Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal originates from a suit instituted on 21 December 1915 by Subramania Ayyar (since deceased) in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Tinnevely. Subramania and his brother Krishna Ayyar constituted a joint and undivided Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, holding immoveable properties both in the Travancore State and in British territory (notably Tinnevelly district). In early 1915 they agreed to separate and divide their properties by a yadast (memorandum of agreement) dated 7 January 1915 (Ex. Ay). On 1 February 1915 a formal partition deed (Ex. Az) was executed and registered in respect of the Travancore properties, giving Krishna (the elder) a larger share. No division or delivery of separate possession was made of the Tinnevelly properties. Krishna died before the suit; his son (the defendant) resisted performance of the agreement in respect of the Tinnevelly properties.

Subramania's plaint sought partition by metes and bounds and a direction that the defendant execute conveyances necessary to give effect to the plaintiff's share under the agreement. The defendant's written statement raised three principal objections: (1) Ex. Ay was obtained from Krishna by undue influence; (2) many of the properties claimed by the plaintiff were the self-acquisition of Krishna and not ancestral; and (3) Ex. Ay was not registered in British India and therefore could not be admitted in evidence or form the basis for specific performance.

At trial the District Judge found that undue influence had not been proved, that the onus lay on the defendant to prove that property claimed by him was self-acquired (and that he failed to discharge that onus), and — relying on a decision of the High Court of Madras — held that where a present right is created the instrument, though unregistered, is admissible in evidence; he therefore decreed in favour of the plaintiff, directing partition and delivery of possession in specified schedules.

On appeal the High Court agreed that undue influence had not been established but held that Ex. Ay, not having been registered in British India, was inadmissible in evidence. The High Court nevertheless directed a general partition in equal shares of the properties both in British India and the Travancore State, thereby upsetting the completed and registered Travancore settlement (Ex. Az). The defendant appealed from this judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the yadast/memorandum (Ex. Ay) required registration under the Indian Registration Act, 1877, and if not registered whether it was admissible in evidence in support of a suit for specific performance.
  2. Whether the District Judge and the High Court correctly treated the claim as one for specific performance versus converting it into a suit for general partition (i.e., whether the High Court was justified in directing a general partition and upsetting the completed Travancore settlement).
  3. Where parties admit a nucleus of ancestral property, whether the onus was on the defendant to prove that particular properties were self-acquired, and whether that onus had been discharged in this case.
  4. The proper scope of relief (i.e., whether the decree of partition should extend to properties in Travancore or be confined to Tinnevelly).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Subramania Ayyar) Position

  • The plaintiff sued for enforcement of the agreement (Ex. Ay) and for partition by metes and bounds, seeking a direction that the defendant convey the plaintiff's share in terms of the agreement.
  • Implicit in the plaint is reliance on the memorandum and the subsequent Travancore partition deed (Ex. Az) as reflecting the agreed division of family property.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The agreement Ex. Ay was obtained by the plaintiff from his father (Krishna) under undue influence and should be invalidated on that ground.
  • A large part of the properties claimed by the plaintiff were the self-acquisitions of Krishna and therefore not divisible as ancestral joint property.
  • Because Ex. Ay was not registered in British India, it was inadmissible in evidence and a suit for specific performance could not be based upon it. Consequently, the High Court was not justified in converting the suit into one for general partition and should have dismissed the plaintiff's claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Note: the opinion refers to a decision of the High Court of Madras relied upon by the District Judge but does not identify that decision by case name or citation.

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Decision of the High Court of Madras (referred to by the District Judge; unnamed in the opinion) The principle that "if a present right is created, the instrument, though unregistered, is admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance." The District Judge relied on that decision to admit Ex. Ay in evidence and to grant decree for specific performance/partition. The High Court disagreed as to admissibility; the appellate court (their Lordships) considered the statutory registration scheme (S.17 and Proviso V) and reached the conclusion that Ex. Ay did not require registration and was admissible so far as it went.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis focuses on three principal aspects: (A) the legal effect and admissibility of the yadast (Ex. Ay) under the Indian Registration Act, 1877; (B) the effect of the executed and registered Travancore partition deed (Ex. Az) upon the present suit; and (C) the allocation of the evidentiary onus regarding claimed self-acquired property.

A. Registration and Admissibility of Ex. Ay

The court examined S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877, which requires registration of certain non-testamentary instruments that purport to create or affect immoveable property of value Rs. 100 and upwards. The court also considered Proviso V to sub-section 2, which excepts "any document not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest ... but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest."

Applying that proviso, the court characterized Ex. Ay as a memorandum (yadast) that did not itself create, assign, limit or extinguish any right in immoveable property, but instead created a right to obtain a subsequent, formal partition deed. Because Ex. Ay was therefore not of the class of documents that must be registered under S. 17, the court concluded that Ex. Ay did not require registration and is admissible in evidence "so far as it goes."

B. The Travancore Partition Deed (Ex. Az) and the Scope of Relief

The court observed that Ex. Ay expressly contemplated the execution and registration of a formal partition deed and provided that until such formal deed was executed and registered the yadast "shall itself be in force." A formal partition deed (Ex. Az) was executed and registered in Travancore between competent parties and appears to have been acted upon, with the defendant or his father obtaining possession of the properties falling to his share.

