(1) This civil second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Sub Judge (C. J. M.) Jammu dated 30-3 74 dismissing the appeal of the appellant as barred by limitation.
(2) Briefly speaking the facts of the case are that in a suit for ejectmant and recovery of arrears of rent in respect of suit premises, the Munsiff R. S. Pura passed an exparte decree on 3-3-72. The defendant appellant filed an application on 29-3-1972 under Order 9 R. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the exparte decree. On appeal before the Sub Judge (C. J. M.) on 12-2-73 the order of dismissal was upheld. A revision petition was filed before this court which also met the same fate on 4-10-73. Having failed on all fronts the defendant appellant there after filed an appeal against the exparte decree of the trial court on 20th of Oct. 1973 before the Sub Judge (C. J. M.) Jammu. Along with the memo of appeal he filed an application under section ,5/4 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of one year and 1\ month?. The applicant claimed the benefit of extension in time on the ground that he had perused another legal remedy under Order 9 R. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He was under a bonafide belief that he would succeed in that Civil Proceedings which he pursued with due care and attention. Also he was advised by his counsel that in the event of his failure in getting the exparte decree set aside he could thereafter file an appeal against the said order. The learned Sub Judge (C. J. M) dismissed the application u/s 5/14 of the Limitation Act. He held that the appellant had not established sufficient cause for claiming the benefit of Sec. 5. The grounds urged by him did not entitle the appellant to seek condonation of delay. The learned court therefore dismissed the appeal as time barred. Aggrieved by this the defendant has come up in second appeal before this court.
(3) I have hard the elaborate arguments of the learned counsel for the parties.
(4) It is conceded by Mr. T. S. Thakur the learned counsel for the appellant that two concurrent remedies ; one by way of making an application under Order 9 R. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the other by way of filing an appeal against the exparte decree were available to the appellant. He has however contended that having chosen to pursue the first remedy in which he did not succeed he could pursue the second remedy available to him by way of appeal and time spent by the appellant in pursuing the first remedy could be deducted in the period of limitation for filing the appeal. This was a sufficient cause u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for extending the time in filing the appeal. Learned counsel has further submitted that although Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act could not apply to the case as this section would apply to suits only yet by analogy the principle underlying section 14 could be made applicable to the case and on this principle time could be extended under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dwelling upon the proposition he has urged that the defendant appellant in a bonafide way moved an application for setting a side the exparte decree passed against him. The matter was hotly contested between the parties. He was sanguine of the ultimate success of his case. But the judicial opinion went against him. Therefore this circumstance was sufficient to entitle him to claim condonation of delay. According to the learned counsel the mere fact that two concurrent remedies were available to the defendant would not make any difference and would not debar him from filing the appeal after he remained unsuccessful in the application for setting aside the exparte decree. Reliance is placed upon AIR 1917 P. C. 156 which according to the learned counsel is the basic authority for the proposition of law enunciated by him. In the authority relied upon the view has been expressed that if a party bonafide presents an application for review of judgment within the ordinary period limited for appealing the time occupied by the court in disposing of such application could not be reckoned among the days limited for appealing but will be added thereto, and a memorandum of appeal within such extended period will be received as presented within time. But this authority cannot be construed to lay down a broad and general proposition of law.
(5) In my view the principle enunciated in this authority cannot be extended to an application for setting aside an exparte decree made under O. 9 R. 13 C. P. C. In fact this very question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court reported in A. I. R. 1.932 Cal. 558. That was a case where an application under O. 9 R. 13 C. P. C. for setting aside the exparte decree was made but failed on merits. Their Lordships of Calcutta High Court held that the time spent in prosecuting that application could not be deducted under section 5 of the Limitation Act from the proper time allowed for filing an appeal. Commenting upon A. I. R. 1917 P. C. (Supra) their Lordships explained the ratio by enunciating the view that the decision of the Privy Council was conclusive only in so far as application for review was concerned. The authority was conclusive of the contention that the period taken up for prosecuting the review petition should not be deducted in computing the period for preferring an appeal. But as observed by the learned Judges there was no reason whatsoever for extending the rule which the Privy counsel approved or for holding by analogy that this principle should be extended to other applications which are not applications for review.
(6) Mr. Thakur has also cited A. I. R. 1966 Orisa 219 Para 7), A. I. R. 1966 A. P. 259 A. I. R 1919 Patna 239 and A. I. R. 1961 Punjab 521 in support of his contention. On consideration of these authorities it is found that the facts involved in these cases were quite different from the case before us and that these authorities are distinguishable. A. I. R. 1966 Orisa (Supra) was a case where a criminal revision was. filed within time in the High Court and the High Court directed the party to come through the Sessions Judge. It was held that the party could not be penalised on the ground of limitation as the party had prosecuted the proceedings before the wrong forum bonafide and in good faith and the delay caused as such could be condoned under section 5. That, however, is not the case before us. The appellant in the instant case had not chosen any wrong forum ; nor was there any suggestion made to him by any of the courts he approached to approach particular forum.
