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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Chandmal, for petitioner.
  • L.N Chhangani with Roshan Lal, for Bhagwan Das Taparia.
Judges
  • Kailash Wanchoo
Acts
  • sec. 22(9) of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act No. 23 of 1951
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Chandmal, for petitioner.
  • L.N Chhangani with Roshan Lal, for Bhagwan Das Taparia.
Judges
  • Kailash Wanchoo
Acts
  • sec. 22(9) of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act No. 23 of 1951
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Ganga Dutt v. Bhagwan Das Taparia (Writ under Art. 226)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Ganga Dutt (petitioner), the Vice‑Chairman of the Nokha Municipal Board (a Board of 10 members). The respondent is Bhagwan Das Taparia (non‑petitioner No. 1), the Chairman of the same Board. The petitioner alleged that special meetings of the Board were held on 11‑6‑1957 and on 23‑8‑1957 at which resolutions expressing want of confidence in the Chairman were passed (the first by six members, the second by five members). Relying on section 22(9) of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951, the petitioner sought writ relief (including prohibition or other appropriate relief) and a declaration that the Chairman had ceased to hold office from 23‑8‑1957 and should be restrained from acting as Chairman.

The Chairman admitted that meetings occurred but challenged their validity as unlawfully convened. He also alleged that the petitioner and others had held an unlawful meeting on 1‑7‑1957 and that the petitioner concealed that fact. The Chairman further asserted that he had convened a special meeting on 22‑8‑1957 at which the no‑confidence motion was put and defeated. The Chairman therefore asked for dismissal of the petition with costs.

Opinion delivered by Dave, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the meetings held on 11‑6‑1957 and 23‑8‑1957 were convened and conducted in accordance with the statutory procedure prescribed by the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951.
  2. Whether the no‑confidence motions passed at those meetings were effective to cause non‑petitioner No. 1 to be deemed to have vacated his office on 23‑8‑1957 under section 22(9)(b) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • On 21‑5‑1957 the petitioner and four other Board members presented a written request to the Chairman asking that a special meeting be called to move a no‑confidence resolution; the Chairman refused to accept it.
  • After refusal, the petitioner caused the request to be sent by express delivery and by registered post; the express and registered deliveries were refused by the Chairman (according to the petitioner), and therefore the petitioner exercised the right to call the special meeting and issued notice on 6‑6‑1957 for a meeting on 11‑6‑1957.
  • The petitioner asserts that the 6‑6‑1957 notice was served on all members and posted at the municipal office and at public buildings (library, Tehsil), making the 11‑6‑1957 meeting and the no‑confidence motion valid.
  • As to the second meeting sequence the petitioner says he made a written request for a second special meeting on 30‑7‑1957 and that it was tendered to the Secretary on 2‑8‑1957, which, in the petitioner’s counsel's submission, affected the period within which meetings could be called by the Chairman or others.
  • The petitioner did not initially mention a meeting of 1‑7‑1957, asserting he did not consider it important (an explanation he later gave for omission).

Non‑Petitioner's (Chairman's) Arguments

  • The Chairman denied receiving any personal written request on 21‑5‑1957, and denied receipt by express or registered post; he alleged collusion between the petitioner and local postal authorities to fabricate a refusal.
  • He produced a complaint to the Post Superintendent (Ex. A/23) and a reply (Ex. A/24) to support his claim that postal delivery was not improperly refused to him.
  • He asserted that he actually received a requisition through the Regional Inspector on 1‑6‑1957 (document Ex. Al/1), which meant the petitioner could not lawfully convene a meeting prior to 15‑6‑1957.
  • He contended the notice for 11‑6‑1957 was not posted at the municipal office or public buildings as required; thus the 11‑6 meeting was invalid.
  • The Chairman said he properly called a special meeting on 22‑8‑1957, at which the no‑confidence motion was defeated; therefore a meeting on 23‑8‑1957 to overturn that result was impermissible under the Act and relevant procedure.
  • He disputed that the person who received a later notice on 2‑8‑1957 (Deepdan) was authorised to accept it, and he maintained he still had the right to call a meeting up to 25‑8‑1957.
  • He argued that the petitioner had concealed material facts (particularly the meetings of 1‑7‑1957 and 22‑8‑1957) and that the petition should be dismissed with costs for that reason.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kabool Chand v. Deputy Custodian, Alwar Principle that a party seeking relief under extraordinary jurisdiction (Art. 226) must place full and true facts before the Court; deliberate concealment of material facts to obtain interim relief will lead the Court to decline to consider merits and reject the application. The Court relied on this authority to note that the petitioner deliberately concealed the meetings of 1‑7‑1957 and 22‑8‑1957 and had obtained interim orders by such concealment; the Court held that, on that ground alone, the application was fit to be dismissed (even though the Court nevertheless examined the merits).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first set out the statutory procedure in the relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act (as cited in the opinion). Key procedural requirements identified and applied were:

