Alternatively, the defendants contend the title is vitiated by fraud (relying on precedent), arguing that the discrepancy between the estimated value and the sale price indicates fraud.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gur Narayan v. Sheo Lal Singh (Privy Council) Benamidar may sue in his own name; the Benamidar is a representative of the beneficial owner and proceedings by/against him bind the beneficial owner (res judicata applies). The Court relied on this authority to hold that the original mortgagee was not a necessary party and that a Benamidar purchaser can sue in his own name to recover property vested in him by a confirmed sale certificate.
Ravji v. Mahadev Confirmed that a benami purchaser (including a purchaser at a Court-sale) has a full right to bring suit; a decree against the benamidar binds the true owner. Cited to support the proposition that a purchaser at a Court-sale, even if benami, may institute suit in his own name to recover possession.
Rangnath Sakharam v. Govind Narsinv Relied upon by respondents to support that a plea of fraud may be raised to vitiate a sale. The Court noted the citation but observed it was unnecessary to express a final view whether such a plea can be raised by way of defence; on the facts here, no fraud had been pleaded or proved, so the contention failed on merits.
Minalal Shadiram v. Kharsetji Also cited by respondents in support of a fraud defence to impeach sale. The Court treated the citation as part of the respondents' argument on fraud but did not rely upon it; the Court held no fraud was shown on the facts before it.
Thathu Naick v. Kondu Reddi Invoked regarding whether a discrepancy between estimated value and sale price indicates fraud. The Court held the facts of that case were different and that the present case was not governed by that authority; the modest difference between estimate and realisation did not amount to fraud here.
Sadashiv bin Mahadu v. Narayan Vithal (referred also as Sudashiv v. Narayan) Holds that where the decree-holder himself is the purchaser, the proper remedy may be execution (section 47) rather than a fresh suit. The Court distinguished that case: it applies where the decree-holder himself is purchaser. Here the purchaser was an auction purchaser (even if benami), treated procedurally as a third party entitled to sue; thus Sadashiv did not bar instituting a suit.
Sonu valad Khushal v. Bahinibai Addressed principles relevant to Order II, Rule 2 and the identity of causes of action in successive suits. Hayward, J. referred to this authority in support of the conclusion that, on the facts found (different properties and different defendants), Order II, Rule 2 did not bar the present suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a series of discrete legal questions applying statutory provisions and precedent to the facts before it:

  1. On whether the original mortgagee was a necessary party, the Court held that the original mortgagee (the purported beneficial owner) was not necessary. The Court relied on Gur Narayan v. Sheo Lal Singh and reasoning that a Benamidar is a trustee/representative of the beneficial owner and may sue in his own name; any judgment would bind the beneficial owner by res judicata. Thus the plaintiff, though a Benamidar, could maintain the suit in his own name.
  2. On the effect of omission to obtain leave under section 294 of the Code of 1882, the Court concluded that the omission did not render the benami purchase invalid or unlawful as against the purchaser's apparent title. The Court observed that a confirmed sale vests title in the purchaser and, under section 66 of the present Code (and corresponding provisions of the earlier Code), even the real owner cannot maintain a suit against a Court-purchaser. The omission could render the purchase liable to be set aside, but that remedy must be pursued (and here no application under para. 3 of section 294 had been made within the period of limitation).
  3. On the defence of fraud, the Court addressed the respondents' contention that the low sale price (Rs. 1,200 versus an estimated Rs. 1,500) demonstrated fraud. The Court noted no plea of fraud was made in the written statement; the only assertion at argument was the price discrepancy. The Court found no evidence the property was genuinely worth Rs. 1,500 and held that the difference in estimate and realisation did not amount to fraud. The respondents' reliance on authority (e.g., Thathu Naick) was rejected as distinguishable.
  4. On the applicability of Order II, Rule 2 (res judicata/Bar by previous suit), the Court analyzed whether the cause of action in the present suit was the same as that in the earlier Suit No. 118 of 1910. The Court emphasized the factual differences: the present suit concerns different specific properties, different defendants in possession, and different factual allegations (including an allegation of transfer of possession). Even assuming a narrow formulation of cause of action ("withheld possession under the sale certificate"), the Court found the causes were not the same because of differences in parties, properties and evidence. Therefore Rule 2 did not bar the present suit.
  5. On the contention that the remedy should have been execution under section 47, the Court distinguished authority cited by the lower appellate Court (Sadashiv) as applicable where the decree-holder himself was the purchaser. Here, the auction purchaser is a third party for procedural purposes (even if benami), and thus is entitled to bring a suit to recover possession. The Court therefore rejected the view that execution alone was the proper remedy.

