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Case Number

D.B Civil Writ Application No. 254 of 1953

Advocates

M.M Tiwari, for petitioners.
K.S Hajela, Advocate General.
R.A Gupta, Deputy Government Advocate.

Judges

Mr. Jawan Singh Ranawat
Mr. K.L. Bapna

Acts

Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Amendment Act, 1954 (Act No. X of 1954),
sub-sec. 3 of sec. 1 (Bihar) Maintenance of Public Order Act 1947,
sec. 1(3) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947,
Act by the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882, S. 15.25.
Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Amendment Act, 1954.(2)
provisions of sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
sec. 15 of the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882,
Madras Act of 1947 as amended by Madras Act 1948
Central Act. Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act
Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947,
Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947,
Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act
Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act
sec. 23(1) of the Constitution Act,
sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act
Bengal Security Act, 1948,
sub-sec. (3) of section 1

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Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary — K.L. Bapna, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan Board of Revenue to proceed with a revision application. Respondent No. 3, Chhaju, filed an application with the Sub-Divisional Officer (S.D.O.), Behror, on 11 June 1952, alleging he was a cultivator entitled to the fourth share in certain plots (total 16 bighas and 11 biswas) in village Rampur and that he had been wrongfully dispossessed on 1 June 1952 by Ram Deo and Lakhmi Singh. He sought restoration under section 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 (R.P.T.O. 1949). The S.D.O. dismissed his petition; Chhaju then filed a revision before the Board of Revenue on 12 March 1953, which fixed a hearing for 28 August 1953. The petitioner sought to prohibit the Board from proceeding on the ground that the R.P.T.O. had ceased to be in force and therefore the Board lacked jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Rajpramukh's notification dated 14 June 1951 extending the R.P.T.O., 1949 for two years (from 21 June 1951) was valid.
Whether the Rajpramukh's subsequent notification dated 20 June 1953 extending the Ordinance for a further one year (from 21 June 1953) was valid, given that by that date the State Legislature had been constituted.
Whether Ordinance No. III of 1954 (promulgated 15 February 1954) and the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Amendment Act, 1954 (Act No. X of 1954) (assented 16 April 1954) — each declaring retrospective effect (deemed to have come into force on 21 June 1949) and lengthening the duration of the Ordinance — could validly revive or validate the R.P.T.O. 1949 for an extended period (5 years under the Ordinance; 7 years under the Act) when an allegedly invalid notification had allowed the Ordinance to lapse.
Whether, in consequence, the Board of Revenue had jurisdiction to entertain the revision application of Chhaju filed in 1953.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The second extension (notification dated 20 June 1953 for one year) was invalid because by that date the State Legislature had been constituted and the Rajpramukh no longer possessed legislative power to extend the Ordinance; any purported delegation in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 R.P.T.O. 1949 did not confer such power.
Because the Ordinance had expired at the latest on 21 June 1953 (the first extension ending on that date), it was "dead" and could not be revived by subsequent Ordinance No. III of 1954 or Act No. X of 1954 which were promulgated/enacted in 1954; reliance was placed on Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar for the proposition that an expired Act cannot be amended unless revived properly (e.g., by a fresh statute expressly reviving it).

