Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • privilege.11. Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • privilege.11. Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (also the appellant) is an Advocate who sued the defendant for damages of Rs. 10,000 with interest at 6% per annum, claiming that the defendant had defamed him and his family by giving a false complaint to the police. The complaint alleged suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of the plaintiff's unmarried sister Devaki and suggested that the plaintiff and his relatives had murdered her and secretly disposed of her body. A criminal case (Cr. No. 1848 of 1976, Thuckalay Police Station) was registered but later the police dropped proceedings, being satisfied that the complaint had arisen from enmity between the families.

The plaintiff produced several documentary exhibits (newspaper publications dated 1–2 January 1977, death extract, the defendant's police statement dated 30.12.1976 (Ex. A7), the FIR (Ex. A8), a reply notice and related documents) and examined two witnesses. The defendant filed a written statement denying responsibility for publication, asserting lack of direct knowledge of the cause of death, and denying having given a signed statement to the police (while admitting signatures were obtained during investigation). The defendant also contended the plaintiff suffered no real reputational or professional loss and that the claimed damages were excessive.

At first instance the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, treating the defendant's statements to the police as privileged and therefore not actionable in defamation. On appeal the District Judge (Kanyakumari at Nagercoil) concurred and confirmed the dismissal and the order on costs. The plaintiff then appealed to this Court in a Second Appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a complaint containing defamatory allegations made to a police officer (here, Ex. A7) is absolutely privileged such that no civil action for defamation can lie in respect of it.
  2. Whether the defendant's conduct, viewed against the ingredients of Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code (false information to a public servant with intent or knowledge that it is likely to cause injury or annoyance), affects the availability of absolute privilege as a defence to a civil defamation claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Srikumaran Nair)

  • The defendant cannot claim absolute privilege for the statement to the police; the District Judge misunderstood the scope of privilege applicable to complaints to police officers.
  • The doctrine of absolute privilege should not bar inquiry into the motive of the person who made the complaint; the lower court misapplied the law by treating the police complaint as absolutely privileged without proper basis.
  • Counsel relied on the distinction that some authorities treat police complaints as not absolutely privileged where the officer is not acting in a judicial capacity or where the protection should be qualified and defeatable by proof of malice.

Respondent's / Defendant's Arguments (Mr. P. Gopalan and defendant's written statement)