  • Ordinary general meetings are to be held monthly and the Chairman must fix dates for ordinary meetings.
  • The Chairman may call a special general meeting whenever he thinks fit; alternatively he is bound to call one if he receives a written request from not less than one‑third of the whole number of members, and the special meeting must be fixed not more than 15 days after presentation of such request.
  • If the Chairman fails to call such a meeting within 15 days, the vice‑chairman or one‑third of members may call it for a day not more than 30 days after the presentation of the request.
  • Notice requirements include at least three clear days' notice for a special meeting (shorter notice allowed only in cases of great urgency and must be reasonable); notices must specify business and be posted at the municipal office or other public building.
  • Section 26(14) (as cited) restricts modification or cancellation of a resolution within three months except by a resolution passed by not less than one‑half of the whole number of members at a meeting of which proper notice pursuant to subsection (3) has been given and where the proposed modification or cancellation is fully set out in the notice.

Applying these rules to the facts before it, the Court engaged in the following stepwise analysis:

  1. Meeting of 11‑6‑1957: There were contested facts about whether a written request was personally presented to the Chairman on 21‑5‑1957 and whether express or registered deliveries had been made and refused. The Court held that such factual disputes could not properly be resolved in the Court's extraordinary jurisdiction without further enquiry. Official material produced by the Chairman (including an endorsement showing official receipt through the Regional Inspector on 1‑6‑1957) cast doubt on the petitioner's timeline. If 15 days are reckoned from the official receipt on 1‑6‑1957, the Chairman retained the right to call a meeting until 15‑6‑1957 and the petitioner's 11‑6‑1957 meeting would be premature. The Court also found doubts about whether the required notices were posted: the endorsements indicating posting were dated 10‑6‑1957, giving only one day's notice rather than the statutorily required three clear days (except in cases of urgency, which were not shown). For these reasons the Court was not satisfied the 11‑6‑1957 meeting complied with law.
  2. Dependency of the second meeting on the validity of the first: Section 22(9)(b) (the statutory provision relied upon) requires that, for removal by two meetings, the second meeting must be held not less than two months and not more than four months after the first meeting and that both meetings must pass resolutions by not less than one‑half of the whole number of members. The Court observed that unless the first resolution (11‑6‑1957) stood in law, the second resolution could not have the effect of removing the Chairman under section 22(9)(b).
  3. Sequence around 22‑8‑1957 and 23‑8‑1957: The Court noted the Chairman had properly convened a meeting on 22‑8‑1957 at which the no‑confidence motion was considered and defeated; the petitioner attended that meeting. The petitioner had also convened a meeting on 23‑8‑1957. The Court examined whether the petitioner could validly convene a meeting on 23‑8‑1957 to alter or cancel the decision of 22‑8‑1957. Section 26(14) requires explicit notice and a three‑month prohibition on cancelling or modifying a resolution except by prescribed procedure and notice. No notice was given indicating an intention to modify or cancel the 22‑8‑1957 resolution, and consequently the meeting of 23‑8‑1957 could not lawfully consider cancellation or modification of the 22‑8‑1957 resolution the very next day.
  4. Additional procedural irregularities and concealment: The Court observed that the petitioner had held an intermediate meeting on 1‑7‑1957 (after 11‑6‑1957) which itself was illegal because it occurred within less than two months of 11‑6‑1957. Crucially, the petitioner had concealed both the 1‑7‑1957 meeting and the 22‑8‑1957 meeting from the Court when obtaining interim relief. Relying on the precedent cited (Kabool Chand), the Court explained that deliberate concealment of material facts to obtain interim orders is a ground for refusing extraordinary relief and for dismissal of the application.
  5. Disposition of contested factual questions: The Court emphasized that it could not resolve the contested primary facts (such as whether the initial written request was personally tendered or whether postal deliveries were genuinely refused) in this extraordinary proceeding without enquiry. On the available material, including official endorsements and the timing of postings, the Court was not satisfied that the petitioner had proven that the meetings of 11‑6‑1957 and 23‑8‑1957 complied with the statutory requirements.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ application is DISMISSED. The dismissal is accompanied by an order of costs in favour of Bhagwan Das Taparia (non‑petitioner No. 1).

