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Advocates
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  • Government order Rule 20
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Advocates
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  • Government order Rule 20
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed as Standing Counsel on 20.10.1998 by respondent No. 4 to represent the respondents before the High Court. The petitioner’s services were terminated abruptly and without notice by the Chairman of the Service Selection Board (SSB) on allegedly whimsical grounds and without sanction from the General Administrative Department/Law Department of the State. The petitioner challenged this termination, seeking a direction to continue as Standing Counsel, quashing of the termination order dated 29.09.2000, and payment of fees and incidental charges. The respondents contended that the appointment was not a public appointment under Article 16(2)(i) of the Constitution, the retainership was for one year only, and they had the right to choose their counsel freely. The writ petition was heard and decided by the court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner’s appointment as Standing Counsel constituted a public appointment under Article 16(2)(i) of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the petitioner’s services could be terminated without notice and without sanction from the relevant government departments.
  3. Whether the petitioner had a right to continue as Standing Counsel despite termination and whether the termination order could be quashed.
  4. Whether the petitioner was entitled to fees and incidental charges claimed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner was appointed on 20.10.1998 and his services as Standing Counsel could not be terminated by the Chairman of SSB without notice.
  • The termination was on whimsical grounds and lacked competence and sanction from the General Administrative Department/Law Department, violating Government order Rule 20 of SRO 1994.
  • The petitioner sought quashing of the termination order dated 29.09.2000 and continuation as Standing Counsel.
  • The petitioner claimed payment of retainer fee, fees per case, and incidental charges.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court judgment in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi vs. State of U.P. to support entitlement to continue as Standing Counsel.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The appointment of an Advocate as Standing Counsel is not a public appointment under Article 16(2)(i) of the Constitution.
  • The relationship is governed by the Advocates Act and clients have the right to choose and change their advocates.
  • The petitioner’s retainership was for one year only and expired; thus, there was no right to compel continuation of the retainership.
  • The respondents have the legal right to select counsel of their choice and terminate the engagement accordingly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. vs. State of U.P. and others (Supreme Court Service Rulings) Consideration of renewal and appointment of government counsels; State must show orders are not whimsical, arbitrary, or unreasonable. The court found this judgment distinguishable as it dealt with renewal of tenure and appointment norms, not applicable to the petitioner’s case.
Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corp., Lucknow vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1244 Contracts of personal service are generally not enforceable by specific performance; exceptions exist for statutory employees or where statutory provisions are violated. The court applied this principle to hold that the petitioner’s engagement was a personal service contract and thus not enforceable; termination was permissible without specific performance relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the nature of the petitioner’s appointment as Standing Counsel and held that it was a contract of personal service rather than a statutory or public appointment. The court emphasized the constitutional right of litigants, including State wings, to select and change their advocates at will, citing the Apex Court’s ruling that an advocate must return the brief if the client decides to change counsel. The petitioner’s argument that the absence of a specified tenure precluded termination was rejected. The court distinguished the petitioner’s case from the Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi judgment, which concerned renewal of government counsel appointments under scrutiny for arbitrariness. The court relied on the Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corp. case to reaffirm that personal service contracts are not enforceable by specific performance, and the remedy for wrongful termination lies in damages, not reinstatement. Since the appointment was not statutory or public in nature, no vested right arose in favor of the petitioner to continue as Standing Counsel. The court thus found no merit in the petition and dismissed it.

Holding and Implications

The petition is dismissed for being devoid of merit.

The direct consequence is that the petitioner’s termination as Standing Counsel stands valid, and the respondents are free to engage counsel of their choice. No entitlement to continuation or payment as claimed by the petitioner arises. The decision does not establish any new precedent but reaffirms established principles regarding contracts of personal service and litigant freedom to select counsel.

    A.M.Shah v. State Of J&K And Ors.

    1. In this writ petition, petitioner prays for direction to respondents to permit him to continue to work as a Standing counsel for service Selection Board for Srinagar Wing of the High Court, The main submis­sion made in the petition are that the petitioner was appointed as Standing Coun­sel on 20.10.1998 by respondent No. 4 to represent the interest of the respondents in the litigation before this Court. The Chairman of SSB could, not terminate the services of the petitioner as a standing counsel, at his back, without notice. The services of the petitioner were terminated on whimsical grounds without any compe­tence and sanction from General Administrative Department/Law Department of the State. In view of the Government or­der Rule 20 of SRO 1994.