Throughout its analysis the Court limited itself to matters in the record: it noted the absence of any application to set aside the sale, the absence of a pleaded fraud, and that the defendants had not shown ignorance of the nature of the purchase that would have prevented timely action.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

The Court reversed the decree of the lower appellate (District) Court and restored the decree of the trial Court. The trial Court's decree in favour of the plaintiff for possession is thereby reinstated, and the Court awarded costs here and in the lower appellate Court against defendants Nos. 2 and 3.

Direct consequences for the parties: the plaintiff's title under the confirmed sale certificate is enforceable by suit in his own name (even if he is a Benamidar), the trial Court's decree for possession stands restored, and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are ordered to pay costs as indicated.

Broader implications: the opinion applies established authorities concerning benami transactions and the rights of purchasers at Court-sales, but it does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond the application and distinction of existing precedents cited in the judgment.

Appeal allowed.

Order: The decree of the lower appellate Court is reversed and the decree of the trial Court restored with costs to the plaintiff (also costs here and in the lower appellate Court against defendants Nos. 2 and 3).

    Ramchandra Vithal Bhat v. Gajanannarayan Deshmukh

    Shah, J.:— It will be convenient to set forth the facts which have given rise to this second appeal.

    One Narayan and his other brothers mortgaged a two-anna share in the Khoti Takshim to one Vinayak Tilak with all the Khasgi lands and other rights appertaining to the Takshim. The mortgagee filed suit No. 194 of 1902 on his mortgage and obtained a decree. In pursuance of that decree the property mortgaged was sold by the Court and the present plaintiff purchased it at the Court-sale on the 16th of June 1908 for Rs. 1,200. The sale was confirmed in July 1908. The auction purchaser applied to have possession of the property and he recovered possession in December 1908 of the Takshim. It was stated, however, at the time by him that certain properties to which the sale certificate related were in the actual possession of the defendants and that he had not received possession of those properties. Those properties were not specified; but generally speaking the main property described in the sale certificate, viz., the Khoti Takshim, was taken possession of under section 319 of the Code of Civil procedure which was then in force. The present plaintiff filed suit No. 118 of 1910 against some of the defendants to the mortgage-suit for possession of certain survey numbers which were in the possession of those defendants. To that suit the present defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were joined as parties, but they had nothing to do with the lands then in suit. In that suit it was found that the plaintiff was not a Benamidar for the original mortgagee and decree-holder, and that the lands then in suit were covered by the sale certificate. Accordingly a decree was passed in his favour for possession of the lands, and that was upheld by both the appellate Courts in appeals preferred by the defendants in that case who were in possession of the lands then in suit. The plaintiff filed the present suit in 1914 against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 alleging that the 1st defendant who was the tenant of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 was really in occupation of the land in suit at the date when he recovered possession in 1908 under the sale certificate and that subsequently he had transferred possession wrongfully to defendants Nos. 2 and 3. Defendant No. 1 did not claim any interest in the property, and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 contended that the land in suit was not included in the sale certificate, that it was a Khoti Kulargi land, that the plaintiff was a Benamidar for the original decree-holder and that the suit was barred under Order II, Rule 2 by the previous suit No. 118 of 1910. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not a Benamidar and that he was entitled to recover possession of the lands in suit as the terms of the sale certificate were sufficient to convey the lands to the plaintiff. The objection based on Rule 2 of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure was overruled with the result that a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 appealed to the District Court. That Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was a Benamidar for the original decree-holder, that the latter was a necessary party to the suit, and that the present suit was not maintainable. The learned District Judge accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout. The plaintiff has appealed to this Court.

    The appeal has been argued before us on the footing that the plaintiff is a Benamidar for the original mortgagee and the decree-holder as found by the lower appellate Court. It is also now common ground between the parties that the land in suit though not expressly mentioned in the sale certificate is included therein, and that the purchaser has a title under the sale certificate to the lands in suit as he has to the two-anna Takshim.

    The first question that arises in this appeal is whether the lower appellate Court is right in holding that the original mortgagee was a necessary party to the suit and that in his absence the plaintiff could not maintain the suit. It is clear in my opinion that the original mortgagee for whom the plaintiff is supposed to have purchased the property at the Court-sale is not a necessary party and that the plaintiff, though a Benamidar, can sue in his own name to recover the property vested in him as a Benamidar. The judgment in Gur Narayan v. Sheo Lal Singh is a clear authority in favour of this view. Their Lordships observe at page 9 of the report that “so long, therefore, as a Benami transaction does not contravene the provisions of the law the Courts are bound to give it effect. As already observed, the Benamidar has no beneficial interest in the property or business that stands in his name; he represents, in fact, the real owner, and so far as their relative legal position is concerned he is a mere trustee for him. Their Lordships find it difficult to understand why, in such circumstances, an action cannot be maintained in the name of the Benamidar in respect of the property although the beneficial owner is no party to it. The bulk of judicial opinion in India is in favour of the proposition that in a proceeding by or against the Benamidar, the person beneficially entitled is fully affected by the rules of res judicata. With this view their Lordships concur. It is open to the latter to apply to be joined in the action; but whether he is made a party or not, a proceeding by or against his representative in its ultimate result is fully binding on him.” This was a case of a private Benami purchaser. But in my opinion it makes no difference that in the present case the plaintiff is a purchaser at a Court-sale. In the case of Ravji v. Mahadev

