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  • Companies Act (R. S. Can., 1906.
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  • Companies Act (R. S. Can., 1906.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two consolidated actions were brought by transferors and a common transferee against two Canadian companies (the Canada National Fire Insurance Company and the Great West Permanent Loan Company). Each action concerned transfers of fully paid-up shares which were regular in form and regularly presented for registration. The central factual issue was whether the directors of either company had an absolute power to refuse to approve and register those transfers.

Initially, in the first case an application for prerogative writs of mandamus was made, but by consent the application was converted into an action with a statement of claim seeking a mandamus or an order in the nature of a mandamus to compel registration. Some formal evidence was given, and by consent the matters were heard on motion for judgment without further pleadings, the parties agreeing the matter was entirely one of law.

Both companies were incorporated under special Acts incorporating Part II of the Companies Act (R.S. Can., 1906, c. 79). Each company had by-laws requiring approval of transfers by the board of directors; the by-laws had been confirmed by shareholders and were in force when the transfers were presented. After receipt of the transfers, directors of each company met and purported to amend the by-laws to add language expressly giving the directors power to refuse transfers without assigning any reason; those amendments were never brought before or confirmed by the shareholders and counsel for the appellants admitted they could not rely upon them.

At first instance (Galt, J.) the Judge decided for the plaintiffs, ordering registration of the transfers, and the Court of Appeal (Howell, C.J., Perdue and Cameron, JJ.A.) affirmed. The present appeal raised (1) whether the existing by-laws warranted the directors' refusals and (2) if they did, whether such by-laws were valid.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the by-law in either company warranted the directors in absolutely refusing to register transfers of fully paid-up shares that were regular in form and regularly presented.
  2. If the by-law did so warrant, whether such a by-law would be valid (or whether it would be ultra vires under the Canadian Companies Act as incorporated in the special Acts).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Appellants relied on a line of English decisions under the Joint-Stock Companies Acts to support the proposition that directors could have a power to refuse registration of transfers.
  • It was pressed that there exist classes of companies for which it is highly important that directors should possess a power of veto over transfers; this point was noted as having influenced minority judges in an earlier Ontario case.
  • Counsel for the appellants admitted they could not rely upon the post-presentation amendments to the by-laws because those amendments had not been confirmed by shareholders.

Plaintiffs / Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments beyond the matters summarized above.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Imperial Starch Co., 10 Ont. L. R. 22 Stated that a statute giving power to pass by-laws "regulating the transfer" of stock means regulation of formalities and manner of transfer, and does not empower a by-law which virtually gives the directors power to prohibit transfer (i.e., an arbitrary veto). The court adopted the statement to support the conclusion that a by-law which effectively permits directors to prohibit transfers is not within the regulatory power and would prevent realization of fully paid-up shares; thus such a by-law would be ultra vires.
In re Good and Jacob Y. Shantz, Son and Co., 23 Ont. L. R. 544 The majority reasoning (adopted from the Imperial Starch approach) that a by-law cannot validly impose a restriction amounting to a directorate veto and that companies incorporated under statutory schemes have only those powers expressly given by statute. Their Lordships regarded the Ontario Court of Appeal's conclusion in this case as correct and adopted its reasoning in holding that a by-law purporting to impose a veto power over the transfer of fully paid-up shares would be ultra vires under the Canadian statutory scheme.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the statutory framework and the by-laws as they stood when the transfers were presented (excluding the unconfirmed amendments). The analysis followed these steps:

  1. Statutory character of the companies: The Court emphasized that companies created under Part II by special Act are creatures of statute and possess only the powers given by statute (the special Acts and the general Companies Act). Because nothing material in the special Acts was relevant, the Court looked to the general Act, paying particular attention to Ss. 132 and 138.
  2. Interpretation of statutory terms: Section 138 provides that stock shall be transferable "in such manner only, and subject to such restrictions and conditions as are prescribed by this part" or by special Act or by-laws. The Court interpreted the power to make by-laws in S. 132 as confined to "regulating the transfer of stock," and drew a distinction between regulation (concerning manner and formalities) and restriction (substantive limitations, such as an arbitrary veto).
  3. Canon of construction applied: The Court applied the principle reddendo singula singulis to read S. 138 as meaning that transferability is subject only to restrictions imposed by the general or special Act and to the manner prescribed by by-laws. Thus, if a "condition" is substantive it aligns with "restriction" (which would need statutory authority); if formal it aligns with "manner" (which by-laws may prescribe).
  4. Reliance on precedent: The Court relied on prior Ontario decisions (In re Imperial Starch Co. and In re Good and Jacob Y. Shantz, Son and Co.) for the proposition that a by-law purporting to give directors a veto power over transfers of fully paid-up shares is ultra vires because it effectively prohibits transferability, a core attribute of personal property recognized by the general Act.
  5. Construction of the existing by-laws: The Court examined the operative by-law language in each company (both required transfers to be approved and recorded). The Court held that such a by-law should be construed, if possible, so as to give effect to it (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) as conferring on directors the power to be satisfied about matters legitimately within their province—such as unpaid calls (S. 148), discretion regarding partly paid stock (S. 145), precautions against forged transfers, verifying title on death or bankruptcy, accepting alternative forms of transfer or indemnities, excluding transfers to an alien enemy, and requiring reasonable fees.
  6. Outcome of interpretation: The Court concluded that, properly construed, a by-law requiring directors' approval is valid insofar as it permits the directors to be satisfied on matters within their statutory duties and powers, but it does not and cannot lawfully furnish an arbitrary veto to refuse registration of regular transfers of fully paid-up shares.
  7. Effect of unconfirmed amendments: The amendments expressly purporting to authorize refusal without assigning reason were not confirmed by shareholders and counsel for appellants admitted they could not rely on them; accordingly those amendments had no bearing in favor of the appellants.

On both grounds—(a) the actual by-laws did not support an arbitrary refusal to register these transfers, and (b) if they did so purport, they would be invalid—the Court concluded the appellants' position failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Their Lordships dismissed the consolidated appeals. APPEALS DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decision upholds the orders of the courts below requiring the defendant companies to register the transfers, make the necessary entries, and issue proper certificates. The directors' refusals to register the specific transfers in these cases were not supported by the by-laws and thus could not stand.
  • Validity of by-laws: By-laws that require directors' approval are valid when they are construed as authorizing directors to be satisfied about matters legitimately within their statutory province (formalities, title inquiries, unpaid calls, forged instruments, fees, etc.). However, a by-law which purports to grant an absolute, unfettered veto over transfers of fully paid-up shares is ultra vires under the statutory scheme and cannot be enforced.
  • On company design: The Court acknowledged that certain companies might require a directorate veto by constitutional design; where such a power is to be conferred in the Canadian statutory context it must be introduced by the appropriate statutory instrument (e.g., Letters Patent or a special Act), not by by-law.
  • Precedential effect: The Court relied upon and endorsed prior Ontario decisions on this point. The ruling applies the existing statutory interpretation and case law to these facts; the opinion does not announce a novel principle beyond affirming that a by-law cannot effect an arbitrary veto on transferability of fully paid-up shares under the statutory regime described.

Disposition: Appeals dismissed with costs.

    Canada National Fire Insurance Company v. Hutchings And Others

    Sir Walter Phillimore:-

    The first mentioned action is brought by the transferor and transferee of a parcel of fully paid-up shares in the Canada National Fire Insurance Company against that Company; the second action is also a joint action by two transferors and the transferee of two parcels of fully paid-up shares in the Great West Permanent Loan Company against that company. It is the same transferee in both cases, and the same point, that is, whether the directors of either company have an absolute power of refusing to approve and register transfers of fully paid-up shares regular in form and regularly presented to them.

    It appears that in the first instance application was made upon motion for prerogative writs of mandamus; but that upon some question arising as to the propriety of this form of remedy the applications for these writs were by consent converted into actions, statements of claim being delivered setting forth the facts, and claiming as relief a mandamus or an order in the nature of a mandamus commanding either defendant company to register the transferee as the owner of the shares in question.

    Some formal evidence was given; but, again by consent, the actions were heard upon motion for judgment without further pleadings, it being agreed that the matter was one entirely of law.

    Both companies were constituted by special Acts incorporating Part II of the Companies Act (R. S. Can., 1906. c. 79). Except as incorporating the general Act, the special Acts are of no importance in this case.

    The material sections of the general Act are as follows : (Their Lordships' judgment set out the sections appearing in the footnote at p. 459.)