Direct consequences and implications that follow from the opinion (as stated in the judgment):

  • The Court found that it could not hold that the Chairman had been deemed to have vacated his office on 23‑8‑1957; accordingly no relief removing the Chairman was granted.
  • The petitioner’s conduct in concealing material meetings (1‑7‑1957 and 22‑8‑1957) was material to the Court’s decision: the concealment rendered the application fit for dismissal under the principle applied from Kabool Chand v. Deputy Custodian, Alwar.
  • The Court stated that, on the merits, the petitioner had not satisfied the Court that the meetings of 11‑6‑1957 and 23‑8‑1957 were held in accordance with law and therefore the statutory mechanism in section 22(9) did not operate to remove the Chairman.
  • No new legal principle or precedent was announced by the Court beyond application of existing law (notably the cited precedent regarding non‑concealment of material facts when invoking extraordinary jurisdiction). The decision’s practical effect is limited to the parties: the petition is dismissed and costs awarded to the respondent.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show full summary ...

    Ganga Dutt v. Bhagwandas Taparia

    Dave, J.:— This is a writ application by Ganga Dutt under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner is Vice-Chairman of the Municipal Board at Nokha, which consists of 10 members. Non-petitioner No. 1, Bhagwan Das Taparia, is the Chairman of the said Municipal Board.

    2. The petitioner's case is that a special meeting of the Nokha Municipal Board was held on 11-6-57 and a resolution expressing want of confidence in the chairman, namely non-petitioner No. 1, was passed by a majority of six members. Within two months of the said resolution, another special meeting of the Board was held on 23-8-57 and this time also, another motion of no-confidence in non-petitioner No. 1 was passed by 5 members. Both these resolutions having been passed under sec. 22(9) of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act No. 23 of 1951 (which will hereafter be referred as the Act) non-petitioner No. 1 should be deemed to have vacated his office forthwith, but in actual fact he did not vacate his office and was still working as Chairman. It has been prayed that there being no alternative, adequate or efficacious remedy, a writ of prohibition or any other appropriate writ, direction or order should be issued against the Chairman. It should be declared that he has ceased to be Chairman of the Board from 23-8-57, when the second no-confidence Page: 256motion was passed against him, and that he should be restrained from working as Chairman of the Municipal Board at Nokha. Non-petitioner No. 1 has not denied the fact that some members of the Nokha Municipal Board (Which will hereafter be referred as the Board) did hold meetings on 11-6-57 and 23-8-1957, but it is contended by him that both these meetings were illegal, since they were convened in contravention of the provisions of law. It has been further urged that the petitioner and a few other members, who are not on good terms with non-petitioner No. 1, had held a similar meeting on 1-7-57, which was also contrary to law and that this fact has been knowingly suppressed by the petitioner. It is further stated that non-petitioner No. 1 called a special meeting according to the proper procedure on 22-8-57 and on that day, the motion of no-confidence in non-petitioner No. 1 was put to vote, but it was defeated. According to non-petitioner No. 1, the petitioner and his associates could not hold a meeting for these same purposes on 23-8-57 according to law and that the meeting of 23-8-57 was therefore illegal. He has prayed that since the petitioner has knowingly suppressed the information about the meetings of 1-7-57 and 22-8-57 and since the meetings of 11-6-57 and 23-8-57 were not in accordance with law the application must be dismissed with costs.