    Mr. Justice Ranade, after reviewing the various reported cases, summed up as follows:— “This review of the authorities shows clearly that appellant No. 1 as benami purchaser had full right to bring the suit. If the true owner holds back, a decree against the benamidar owner would bind him as res judicata. The present suit was, therefore, properly instituted. The addition of appellant No. 2's name made no difference in the character of the suit.” This was said with reference to a case in which the plaintiff was a purchaser at a Court-sale.

    It is urged, however, on behalf of the respondents that this rule holds good so long as the Benami transaction does not contravene the provisions of the law and that in the present case the provisions of section 294 of the Code of 1882 have been contravened in so far as the decree-holder did not obtain any leave to bid for or purchase the property. It seems to me that the omission on the part of the mortgagee to obtain such a leave does not render the purchase by the Benamidar invalid or unlawful. It is clear that so far as the apparent title of the Benamidar is concerned, the sale, when it has been confirmed, has the effect of vesting the property in the purchaser and that under section 66 of the present Code of Civil Procedure and the corresponding provisions of the Code of 1882 even the real owner cannot maintain a suit againt the Court-purchaser. Further, section 294 of the Code of 1882 and the corresponding provisions in the present Code show that the omission on the part of the decree-holder to obtain the necessary leave has not the effect of rendering the Benami purchase void; but such a purchase is liable to be set aside. It is an admitted fact in this case that none of the defendants in the mortgage suit applied under section 294, paragraph 3 to have the sale set aside. The application for setting aside a sale under that paragraph could have been made within the period prescribed by the law of limitation. No such application was made, and having regard to the fact that the original mortgagors were all brothers and that some of the defendants, who were parties to the suit of 1910, had specifically raised the point that the plaintiff was a Benamidar for the original decree-holder, it cannot be said that the defendants were really ignorant of any fact which could have prevented them from making a proper application for setting aside the sale. There is no allegation in the present case that the defendants were ignorant of the real nature of the purchase by the plaintiff during all the time preceding the present suit. The sale certificate therefore must be taken as a valid certificate giving the plaintiff a title to the land in suit which he is entitled to enforce.

    It is further urged that though the present defendants Nos. 2 and 3 may not be in a position to have this sale set aside by a proper application under para. 3 of section 294 or under the corresponding provisions in the present Code on account of the bar of limitation, it is open to them to plead by way of defence that the title of the plaintiff is vitiated by fraud. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon Rangnath Sakharam v. Govind Narsinv and Minalal Shadiram v. Kharsetji. It is not necessary in this case to express any opinion as to whether such a plea could be raised by way of defence though any suit based on that ground would be time-barred. Assuming in favour of the defendants that such a defence is open to them, it seems to me that on the merits that defence must fail. In the first place no such plea of fraud was raised in the written statement; and the only fraud suggested in the argument before us is that the property which was roughly valued at Rs. 1,500 fetched only Rs. 1,200 at the Court-sale. In my opinion this is no fraud whatever. In the first place there is nothing to show that the property was really worth Rs. 1,500. It only shows that in execution proceedings the Court had estimated the value at that figure, and the difference between the estimated value and the price actually realized is not so great as to indicate any kind of fraud on the part of the decree-holder or any other person. In connection with this point the learned pleader for the respondents relied upon the case of Thathu Naick v. Kondu Reddi. The facts of that case were quite different and I do not see how that case could be treated as an authority in favour of the view that in the present case the fact of the property having fetched Rs. 300 less than its estimated value amounts to fraud.