    At the time of the presentation of the transfers for registration the by-law of the insurance company relating to the transfer of shares was in the following terms :-

    "Article VII. (a) Shares in the capital stock of the company shall be transferable only on the books of the company by the owner in person, or by attorney, on surrender of the certificates of stock properly endorsed. (b) Transfers and allotments of shares shall not be valid unless approved by the board of directors."

    And the by-law of the loan company was in the following terms :-

    "Article III This stock shall be issued subject to the following conditions - (a) That the holder of this stock will be paid the semi-annual dividends that may be declared from time to time by the board of directors. (b) Said dividends shall be payable on the 1st day of January and July of each year. (c) That said stock shall be non-withdrawable, but may be sold, and such transfers must be recorded in the books of the company.

    "Assignment of stock shall not be valid unless approved and endorsed by the board of directors and accompanied by a transfer fee of one dollar. The assignment shall be accompanied by the stock certificate."

    These by-laws had been confirmed by the shareholders in their respective companies, and were in force when the transfers were presented for registration.

    After the receipt of the transfers a meeting of the directors of each of the companies was held, and the by-laws were then amended by the addition in each case of the following words :

    "For greater certainty, but not so as to restrict anything herein contained, or and in addition thereto, the directors may refuse to register any transfer of stock heretofore or hereafter made upon which the company has a lien; and the directors, without assigning any reason, may refuse to register any transfer of stock heretofore or hereafter made, whether fully paid-up stock or not, to a person of whom they do not approve."

    These amendments, however, were never brought before or confirmed by the shareholders of either of the companies; and counsel for the appellants admitted that he could not place reliance upon them.

    Upon the actions coming on for hearing the Judge of first instance (Galt, J.) decided in favour of the plaintiffs, and ordered the defendant companies to register the transfers, make the necessary entries, and issue the proper certificates. Upon appeal the Court of Appeal (Howell, C.J., and Perdue and Cameron, J.J.A.) confirmed those decisions.

    The question now raised upon appeal from the Court of Appeal is one of some importance, in the solution of which their Lordships have been greatly assisted by counsel. There are two branches of it : (1) Did the by-law in the case of either company warrant the directors in their refusal? (2) If so, was the by-law valid?

    At the time that the cases were before the Court in Manitoba the amendments to the by-laws had not come up before the shareholders for confirmation, and the Courts below appear to have proceeded upon the footing that they were provisionally in force. If this were so still, there would only be one matter for inquiry : Were the by-laws valid ? But now that the amendments have not been confirmed, and after the admission of counsel for the appellants, both matters have to be considered.

    Upon the whole it will be best to give first consideration to the point upon which the Courts below decided the validity of a by-law supposing it to warrant the directors in absolutely refusing to register a transfer of fully paid-up shares, regular in form and regularly presented.

    In the argument for the appellants stress was laid upon the line of English decisions upon cases of this nature arising under the Joint-Stock Companies Acts. There is, however, for the present purpose no analogy between companies in the United Kingdom which are formed by contract, whether it be under deed of settlement or under memorandum and articles of association to which the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies necessarily assents if the documents are regular in form, and Canadian Companies which are formed under the Canadian Companies Act, either by Letters Patent or by special Act.

    A nearer resemblance would be found in the Companies Clauses Act, 1845. But it is wiser to look at the Canadian legislation as complete in itself and unaffected by British jurisprudence.

    The Canadian Companies, at any rate those created under Part II of the general Act by special Act, are pure creatures of statute, and their powers and duties are to be found in the two Acts. There being nothing material in the special Act, their Lordships look to the general Act, and especially to Ss. 132 and 138. The latter section provides that stock shall be personal estate and transferable. No doubt the stock is transferable "in such manner only, and subject to such restrictions and conditions as are prescribed by this part" (of the Act) "or by the special Act or the by-laws of the company" (S. 138). This provision, however, is not to be construed as empowering the company to make restrictive by-laws. The power to make by-laws is in S. 132, and it is confined in this matter to by-laws regulating "......the transfer of stock." Regulation does not mean restriction, still less subjection to an arbitrary veto.

