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  • s. 3 of the mortgagees legal costs act, 1895, Sub - section (2)
  • sub - section [i. E., S. 11 (2)
  • sub - section (2) of s. 12
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Advocates
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  • s. 3 of the mortgagees legal costs act, 1895, Sub - section (2)
  • sub - section [i. E., S. 11 (2)
  • sub - section (2) of s. 12
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent landlord filed R.C.O.P. No. 207 of 1954 for eviction of the appellant tenant under the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1949. That proceeding was continued, after the enactment of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1959 (referred to in the opinion as "the Act"), which by s.33 deemed pending proceedings commenced under the Madras Act to be commenced under the Kerala Act and continued subject to its provisions.

Section 12 of the Act required a tenant facing an eviction application to pay or deposit admitted arrears of rent before he could contest the eviction or appeal. Section 12(2) was amended by Act 29 of 1961 to prescribe minimum times for such deposits (a minimum of four weeks for arrears and two weeks for subsequently accruing rent).

The appellant filed a statement on December 7, 1959 admitting arrears of Rs. 3,327.70 after set-offs. In the absence of a rule fixing time to clear arrears, the rent control court on January 28, 1960 directed the appellant to deposit the admitted arrears within 15 days. The appellant did not comply, and the court ordered surrender of the building to the landlord on February 12, 1960 under s.12(3). The appellant's appeal (C.M.A. No. 53 of 1960) and a revision (C.R.P. No. 328 of 1960) failed. He filed O.P. No. 1486 of 1961 in this Court seeking certiorari to quash the eviction order.

On March 7, 1960 the appellant deposited Rs. 3,345.70 (the admitted arrears plus interest) but had ignored rents that accrued in the interim. He applied to vacate the eviction order under s.11(2)(b); the rent control court dismissed that application, the C.M.A. No. 99 of 1960 was dismissed by the appellate authority, and C.R.P. No. 330 of 1960 was dismissed by the district judge. The landlord filed O.P. No. 2381 of 1961 in this Court to quash an observation in the lower orders.

While these writ petitions were pending, Act 29 of 1961 (which, according to the amendment, was to be deemed to come into force on April 3, 1959) substituted a new proviso in s.12(2) requiring minimum times for deposit. Vaidialingam, J. delivered a common judgment dismissing O.P. No. 1486 and allowing O.P. No. 2381. The tenant (appellant) brought the present appeals challenging that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the retrospective operation of Act 29 of 1961 (deemed to come into force on April 3, 1959) governs the rent control court's orders made on January 28, 1960 and February 12, 1960, and thereby rendered the 15‑day time given to the tenant insufficient and the eviction unlawful.
  2. Whether the appellant may rely on the retrospective proviso to s.12(2) in writ proceedings when he did not press that proviso before the appellate authority or revisional court.
  3. Whether a legislative amendment with retrospective effect but without express language affecting final decrees can be construed to disturb judgments that became final before the amendment.
  4. Whether an order for eviction passed under s.12(3) can be vacated under s.11(2)(b) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that Act 29 of 1961 was retrospective and deemed to have come into force on April 3, 1959; therefore the proviso introduced into s.12(2) must be treated as if it existed at the time the rent control court made orders on January 28, 1960 and February 12, 1960.
  • Because of the retrospective proviso, the minimum time for deposit required by s.12(2) (as amended) was not met by the 15 days directed by the rent control court; consequently, the eviction ordered for non-deposit within that time was unwarranted and liable to be quashed by certiorari.
  • The appellant also argued he could not have raised the provision before the appellate or revisional authorities because the proviso only came into being (was enacted) later in 1961.
  • Counsel for the appellant further urged reconsideration of the learned judge's view that eviction orders passed under s.12(3) cannot be vacated under s.11(2)(b).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of specific contrary arguments advanced by the respondent landlord's counsel; the court's discussion focuses on the appellant's contentions and legal principles bearing on those contentions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1952 App. Cas. 109 (quoted Lord Asquith) The principle that if a statute directs one to treat a putative (imagined) state of affairs as real, one must also imagine the consequences and incidents that would inevitably flow from that putative state of affairs. The court applied this reasoning to hold that if the amendment is to be treated as having operated retrospectively, its inevitable corollaries (including that the appellant should have relied on the proviso in earlier appeals) must also be treated as real; the appellant could not selectively invoke retrospective operation only to find errors without accepting the consequential effects.
M. K. Venkatachalam v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 875, 878 Reiteration of the Asquith principle concerning the consequences that must follow when a statute is to be treated as retrospectively applicable. The Supreme Court's reiteration was relied upon to support the position that retrospective application must be applied consistently, including consequences such as abandonment of pleas not pressed on appeal.
Eyre v. Wynn Mackenzie (1896) 1 Ch. 135 The rule that statutes are not construed as affecting judgments which became final before the statute's commencement, unless the legislature expressly provides otherwise. The court relied on this authority to accept that even though Act 29 of 1961 was made retrospective, it was not intended to interfere with judgments that had already been given and had become final; the amendment did not expressly operate "notwithstanding any decree of court."
Day v. Kelland (1900) 2 Ch. 745 Reinforcement of the principle that rights ascertained by a court order are to be interpreted by reference to the law as it stood when the order was made, and that subsequent changes in law should not alter rights already ascertained. The court cited the case to support the conclusion that to allow a later statute to alter rights already determined by an earlier order would be to change rights ascertained before the passing of the later statute.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court commenced its analysis by setting out the statutory framework: s.12 of the Act bars a tenant from contesting an eviction or preferring appeals unless he pays or deposits admitted arrears and continues to deposit subsequently accruing rent; s.12(2) as amended by Act 29 of 1961 prescribed minimum times for such deposits (four weeks for admitted arrears, two weeks for subsequent rent).