The court found it difficult to see how the Travancore transaction (Ex. Az), duly executed and registered and apparently carried into effect, could properly be upset in proceedings primarily concerned with properties in Tinnevelly. The appellate court's direction of a general partition that affected the Travancore settlement was treated as proceeding upon a misapprehension. Consequently, their Lordships concluded the present suit must be confined to joint family properties situated in Tinnevelly.

C. Onus of Proof Regarding Self-Acquired Properties

The court agreed with the lower tribunals that, given the parties' admission of an ancestral nucleus, the burden lay on the defendant to show that particular properties he claimed were the self-acquisitions of his father. The defendant examined witnesses on commission in support of that contention, but those depositions were not placed in evidence. The record (as reflected in the District Judge's judgment) showed "Defendant's exhibits ... nil" and "Defendant's witnesses ... nil." On that basis, their Lordships concluded that the defendant had wholly failed to discharge the onus.

D. Remedy and Practical Directions

Recognizing that the suit was substantially one for partition, their Lordships varied the High Court's decree by confining partition to the properties in the Tinnevelly district. They remitted the matter to the High Court for transmission to the District Judge with directions that a Commissioner be appointed to make the division by metes and bounds in equal shares and to allot to the plaintiff his half-share of the joint family properties in Tinnevelly. If exact equal division of any particular property was not practicable, the Commissioner was to make appropriate adjustments subject to the District Judge's decision.

Holding and Implications

Primary Holding: The appeal is dismissed save that the decree of the High Court is varied to confine partition to the properties held by the parties in the Tinnevelly district; the case is remanded for partition in Tinnevelly in equal shares by a Commissioner under the District Judge's supervision.

Consequences and practical implications:

  • Ex. Ay (the yadast) was held not to require registration under S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877, because it merely created a right to obtain a formal partition deed (and hence is admissible in evidence "so far as it goes").
  • The completed and registered Travancore partition deed (Ex. Az), which had been executed and acted upon in Travancore, should not be upset by this suit concerning Tinnevelly properties; the Travancore division stands unaffected by the present decree.
  • The defendant failed to discharge the onus of proving that the properties he claimed were self-acquired; accordingly the decree for division in Tinnevelly is to be by equal shares unless evidence to the contrary is presented in proper proceedings.
  • Remedial directions: the case is remitted so that a Commissioner can make division by metes and bounds in Tinnevelly, with provision for adjustments where equal division is impracticable.
  • Costs: as the suit was substantially for partition, the parties are to bear their respective costs throughout the proceedings, except that the defendant must pay to the plaintiff his half-share of the Court fees.

The opinion does not state that it establishes any broader precedential rule beyond its statutory construction and application to these facts; the direct effects above are the primary practical outcomes for the parties, and the case was remanded as described.

Disposition: Case remanded with the variation described above.

    Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar

    This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff, Subramania Ayyar, since deceased, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Tinnevely, in the Madras Presidency on the 21st December, 1915, under the following circumstances.

    Subramania Ayyar, with his brother Krishna Ayyar, who died before the institution of the suit, formed a joint and undivided Hindu family subject to the Mitakshara law. They possessed considerable immoveable properties both within the Travancore State and in British Territories. The landed properties belonging to them in British India are situated in the Tinnevelly district.

    In 1915 they decided to separate and make an amicable division of the properties belonging to them both immoveable and moveable. By a yadast, or memorandum of agreement, dated the 7th January, 1915, which is marked as Ex(Ay) in these proceedings, they agreed to divide their properties both in Travancore and in British Territories according to certain specified shares.

    Later, on the 1st February of the same year, effect was given to this agreement in respect of the properties in Travancore under which Krishna Ayyar, as the elder brother, obtained, under the designation of jesthabhagam, a larger share than would have come to him otherwise. This document was registered in Travancore, and effect appears to have been given to it in respect of the properties situated in that State. No division, however, was made of the properties in Tinnevelly or separate possession delivered to the parties of their respective shares. Krishna Ayyar having died in the meantime, his son, the present defendant, evaded the fulfilment of the agreement embodied in Ex. (Ay); and accordingly Subramania brought the present suit for its enforcement.

    In the plaint the relief asked for is a decree for partition by metes and bounds, and a direction to the defendant to execute a conveyance of the properties that should fall to the share of the plaintiff in terms of the agreement.

    The defendant in his written statement raised three objections to the suit ; firstly, that the agreement (Ay) had been obtained by Subramania from his father under undue influence; secondly, that a large portion of the properties in which the plaintiff claimed a share was his father's self-acquisition and did not form part of the ancestral estate : and thirdly, that the agreement not having been registered in British India, could not be admitted in evidence, and no suit for specific performance could be based on it.

    The District Judge held that the defendant had failed to prove his allegation of undue influence to invalidate the agreement on which the plaintiff relied. He also held that the defendant having admitted that there was a nucleus of ancestral property, it lay upon him to establish that the properties which he claimed exclusively, were acquired by his father, and this onus he had wholly failed to discharge.