    The words in S. 138 should be construed reddendo-singula singulis, and so construed mean subject to such restrictions as are imposed by the general or the special Act and in such manner as are prescribed by the by-laws. The word "condition'' is perhaps ambiguous. If the condition is to effect substantive limitation, it would go with ''restriction;" if formal, with "manner.''

    That a power of regulation does not extend to restriction was well stated by MacMahon, J., in In re Imperial Starch Co. 10 Ont. L. R. 22. In language which was adopted in a latter case, and which their Lordships would repeat:

    "The statute gives the company, power to pass by-laws "regulating the transfer' of stock; that is: How and in what manner and with what formalities it is to be transferred. But the Imperial Starch Company has passed a by-law virtually empowering the directors to prohibit the transfer of stock; that is, unless the directors approve of the transfer it cannot be made in the books of the company. This, in effect, would prevent a holder of fully paid-up shares in the company from selling and realising on his stock, because no purchaser could be found, if registration as owner could be prevented at the caprice of the directorate."

    And their Lordships are of opinion that the Court of Appeal for Ontario came to the right conclusion in In re Good and Jacob Y. Shantz, Son and Co. 23 Ont. L. R. 544. The reasoning of the Judges who were in the majority in that case is substantially the same as that of MacMahon, J., in In re Imperial Starch Co. (1) and it is in that case that his words are adopted by Garrow, J. A.

    It is to be observed that Jacob Y Shantz, Son and Co, was a limited company formed under Letters Patent by virtue of Part I of the Companies Act, and not by special Act in accordance with Part II. But, so far as there is any difference, the argument against assuming that a company formed under the Companies Act has any other powers than those expressly given to it is stronger in the case of a company incorporated by special Act than in the case of a company incorporated by Letters Patent.

    The conclusion is that a by-law purporting to impose such a restriction upon transfer as would be imposed if the directors had a power of veto would be ultra vires; and further that it would interfere with that transferability of stock which is an ordinary incident to personal property, and which is provided for in the general Act. This is the conclusion at which correctly, in their Lordships' opinion, the Courts of Manitoba have arrived. If, therefore, the by-laws of these two companies purport to give such a power of veto they cannot stand. This is the matter of general interest to which alone the Courts below addressed themselves, and which has accordingly been dealt with by their Lordships in the first instance.

    But now that it is admitted that the amendments are not to be regarded; it may be that the by-laws upon a true construction do not purport to impose any such restriction.

    There is a slight difference in the language as between the two companies, but it is not material. Both require transfers to be approved, and to be recorded in the books of the company. This leaves to the directors certain matters upon which they have to exercise a judgment. They are by S. 148 to refuse to register if a call is unpaid. They have under S. 145 a discretion in the case of stock not fully paid up. They are entitled to take precautions against forged transfers. If the shareholder on the books is dead or has become bankrupt, they have to see that the title has duly devolved upon the transferor before they register his transfer. The usual form of assignment in these companies is by transfer endorsed on the certificate. The directors may require a transfer in this form or satisfactory explanation and indemnity in case of a departure from it. They could refuse to register a transfer to an alien enemy. They may, and in the case of one of the two companies they do, require a reasonable fee. On the whole, the directors have the powers and duties conferred by Ss. 143 and 145, and they have to see to matters of title and conveyance.

    A by-law requiring their approval is properly construed as meaning that they are to be satisfied in respect of matters which are within their province. So construed, as it should be, ut res magis valeat quam pereat, it is a valid by-law; but one which gives no warrant for the imposition of a veto.

    On both grounds, therefore, because the action of the two companies in refusing to register these transfers was not supported by their by-laws, and because if it were so supported the by-laws would be invalid, this appeal fails.

    It was pressed upon their Lordships that there are classes of companies in which it is highly important that directors should have such a power of veto; and this consideration had weight with the two learned Judges who formed the minority in Good's Case (2). It may well be so. There are decided cases in the English Courts which show that such a power may be lawfully reserved on the occasion of the constitution of the company, and a sufficient number of such cases to show that the power has been found convenient in use. But if it is to be introduced under the Canadian Legislature, it must be in the Letters Patent or in the special Act.

    Their Lordships will therefore humbly recommend to His Majesty that these consolidated appeals should be dismissed with costs.

    Appeals dismissed.

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    Comments

    Canada National Fire Insurance Company v. Hutchings And Others
    (Jan 31, 1918)