    It is urged in support of the decree of the lower appellate Court on behalf of the respondents that the present suit is barred under Rule 2 of Order II. The contention is that the plaintiff should have included in the suit of 1910 his claim for the possession of all the properties to which he acquired a title under the sale certificate and that if he failed to do so, this present suit would be barred. It is urged that the plaintiff having omitted to sue in respect of the property now in suit in 1910, he cannot now sue in respect thereof. The question is whether the cause of action in the present suit is the same as that in the previous suit. Several cases have been cited in the argument in connection with this point; but I do not consider it necessary to refer to these cases. The point, it seems to me, must be decided with reference to the facts of this case. It is clear that the cause of action in the present suit cannot be treated as the same as that in the previous suit. The plaintiff no doubt acquired a title to several properties under a general description of the Khoti Khasgi lands under one and the same sale certificate. But his cause of action in respect of the lands in the possession of different persons cannot be treated as the same. It was open to him to have sued the several defendants in possession of the different lands including the present defendants in the suit of 1910; but I do not think that the plaintiff was bound to do so. The property in this suit is different. The parties in possession sued now are different, and the cause of action alleged is also different. For the purposes of this point, however, I assume that the cause of action is simply that the defendants have withheld possession from him although he is entitled thereto under the sale certificate and leave out of consideration the special allegations which the plaintiff has made. With regard to these special allegations as to the land being in the possession of defendant No. 1 and the possession having been subsequently transferred by defendant No. 1 to defendants Nos. 2 and 3 the trial Court found in favour of the plaintiff and the appellate Court does not seem to me to have recorded any specific finding on that point. In the view I take of the case, I consider this allegation to be immaterial and it is not necessary to have any finding on that question. Assuming that there was no intervention of defendant No. 1 and the position of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 was throughout as I have stated it I think that the cause of action would not be the same as that in the suit of 1910 in which different properties were involved and different defendants were in possession of the properties in that suit. The evidence in the present case may be similar, but it cannot be said to be identical. Besides, the plea raised by the defendants that the land in suit is Kulargi land shows that the evidence in this suit must be different. Taking the meaning of the expression “cause of action” most favourable to the defendants' contention, I am satisfied that the cause of action in the present case is not the same as that in the suit of 1910 and that Rule 2 of Order II presents no bar to the maintainability of the present suit.

    It remains only to notice the point which has been made by the lower appellate Court but which has not been expressed before us. The learned Judge has held relying on Sudashiv v. Narayan, that the proper remedy of the plaintiff is not a suit but an application in execution under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That was, however, a case in which the decree-holder himself was the purchaser. The view taken in that case has not been applied to a case in which the decree-holder himself is not the purchaser but where a third person has purchased Benami for him. For the purposes of procedure the auction purchaser, even though a Benamidar for the decree-holder, is a third party. The ruling in Sadashiv bin Mahadu v. Narayan Vithal really can apply to a case where the decree-holder himself is the purchaser at the Court-sale. The present suit is a suit by an auction-purchaser, who is not the decree-holder for the purposes of procedure and who is therefore entitled to sue to recover possession of the property which he has purchased.

    In my opinion, therefore, this appeal should be allowed, the decree of the lower appellate Court reversed and that of the trial Court restored with costs here and in the lower appellate Court on defendants Nos. 2 and 3.

    Hayward, J.:— I concur. I have no doubt that the Benamidar was entitled to sue. The certificate of sale was good title until set aside in regular proceedings. The general proposition of law has clearly been wrongly stated by the lower appellate Court. It would be sufficient to refer to the Privy Council case of Gur Narayan v. Sheo Lal Singh. But it has been argued that the Benamidar had no permission to bid at the sale and that it was therefore a nullity. But no steps were taken to avoid the sale as they might have been in execution on that account, nor was it alleged in the written statement that there was any fraud. It was not even alleged in the first appeal Court. It has, as a final resource, been alleged here, but it has in my opinion not been established. It would appear to me, therefore, no good reason for treating the sale as a nullity, whether or no it was open to the defence to raise the plea of fraud, in view of the provisions of Article 168 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act.

    It has been somewhat difficult to follow the line of reasoning in the remainder of the judgment of the first appeal Court. The learned Judge devoted a material part of his judgment to the proposition not raised as an issue that the real remedy for recovering possession was by execution and not by way of suit and he held that there was no real possession recovered in execution, and apparently (the point was not clearly stated) that there was no remedy left by suit. But he did not explain precisely why even in default of recovery of possession in execution there should not have been a regular suit to recover possession upon the title deed, that is to say, the certificate of sale of the Court.

    The learned Judge held on the other hand on the issue raised that there was no bar to the suit under Order II, Rule 2 of the Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code. But he has not given, so far as it would appear from the judgment, any reasons for that conclusion. It would appear to me, however, to have been correct. For he has found as a fact that the previous suit was to recover possession of different properties from different defendants. If that were so, it was, in my opinion, clear that recourse could not be had to Order II, Rule 2 of the Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code. My detailed reasons for holding this need not be further stated as they have already been given in the case of Sonu valad Khushal v. Bahinibai.

    It seems to me, therefore, that we ought to restore the decree of the trial Court and reverse that of the first appeal Court.

    Appeal allowed.
    R.R
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    Ramchandra Vithal Bhat v. Gajanannarayan Deshmukh
    (Sep 19, 1919)