The factual matrix established that the rent control court, in the absence of a rule fixing deposit time, directed the appellant on January 28, 1960 to deposit the admitted arrears within 15 days; non-compliance led to an eviction order on February 12, 1960. The appellant's subsequent appeals and revision failed and the relevant proceedings became final (the district judge disposed of the concerned C.R.P.s on March 30, 1961).

The appellant's primary contention was that the retrospective operation of the 1961 amendment (deemed effective from April 3, 1959) meant the rent control court's 15‑day order contravened the minimum times required by the amended provision, rendering the eviction unlawful. The court addressed this in two complementary lines of analysis.

First, invoking the principle quoted from Lord Asquith and reiterated by the Supreme Court in M. K. Venkatachalam, the court held that if legislation is to be treated as retrospectively in force, one must also treat as real the consequences that would have followed from that putative state of affairs. Applying that principle, the court observed that the appellant had not relied on the proviso to s.12(2) when he took his matter in appeal and revision before the statutory authorities. The court concluded that a plea not taken before the statutory tribunals ordinarily cannot later form the basis for a writ complaint; the appellant cannot "blow hot and cold" by electing inconsistent timings for retrospective effect.

Second, the court relied on authorities (Eyre v. Wynn Mackenzie and Day v. Kelland) establishing that legislatures are not to be construed as intending to affect judgments which became final before the enactment, unless the legislature has expressly said so. Because Act 29 of 1961, though retrospective, was not made to operate "notwithstanding any decree of court," the court reasoned it could not be held intended to affect judgments that had become final and conclusive before its enactment.

Combining these approaches, the court found no proper ground to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 to interfere with the eviction order. The court further considered the contention about s.11(2)(b): it found s.11 and s.12 to be independent provisions addressing different contingencies though both could lead to eviction as a consequence. Consequently, an eviction under s.12(3) is not amenable to correction under s.11(2)(b), which is concerned only with s.11(2) situations.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The decisions of the learned judge are affirmed and these appeals are dismissed.

Implications and Consequences:

  • The eviction order against the appellant (made under s.12(3)) stands and is not quashed by this Court.
  • The Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 to interfere with the rent control court's orders on the facts and legal principles before it.
  • The court held that the appellant could not selectively rely upon the retrospective effect of the 1961 amendment when he had not pressed the relevant proviso in the earlier appeals and revisions; retrospective operation carries its corollaries and consequences.
  • The court held that a legislative amendment, even if framed retrospective, is not to be construed as affecting judgments that became final before the amendment unless the legislature has explicitly said so; Act 29 of 1961 contained no such express provision.
  • The court held that an order of eviction passed under s.12(3) is not amenable to vacation under s.11(2)(b), because s.11 and s.12 address different contingencies and are not dependent on each other.
  • No order as to costs was made in the circumstances.

Note: The opinion applies established principles from cited authorities but does not purport to lay down a novel or general rule beyond the application of those principles to the facts of this case.

