Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

W.P No. 648 of 1959.

Advocates

Messrs. G. Vasantha Pai and D. Padmanabha Pai for Petr.
Mr. K.V Sankaran for Respts.

Judges

Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.

Acts

S. 20 (2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act of 1950 and S. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947.
S. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate. Tribunal) Act ran:(1)
S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appelate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
S. 31 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947,
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act of 1950,
S. 50 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act,
S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
S. 51 of the Shops and Establishments Act,
S. 31 of the Shops and Establishments Act,
S. 33 (C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
S. 33-C by Central Act XXXVI of 1956.
S. 20 (2) of this Act and the Section

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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Railway Employees' Co-operative Bank Ltd., Madras (the petitioner) sought a writ of prohibition restraining the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Madras from proceeding with the hearing in C.P. No. 160 of 1959. There are two respondents: (i) the Presiding Officer (against whom the writ is sought) and (ii) Jayaraman, an employee of the Bank and one of 84 employees who filed applications before the Labour Court claiming overtime wages under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The 84 applications (filed in April 1959) sought money-computation of overtime for the period May to November 1956.

The employees' substantive legal premise was that, prior to 26 May 1956 (and prior to 1 April 1948 when the Madras Shops and Establishments Act came into force), their normal hours were 10:00 am to 4:30 pm on weekdays and 10:00 am to 1:30 pm on Saturdays (a 33½ hour week). After the employer changed the working hours to 10:00 am–7:00 pm (weekdays) and 10:00 am–4:00 pm (Saturdays), they claimed overtime for hours worked beyond the earlier normal hours, relying on S. 50 and S. 31 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act and sought valuation under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The employees had earlier invoked the Commissioner of Labour under S. 51 of the Shops and Establishments Act to decide whether S. 50 applied. The Commissioner, by order dated 31 December 1958, found that although prior normal hours were 33½ hours, employees were not paid overtime previously and therefore were not entitled to protection under S. 50. The Labour Court proceedings followed and the Bank petitioned for prohibition.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a Labour Court (or Tribunal) has jurisdiction under S. 33‑C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to determine and compute in terms of money the value of a benefit to which a workman is entitled when that benefit arises under a statute (such as the Madras Shops and Establishments Act) or under contract, rather than only under a settlement, award or Chapter V‑A retrenchment provisions.
Whether the decision of the Commissioner of Labour under S. 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act (that workers were not entitled to overtime under pre‑existing contract) is binding on the Labour Court and, if binding, whether it precludes the overtime claims based on S. 50 read with S. 31 of the Shops and Establishments Act.
Whether, despite the Commissioner's decision, the workers could claim overtime under S. 31 of the Shops and Establishments Act (for work beyond 48 hours) or under any agreement/assurance to pay overtime when normal hours were increased, and whether the Labour Court could compute the monetary value of such benefits under S. 33‑C(2).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Bank)

The petitioner contended that S. 33‑C(2) should be read as limited in scope to benefits conferred under the Industrial Disputes Act itself—i.e., benefits under a settlement, an award or under Chapter V‑A—analogous to S. 33‑C(1), and therefore the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to evaluate benefits claimed under the Shops and Establishments Act or contract.

Respondents' / Employees' Arguments

The employees (and their counsel) argued that S. 33‑C(2) is not so limited: the absence of the specific limiting words ("settlement", "award", and "Chapter V‑A") in Subsection (2) indicates a deliberate wider legislative scope to permit computation of any benefit that a workman is entitled to receive from an employer and which is capable of monetary valuation.
They relied on the legislative history and textual contrast between S. 20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (which expressly limited tribunal computation to benefits under an award or decision) and S. 33‑C(2) (introduced by Central Act XXXVI of 1956), arguing that the difference in language demonstrates an expanded jurisdiction conferred by S. 33‑C(2).
It was also advanced that, if there had been an assurance or undertaking to pay overtime when normal hours were increased, that arrangement would give rise to a benefit whose money value could be determined by the Labour Court under S. 33‑C(2).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by statutory interpretation and sequential analysis of facts and prior administrative decision:

Interpretation of S. 33‑C:
- The court observed S. 33‑C(1) is expressly limited to recovery of moneys due under (i) a settlement, (ii) an award, and (iii) provisions of Chapter V‑A. The petitioner urged that Sub‑section (2) should be read with a similar limitation.
- The court contrasted S. 33‑C(2) with S. 20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, where the language explicitly limited computation to benefits under an award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal. S. 33‑C(2), introduced by Central Act XXXVI of 1956, lacks those limiting words.
- Relying on that textual distinction and the legislative history (the 1956 enactment conferred computation powers on Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts), the court held that the absence of limiting language in S. 33‑C(2) was deliberate and significant.
- Consequently, the court concluded that S. 33‑C(2) empowers the Labour Court to determine in monetary terms the value of any benefit to which a workman is entitled from his employer that is capable of being computed in terms of money — not confined to benefits arising only under a settlement or award under the Industrial Disputes Act but also benefits arising under contract or other enactments.
Effect of the Commissioner's Decision under S. 51 of the Shops and Establishments Act:
- The court noted S. 51 provides that questions whether S. 50 applies are to be decided by the Commissioner of Labour and that his decision is final and not questionable in any court of law.
- On the facts, the Commissioner found that although normal hours prior to 1 April 1948 were 33½ hours per week, employees were not paid overtime for hours worked beyond those hours; thus they were not entitled to protection under S. 50. The court acknowledged that this finding is binding on the Labour Court by virtue of S. 51.
- The consequence of that binding finding is that the workers' contention that they are entitled to overtime under S. 31 by virtue of S. 50 (continuation of prior, more favourable rights) could not be maintained before the Labour Court in light of the Commissioner's determination.
Remaining avenues for relief and jurisdictional consequence:
- The court observed that, notwithstanding the Commissioner's finding, the workers' case could still rest on either (a) a direct claim under S. 31 of the Shops and Establishments Act for work beyond 48 hours (which is distinct from the S. 50 continuity argument), or (b) any agreement/assurance between employer and employees to pay overtime when hours were increased. If such an agreement were established, its monetary value would fall within S. 33‑C(2) for computation by the Labour Court.
- Because S. 33‑C(2) was interpreted broadly to include benefits under statute or contract, the Labour Court therefore had jurisdiction to determine and compute the monetary value of any such benefit, if the factual prerequisites were established.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition for prohibition was dismissed; the court held that the Labour Court has jurisdiction under S. 33‑C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to compute in monetary terms benefits to which a workman is entitled that are capable of being so computed, including benefits arising under contract or other enactments, and not limited solely to benefits under a settlement or award. The rule nisi was discharged and there was no order as to costs.

Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):

The Labour Court is entitled to proceed with C.P. No. 160 of 1959 and may, under S. 33‑C(2), determine the monetary value of any benefit properly before it that is capable of being computed in money — including benefits claimed under statute or contract.
The prior decision of the Commissioner of Labour under S. 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, which held that the employees were not entitled to overtime under the pre‑existing contract and therefore not protected by S. 50, is binding on the Labour Court and prevents re‑litigation of that specific point before the Labour Court.
Where the workers' claim rests instead on S. 31 of the Shops and Establishments Act (overtime for work beyond 48 hours) or on any established agreement/assurance to pay overtime, the Labour Court can assess and compute the monetary value of such benefit under S. 33‑C(2).
The court did not order costs and made no further directive; the opinion does not purport to lay down any broader precedent beyond its statutory interpretation and application to the facts of this case.

Signed: V.C.S.

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Railway Employees Co-Operative Bank Ltd., P.T Madras v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madras And Another.

The Railway Employees' Co-operative Bank Ltd., Madras, is the petitioner, and it prays for the grant of a writ of prohibition, restraining the presiding Officer of the Labour Court from proceeding further with the hearing in C.P No. 160 of 1959 on its file. There are two respondents to this petition. The first is the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Madras, against whom the writ of prohibition is sought, the other is Jayaraman who was an employee of the petitioner Bank. 84 of the employees of whom the second respondent is one, filed applications before the Labour Court claiming over-time wages under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, on the basis that this was a benefit which they were entitled to receive from the employer, the prayer being that it should be computed in terms of money. The overtime wages claimed and which they desired to be computed related to the period May to November 1956. These 84 applications which were in common form but naturally claiming different sums were filed in April 1959.