    2. The petitioner being aggrieved of the action of termination of his retainer ship prays that the respondents be directed to quash order No. 178-SSB of 2000 dated 29.09.2000 vide which new Legal Team has been appointed and act upon the or­der No. 578-ID (Estt.) of 1999 dated 20.05.1999. The petitioner further prays that respondents be directed to pay Rs. 20,000/- as retainer ship fee, Rs. 10.000/- as fee for each case and incidental charges of Rs. 1000/- per case.

    3. The stand by the respondents is that appointment of an Advocate as a standing counsel by the respondents does not constitute public appointment within the meaning of Article 16 (2) (i) of the Consti­tution. The relationship of an Advocate is regulated by the provisions of the Advo­cates Act and every client has a right to choose the advocate of his choice. The retainership of the petitioner was only for a period of one year and after the expiry of the said period, the petitioner has no right to compel the respondents to con­tinue with the retainership arrangement in disregard of the legal rights of the respon­dents to choose the counsel of their choice.

    4. Heard learned counsel for the par­ ties and perused the entire material placed on record.

    5. The submission of learned coun­sel for the petitioner that simply because there is no mention of duration of retainership in the initial order of appointment No. 578 ID (Estt.) of 1999 dated 20.05.1999. therefore, the services of the petitioner as retainer could not be termi­nated, cannot be allowed for multiple-rea­sons. Respondent No. 4, SSB. admittedly a wing of the State is a litigant before the Courts and all litigants, not only, have con­stitutional guarantee to select the counsel of their choice, but also, freedom to change the Advocates whenever they feel to do so. While upholding this view, the Apex Court has gone a step further and ob­ served that once the litigant decides to change his Advocate, the Advocate is un­der obligation to return the brief to the cli­ent. This view has been taken by the Apex Court in judgement reported in SRJ 113, the relevant portion of which reads as un­der :-

    16. A litigant must have the freedom to change his advocate when he feels the advocate engaged by him is not capable of espousing his cause efficiently or that his conduct in prejudicial to the interest involved in the list, or for any other reason. For whatever reason, if a client does not want to continue the engagement of a particular advocate it would be a profes­sional requirement consistent with the dignity of the profession that he should return the brief to the cli­ent, it is time to hold that such ob­ligation is not only a legal duty but a moral imperative."

    6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in view of the judge­ment of the Apex Court in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. vs. state of U.P. and others, reported in Supreme Court Service Rulings, the petitioner is entitled to continue as Standing Counsel for the respondents department.

    7. The judgement of the Supreme Court has been carefully perused. With due respects, the judgement is distinguish­ able and does not apply to the facts of the present case. Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the petition was filed in which re­newal of tenure of, all the existing Gov­ernment Counsels and calling of new pe­nal for new appointments, was under con­sideration and the Apex Court while scru­tinizing the action of the State observed that the State must show that the orders have not been passed on whims or caprice and are not arbitrary or unreasonable in violation of rules and norms governing the controversy.

    8. From the perusal of the order un­der which the petitioner was taken as standing counsel, it is manifestly dear hot the engagement was purely for personal service. A contract of personal service cannot be enforced as held by the Su­preme Court in case titled Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corp., Lucknow vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi reported in AIR 1970 SC 1244, the relevant portion of which is reproduced as under :-

    "Normally a contract of personal service will not be enforced by an order for specific-performance nor will it be open for a sevant to refuse to accept the repudiation of a con­tract of service by his master and say that the contract has never been terminated. The remedy of the employee is a claim for dam­ages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract. But then; a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a vio­lation of the provisions of the stat­ute while terminating the services of such an employee, the latter will be eligible to get the relief of a declaration that the order is null and, void and that the he continues la be in service, as it will not then be a mere case of a master terminating the services of a servant. The exceptions to the normal rule that no declaration to enforce a con­tract of personal service will toe, granted are:

    (1) a public servant. who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311

    (2) reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Tribunal's.;

    (3) a statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute. "

    (4) The engagement of an by the State does not constitute a statu­tory appointment. There is no legal require­ment to advertise the posts and no one has a vested right to claim, consideration for appointment even if he is otherwise eli­gible. The petitioner cannot and should not have projected his grievance, if the respon­dents selected some other advocate. which in the opinion of the respondents, would serve and safeguard their interest in an effective and satisfactory manner.

    9. As the petition is devoid of any merit, the same is dismissed alongwith connected CMP(s).

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    A.M.Shah v. State Of J&K And Ors.
    (Mar 14, 2002)