State / Advocate General's Arguments

The proclamation of Ordinance No. III of 1954 and the subsequent Act No. X of 1954 had the effect of declaring the R.P.T.O. 1949 to have duration beyond the earlier dates, by retrospective operation: both instruments declared that they shall be deemed to have come into force on 21 June 1949.
Therefore, the net effect was that the duration of Ordinance No. IX of 1949 became seven years from 21 June 1949 (as enacted by Act No. X of 1954), and hence the Board of Revenue retained jurisdiction to entertain the revision filed in 1953.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Sukhlal v. Revenue Board Rajasthan	Supported validity of the first extension (notification of 14 June 1951) because the Rajpramukh was then the legislative authority.	The Court agreed with this earlier decision and treated the first extension as valid.
Sadaria v. The Rajasthan Board of Revenue (1955 R.L.W. 355)	Held that the Rajpramukh had been the legislative authority earlier but that no power was delegated to him by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 R.P.T.O. 1949 to make extensions under a delegated authority; an extension under a delegated authority would be invalid.	The Court relied on this decision to support the view that the second extension (20 June 1953) was invalid if made under a delegated power; it also noted that Sadaria had held the first extension valid for historical reasons.
Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar	Illustrated that the apt manner of reviving an expired Act is by enacting a fresh statute or by a statute expressly saying the Act is revived; held in that case that an amendment could not operate when parent Act had already ceased to be in operation.	The petitioner's counsel relied on this case; the Court distinguished it, observing that Jatindra Nath did not represent an exhaustive list of revival mechanisms and that the facts there differed from the present because in this case the Ordinance/Act of 1954 were made retrospective to a date when the parent Ordinance was alive.
Ram Kishan v. State	Held attempts to continue an expired Act by later Ordinance and Act failed where (1) neither instrument was expressly retrospective and (2) neither purported to revive an enactment already ceased to be operative.	Cited for comparison: the Court noted that, unlike Ram Kishan, the Ordinance No. III of 1954 and Act No. X of 1954 in the present case were expressly made retrospective.
In re Kelyanam Veerabhodrayya (Veerabhadrayya)	Held that a temporary Act which had ceased to operate could not be validated by amending provisions unless the main Act was re-enacted; amending provisions alone were of no effect when main Act had died.	The petitioner's counsel relied on this case; the Court considered it but then discussed subsequent authorities (e.g., Valyudan) and distinguished the present case on the ground that the later instruments here were expressly retrospective and intended to re-enact/validate.
Badal Bose v. Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal	Declared the power of extending the life of an Act by a resolution (in West Bengal Security Act, 1948) to be invalid.	Referenced as part of the jurisprudence showing limits on delegated extension powers; used to contextualize the invalidity of the 20 June 1953 notification if it relied on delegated authority.
In re Valyudan	Upheld validity of a later Ordinance (No. IV of 1949) which re-enacted the parent Act retrospectively; held that the ordinance-making authority could promulgate retrospective ordinances re-opening past transactions.	Used by the Court to support the proposition that a competent authority may promulgate retrospective re-enacting legislation and thereby revive or validate prior laws and actions.
Conderham and Works, Ltd. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation	Example where successive Acts retrospectively altered the expiry date of a temporary Act so that it was deemed to have remained in force until a later date.	Relied on as an authority showing that temporary Acts have been kept alive by later legislation employing language similar to that used in the Rajasthan instruments; supported the Court's view that revival through retrospective enactment is possible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, drawing strictly on what is stated in the opinion:

The Court accepted the earlier decisions in Sukhlal and Sadaria which held that the Rajpramukh was the legislative authority at the time of the first extension (notification dated 14 June 1951) and therefore the first extension for two years from 21 June 1951 was valid. The opinion expressly states agreement with those cases and notes no new grounds were urged to challenge that extension.
The Court examined the second notification dated 20 June 1953 (extending for one year from 21 June 1953). It noted that by that date the State Legislature had been constituted and had met, so the Rajpramukh's special legislative authority (preserved earlier by covenant and the relevant constitutional provision while the Legislature was not constituted) had come to an end. Consequently, if the 20 June 1953 notification purported to extend the Ordinance under a delegated power, it was invalid. The opinion relies on Sadaria's holding that sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 R.P.T.O. 1949 did not delegate such a power and that an extension under a delegated authority would be invalid.
The Court observed that the invalidity of the second extension did not resolve the case because the State subsequently (while the petition was pending) took legislative measures: the Rajpramukh promulgated Ordinance No. III of 1954 (15 February 1954) and the State Legislature enacted Act No. X of 1954 (assent 16 April 1954). Both instruments declared retrospective operation (deemed to come into force on 21 June 1949) and substituted longer durations for sub-sec. (3) — the Ordinance substituting five years and the Act substituting seven years — and included declaratory provisions intended to remove doubts and validate prior notifications or defects.
The Court analyzed authorities relating to whether a temporary or expired statute may be revived or its duration extended retrospectively. It reviewed Jatindra Nath Gupta (where an amendment could not operate because the parent Act had ceased to operate), Ram Kishan (where attempts failed because instruments were not retrospective nor purported to revive), Veerabhodrayya and Valyudan (contrasting outcomes where a later ordinance re-enacted and was held valid), and an example from Canadian law (Conderham) where successive Acts effectively kept a temporary Act alive. The Court extracted from these authorities that a competent legislature or competent ordinance-making authority can, by retrospective enactment or re-enactment, revive or render operative provisions from an earlier date, subject to competence to legislate and the form of the instrument.
The Court distinguished Jatindra Nath Gupta on the ground that in that case the amendment was brought into force at a time when the parent law had already ceased to operate; by contrast, the Rajasthan Ordinance/Act of 1954 were declared to come into force on 21 June 1949 — a date when the parent Ordinance was in force — and therefore operated retrospectively to substitute a longer duration. The Court also noted that retrospective legislation and revival are permissible where the competent authority does so.
The Court concluded that Ordinance No. III of 1954 and Act No. X of 1954 were retrospective and validly declared the duration of Ordinance No. IX of 1949 to be extended (with the Act being the operative instrument substituting seven years). It further pointed out that sec. 14 of the R.P.T.O. 1949 made sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applicable so that repeal would not affect rights or proceedings which had accrued under the Ordinance; hence Chhaju's right to seek assistance (having arisen on 1 June 1952) was preserved and legal proceedings instituted before expiry could be continued.
Based on the above, the Court reached the practical conclusion that the Board of Revenue retained jurisdiction to entertain the revision filed by respondent No. 3 and that the petition under Article 226 had no force.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition is DISMISSED. The Court held that Act No. X of 1954 validly declared the duration of Ordinance No. IX of 1949 to be seven years from 21 June 1949, and therefore the Board of Revenue had jurisdiction to decide the revision filed by respondent No. 3.