    K.P. Mohammed v. Madhavi Amma

    1. The landlord who is the respondent in these two appeals, Filed r. C. O. P. No. 207 of 1954 for eviction of the appellant - tenant under the madras buildings (lease & rent control) act, 1949, And continued it, After the enactment of the kerala buildings (lease & rent control) act, 1959, Under the latter act (which will be referred to hereinafter as the act) as s. 33 thereof directed all proceedings, Commenced under the madras act and pending at its commencement, To be deemed to have been commenced under it and continued subject to its provisions.

    2. Under the act, No tenant is allowed to resist eviction by his landlord unless he be free of arrears of rent. S. 12 of the act provides:

    " (1) no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under s. 11, Shall be entitled to contest the application before the rent control court under that section, Or to prefer, Any appeal under s. 18 against any order made by the rent control court on the application, Unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, Or deposits with the rent control court or the appellate authority, As the case may be, All arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, And continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, Until the termination of the proceedings before the rent control court or the appellate authority, As the case may be;

    (2) the deposit of rent under sub - section (1] shall be made within the time and in the manner prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of the notice referred to in sub - section (4) ;

    (3) if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid the rent control court or the appellate authority as the case may be, Shall, Unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, Stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. "

    this section was amended by act 29 of 1961 which substituted for its subsection (2) the following:

    " (2) the deposit under sub - section (1) shall be made within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub - section (4) :

    provided that the time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent shall not be less than four weeks from the date of the order and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due. "

    3. In view of the provisions of s. 12 (1) of the act, The appellant was asked to state the rent that was in arrear. The statement he filed on december 7,1959, In response thereto, Showed rs. 3327 - 70 np as due by him after setting off the amounts alleged to have been spent by him for repairs of the building. As there was no rule fixing the time to be allowed to a tenant to clear off arrears, The court, On january 28, 1960 directed the appellant to deposit the admitted arrears in 15 days; and that order not having been complied with, Surrender of the building to the landlord under s. 12 (3) was ordered on february 12,1960. An appeal (c. M. A. No. 53 of 1960) preferred before the appellate authority (the subordinate judge), As also a revision (crp. No. 328 of 1960) of the appellate order sought before the district judge did not succeed. So he moved o. P. No. 1486 of 1961 in this court for a writ of certiorari to quash the aforesaid order of eviction.

    meanwhile, On march 7,1960, The appellant deposited rs. 3345 - 70 np. Being the admitted arrears (rs. 3327 - 70) and interest thereon, But ignoring further rents that fell in arrears in the interval, And applied to have the order of eviction vacated under s. 11 (2) (b) of the act. The rent control court dismissed it. C. M. A. No. 99 of 1960 preferred against that order came to be dismissed by the appellate authority; and crp. No. 330 of 1960 moved before the district judge was also dismissed, With an observation that

    "it is still open to the tenant to forgo his contentions and request the rent control court to give him the benefit contemplated under clause. 2 (b) of s. 11, If the deposit made represents the correct amount as required under the section."
    to quash that observation the landlord moved 0. P. No. 2381 of 1961 for a writ of certiorari from this court.

    during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petitions, The amendment act, 29 of 1961, Came to be passed, Substituting a new provision for sub - rule (2) of s. 12 of the act (as mentioned above) with effect from april 3,1959. Though that amendment was also pressed into service, Vaidialingam, J., By a common judgment dismissed o. P. No. 1486 and allowed o. P. No. 2381. These appeals by the tenant are against that judgment.

    4. Counsel for the appellant contends that the amendment act, 29 of 1961, Having been made retrospective and "deemed to have come into force on the 3rd day of april 1959" must govern the orders of the rent control court, Made on january 28, And february 12,1960, And that therefore the 15 days' time granted to the appellent to clear off arrears of rent fell short of the minimum prescribed by the amendment act and the eviction ordered as a penalty for non - deposit within that time was unwarranted and liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari. One of the effects of the retrospective operation of the amendment act is to regard the proviso, Introduced in sub - section (2) of s. 12 by the act of 1961, As been included in the act on april 3,1959; and it must then follow that the order of eviction passed by the rent control court on february 12,1960 was not warranted by law. But that court, Being vested with exclusive jurisdiction in the matter, May decide the matter rightly or wrongly. An appeal by the party aggrieved by an order of the rent control court is provided for in s. 18 of the act and a further revision under s. 20. The appellant has availed of those proceedings, Though not with success; and it is conceded that the proceedings in the rent control court have become final by the disposal of the concerned c. R. P. S by the district judge on march 30, 1961.