    3. The questions which thus arise for determination are—

    (1) whether the meetings held on 11-6-57, and 23-8-57 were according to law, and

    (2) whether no-confidence motions passed in the said two meetings were in order and non-petitioner No. 1 should be deemed to have vacated his office on 23-8-57 according to sec. 22(9)(b) of the Act?

    4. It is common ground between the parties that both the meetings of 11-6-57 and 23-8-57 were called by the petitioner and not by the non-petitioner No. 1, before entering into the question of the validity of the resolutions passed in these meetings, it would be proper to point, out what is the proper procedure laid down by law for calling such meetings. The relevant part of sec. 26 of the Act which lays down that procedure runs as follows:—

    “Sec. 16— The following provisions shall be observed with respect to the meetings of a Municipal Board:—

    (1) There shall be held an ordinary general meeting in each month for the disposal of general business. It shall be the duty of the Chairman to fix the dates for all ordinary general meetings.

    (2) The Chairman may, whenever he thinks fit, and shall upon the written request of not less than one-third of the whole number of members and for a date not more than fifteen days after the presentation of such-request, call a special general meeting. If the chairman fails to call a special general meeting as provided in this sub-section, the vice-chairman or one-third of the whole number of members may call such meeting for a day not more than thirty days after the presentation of such request.

    (3) Four clear days' notice of an ordinary general meeting, and three clear days' notice or in cases of great urgency notice of such shorter period as is reasonable of a special general meeting specifying the time and place at which such meeting is to be held and the business to be transacted there at shall be given to the members, and posted up at the municipal office or some other public building in the municipality. The said notice shall include any motion or proposition which a member shall have given written notice not less than ten days previous to the meeting, of his intention to bring forward there at, and, in the case of a special general meeting, any motion of proposition mentioned in any written request made for such meeting.

    …………………………

    (14) No resolution of a municipal board shall be modified or cancelled within three months after the passing thereof, except by a resolution passed by not less than one half of the whole number of members at a general meeting whereof notice shall have been given fulfilling the requirements of sub-sec. (3) and setting forth fully the resolution which it is proposed to modify or cancel at such meeting and the motion or proposition for the modification or cancellation of such resolution.”

    5. It is clear from the above provision that according to sub-sec. (1), one general meeting must be held every month for the disposal of general business and a duty has been cast upon the Chairman that he should fix the dates for all such ordinary general meetings. Then, sub-sec. (2) provides that the Chairman may also call a special general meeting whenever he thinks fit. This is left to Page: 257his discretion, but, at the same time, this sub-section provides that if some members, who are not less than one-third of the total number of members of the board, send to the chairman a request in writing for calling a special general meeting, then it is incumbent upon the chairman to call such a meeting. It also lays down that such a meeting must be fixed on a date not exceeding 15 days from the date on which the written request is presented to the Chairman. The said sub-section further lays down that if the Chairman fails in his duty to call a special general meeting according to the written request of the said members, then the vice-chairman or one-third of the total number of members may call such a meeting, but it should be held on a day which is not beyond 30 days from the date on which the written request is presented by them to the chairman. Then it would further appear from sub-sec. (3) that atleast 3 clear days' notice specifying the time and place at which such meeting is to be held must be given to the members. A notice of a shorter period may also be given, but only in cases of great urgency and such shorter period should not be unreasonable. It is further required that in the notice, which is given, the business, which is to be transacted at the meeting, must be shown. The said notice should not only be given to the members, but it should also be posted up at the Municipal office or some other public building in the municipality. The notice must also include any motion or proposition which is mentioned in the written request sent by the members to the chairman and which is to be discussed at such a meeting.