Direct implications for the parties and proceedings:

The Board of Revenue may continue to hear and decide the revision application filed by Chhaju (respondent No. 3).
The Court recorded that sec. 14 of the R.P.T.O. 1949, by making sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act applicable, preserves rights and proceedings that had accrued while the Ordinance was in force; accordingly, Chhaju's right (arising on 1 June 1952) to seek restoration could be continued.
The Court made no order as to costs (explicitly noting that the Ordinance No. III of 1954 and Act No. X of 1954 were brought into force after the presentation of this petition).

Broader precedential effect: The opinion rests on application and reconciliation of existing authorities regarding retrospective legislation and revival of temporary statutes. The Court applied established principles (as discussed) to conclude that retrospective re-enactment by a competent authority can validly extend or revive the duration of a temporary law; the decision thus resolves jurisdiction in this case but does not purport to announce a novel legal principle beyond its reasoning.

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Ramdeo v. The State Of Rajasthan

K.L Bapna, J.:— This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. Respondent No. 3 Chhaju, made an application to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Behror, on 11th June, 1952, on the allegations that he was a cultivator of the fourth share in his plots of land measuring in all 16 bighas and 11 biswas situated at village Rampur, but had been wrongfully dispossessed by Ram Deo and Lakhmi Singh on 1st June, 1952. He claimed to be put in possession of the land falling to his share under sec. 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Behror, dismissed the petition, and Chhaju filed a revision application before the Board of Revenue on 12th March, 1953. The Board, after entertaining the application, fixed 28th August, 1953, for hearing. The present petition has been made for prohibiting the Board of Revenue to proceed with the application on the ground that the operation of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance (No. IX of 1949) had come to an end, and the Revenue Board had no jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter of the revision. The Rajasthan (Protection of tenants) Ordinance, 1949 (No. IX of 1949) (hereinafter called R.P.T.O 1949), was promulgated by the Rajpramukh on 21st June, 1949, and sub-sec. (3) of section 1 thereof provided that:—

“It shall come into force at once and shall remain in force for a period of two years unless this period is further extended by the Rajpramukh by notification in the Rajasthan Gazette.”

3. On 14th June, 1951, the Rajpramukh issued a notification No. F. 1(2) Rev./50 dated 14th June, 1951, as follows:—

“In pursuance of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 (No. IX of 1949), R.H the Rajpramukh is pleased to extend the period for which the said Ordinance shall remain in force for a further term of two years with effect from the 21st of June, 1951.”

4. The validity of this extension was challenged by learned counsel for the petitioner, but the point is covered by two decisions of this Court, viz., Sukhlal v. Revenue Board Rajaithan (1) and Sadaria v. The Rajasthan Board of Revenue (2) (Since reported as 1955 R.L.W 355). It was said in these cases that the Rajpramukh was then the legislative authority and the extension, which was equivalent to legislation, had been properly made. We agree with the view taken in these cases, and no new ground was urged in support of the contention that the said extension was invalid.