    With regard to the non registration of the agreement the District Judge said as follows :-

    "I do not think that the fact, that the yadast (Ex. Ay) and the document of partition (Ex. Az) referred to in paragraph 8 of the plaint were not registered in British India, precludes their admission in evidence."

    And, relying upon a decision of the High Court of Madras, he held that

    "if a present right is created, the instrument, though unregistered, is admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance, and I hold that they are admissible in evidence in this suit."
    He accordingly made a decree in favour of the plaintiff, declaring in the first place that the properties claimed by the plaintiff had fallen to his share, and directing that the defendant should put the plaintiff in possession of the property detailed in Schs. 1, 4 and 6 of the plaint and half of certain other properties, after dividing by metes and bounds. He made certain other directions on the same basis.

    On appeal to the High Court the learned Judges held, in agreement with the first Court, that the defendant had utterly failed to prove that the memorandum had been obtained by undue influence, but they also held that the agreement Ex. Ay, not having been registered in British India, was not admissible in evidence. Having regard, however, to the facts of the case and the admitted jointness of the parties until 1915, they directed a general partition in equal shares of the properties both in British India and the Travancore State.

    The effect of the High Court's decision on the latter point is that it upsets the completed settlement embodied in Ex. Az, which was duly executed and registered in the Travancore State, and which appears to have been carried into effect, the defendant or his father having got possession of the properties which fell to his share.

    With regard to the properties in Tinnevelly, the High Court considered, in agreement with the District Judge, that the defendant having admitted an ancestral nucleus, it lay upon him to prove that the properties which he claimed were self-acquired.

    The defendant, on appeal, contends that the High Court was not justified in turning a suit for specific performance of an agreement which, not having been registered, could not be given in evidence, into a suit for general partition, and that accordingly the present claim should be dismissed. He also contends that the High Court was wrong in decreeing a partition of the properties in the Travancore district.

    In their Lordships' judgment the High Court, in upsetting the division of the Travancore properties appears to have proceeded upon a misapprehension.

    The yadast, as its name implies was a memorandum regarding the cessor of jointness, which amounted to a declaration that from that time forth the parties

    became entitled to the possession and enjoyment of their properties in separate shares ; and it provided for the execution of a further deed effectuating the partition. It says :-

    "A partition deed in terms hereof shall be executed and registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar of this place, as also at Tinnevelly, as early as possible ; that until then this shall itself be in force."

    It then goes on to give a larger share to Krishna Ayyar, as the elder brother. In accordance with the provisions of the agreement, a formal deed of partition (Az) was executed and registered in Travancore relating to the Travancore properties. It was entered into between two persons sui juris fully competent to enter into the transaction. It is difficult to perceive how that transaction can be upset in a suit which relates to properties in Tinnevelly, and asks for a partition of those properties alone. Subramania, no doubt, in his plaint had said that he would bring a suit in the Travancore Court to set aside the division effected by Az, and it is possible that that statement led the defendant to throw every possible obstacle in the way of the plaintiff to get the relief he asked for. But it furnishes no ground in their Lordships' opinion, to upset a completed transaction. The present suit must consequently be confined to the joint family properties situated in Tinnevelly.

    It has been contended that this is a suit for the specific performance of an unregistered contract ; and that the High Court dealt with it as one for general partition.

    As regards the non-registration of the agreement, it is to be observed that S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877, makes the registration of certain classes of documents compulsory. Among others :-

    (b) "non-testamentary instruments which purport to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immoveable property.

    From this, Proviso V to sub-S. 2 excepts the following :-

    "any document not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immoveable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest."

    Ex. Ay is not a document by itself creating, assigning, limiting, or extinguishing any right or interest in immoveable property ; it merely creates a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create a right in the person claiming the relief, and on that ground their Lordships think Ex. Ay did not require registration, and accordingly is admissible in evidence, so far as it goes.

    The learned Judges of the High Court were, however, perfectly right in the view that the onus was on the defendant to establish that the properties he claimed as the self-acquired properties of his father, Krishna Ayyar, bore that character.

    The defendant examined a number of witnesses on commission, apparently in support of his statement, but the depositions of these witnesses do not appear to have been put in evidence, and the list attached to the District Judge's judgment, after mentioning the exhibits filed on the plaintiff's behalf and giving the names of his witnesses, contains the following entries :-

    "Defendant's exhibits ... nil

    Defendant's witnesses ... nil."

    Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that the decree of the High Court should be varied by confining the decree for partition to the properties held by the parties in the Tinnevelly district ; that save and except this variation the appeal should be dismissed. The case will go back to the High Court for remission to the District Judge in order that he may appoint a Commissioner to make the division of the properties by metes and bounds in equal shares and to allot to the plaintiff his half-share of the whole of the joint family properties situated in Tinnevelly ; that in case, owing to any circumstances, equal division cannot be made of any particular property to one party or the other, the difference should be arranged for by the Commissioner, subject to the decision of the District Judge.

    As the suit was one substantially for partition, their Lordships think that the parties should bear throughout the proceedings their costs, save and except that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff his half-share of the Court fees. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.

    Case remanded.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar
    (Jul 31, 1922)