  • Counsel for the respondent relied on a line of authorities (including Bapalal & Co. v. Krishnaswami Iyer and earlier Madras decisions) that hold complaints to police officers are, by their nature, absolutely privileged because they are preliminary to statements a complainant might later be called to substantiate on oath.
  • In his written statement the defendant contended inter alia that he had no direct knowledge of cause of death, that statements he related were hearsay or investigation-related, that he did not give any signed statement before the police, that he was not responsible for publication of the alleged defamatory reports, and that the plaintiff's practice and reputation were not materially affected.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bapalal & Co. v. Krishnaswami Iyer, A.I.R. 1941 Madras 26 (52 L.W. 510) Held that a complaint to a police officer, being preliminary to possible sworn testimony, is absolutely privileged and cannot be the subject of civil action for defamation where made bona fide. Relied upon by respondent counsel and considered by this Court as part of the body of authority supporting absolute privilege for police complaints; the Court noted the authority and its reasoning and treated it as persuasive in confirming lower courts.
Sanjivi Reddi v. Koneri Reddi, A.I.R. 1926 Madras 521 (23 L.W. 328) Held that statements made by a potential witness as a preliminary to going into the witness-box are privileged like statements in court. Identified by the Court as a foundational authority for treating preliminary statements (including complaints to police) as absolutely privileged; the Court cited and followed this line of authority.
Golap Jan v. Bholanath (38 Cal. 880) One of the authorities supporting the proposition that complaints to judicial officers or preliminary statements enjoy absolute privilege. Noted by the Court as part of the cluster of decisions pointing towards absolute privilege for certain preliminary statements; used in the Court's reasoning to justify following earlier decisions.
Madhab Chandra v. Nirode Chandra, I.L.R. 1939 (1) Cal. 574 Held that a report to the police alleging the commission of a crime and evidence given in court in support of the accusation were absolutely privileged. Cited as another authority in the line supporting absolute privilege; formed part of the precedent matrix the Court considered when deciding to confirm the lower courts' view.
Majju v. Lachman Prasad (46 All. 671) Distinguished complaints that led to judicial proceedings from those that did not; a complaint that did not lead to judicial proceedings was held not to be privileged in that authority. The Court noted this distinction but treated the overall weight of authorities as favouring absolute privilege for police complaints in the circumstances analogous to the present case.
Watson v. M. Ewan (1905 A.C. 480) English common law foundation: absolute privilege extends to statements made in the witness box and preliminaries thereto. Referred to as the common law root of the principle; the Court acknowledged the lineage from the English authorities when considering extension of absolute privilege.
V. Narayanan v. F. Subbanna, A.I.R. 1975 Karnataka 162 Held that defamatory statements made in a complaint to a police officer are absolutely privileged and not actionable in damages. Referred to as a supporting authority for absolute privilege in complaints to police; used by the Court to justify affirming the lower courts' rulings.
K. Ramadas v. P. Samu Pillai, 1969-1 M.L.J. 338 (81 L.W. 505) Held that a complaint to a police officer is absolutely privileged because it is a statement the complainant must be prepared to substantiate on oath. Cited by the Court as part of the precedential support for absolute privilege for police complaints and relied upon in confirming the dismissal.
Moroti Sadashiv v. Godubai Narayana Rao, A.I.R. 1959 Bombay 443 Observed that statements before a police officer not acting in a judicial capacity cannot be said to be absolutely privileged; such statements are only under qualified privilege, defeatable by proof of malice. Referred to by the appellant's counsel and noted by the Court; the Court acknowledged this contrary view but, considering the line of Madras and other authorities, did not adopt it to alter the outcome in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by (i) outlining the uncontested factual matrix, (ii) identifying the crucial legal question (whether the police complaint was absolutely privileged), and (iii) examining the applicable statutory provision and precedents.

Factually, the Court noted (as did the courts below) that there was longstanding enmity between the families, that Devaki died on 29.12.1976 and was cremated the same night, and that the defendant lodged a complaint on 30.12.1976 describing the death as suspicious and suggesting foul play by the plaintiff and his relatives. The complaint led to police action and an FIR (Ex. A8), although the police ultimately referred or dropped further criminal proceedings after investigation.

The Court also adverted to Section 182, Indian Penal Code (false information with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another), and set out the statutory ingredients: (i) giving false information, (ii) to a public servant, (iii) knowledge or belief that the information is false, and (iv) intent or knowledge that the information would cause the public servant to act in a way that would injure or annoy another. The Court observed that, on the material before it (notably Ex. A7), the defendant's conduct prima facie fell within the perspective of Section 182.

Nevertheless, the Court confronted the competing precedents. A cluster of Madras and other Indian decisions had held that complaints to police officers (as preliminary statements which a complainant must be prepared to substantiate on oath) enjoy absolute privilege similar to statements in court or in preliminary witness examinations. The Court reviewed the leading authorities (including Bapalal & Co., Sanjivi, K. Ramadas and similar decisions) and the contrary view expressed in Moroti Sadashiv (that police statements may only attract qualified privilege if the officer is not acting judicially).

Although the presiding judge at one point "reacted sharply" and felt the defendant's act was defamatory and that absolute privilege should not apply (especially given the potential overlap with Section 182), the Court concluded that it was bound by the precedent line favouring absolute privilege for such complaints. The Court therefore declined to depart from the earlier Madras/other authorities and confirmed the view taken by the lower courts that the complaint to the police was absolutely privileged in the circumstances of this case.