5. The period of extension by the aforesaid notification, however, expired on 21st June, 1953, and on 20th June, 1953, the Rajpramukh issued a notification No. F. 1(4) Rev. 1.B/52 to the following effect:—

“In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. 3 of sec. 1 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 (No. IX of 1949), H.H the Rajpramukh is pleased further to extend the period for which the said Ordinance shall remain in force for a further term of one year with effect from 21st day of June 1953.”

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this second extension was invalid. A two-fold argument was advanced in this connection. The Notification, on the face of it, purports to have been issued under a delegated power. By that date the State Legislature had been constituted, and extension of law, which amounted to a fresh legislation, could not have been made under a delegated power. Further, sec. 1, sub-sec.(3), R.P.T.O 1949 did not purport to delegate any power to the Rajpramukh. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Sadaria v. The Rajasthan Board of Revenue (2), referred to above.

7. It may be pointed out that Rajpramukh's power to legislate conferred upon him by the Covenant entered into by the Rulers in 1949 was preserved by Art. 335 of the Constitution only for such period as the Legislature of the State had not been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provision of the Constitution. That body had been constituted and had met prior to 20th of June, 1953, and, therefore, the legislative powers under Art. 385 had come to an end. The other power conferred upon the Rajpramukh under Art. 213 had not been exercised in issuing the Notification of 20th June, 1953, and need not be examined. The Rajpramukh having no legislative power under Art. 385 of the Constitution, the Notification extending the duration of Ordinance No. IX of 1949 for one year with effect from 21st June, 1953, under colour of power delegated to, him was invalid, as being legislation under a delegated authority. In Sadaria's case it was also held that no power had been delegated to the Rajpramukh Page: 370by sec. 1(3) R.P.T.O 1949, and that if he purported to extend the R.P.T.O under a delegated authority, it would be invalid. The validity of the first extension was, however, upheld as on the earlier occasion the Rajpramukh had vested in him the power to legislate, because the State Legislature had not been constituted till then, and the Notification did not purport to have been issued in exercise of any delegated power.

8. The aforesaid finding as to the invalidity of the second extension is, however, not sufficient to dispose of the case. It seems that the contention of the State that a power had been delegated by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 of the R.P.T.O 1949 to the Rajpramukh to extend the Notification having been questioned in Sadaria's case and the invalidity of the extension of a law under a delegated power having been canassed out in that case, the Government felt that legislative measures were necessary to cure the invalidity of the extension, and the Raj Pramukh in exercise of his powers under Art. 213 of the Constitution promulgated an Ordinance No. III of 1954 on the 15th of February, 1954, while the present petition was pending. It consists of the following three sections

“1. (1) This Ordinance may be called the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Amendment Ordinance, 1954.

(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 21st day of June, 1949.

2. For sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949, (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance), the following sub-section shall be substituted and shall be deemed always to have been substituted, namely:—

“(3) It shall come into force at once and shall remain in force for a period of five years.”

3. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that notwithstanding any defect in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 of the said Ordinance as originally enacted or in any notification issued by the Raj Pramukh thereunder, the said Ordinance as amended by this Ordinance shall be and shall always be deemed to have been validly in operation from the 21st day of June, 1949”.

9. The State Legislature soon after passed the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Amendment Act, 1954 (Act No. X of 1954), which received the assent of the Raj Pramukh on 16th April, 1954, and was published on the next day. It consists of 4 sections which are as follows:—

“1. (1) This Act may be called the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Amendment Act, 1954.

(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 21st day of June, 1949.

2. For sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance), the following sub-section shall be substituted and shall be deemed always to have been substituted namely:—

“(3) It shall come into force at once and shall remain in force for a period of seven years.”

3. For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that notwithstanding any defect in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 of the said Ordinance as originally enacted or in any notification issued by the Raj Pramukh thereunder, the said Ordinance as amended by this Act shall be and shall always be deemed to have been validly in operation from the 21st day of June, 1949.

4. The Rajasthan (Asamiyon ke Sanarakshan ka Sanshodhan Adhvadesh, 1954. The Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Amendment Ordinance, 1954, (Rajasthan Ordinance No. III of 1954) is hereby repealed but not so as to affect in any way its previous operation.”