A. I. R. 1966 A. P. 259 was also a case where the unsuccessful party had approached a wrong forum. It was held that the period spent in prosecuting the case before the wrong Tribunal was "sufficient cause" for bringing the case within the purview of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act so that time spent could be added to the period allowed for presenting the appeal. In this case also there was a direction by the court to file an appeal.
(7) "A. I. R. 1961 Punjab 521 was a case where a memo of appeal was presented before A Court but was returned and the same was thereafter presented to B court. It was held that though Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act did not in terms apply to appeals yet on • the analogy of that section that proceedings were held in a wrong forum and on a mistaken advice of the legal practitioner delay could be condoned in filing the appeal. That indeed is not the case before us.
(8) A Division Bench of Patna High Court consisting of Miller C. J. and Foster J. observed in A. I. R. 1919 Patna Page 230 that an appellant applying u/s 5 ought ordinarily to be deemed to have acted with ordinary diligence when the whole period between the date of the decree appealed against and the date of presenting the appeal does not after excluding the time spent in prosecuting with the diligence a proper application for review of judgment exceed the period prescribed by law for presenting the appeal and his appeal should in such a case be admitted u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. That was also a case where the appellant had been mislead by the practice of the court that had hitherto prevailed in the subordinate courts but which had recently been held wring by the High Court. Extension in time it was held could be claimed on that ground. That also indeed is not the case before us.
(9) Therefore on consideration of the facts of the aforesaid authorities it is quite manifest that none of them can be said to have laid down the law as the appellant wants me to lay down. These authorities can have no application to the case before us.
(10) It is admitted in the case that when the appellant moved on application under O. 9 R. 13 he could also file an appeal against the exparte decree. Having chosen and pursued the first remedy to its logical and he did so at his own risk. There was nothing to prevent him from also filing the appeal in time. He all along remained negligent and did not act with due care and caution although the second remedy by way of appeal was concurrently available to him. Therefore there can be no sufficient cause within the meaning of Sec. 5 to entitle the appellant to seek extension in the period of limitation.
(11) In A. I. R. 1938 Bombay 459 the view has been expressed that where an exparte decree was passed against the defendant and he applied for setting aside the same but his application was rejected and he filed an appeal before the District Judge against the order of dismissal of his application and the appeal also was dismissed, and thereafter he filed an appeal against the exparte decree, but not within the period of limitation and he sought condonation of delay on the ground of his having spent time in pursuing the first remedy, the appeal so preferred was held as time barred. The view was also held that the fact that the defendant took proceedings to set aside the exparte decree would not constitute sufficient cause under section 5 because it was perfectly open to the defendant to pursue the concurrent remedy of preferring an appeal against exparte decree on merits while he was prosecuting his application to set aside the exparte decree.
(12) The appellant cannot also be heard to contend en the matter that he was given a wrong advice by his counsel. Where a party has engaged the service of a lawyer who gives a wrong advice to his client with the result that he fails at the preliminary stage of the litigation but he unwittingly drags on the litigation to the last forum he cannot be said to have acted with due care and caution so as to claim benefit of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act.
(13) In 1963 K. L. J. 56 this court pronounced the view that it is not always and under every circumstance that a party is entitled to claim benefit under section 5 on the ground of mistake of his lawyer. The counsel must show that there was a bonafide mistake on his part and inspite of due care and attention he could avoid the mistake which was committed by him. The observations made in A. I. R. 1956 Hyd. 161 also applies with equal force to the case before us which run as under.
"Where after unsuccessfully seeking to sot aside a preliminary decree under O. 9 R. 13 Civil P. C. the appellant files an appeal against the preliminary decree beyond time and the dismissal of the application to set aside the exparte decree was not for want of jurisdiction, the delay in filing the appeal against the preliminary decree cannot be condoned under S. 14."
Where a party selects to choose one of the two remedies open to him and having failed in one want to fall back upon the other remedy he cannot be allowed to invoke S. 5 and claim to exclude the period spent in pursuing the remedy that he elected to pursue first.
Where after unsuccessfully seeking to set aside a preliminary decree under O. 9. R 13 Civil P. C. the appellant files an appeal against the preliminary decree beyond time and the dismissal of the application to set aside exparte decree was not for want of jurisdiction and the record further shows that the appeal against the preliminary decree filed only as a matter of form by way of exabundanti cautela no question of bonafides of the appellant arises and much less of the due diligence and the appellant is clearly not entitled to the benefit of S. 5."
(14) Again, as observed by me in 1969 K. L. J 565 a party claiming condonation under section 5 of the Limitation Act must explain the delay of each day The appellant in the present case has not been able to explain as to why he did not prefer the appeal against the exparte decree immediately after his revision petition was dismissed by this court, and what was he doing during the intervening period. The interval of 16 days between the date of dismissal of the revision petition and the filing of the appeal has remained unexplained.
(15) For the foregoing reasons I am of the view that the appellant cannot claim benefit of section 5 and therefore delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned. The judgment and the decree the first appellate court are hereby affirmed. The appeal is dismissed but without any order as to costs. At this stage Mr. T. S. Thakur has sought leave to file L. P. A. which in the circumstances of the case is granted.