In short: the Court balanced statutory considerations (Section 182) and the facts against the prevailing judicial authorities and, despite initial reservations, chose to follow the established precedents that treat police complaints of this nature as absolutely privileged.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court confirmed the judgments of the lower courts and dismissed the Second Appeal. The Second Appeal is therefore DISMISSED. The Court ordered no costs (i.e., "No costs.").

Implications:

  • The plaintiff's civil suit for damages based on the defendant's complaint to the police remains dismissed; the defendant is not held civilly liable for defamation on the basis of that police complaint in this litigation.
  • The lower courts' conclusions that the police complaint (Ex. A7) was absolutely privileged in the circumstances were affirmed by this Court.
  • The Court explicitly noted that, although Section 182 IPC could be relevant to criminal culpability for giving false information, the precedential treatment of complaints to the police as absolutely privileged in the cited authorities meant the civil defamation claim could not succeed on the basis of that complaint. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new rule; rather, it confirms the existing line of decisions favoring absolute privilege for police complaints in analogous circumstances.

This summary is confined to, and strictly based upon, the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the opinion have been introduced.

    M. Neelakantadas v. M. Gopinathan

    The plaintiff is the appellant. He filed a suit for damages claiming Rs. 10,000/- with interest at 6% per annum against the defendant. The Courts below dismissed the suit, and therefore, the plaintiff is before this court. The facts which had given rise to the second appeal are not very much in dispute. Before I advert to the point of law that I have to deal within this matter, I have to notice a few facts. The plaintiff is an Advocate. There was no love lost between the plaintiff and the defendant and their neighbours.

    2. The plaintiff had a sister by name Devaki. She was suffering from illness for a long time and she was a spinster. In spite of the best treatment given to her she died on 29.12.1976 On 30.12.1976 the defendant gave a complaint to the police stating that there was difference of opinion between the plaintiff and his deceased sister Devaki. In the night of 28.12.1976 there was a quarrel between the plaintiff and his sister and the next day he came to know that Devaki died in the night of 29.12.1976 under suspicious circumstances. In short, the complaint given by the defendant to the police was that the plaintiff and his family members had done away with Devaki and the body of the deceased was disposed of secrertly. Thuckalay Police registered a criminal case in Cr. No. 1848 of 1976 of Thuckalay Police Station. The defendant gave such a false information without any justification and knowing fully well that, if the police complaint is given the news will spread all over Tamil Nadu and the news item will appear in the newspapers next day. Pursuant to the complaint, given by the defendant, the police set in motion the criminal law and ultimately, the police dropped further proceedings being convinced that the complaint had emanated from the defendant because of the enmity between the defendant and the plaintiff. On these allegations, the plaintiff laid the suit stating that the defendant had defamed the name of the family and he and his family members were put to mental agony and pain and his status as an Advocate is very much affected and he came to a low ebb in the eyes of the brother members of the bar. The plaintiff sent a lawyer's notice to the defendant on 5.12.1977 and the defendant sent a reply on 14.12.1977 justifying his action.

    3. The defendant filed a written statement contending inter alia the plaintiff has to prove that his sister was suffering from asthma, that the defendant had no direct knowledge of the cause of the death of his sister, that he was not aware of the circumstances under which Devaki died, that it is for the plaintiff to prove that the sister was given treatment for ailment, that the defendant did not give any statement before the Thuckalay Police on 30.12.1976, that the defendant did not give any signed statement before the Police Station and that during investigation the police got the signatures of the defendant in various papers. It is further stated in the written statement that whatever facts stated by him before the police during investigation were passed on hearsay reliable information. According to him no false information was given by him to defame the plaintiff and that he was not at all responsible for publication and that he was not aware of the same. The plaintiff has no active practice as an advocate and he was not affected much in his practice by this action and that the plaintiff and the members of his family were not put to any loss of reputation, as alleged. Lastly, the defendant contended that the amount claimed is excessive.