10. The learned Advocate General contended that the effect of the Ordinance and the Act was that the duration of the Ordinance No. IX of 1949 became 7 years from 21st June, 1949, and, therefore, the Board of Revenue continued to have jurisdiction to entertain revision according to the provisions of Ordinance No. IX of 1949 even after the original period had expired in 1951.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the validity of Ordinance No. III of 1954 and Act No. X of 1954 on the ground that Ordinance No. IX of 1949 had expired on the 21st of June, 1951, and even if the first extension from 21st June, 1951, be held to be valid as held by this Court in the two cases referred to above, it came to an end on the 21st of June, 1953. The extension for another year by notification of 20th June, 1953, being invalid, the Ordinance expired, at any rate, on the 21st of June, 1953, and having become dead, it could not be rejuvenated by Ordinance No. III of 1954 or Act No. X of 1954, which were promulgated on 15th February, 1954, and 17th April, 1954, respectively.

12. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that after the expiry of Ordinance No. IX of 1949 at the latest on 21st June, 1953, it remained obliterated from the Statute book, and could not be revived except in the manner indicated in Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar (3). Reliance was placed on the following observation of Mahajan J. (as he then was) at page 187:—

“The only apt manner of reviving the expired Act was by enacting a fresh statute or by enacting a statute expressly saying that Act is herewith revived.”

13. It may be pointed out that the observations of the learned Judge of the Federal Court only illustrated the manner in which a revival of an expired Act could be effected and cannot be taken to be an exhaustive enumeration of the manner in which a revival of an expired statute can be made. In the case before their Lordships of the Federal Court, sec. 1(3) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, provided that “it shall remain in force for a period of one year from the date of it; commencement”. It had a proviso in the following terms:—

“Provided that the Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification.”

14. A notification was published on 11th March, 1949, extending the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, for a further period of one year from 15th March, 1948, mentioning that a resolution had been passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council for extending the period of the Act for one year. On 15th March, 1949, Bihar Act V of 1949 was passed amending the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, and the material part was in these terms:—

“Whereas it was expedient to amend the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act 1947, in the manner hereinafter appearing, it is hereby enacted as follows:

(2) In sub-sec. 3 of sec. 1 (Bihar) Maintenance of Public Order Act 1947, for the words ‘for a period of one year from the date of its commencement, the words and figures ‘till 31st March, 1950’, shall substituted.”

15. Their Lordships of the Federal Court held that the power to extend the duration of the Act for a further period of one year, with modification, if any, was ultra vires, and therefore, the first extension made by the Governor of Bihar beyond the first year mentioned in the Act was ultra vires. On contention being raised by the State of Bihar that even if the extension be invalid, the amendment made by the Bihar Act No. V of 1949 by substituting ‘till 31st March 1950’ in place of ‘for a period of one year from the date of its commencement’ made the Act of 1947 in operation till the aforesaid date, it was held that the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act was only a temporary Act and came to an end with the expiration of the first year, and the Act was not (thereafter) in operation so as to be capable of being, amended, and unless the Act of 1947 was revived, no amendment made could be of any effect. The Bihar Act No. V of 1949 was not declared to be in force retrospectively, and on the date when the amendment was made in the parent Act, the said Act was no longer in force.

16. There is, however, no doubt that if the Legislature is competent to make an Act, it may declare that it would be retrospective in its operation. The authority of the Rajpramukh to promulgate Ordinance No. III of 1954 or of the State Legislature to enact Act X of 1954 has not been challenged. According to the first section of the Ordinance it was declared to come into force on the 21st day of June, 1949. The second section purported to amend sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 of the R.P.T.O 1919 by substituting a period of 5 years for a period of two years. The effect of the two sections is that the substitution of the period of duration of 5 years for the R.P.T.O 1949 was in force. The present case is, therefore, distinguishable from the case of Jatindra Nath Gupta (3), inasmuchas in the case of Jatindra Nath the amendment was brought into force on a day when the parent law was no longer in operation. Similarly Act No. X of 1954 purported to amend Ordinance No. IX of 1949 on 21st of June, 1949, when it was in force by substituting a period of 7 years for a period of 2 years (according to the parent Act, or five years according to the amendment made by the Ordinance).

17. In Ram Kishan v. State (4) a certain Act expired on 20th September, 1947, and subsequent attempts to keep it alive or continue its operation by an Ordinance and Act brought into force on 23-9-48 and 16-12-48 respectively were held to be unsuccessful for two reasons, viz.

“1. Neither the Ordinance nor the Act purports to have retrospective effect as both of these proceed explicitly on the footing that the Act was alive till the date of their own enactment.