    6. It would now be proper to first take up the question of the meeting of 11-6-57 and see whether it was held in accordance with the procedure set out above. The petitioner has stated that on 21-5-57 he alongwith four other members of the Board sent a written request to the Chairman that they proposed to bring a no-confidence motion against him and a special meeting should, therefore, be called for that purpose. This request was personally offered to the chairman, but he refused to accept it. Thereafter, it was sent by post to express delivery on the same day, but it was returned with an endorsement by the postman that its acceptance was refused. Thereafter, the said request was sent by registered post the same day, but it was also refused on 22-5-57. Since the Chairman thus failed to call a special meeting within 15 days after the presentation of the said request, the petitioner issued a notice on 6-6-57 for holding a special meeting on 11-6-57. According to the petitioner, this notice of 6-6-57 was served on all the members of the Board and thus the meeting of 11-6-57 and the no-confidence motion passed on that day was quite in order.

    7. Non-petitioner No. 1's reply is that the petitioner did not personally offer any written request to him on 21-5-57; nor did he receive any notice by ‘Express Delivery’ or by registered post. It has been alleged by him that the postal authorities in Nokha were against him as he had turned out one Gulam Farid a tax collector in the municipality, since he was not discharging his duties properly. The Post Master at Nokha was also a Mohammaden, that he was on good relations with Gulam Farid, that the petitioner had joined hands with the postal authorities and got a false refusal noted on the letters, if any were sent by them. He goes on to say that when he came to know of this trick he made a complaint to the Superintendent of Post Offices, Bikaner Division, on 8-6-57. He has filed a copy of that complaint which is marked Ex. A/23 and also a reply received by him from the Superintendent of Post Offices, Northern Rajputana Division, dated 13-6-57 marked Ex. A/24. According to non-petitioner No. 1, it was on 1-6-57 that he received through the Regional Inspector, District Boards and Municipalities, Bikaner, a requisition made by the petitioner for calling a special meeting. The petitioner had no right to call such a meeting upto 15-6-57, i.e, 15 days from the receipt of the written request, but the petitioner held a special meeting on 11-6-57 and since he did not wait till the expiry of 15 days, the said meeting of 11-6-57 was illegal. It has also been alleged that a notice about this meeting was not posted at the Page: 258municipal office or on any other public building in the municipality and for that reason also the meeting was illegal.

    8. In the rejoinder which has been filed by the petitioner, he has asserted that the notice given by him in his petition was correct, that he was not in league with the postal authorities and that the notice of the meeting of 11-6-57 was posted at the municipal office and other public buildings such as library, Tehsil etc.

    9. It would appear from what has been pointed out above that there is a dispute between the parties not only on questions of law but also on questions of fact. According to the petitioner, the written request for calling a general meeting was personally offered to non-petitioner No. 1 and the non-petitioner has denied this fact. The question therefore arises whether a written request was personally offered to non-petitioner No. 1. We cannot decide such a question of fact in our extraordinary jurisdiction. Then, there is also a dispute between them about the fact whether any such written request was tendered to non-petitioner No. 1 by express delivery or by registered post. The petitioner has no doubt filed a copy of the acknowledgment of the registered letter. In ordinary circumstances, we would have presumed that a registered letter was sent to the non-petitioner and that it was refused by him, but in view of the fact that the non-petitioner has also produced a copy of his complaint to the Superintendent of Post Offices (Ex. A/23) and the reply received by him (Ex. A/24) we cannot hold definitely that the registered letter must have been offered to the non-petitioner and that its acceptance was refused by him. It is not unlikely that the petitioner might have won over the postman and got a false refusal noted by him. At any rate, the matter needs enquiry and it is not the practice of this Court to decide such questions of fact in its extraordinary jurisdiction. It, therefore, remains doubtful whether any written request for calling a special general meeting was presented to non-petitioner No. 1 in the manner alleged by the petitioner. Non-petitioner No. 1 has produced Ex. Al/1 which shows that the written request made by the petitioner for calling a special general meeting was received by the non-petitioner through the Regional Inspector, District Boards and Municipalities, Bikaner, on 1-6-57. This is the date marked by the office about the receipt of the letter. The date of the receipt of the letter in the Regional Inspector's office is noted as 30-5-57 and his endorsement to non-petitioner No. 1 is also of the same date. It is not easily understandable why the Regional Inspector should have received the petitioner's letter on 30-5-57 if it were dispatched on 21-5-57. This also casts doubt on the truth of the assertion made by the petitioner. At any rate, the said request was officially received in the Board on 1-6-57. If 15 days be reckoned from 1-6-57, non-petitioner No. 1 had a right to call a meeting upto 15-6-57 and the petitioner had no right to call a meeting before that date. The meeting of 11-6-57 cannot thus be said to be in order unless an elaborate enquiry is conducted and it is established by the petitioner beyond doubt that the written request was received by non-petitioner No. 1, 15 days before 11-6-57.