This claim to overtime was based on S. 31 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, reading,

“Where any person employed in any establishment is required to work overtime, he shall be entitled, in respect of such overtime work, to wages at twice the ordinary rate of wages.”

S. 9 of the same Act enacts:

“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, no person employed in any shop shall be required or allowed to work therein for more than eight hours in any day and forty-eight hours in any week;

Provided that any such person may be allowed to work in any shop for any period in excess of the limit fixed under this sub-section subject to payment of overtime wages, if the period of work, including overtime work, does not exceed ten hours in any day and in the aggregate fifty-four hours in any week.”

If these two provisions alone applied, it is common ground that the second respondent would not have been entitled to the payment of any overtime, because the hours during which the workmen were required to work by the Bank were 10 am to 7 pm, with an interval for lunch on week days and 10 am to 4 pm with an interval for lunch on Saturdays and therefore limits prescribed by S. 9 were not exceeded.

Page: 279The case of the workers, however, was that prior to 26th May 1956 from when, by reason of an office order they were to adhere to the working hour stated earlier the hours of work was between 10 am to 4-30 pm on week days with half an hour interval for lunch and 10 am to 1-30 pm, on Saturdays. The claim of the workmen was that under S. 50 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, the obligation to work only between 10 am to 4-30 pm and upto 1-30 pm on Saturdays was a right or privilege to which they were entitled before the Madras Shops and Establishments Act came into force, and to the continuance of which they were entitled under S. 50 of that Act. S. 50 of the Act ran:

“Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any rights or privileges which any person employed in any establishment is entitled to, on the date on which this Act comes into operation in respect of such establishment, under any other law, contract, custom or usage applicable to such establishment, if such rights or privileges are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act.”

The argument on the basis of which the claim to overtime wages was made was that previous to the Shops and Establishments Act they were bound to work only between 10 am and 4-30 pm Any work required to be done by them beyond those hours should be treated as overtime within S. 31 of the Act, and they were entitled to have the monetary value of this benefit evaluated by the Labour Court under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Shops and Establishments Act, provides for questions or disputes arising under S. 50 to be referred and decided by the Commissioner of Labour. S. 51 enacts (to quote only the relevant words):

“If any question arises………whether S. 50 applies to any case or not, it shall be decided by the Commissioner of Labour and his decision thereon shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law.”

The workers accordingly invited the Commissioner of Labour to decide their previously existing rights which were continued by S. 50 by invoking his jurisdiction under S. 51. In his; order dated 31st December 1958 the Commissioner of Labour decided two points which were in controversy before him: (i) whether the normal hours of work prior to 1st April 1948 (the date when the Shops and Establishments Act came into force) were 33½ hours per week. On this the finding was that the normal hours of work was between 10 am and 4-30 pm but that the employees who could not finish their work within that time used to work beyond the normal working hours for which no overtime wages were paid. The second point as formulated was “whether the employees were entitled to overtime wages for work in excess of the normal hours of work.” The finding of the Labour Commissioner was that

“although I have found that the normal hours of work were 33½ hours per week prior to 1st April 1948 admittedly the employees were not paid overtime wages for the hours worked after 4-30 pm and after 1-30 pm on Saturdays. The employees were not therefore entitled to any protection under S. 50 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act. 1947.”

It will be found that the contention which was raised before the Labour Court by the workers was that they were entitled to overtime wages under S. 31 of the Shops and Establishments Act for any period during which they worked beyond 33½ hours per week. Such a contention could not be countenanced in the face of the finding of the Commissioner of Labour under S. 51.

Mr. Vasantha Pal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, sought to sustain the relief of prohibition by contending that on a proper construction of S. 33 (C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the claim for overtime wages under the Shops and Establishments Act could not be within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. For the purpose of appreciating the argument, it is necessary to set out the whole of S. 33-C Which runs:

(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VI, the workman may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.