2. Neither of them purports to revive an enactment which had already ceased to be operative.”

18. In the present case, both the Ordinance No. III of 1954 and Act No. X of 1954 were retrospective in their operation, as having been declared to have come into force on the 21st day of June, 1949. As observed by Mukherjee J. in the case of Jatindra Nath (3) at page 192:—

“It is certainly competent to the Legislature in exercise of its plenary powers to revive or re-enact a legislation which has already expired blapse of time. The Legislature is also competent to legislate with retrospective effect.”

19. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on In re Kelyanam Veerabhodrayya (5). In that case the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, received the assent of the Governor-General on 11th March, 1947 and was published on the 13th March, 1947, and its duration was fixed for a period of one year, but the Provincial Government was empowered to extend the continuance of this Act for a further period not exceeding one year. Before the expiry of the period of one year the Provincial Government extended the duration for a further period of one year from 12th March, 1948. The Act was amended by Act No. XVII of 1949 by substituting for the words “for a further period or periods not exceeding one year in the aggregate.” the words “for a further period or periods not exceeding three years in the aggregate”. The Amending Act received the assent of the Governor General on 17th August, 1948, and was published in the Gazette on 20th August, 1949, and was published in the Gazette on 20th August, 1948. The life of the Act was extended by another notification for a period of one year from 19th March, 1949. The Federal Court decided on 22nd May, 1949, in Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar that the power delegated to the Provincial Page: 372Government to extend the duration of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, on a resolution passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, without notifications was invalid, and that the said Act ceased to have operation on the termination of the period of one year from the commencement of that Act. The Calcutta High Court declared on the 27th of June, 1949, in Badal Bose v. Chief Secretary Government of West Bengal (6) that the power of extending the life of an Act by a resolution of the Provincial Legislature contained in the west Bengal Security Act, 1948, was invalid. The Governor of Madras issued an Ordinance on the 11th August, 1949 in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by sec. 23(1) of the Constitution Act, declaring that the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, remained in force on and from 12th March, 1949, and shall continue to remain in force so long as the Ordinance remains in operation, and it purported to validate Act No. XVII of 1948, and sub-sec. (3) stated that:—.

“No section or proceeding taken, no notification issued, no order made, and nothing done, by any authority in accordance with the provisions of the said Act at any time on or after 12th March 1948 shall be questioned on the ground that the said Act was not in force at that time.”

20. It was held that the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act ceased to have operation and died a natural death on 11th March, 1949, and the amending provisions of the Ordinance of 1949 were of no effect on the ground that the main Act came to an end when the first year expired. It was observed that unless there was a re-enacting provision in the Ordinance which amounted to a new Act, the declaratory and amending provisions of the Act were not valid.

21. Learned counsel contended that as the provisions of the expired Act had not been re-enacted, the amending provisions were of no effect, as the main Act had expired, at any rate, on the 21st of June, 1953, if not earlier.

22. The learned Advocate General cited In re Valyudan case (7), and it appears that the Governor of Madras, after the decision in In re Veerabhadrayya's case promulgated another Ordinance No. IV of 1949, whereby the Madras Act of 1947 as amended by Madras Act 1948 with the additional section inserted by the Ordinance of 1949 was re-enacted with some additions, and sec. 1(3) of the Ordinance laid down that “It shall be deemed to have come into force on and from 12th March 1948”. This Ordinance No. IV of 1949 come for examination in In re Valyudan (7), and it was held that the power of a Governor to Make Ordinance being as vide as the powers of the Legislature, there was no reason why a Governor should not be at liberty to promulgate retrospective Ordinance having the effect even of re-opening transactions which had been adjudicated upon by courts of law. While referring to the observations made in In re Veerbhadrayya (5), it was observed that the Ordinance-making authority was conforming to the views expressed in that judgment, and a legislature had power to interveen and set right the result of case law which in the opinion of the legislature was against public interest, and the Court upheld the validity of Ordinance No. IV of 1949, the provisious where of were retrospectvie in their effect.

23. Crawford in his treatise on “Statutory Construction” stated in paragraph 321 that:—

“After a statute has been repealed, it may again become operative as law, either through the enactment of legislation expresaly reviving it, or by the operation of law.”

24. Craies in his treatise on Statute Law, Fourth Edition, page 350, says:—

“It is now rare to revive an expired Act. The only recent instance is the revival of the Alien Act by the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882, S. 15.”

