Jagdish Sahai, J.:— This writ petition has come to us on a reference made by our brother Pathak on 5th May, 1965.

2. The petitioner carries on the business of running stage carriages on hire under the name and style of Jain Transport and General Trading Company, and held two permits for plying his stage carriages on the Mathra-Aligarh route. There were some other operators also on this route. The permits of all the operators were to expire on 5th August, 1957, but before that date could arrive, the State of Uttar Pradesh nationalised the aforesaid route (hereinafter referred to as the route) under the provisions of the U.P Road Transport Services (Development) Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Some compensation was offered to the petitioner and the others, which they did not accept, with the result that under the provisions of Section 11(5) of the Act, reference was made to the District Judge, Agra, by the Transport Commissioner, U.P, who, on 2-9-1964, transferred all of them for decision to the Court of the Additional District Judge. The petitioner and the others made application on 7-9-1964 before the District Judge, Agra, for recalling the cases from the Court of the Additional District Judge to his own. Those applications were rejected by the District Judge, Agra, by means of the order, dated 26-9-1964. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition in this Court and prayed that the order of the District Judge, Agra, dated 2-9-1964 be quashed. It is also prayed that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the District Judge, Agra, to recall the petitioner's case from the Court of the Additional District Judge, Agra, to his own Court. In addition there is the usual prayer for the issue of any other writ, order or direction that this Court may deem fit to issue. When this writ petition came up for hearing before our brother Pathak, the only submission that was made on behalf of the petitioner before him was that the reference could not be heard by the Additional District Judge and that the District Judge alone was competent to hear it. Considering that the question was of general importance, Pathak, J. referred the case to a Division Bench.

3. Mr. S.C Khare, who has appeared for the petitioner before us, has confined himself to the same submission that he made before Pathak, J. He contends that the words ‘District Judge’, occurring in Section 11(5) of the Act cannot include an Additional District Judge because the District Judge is a persona designata for the purpose of that provision and is not referred to by his office. Section 11 of the Act reads:—

“11(1) Where in pursuance of the Scheme published under S. 8 any existing permit granted under Chap. IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, the route or routes covered by it are curtailed 1939, is or is deemed to have been cancelled or or are deemed to have been curtailed, the permit-holder shall, except in cases where transfer of the permit has been agreed to under sub-s. (2) of S. 5, be entitled to receive and be paid such compensation by the State Government for and in respect of the premature cancellation of the permit or, as the case may be, for curtailment of the route or routes covered by the permit as may be determined in accordance with the principles specified in Sch. I.

(2) The compensation payable under this section shall be due as from the date of order of cancellation of the permit or curtailment of the route covered by the permit.

(3) There shall be paid by the State Government on the amount of compensation determined under sub-s. (1) interest at the rate of two and one-half per cent from the date of order of cancellation or curtailment of route to the date of determination of compensation as aforesaid.

(4) The compensation payable under this section shall be given in cash.

(5) The amount of compensation to be given in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (2) shall be determined by the Transport Commissioner and shall be offered to the permit-holder in full satisfaction of the compensation payable under this Act and if the amount so offered is not acceptable to the permit-holder, the Transport Commissioner, may within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed refer the matter to the District Judge whose decision in the matter shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court.”

Rule 12 of the U.P Road Transport Services Development) Rules, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as the rules) reads:—

“12. Reference to District Judge under Section 11.—(1) If the permit-holder does not accept the amount of compensation offered to him, the Transport Commissioner shall within 30 days of the receipt of the intimation of his non-acceptance refer the matter to the District Judge of the district in which the headquarter of the Regional Transport Authority which issued the permit is located and shall also forward the following papers:

(a) a full report of the circumstances which have rendered the reference necessary,

(b) a memo showing how the compensation has been determined and calculated,

(c) a copy of relevant documents including copy of the plan of the route concerned

(2) The District’ Judge may call for such further papers as he may consider necessary for the disposal of the reference

(3) The District Judge shall cause to be served a notice on parties of the date and time fixed for the disposal of the reference and any party may, with the permission of the District Judge, file any additional particulars as may be necessary for the complete and effective disposal of the reference.

(4) In the hearing and disposal of the reference the District Judge shall follow the procedure as nearly as may be applicable to suits for recovery of money but nothing herein shall be deemed to require him to maintain otherwise than a memoranda of the evidence produced by the parties.”