    4. The plaintiff filed Ex. A-1 a paper publication in ‘Dinamalar” dated 1.1.1977 which is a Tamil publication, Ex. A.2, a similar Tamil Publication in “Dhinathanthi” dated 1.1.1977, Ex. A.3, a paper publication in “Malaimurasu”, an evening Tamil daily dated 2.1.1977, Ex. A4, Death extract certificate dated 5.4.1977, Ex. A6 reply notice dated 14.12.1977, Ex. A7 statement of the defendant given before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Thuckalay, dated 30.12.1976, Ex. A8 first information report dated 30.12.1976, Ex. A9 notice to the compliant dated 31.03.1977 and Ex. A10 signature of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thuckalay, in the grave Crime Report No. 9/78 of Thuckalay dated 31.12.1976 Besides filing these documents, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W 1 and one A. Kumaresan as P.W 2.

    5. The defendant did not file any documents. He examined himself as D.W 1. Learned Subordinate Judge, Padmanabhapuram, observed in paragraph 13 of the judgment.

    “Consideration of the arguments of the learned counsel for both sides makes it clear that it is true that there is enmity due to litigation between the family of the plaintiff and the family of the defendant for a long time.”

    Learned Subordinate Judge further observed in the same paragraph.

    “Therefore, in such circumstances in the present case, though the defendant had uttered defamatory statements under Ex. A7 about the death of the plaintiffs sister, such statement is a privileged statement as referred supra and the same could not have given a cause of action for the plaintiff for a suit for damages for defamation. Therefore, in such circumstances I hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to any damages as claimed in the plaint.”

    The learned Subordinate Judge has noted the two facts, one is that there was enmity between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the other is that there was a statement by the defendant to the police. Applying the law referred to by the learned Subordinate Judge in the case mentioned in the said judgment, learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. As regards costs he directed the parties to bear their respective costs.

    6. The plaintiff preferred A.S No. 211 of 1978 before the District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. The defendant preferred cross appeal claiming costs. Learned District Judge by Judgment dated 12.2.1981 concurred with the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge, both on the plaintiff's claim and on awarding costs. Learned District Judge confirmed the judgment as I had mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment and noted the following facts:—

    “Point in the appeal:— The facts proved or which cannot be denied are these:—

    The appellant (Plaintiff) and the respondent (defendant) are neighbours. The house of the respondent is just 150 feet away from the house of the appellant. There had been litigation between the two families since 1958 and they are on inimical terms. Devaki was the younger sister of the appellant (P.W 1). She took ill on 29.12.1976 and she was taken to the hospital at Palliadi for treatment. She died in the evening of the same day. Her body was cremated the same night. The respondent D.W 1 preferred a complaint to the Thuckalay Police under the original of Ext. A7 on 30.12.1976, before P.W 2 the then S.I of Police Thuckalay. On the basis of the said complaint, P.W 2 prepared the printed F.I.R under the original of Ext. A8. The case was investigated and ultimately the complaint was referred. Ex. A9 dated 31.3.1977 is the copy of the refer notice given to the respondent herein.

    The original of Ext. A7 has given the cause of action for the appellant to file the present suit Admittedly, the deceased Devaki was unmarried and she was aged 25 at the time of her death. The gist of the allegations in the abovesaid complaint against the appellant is, that Devaki was often quarrelling with her elder brother Neelakantadas, the appellant herein demanding partition, that about a month prior to her death, there was partition and Devaki got a share, that she was pestering her elder brother the appellant herein to get her married to an educated and employed bridegroom and since she did not succeed in her attempts, she became frustrated and on that account, there was wordy quarrel on the night of 29.12.1976 between her and the appellant and the noise of her cries were heard and that since Devaki died on 29.12.1976, her brothers cremated her the same night and he came to know about it only on the morning of 30.12.1976 and that it is a case of suspicious death. The respondent in the said complaint seems to suggest that, the appellant herein, his brothers and brother-in-law have murdered Devaki and cremated her the same night and it is a case of suspicious death.”

