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  • S. 6, T. P. Act, Act 4 of 1882,
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  • S. 6, T. P. Act, Act 4 of 1882,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon concerning a suit originally brought by Ebrahim Moolla, the assignee of Maung Chit Maung. The plaintiff sought a declaration of the interests of the assignor under a settlement made by the assignor's father in 1908. The defendants, trustees of the settlement, contended that the assignment was invalid under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (T.P. Act), which restricts the transfer of certain possibilities and rights to sue. The case turned on whether the rights assigned were mere possibilities or rights to sue, or whether they constituted assignable interests under the settlement.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the rights assigned to the plaintiff's assignor under the 1908 settlement constituted a mere possibility of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate or a mere right to sue, both of which are non-transferable under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
  2. Whether the contingent interests in the corpus of the property under the settlement were assignable despite not being vested interests at the time of assignment.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the nature of the interests created by the 1908 settlement. It identified that the settlement granted the children a vested interest in the income of the property and a contingent interest in the corpus until certain conditions were met (such as the youngest child attaining the age of 20 or death). The court distinguished these contingent interests from mere possibilities prohibited from transfer under Section 6 of the T.P. Act, emphasizing that these interests were well-recognized forms of property that could be assigned and used as security or otherwise disposed of. Although the courts below had treated the contingent interests as vested at the time of assignment, the Privy Council clarified that while these were not vested interests, they were still assignable. Consequently, the defense based on Section 6 failed, and the decree in favor of the assignee was upheld.

Holding and Implications

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the validity of the assignment of contingent interests under the settlement, rejecting the defense that such interests were non-transferable mere possibilities or rights to sue under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. No new precedent was set beyond affirming the assignability of such contingent interests in this context.

    Ma Yait And Others v. Official Assignee

    Lord Atkin:-

    This is an appeal from the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon in a suit which was brought originally by one Ebrahim Moolla, who was the assignee of one Maung Chit Maung. The plaintiff claimed to have a declaration of the interests of the assignor under a settlement made by the assignor's father in the year 1908. The defendants, who are the present appellants, are the trustees of the settlement, and the defence to the suit was an allegation that the assignment was invalid by reason of its being in breach of S. 6, T. P. Act, Act 4 of 1882, which applies to the dispositions of this particular settlor. The clauses relied on are Cl. (a), S. 6, which says :

    "The chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman, or any other mere possibility of a like nature, cannot be transferred ;"

    and Cl. (e), which says that a mere right to sue cannot be transferred.

    The question at issue was whether the rights that were given, if any, to the assignor of the plaintiff, the eldest son, were a possibility of a like nature of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate and so forth, or were a right to sue. That turns upon the construction of the settlement. Without going into it in detail, it may be described as an ordinary settlement made in the settlor's lifetime, by which the settlor transferred to the trustees a large amount of property, in substance, probably, the whole of his property, in trust to allow the settlor during his lifetime to manage the property, and to have the sole benefit of the income both from the immovable and moveable property. The settlement then proceeded to declare certain trusts that should come into operation after his death. The trusts to come into operation after his death were that, as to the property comprised in three schedules the trustees, during the life of the widow and until the youngest child attained the age of 20, were to distribute the income in the manner provided, namely, that they were to pay Rs. 1,000 a month to the widow, and to divide the remainder amongst the children, including the eldest son, Maung Chit Maung, the assignor of the plaintiff. After the youngest child attained the age of 20, the property was to be sold, and the proceeds were to be divided in equal shares between the children then surviving, the issue of any child who was dead to represent his father's share. There was a slight alteration in the trusts in relation to the property comprised in the fourth schedule, because in that case the property was not to be distributed until the death of the youngest child, and it was to be divided then amongst the children living at that date.

    Now, it is plain that the result of this disposition was to create, first of all, a vested interest in all the children in the income of the property; secondly, it created a contingent interest in all the children in the corpus in respect of all the property until, at any rate, the youngest child reached the age of 20. When the youngest child reached the age of 30, the children who were alive at that date obtained a vested interest and and right to have the proceeds distributed among them as to the property in Schs. 1, 2 and 3. As to the property of Sch. 4, all the children took a contingent interest until the death of the youngest child, and, as soon as the youngest child died, the children then surviving, and, of course, their issue, obtained a vested right to have the property distributed among them. That is a very plain and ordinary settlement, and it gives very plain and well understood rights to all the parties who benefit under the settlement : a vested right in the income, contingent rights in the corpus; and it appears to their Lordships to be plain that the contingent interest which the children took, whether they took it under Schs. 1, 2 and 3 or under Sch. 4, was something quite different from a mere possibility of a like nature of an heir-apparent succeeding to the estate, or the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy, and also something quite different from a mere right to sue. It is a well ascertained form of property-it certainly has been transferred in this country for generations-in respect of which it is quite possible to raise money and to dispose of it in any way that the beneficiary chooses.

    Their Lordships think, therefore, that the defence failed, and that the Courts were perfectly right in making the decree which was eventually asked for, not by the assignee himself, but by his assignee in bankruptcy who succeeded to his rights.

    Their Lordships think it desirable to say that they are not prepared to accede to the whole of the reasoning of the Courts below, who seem, with great respect, to have treated the interest in the corpus as being a vested interest at the time of the assignment, when, quite plainly, in their Lordships' view, it was not : nevertheless, it being of the nature that their Lordships have described, it was such an interest as could be assigned, and the Courts were, in their Lordships' opinion, quite right in making the decrees complained of. It is not unnatural, as it appears to their Lordships, that when the matter comes to be carefully looked at, counsel for the appellants find it impossible to put any different view before their Lordships from that which they have already expressed; the case is indeed unarguable.

    Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Ma Yait And Others v. Official Assignee
    (Oct 28, 1929)