It is clear from the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act that a permit can be prematurely cancelled or a route mentioned in the permit can be curtailed only on payment of compensation to the permit-holder. Schedule I to the Act provides the manner of computing the compensation. It is well settled that prohibition of the Stage Carriage operators from doing their motor transport business is deprivation of their property or interest in a commercial undertaking within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Constitution of India: see Deep Chand v. State of U.P, AIR 1959 SC 648 and Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P, AIR 1954 SC 728. Therefore, the compensation, that is paid or is made payable under Section 11 of the Act is compensation for deprivation of proprietary rights or interest in a commercial undertaking. Section 11(5) of the Act clearly provides for reference to the District Judge for the final determination of compensation. Rule 12 provides the procedure for the disposal of the reference made to the District Judge. The procedure provided is one that is followed in a regular Court of law. Considering the fact that it is the determination of compensation relating to proprietary rights, the procedure provided is that of a law Court and the circumstance that the District Judge is mentioned by his office and not by name leads to the conclusion that it is the Court of the District Judge that is meant by the expression “District Judge” occurring in Section 11(5) of the Act and R. 12 of the rules and he is not to be treated as persona designata. This conclusion finds support from the provisions of sub-r. (1) of R. 12 which provides that the reference under Section 11(5) of the Act is to be made to the District Judge of the district “in which the headquarter of the Regional Transport Authority which issued the permit is located”. This introduces the element of territorial jurisdiction which is required for a Court and not for a persona designata Per sona designata or designated persona mean the singling out by description of a party Persona designata differs from a legal tribunal in so far that its “determinations are not to ??? treated as judgments of legal tribunals”. See Kedar Nath v. S.N Misra, 1957 All LJ 379: (S) (AIR 1957 All 484 (FB)). In Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 606 relying on Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. p. 353 it was held that a persona designata is a person pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character. In this case, Parthasarathy Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, ILR 47 Mad 369 (AIR 1924 Mad 561 (FB)) where Schwabed C.J had held that persona designata are “persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges” was referred to. In our opinion, therefore, the reference to the District Judge in Section 11 of the Act and Rule 12 of the rules is to the District Judge by his office and not in the capacity of persona designata. We find support for our view from Abdul Aziz v. Punjab Government, Lahore, AIR 1942 Lah 186 and Y. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Madras, AIR 1962 Andh Pra 58. In both these cases the provisions that came up for interpretation were those of Section 16(3) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. That provision reads:

“If any dispute arises concerning the sufficiency of the compensation to be paid under Section 10, Cl. (d), it shall on application for that purpose by either of the disputing parties to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property is situate, be determined by him”. In the Lahore case mentioned above, Backett, J., who spoke for the Division Bench, observed:—

“I think, it may be safely said, however, that when a Court normally consists of a single judicial officer, as the Court of a District Judge does, it is quite an ordinary practice in the drafting of Indian statutes for a reference to be made to that officer under this particular title when the intention is to refer to the Court.”

In the Andhra Pradesh case mentioned above Rafter extracting the passage quoted above, Kumarayya, J. observed:—

“With respect, I find myself in complete agreement with the above observation. That apart, as already discussed when on a true construction of the provisions of the Act it is abundantly clear that the intention of the Act was to obtain determination of civil rights of the kind by a civil Court, the use of expressions “the District Judge” or “a District Judge” who are the presiding officers of the District Court, does not militate against any inference as to their being used as synonym for the District Court and such officers on that account cannot be said to have been selected to overcise the powers of a persona designata.”

In ILR 47 Mad 369 : (AIR 1924 Mad 561 (FB)) (supra) the question that a Full Bench of the Madras High Court had to consider was whether the District Judge acting under the powers ??? upon him by the rules framed under. The Madras Local Boards Act acted as persona ??? or as the court of the District Judge, the ??? three Judges, who constituted the Full such, held that the District Judge acted as a part and not as a persona designata. In that case reliance was placed upon National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster General (1913) A.C 546 in which at page 562 Lord Parker observed:—

“Where by statute matters are referred to the determination of a Court of Record with further provision, the necessary implication ??? I think, that the Court will determine the ??? as a court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged ??? all the incidents of such jurisdiction, include the right of appeal from its decision, ??? the same.

4. Mr. Khare has not been able to point out to us anything either in the Act or in the rules to justify the conclusion that the District Judge had to act as a persona designata and not as a court while deciding the references made to him under Section 11(5) of the Act. All that he contended was that the words used are “District Judge” and not “the court of the District Judge”. He also pointed out that Rule 12 provides its own procedure for deciding the reference made to the District Judge, without making the Code of Civil Procedure applicable, and that Section 11(5) provides that the order passed by the District Judge shall be final. According to Mr. Khare these three circumstances lead to the conclusion that the District Judge had to act as persona designata. In our opinion that is not so. Merely because the section speaks of a District Judge and not the court of the District Judge does not mean that the court of the District Judge was not intended. Several provisions as far example, Section 50 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, Section 265 of the U.P Tenancy Act and Sections 18, 20 and 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act speak of the District Judge, but it is well settled that what is meant is the court of the District Judge and not the District Judge as persona designata. It is not necessary to multiply instances because there are many more Acts in which instead of using the words “court of the District Judge” the words “District Judge” have been used, even though the intention was that it was the court of the District Judge and not the District Judge in his personal capacity who had to decide the matter. The circumstance that Rule 12 provides its own procedure (not inconsistent with the one followed in law courts) for deciding a reference instead of making the Code of Civil Procedure applicable is also a colourless circumstance. The procedure given there is one which is adopted in some judicial proceedings in law courts. It is true that the District Judge is not required under Rule 12 of the rules to maintain a full and verbatim record of the statement of witnesses, but that is not required even under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, under Section 145 of the Cr PC in criminal cases tried summarily and in proceedings under some other Acts. The words that the decision of District Judge “shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court” only mean that there shall be no appeal against his judgment. It is not a circumstance to show that he does not act as a court, but as a persona designata. Instances of provisions where a court has to act as a court and yet there is no right of appeal can be easily recalled. A decree passed by a Judge Small Cause Court is not appeal-able, but it cannot, for that reason, be said that the Judge Small Cause Court is not a court but a persona designata. In our judgment all the three circumstances to which Mr. Khare has pointed are at best neutral and lead to no inference either one way or the other.