    7. In paragraph 9, learned District Judge has come to the definite conclusion that,

    “The allegation per se in the abovesaid complaint is defamatory.”

    But, learned District Judge has posed the question whether the complaint containing defamatory allegations made to a police officer is absolutely privileged.

    8. I have heard Mr. Srikumaran Nair, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. P. Gopalan for the respondent

    9. Mr. Srikumaran Nair contended that the defendant cannot claim any absolute privilege and the learned District Judge has completely misunderstood the scope of privilege that has to be claimed in such cases. Learned District Judge has come to the conclusion that the defamatory statement made to a police is absolutely privileged and that cannot be made the basis for allegations and the doctrine of absolute privilege bars any enquiry into the motive of the person who made the complaint. Learned District Judge, according to the learned counsel has completely misapplied the law by stating:

    “The plea of absolute privilege means that by a sort of legal fiction, the law, owing to compelling consideration of public policy invests statements made upon certain occasions with a special protection so that all statements made on such occasions even though they may be defamatory, cannot be made the subject matter of litigation in courts of law, and no action for defamation will lie in respect of them”

    Further, learned District Judge while referring to the publication has observed that there is no proof that the publications were made at the instance of the defendant and therefore, in the light of the ratio decided in the decision referred to, the statement made to a police officer is absolutely privileged.

    10. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the findings rendered by the Courts below, I could not completely accept on the prima facie consideration of the matter that the lower courts were right, but at the same time while listening to the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant, I could not have a complete hand over the matter with reference to the principles stated in the cases and therefore, I wanted to have an examination of the cases by me would persuade me to take a different view of the matter, because, the question of privilege depends upon the act complained of on the basis of which the plaintiff claims to have been defamed by the defendant. Therefore, drawing analogy from the facts of the decided case, we cannot come to the conclusion on the facts of this case that the defendant is entitled to the privilege.

    11. Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code has to be borne in mind. The marginal note of the Section reads:

    “False information with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person.”

    The section reads as follows:

    “Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, such public servant-

    (a) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him, or

    (b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”

    Therefore, the ingredients of the offence mentioned in the Section are:

    i. give a false information,

    ii. to public servant,

    iii. the informant knew that the information is believed to be false, and

    iv. he gave the information in order to annoy the public servant to behave in a way in which he ought not to behave when the true state of facts were known to him.

    12. Therefore, it is clear on the facts of the case before me that the defendant ought to come within the perspective of Section 182 of the Code. Therefore, here is a person who has committed an offence under Section 182 of the Code and that is the finding given by the courts below on the basis of Ex. A7. Therefore, the question I asked myself is whether the person who could be found guilty of an offence under the Indian Penal Code could take umbrage under the obsessive description of an unknown phrase “absolute privilege.

    13. Learned counsel Mr. P. Gopalan, brought to my notice the decision in Bapalal & Co. v. Krishnaswami Iyer A.I.R 1941 Madras 26 = 52 L.W 510. In that case, a medical practitioner at Madras who was the respondent took some diamonds from the appellant's firm of jewellers, in April, 1936. In May, the appellants presented the respondent with an invoice for their cost. By 27.9.1936 the money had not been paid by the respondent On that date, the appellants sent a letter to the Inspector of Police, Flower Bazaar Police Station, which is claimed by the respondent to be defamatory, as being equivalent to a charge against him of criminal breach of trust In the written statement, the appellants contended that this communication was privileged, having been sent bona fide with the sole purpose of protecting their own interests. The City Civil Court held that the occasion was privileged and if the letter were in fact bona fide the suit must be dismissed, but it held further that the letter did not state the true facts. The suit was decreed. On appeal, it was contended that the letter in question was privileged absolutely and consequently, the civil court was precluded from adjudicating upon the question whether it was sent maliciously or not. King, J. observed.