    10. As pointed out above, non-petitioner's next objection is that the notice about the meeting of 11-6-57 was not posted at the municipal office or some other public building in the municipality. The petitioner in his rejoinder has asserted that such a notice was posted, but he has not filed affidavits of the persons who might have posted the notice on a particular public building or buildings. He has no doubt produced a copy which has been marked Ex. 12 and it has been urged that on that copy there are endorsements of the Motbirs to the effect that notices were posted on the Tehsil Notice Board and the library. But it is again a question of fact whether such notices were really posted or not and we cannot decide it in this application. Moreover even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the endorsements of the Motbirs on Ex. 12 are correct, those endorsements are dated 10-6-57, which means that even if notice was posted, it was posted only one day earlier than the date of the meeting. It is Page: 259clear from sec. 26(3), referred above, that there should have been at least three clear days' notice. It is only in cases of great urgency that a notice of shorter but a reasonable period is allowed by law. In the present, case, however, there was certainly no urgency and a notice of this type given only a day earlier cannot, in the absence of very grave circumstances, be considered reasonable. We are thus not satisfied that the meeting of 11-6-57 was held in accordance with law.

    11. Now, coming to the meeting of 23-8-57, it cannot he denied that it was held after two months from 11-6-57. Sec. 22(9) of the Act lays down as follows:—

    “Every chairman and every vice-chairman of a municipal board shall forthwith be deemed to have vacated his office—

    (a) if a resolution expressing want of confidence in him is passed by a majority of not less than two thirds of the whole number of members at a special general meeting convened for the purpose, or

    (b) if resolutions expressing want of confidence in him are passed by the votes of not less than one-half of the whole number of members at special general meetings convened for the purpose within an interval of not less than two months and not more than four months from each other”.

    12. It is clear from the language of clause (a) of sub-sec. (9) of sec. 22 that if a resolution expressing want of confidence in the chairman or vice-chairman is passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the whole number of members at a special general meeting convened for the purpose, then he would be deemed to have vacated his office on that very day. This clause, however, does not apply to the present case, because according to the petitioner himself, the no-confidence motion was never carried by a majority of two-thirds of the members. He relies only on clause (b) of sub-sec. (9) of sec. 22 which says that if the resolution of no-confidence is passed by votes of not less than one-half of the whole number of members, then another special general meeting should be convened with an interval of not less than 2 months and not more than 4 months from the first meeting and that another resolution of no-confidence should be passed by not less than one-half of the whole number of members. So, unless we hold that the first resolution of 11-6-57 was in order, the second resolution of 23-8-57, even if it were valid, could not be enough to remove the non-petitioner from his office of chairman.