5. The expression “District Judge” not having been defined in the Act or the rules, the definition given in the U.P General Clauses Act would apply. Section 4(12) of that Act defines “District Judge” and reads:—

“District Judge” shall mean the Judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction;”

Section 18 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act reads:—

“Save as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force, the jurisdiction of a District Judge or Civil Judge extends, subject to the provisions of Section 15 of the CPC to all original suits for the time being cognizable by Civil Courts”. This provision makes it clear that the District Judge is a civil court of original jurisdiction. It is also clear that he is a Judge of the principal court in the judgeship. Consequently in the present case the expression “District Judge” means the court of the District Judge. We find support for the view that we are taking from G.C Bezfarua v. State of Assam, AIR 1954 Assam 161.

6. Mr. Khare has placed reliance upon Gulam Nizamuddin…(Applicant); v. Akhtar Husain Khan…(Opposite Party).*, 1933 All LJ 971 : (AIR 1933 All 764) : 1957 All LJ 379 : (S) (AIR 1957 All 484), and Hans Kumar Kishan Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 947. In our judgment all these cases are distinguishable.

7. In 1933 All LJ 971 : (AIR 1933 All 764) (supra) a Division Bench of this Court had to consider whether the District Judge had to act as a court or persona designata while deciding an election petition filed under the provisions of the U.P District Boards Act. Their Lordships referred to Section 20 of that Act which provided that “the election court shall have the same powers and privileges as a Judge of a civil court, and may, for the purpose of serving any notice or issuing any process or doing any other such thing, be entitled to employ, with the consent of the District Magistrate, any peon or other officer or clerk attached to the court of the District Magistrate” and held that in view of the circumstances that the provision itself called the tribunal the Election court, and expressly extended to it the privileges of a civil court and even cut out the use of the staff of the District Judge, he was a persona designata and not the court of the District Judge.

8. In 1957 All LJ 379 : (S) (AIR 1957 All 484 (FB)) (supra) the question that came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court was whether the Sub-Divisional Officer hearing an election petition under the provisions of the U.P Panchayat Rai Act acted as persona designata or as a court. On the basis of the circumstances that Section 12-C of the U.P Panchayat Raj Act does not mention the authority before whom an election petition can be filed but only mentions that it shall be filed before such authority as may be prescribed, it was held by the Full Bench that the Sub-Divisional Officer was a persona designata and not.

9. In AIR 1958 SC 947 (Supra) the provisions that came up for interpretation required reference to be made to an arbitrator and not to a court.

10. In view of that circumstance the Supreme Court held as follows:—

“Under S. 19(1)(b), the reference is admittedly to an arbitrate. He need not even be a Judge of a Court. It is sufficient that he is qualified to be appointed a Judge of the High Court. And under the law, no appeal would have Iain to the High Court against the decision of such an arbitrator…………. The fact that, in the present case, the reference was to a District Judge would not affect the position. Then again, the decision of the arbitrator appointed under S. 19(1)(b) is expressly referred to in S. 19(1)(f) as an award. ……………In our view, a proceeding; which is at the inception an arbitration proceeding must retain its character as arbitration, even when it is taken up in appeal, where the is provided by the statute.”

All the cases relied upon by Mr. Khare were decided on their own farts and are clearly distinguishable. There was a clear indication in the relevant provisions that not a court, but a persona designata was incended. In the instant case we have already held that all the indications available point to the conclusion that by the expression “District Judge”, was meant the court of the District Judge. We have also held-that if it be held that Section 11 of the Act and Rule 12 of the rules are neutral, by virtue of the provisions of General Clauses Act, the expression “District Judge” must be read to mean the court of the District Judge. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that the expression “District Judge” means the court of the District Judge.

11. If the District Judge Agra had to act as the court and not as the persona designata, he could transfer the reference to the court of the Additional District Judge under the provisions of Section 8(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. Section 8 of that Act reads:—

“8(1) When the business pending before any District Judge requires the aid of Additional Judges for its speedy disposal, the State Government may having consulted the High Court appoint such Additional Judges as be requisite. (2) Additional Judges so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may ??? to them, and, in the di: charge of those functions, they shall exercise the same powers as ??? District Judge.”

In our view, therefore, the District Judge was competent to transfer the petitioner's case to the court of the Additional District Judge, who, in our view, is competent to hear the case.

12. That being the position we are of the opinion that there are in merits in this writ petition. It is according dismissed with costs. The interim order dated 1-10-1964 is vacated.

EJ/RSK/D.V.C

13. Petition dismissed.