25. The Alien Act was enacted on 9th June, 1948, and its duration was mentioned in sec. 7 that the Act shall continue in force for one year from the passing thereof and until the end of the then next session of Parliament. It expired as provided in the Act, but was revived by sec. 15 of the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882, which provided, among other things, that “the Act intituled “An Act to authorise for one year and to the end of the then next session of Parliament the removal of aliens from the realm”, and a copy of which is set forth in the third schedule to this Act, is hereby re-enacted, and shall continue in force for the same period as this Act.”

26. In Conderham and Works, Ltd. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (8) a certain temporary Act, Chap. 35 of the Statutes of 1932–1933, came into operation on 23rd May, 1933, and by sec. 4 was declared to expire on 30th April, 1934. By two successive Acts of 1934 and 1935 the date of expiry of the Act of 1932 was postponed to 30th April and then to 30th June, 1933. Finally on 5th July, 1936 an Act was passed which provided as follows:—

“The provision of secs. 1, 2 and 3 of Chap. 35 of the Statutes of 1932–1933 shall be deemed always to have been and hereafter they shall be operative and in force only until the 31st day of March 1936.”

27. And it was held that the temporary Act remained in force till 21st March, 1936. It may be observed that it had at one stage expired on 30th June, 1935, but the Act of 1935 by language similar to the one used in Rajasthan Ordinance No. III of 1954 and Act No. X of 1954 kept it alive and continued it till 31st March, 1936.

28. As discussed above, there is no prohibition for making retrospective legislation by competent authority or for reviving an expired statute.

29. Ordinance No. III of 1949 was declared to have come into force on the 21st day of June, 1949, and Act No. X of 1954 has a similar provision. As retrospective legislation is permissible, this Ordinance as also the Act came into force on 21st June, 1949. On Page: 373that day the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance was in force, and not dead, and the amendment made by sec. 2 of the Ordinance or sec. 3 of the Act was engrafted upon it on 31st June, 1949. Sec. 3 of the Act No. X of 1954 further makes it clear that the legislature intended to enact that Ordinance No. IX of 1949 as amended by secs. 1 and 2 was to be deemed to have been in operation from the 21st day of June, 1949, which means, in other words, a further repetition of the intention of the legislature that the duration of Ordinance No. IX of 1949 was to be deemed to be for 7 years. The effect of sec. 3 of the Ordinance No. IX of 1949 is the same except that its duration was then considered only to be required for 5 years, but the Ordinance having been repealed by the Act, the effect of the Act has only been noticed which is for a longer duration.

30. In our opinion, the R.P.T.O 1949 by virtue of Act X of 1954 validly declared the duration of Ordinance No. IX of 1949 to be for 7 years from 21st June, 1949, and the Board of Revenue has jurisdiction to (?) according to the powers conferred upon it by that Ordinance. It may be mentioned in passing that the first extension made by the Rajpramukh for two years from 21st June, 1951, has been held by us in Sukhlal v. Board of Revenue (1) and Sadria v. Board of Revenue (2), referred to above, to be valid, and the cause of action giving right to Chhaju to seek the assistance of the Anti-Ejectment Officer is stated to have arisen on the 1st June, 1952, when the Ordinance existed, even without the enactment of Ordinance No. III of 1954 or Act No. X of 1954. Sec. 14 of R.P.T.O 1949 provided that even after the expiry of the Ordinance the provisions of sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, would become applicable as if the Ordinance were a Central Act and had been repealed by a Central Act. sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act provided, among other matter, that the repeal of an enactment shall not:—

“(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the Repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.”

31. Respondent No. 3 having alleged to have acquired a right to apply to the S.D.O for restoration before the expiry of the Act had a right under sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act to continue the legal proceedings before the final authority having power to grant him the relief. This accidentally makes it clear that the R.P.T.O 1949 is not one of those temporary legislations which are totally effaced on the expiry of their term, but its provisions continue for the purpose of enforcing rights or continuing legal proceedings which have accrued or began while the Ordinance remained in force.

32. As a result of the conclusion to which we have arrived, the Board of Revenue has jurisdiction to decide the revision filed before the Board by respondent No. 3. This petition has no force, and is accordingly dismissed. We will make no order as to costs for Ordinance No. III of 1954 and Act No. X of 1954 were brought into force after the presentation of this petition.

Ramdeo v. The State Of Rajasthan

Court Opinion Summary — K.L. Bapna, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

State / Advocate General's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ramdeo v. The State Of Rajasthan

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