(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which Page: 280is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-S. (1).

(3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner who shall after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court, and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case.”

Under S. 33-C (1) the certificate is issued only for moneys due to a workman by an employer under (i) a settlement, (ii) an award and (iii) under the provisions of Ch. V-A (Retrenchment Compensation) and to no others. Learned Counsel urged that the scope of the Sub-S. (2) was also similar and should be also held to be confined to the evaluation of the benefits which were conferred under some one or other of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, which would practically mean under a settlement or an award. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent urged that there was no reason to limit the Court's jurisdiction under Sub-S. (2) and that the absence of the words “settlement award” and “under Chapter V-A” in the second subsection indicated that the legislature intended for it a wider scope so as to comprehend all claims which arose between an employer and workman in their character as employer and workmen.

In this connection learned Counsel for the respondent pointed out that S. 33-C was introduced into the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by Central Act XXXVI of 1956. The first statutory provision that was introduced into Industrial Legislation for enabling either recovery of moneys due to workmen from employers or providing the machinery for the ascertainment of the amounts due in the case of dispute, was contained in S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appelate Tribunal) Act, 1950. I shall set out the terms of this section since the main argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent rested on a comparison or contrast between the provision contained in S. 20 (2) of this Act and the Section with which this petition is concerned, namely, S. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate. Tribunal) Act ran:

“(1) Any, money due from an employer under any award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal may be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate Government on an application made to it by the person entitled to the money under that award or decision.

(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit under an award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the moment at which such benefit should be computed, may, subject to the rules made under this Act, be determined by that Industrial Tribunal, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-S. (1).

(3) For the purpose of computing the money value of a benefit the Industrial Tribunal may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner, who shall, after taking such evidence, as may be necessary submit a report to the Industrial Tribunal, and the said Tribunal shall determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case.”

The Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act of 1950, though it effected several amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 (Vide S. 34 of the 1950 Act) did not however enable the original Industrial Tribunals functioning under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to exercise powers similar to those which were vested in the Appellate Tribunal under S. 20. It was only in 1956 that such a power was conferred on the Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts by reason of the enactment of S. 33-C by Central Act XXXVI of 1956. As I indicated earlier a large part of the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent was based upon the contrast between the language used in S. 20 (2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act of 1950 and S. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. In the former the computation in terms of money could be effected by the Tribunal only of benefits which the workmen were entitled to receive from the employer under an award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal, whereas those words are significantly absent in S. 33-C (2). I consider this argument well founded and I hold that the jurisdiction Page: 281of a Tribunal or of the Labour Court under S. 33-C (2) extends to the computation in terms of money not merely of all benefits which workmen are entitled to receive from the employer under a settlement or award under the Industrial Disputes Act but also any benefit to which they might be entitled in their character as workmen under contract or by virtue of any other enactment.

The next point that arises for consideration is whether in view of the decision of the Labour Commissioner under S. 51 of the Shops and Establishments Act, there could be any claim for overtime wages based upon the combined operation of S. 50 and S. 31 of that Act. It need hardly be mentioned that the decision of the Labour Commissioner under S. 51 would be binding upon the Labour Court by virtue of the terms of that section. That authority had held that the workmen were not entitled to overtime under the contract which subsisted between the parties prior to April 1948, when the Shops and Establishments Act came into force. This finding would mean that the claim of the workers would be based either on S. 31 of the Shops and Establishments Act, that is, for work beyond 48 hours specified in that section, or on the basis of any agreement between the parties for the payment of overtime wages. Indeed the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted before me that it was the case of the workers that at the time when the normal hours of work were increased, there was an undertaking or an assurance that they would be paid overtime wages. Undoubtedly if this was established the workers would be entitled to the benefit of such arrangements and its monetary value could be evaluated by the Labour Court under S. 33-C (2).

This writ petition, however, is for a writ of prohibition and in view of my rinding that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim the petition fails. The petition is dismissed and the rule nisi discharged. There will be no order as to costs.

V.C.S

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