    13. Moreover, it is not denied by the petitioner himself now, (though he had suppressed the fact of the meeting of 22-8-57 in his application) that non-petitioner No. 1 had called a special general meeting on 22-8-57; that the no-confidence motion was considered at that meeting and that it fell down. It has, therefore, to be determined whether another meeting for no-confidence could be validly held on the very next day. It has been urged by the petitioner's learned counsel that his client had made a written request for convening the second special general meeting on 30-7-57, that it was tendered to the Secretary, Municipal Board, on 2-8-57, that the petitioner could, therefore, call a meeting upto 17-8-57 and he had no right left to call a meeting on 22-8-57. Non-petitioner No. 1 has replied that the person, namely, Deepdan, who received the notice on 2-8-57, was not working as Secretary at that time, but it was Shri Prakash Chandra who was the Secretary. It is further stated that non-petitioner No. 1 had gone to Jaipur before 2-8-57, that he returned to Nokha on 10-8-57, and therefore, he had a right to call a meeting upto 25-8-57. The question whether Deepdan was authorised to accept the notice on 2-8-57 cannot be decided without an enquiry, but even if it be assumed for the sake of argument, that 15 days' time should be computed from 2-8-57, it cannot be said that non-petitioner No. 1 had no right to call a meeting on 22-8-57. Sec. 26(2) no doubt enjoins upon the chairman that he must call a special general meeting within 15 days from the receipt of a written request of the members and if he fails to do so, he certainly fails in his duty. Sec. 26(2) however, does not further lay down that if the chairman fails to call a special general meeting within the said 15 days, he would be debarred from calling such a meeting ever afterwards. The result of his failure to call a special general meeting within the prescribed Page: 260time, is that a right accrues to the vice-chairman or other members to call such a meeting after the expiry of 15 days, but it does not mean that the chairman loses his right to call such a meeting according to the usual procedure. In the present case, such a meeting was undoubtedly called by non-petitioner No. 1 on 22-8-57 and it is not denied that the petitioner also attended that meeting and though he was able to secure certain votes in his favour, but even then, the motion of no-confidence was lost.

    14. The question that next arises is whether a meeting could still be validly held on 23-8-57 for the same purpose. Sec. 26(14), which has been set out above, makes it quite clear that if a certain resolution is passed by the Board on a certain date, it cannot be modified or cancelled within three months from that date except by another resolution which must be passed by not less than one-half of the whole number of members at a general meeting whereof notice shall have been given according to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 26. That notice should give full details that the new resolution is proposed to modify or cancel the previous resolution. In the present case, no notice was given to cancel or modify the resolution passed on 22-8-57 and such a resolution could not certainly be considered on the very next day. It is thus clear that the meeting of 23-8-57 was also not held according to law. Under the circumstances we cannot hold that non-petitioner No. 1 should be deemed to have vacated his office on 23-8-57 or any other date and the application is, therefore, fit to be dismissed. Before parting with the case, we may also point out that one special general meeting for considering a resolution of no-confidence in non-petitioner No. 1 was held by the petitioner and some other members on 1-7-57. But it was illegal since it was convened within less than two months from the earlier meeting held on 11-6-57. The petitioner concealed the fact of this meeting and also the meeting held on 22-8-57, though he was present on that day. In Kabool Chand v. Deputy Custodian, Alwar (1) it was held by this Court that “a party who comes to the Court and asks it to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India should place full and true facts before it and should not word the application or affidavit in such a way as to create a completely misleading picture of the facts leading to the making of the application in order to deceive the Court in passing interim orders in his favour. Where the Court has reason to be satisfied that there has been a deliberate concealment of material facts so as to obtain an interim order by deceiving it, the Court will decline to consider the merits and reject the applications.” In the present case, the petitioner was able to get interim orders by deliberately concealing the fact of the meeting of 22-8-57. He also concealed the fact of the meeting held on 1-7-57 and, under these circumstances, this application was fit to be dismissed even without hearing the petitioner on merits. The petitioner has contended that he did not see any importance in the meeting of 1-7-57 and so it was not mentioned. He has, however, given no reason why he concealed the meeting of 22-8-57 and if it were not concealed, he would not have been able to obtain the interim order. His application was thus fit to be dismissed summarily. Still, we have looked into the merits and we find that the petitioner has not been able to satisfy us that the meetings of 11-6-57 and 23-8-57 were held in accordance with law.

    15. We, therefore, see no reason to allow this application and it is dismissed with costs to Bhagwandas Taparia.

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    Comments

    Ganga Dutt v. Bhagwandas Taparia
    (Dec 9, 1957)