    it is freely conceded that non - observance of the provisions of the proviso has not been complained of by the appellant before the appellate authority or the revisional court. Counsel stated that the appellant could not make that complaint since the proviso itself came to be only in 1961 when the amendment act was passed. The appellant cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time. For one purpose he wants the provisions of the amendment act to have been in the act on april 3,1959, And for another purpose the same to be regarded as enacted only on august 31, 1961. We. Cannot accede to that. The retrospective effect of the amendment is for all legal purposes. It cannot be confined to find errors in the orders of the rent control court, Which were in accordance with the law existent at the time of their rendition; but must extend to find abandonment of the plea available thereunder by the appellant when he preferred appeals and sought revision of those orders. As observed by lord asquith in 1952 app. Cas. 109 & reiterated by the supreme court in m. K. Venkatachalam v. Bombay dyeing and manufacturing co. Ltd., (air. 1958 sc. 875, 878) :

    " if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, You must surely, Unless prohibited from doing so, Also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, If the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, Must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, You must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs."

    and that corollary here is that the appellant had not pressed into service the proviso to s. 12 (2) of the act when he took the matter in appeal and revision before the statutory authorities concerned. A plea not taken before the concerned statutory tribunals cannot ordinarily be made the foundation of the complaint in a writ proceeding.

    5. Another line of reasoning also leads us to the same conclusion. Acts of legislature are not construed as affecting judgments become final before their enactment, Unless the legislature has expressly said so. Eyre v. Wynn mackenzie (1896 - 1 ch. 135) concerned the effect of s. 3 of the mortgagees legal costs act, 1895, Sub - section (2) of which provided:

    "this section applies to mortgages made and business transacted and acts done either before or after the commencement of this act."

    the plaintiff, Who obtained judgment on a mortgage two years before the passing of the act, Claimed the benefit of the altered law. The court of appeal presided by lindley l. J., Smith l. J., And rigby l. J., Refused it observing:

    "it is impossible for us to say that the judgment was wrong as the law stood at the time when it was given. It is obvious that the act was not intended to interfere with judgments which had already been given by the court."

    a similar question arose in day v. Kelland (1900 - 2 ch. 745). Lord alvertstone c. J., With whom vaughan williams l. J., Concurred, Observed:

    "it is not necessary to express any opinion as to the effect of s. 3 of the (mortgagees legal costs) act. In my opinion the rights of the parties were determined by the order of april, 1893. Everything which has since been done in the action has been done under that order. It is said that in working out that order the plaintiff ought to have the benefit of the change in the law which was made by the act of 1895. But to allow that would, I think, Be to alter rights which were ascertained before the passing of the act."

    and, Rigby l. J. Also, Concurring with the chief justice observed:

    "whatever rights were ascertained by the order of april 19, 1893, Must be interpreted with reference to the law as it stood at that time. I understand that to be the principle of the decision of the court of appeal in eyre v. Wynn mackenzie, And, If i may venture to say so, Agree with their view."

    in the present case also, Act, 29 of 1961, Though enacted with retrospective effect, Has not been made to operate 'notwithstanding any decree of court. ' the act cannot therefore be held intended to affect judgments become final and conclusive before its enactment.

    6. In either view, A case for interference, Under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under art. 226 or art. 227 of the constitution, With the order for eviction made against the appellant is not indicated. The dismissal of o. P. No. 1486 of 1961 was in the circumstances justified; and w. A. No. 58 of 1963 must therefore fail.

    7. Counsel contends that the opinion of the learned judge that orders for eviction passed under s. 12 (3) of the act cannot be vacated under s. 11 (2) (b) requires reconsideration by us. S. 11 and 12 of the act are not dependent on each other. They provide for different contingencies though the consequence of the non - compliance of the mandates of either section is eviction. It must then follow that an order of eviction passed under s. 12 (3) is not amenable to correction under s. 11 (2) (b), Which relates to orders of eviction passed under that sub - section [i. E., S. 11 (2) ] only. We are thus in agreement with the view of the learned judge on the matter. W. A. No. 57 of 1963 also fails.

    in the result, The decisions of the learned judge are affirmed and these appeals dismissed, Though without any order as to costs in the circumstances.

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    Comments

    K.P. Mohammed v. Madhavi Amma
    (Jul 8, 1963)