    “On a careful consideration of the authorities I think this contention must prevail. Principal authorities to which I have been referred to in the course of the arguments are Sanjivi Reddi v. Koneri Reddi (49 Mad 315), Golap Jan v. Bholanath (38 Cal. 880), Madhab Chandra v. Nirode Chandra (I.L.R) 1939(1)Cal. 574 and Majju v. Lachman Prasad (46 All. 671). All these authorities are unanimous in holding that the Common Law of England which grants an absolute privilege to all statements made in the witness box should be applied in India. That privilege extends in England to the preliminary examination of witnesses, by a solicitor to find out what they can prove. The question then is bow far this principle derived from Watson v. M. Ewan (1905 A.C 480) should be extended. 49 Madras 315 (cited supra) dealt with a complaint to a Magistrate requesting him to take action under S107, Criminal P.C and to statements made by the complaint to a police officer investigating that complaint. Both were held to be absolutely privileged. No actual evidence was given in this case, as the Magistrate eventually refused to take any action under S. 107. In 3 Cal. 880 (cited supra) a complaint laid before a Magistrate for criminal breach of trust which led to no trial, but was dismissed under S. 203, Crl. P.C was held to be absolutely privileged. In I.L.R (1939) I Cal. 574 (cited supra) it was held that both a report to the police alleging the commission of a crime and evidence given in court in support of the accusation were absolutely privileged. In 46 All. 671 (cited supra) a distinction was drawn between a complaint to the police which in fact led to judicial proceedings, and one which did not A complaint in the latter case was held not to be privileged.”

    Learned Judge concluded by saying:

    “lam accordingly of opinion that the weight of authority is in favour of the view that a complaint to a police officer from its very nature as a statement which the complaint is prepared later, if called upon to do so, to substantiate upon oath is absolutely privileged.”

    The appeal by the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned Judge.

    14. In Sanjivi v. Koneri A.I.R 1926 Madras 521 = 23 L.W 328 the view taken was that all statements made by a potential witness as a preliminary to going into the witness-box are equally privileged with the statement made when actually in the box in the Court.

    In V. Narayanan v. F. Subbanna (A.I.R 1975 Karnataka 162) the view taken by the learned single Judge is that defamatory statements made in complaint to a police officer are absolutely privileged and no action in damages can lie regarding such statements. Alagiriswami, J. (as he then was) had an occasion to deal with the point in K. Ramadas v. P. Samu Pillai 1969-1-M.L.J 338 = 81 L.W 505 and held that a complaint to a police officer from its very nature, as a statement which the complaint is prepared later, if called upon to do so, to substantiate upon oath, is absolutely privileged and no action for defamation in respect thereof is maintainable.

    15. Learned judge relied on A.I.R 1926 Madrs 521 = 23 L.W 328 (cited supra). Learned counsel relied on the judgment Moroti Sadashiv v. Godubai Narayana Rao A.I.R 1959 Bombay 443 wherein Dator, J. observed as follows.

    “A statement if made before an officer who was not acting in judicial capacity or who was not exercising the attributes of a court cannot be said to be absolutely privileged. Hence, defamatory statements made before the police officer in the course of the investigation carried on under Criminal P.C cannot be regarded as absolutely privileged, but only a qualified privilege attached to them which is liable to be destroyed by proof of malice.”

    Lower appellate court has referred to this judgment and has referred to the view taken by this Court earlier.

    16. On hearing Mr. Sreekumaran Nair, learned counsel for the appellant, I reacted very sharply and felt that the act of the defendant was defamatory and he cannot claim absolute privilege. But, in the light of the view taken by this court, I do not want to take a different view and the learned counsel for the appellant did not produce any weighty authority which can persuade me to differ from the View taken by this Court on the earlier occasions. Therefore, I have to confirm the judgment and decree of the Courts below. The Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs.

    KA/RR/VCS

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    M. Neelakantadas v. M. Gopinathan
    (Nov 25, 1994)