Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff instituted a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale concerning agricultural land (Khasra No. 123). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant agreed to sell the land for Rs. 17,000, of which Rs. 15,201 was paid in cash and the balance was to be paid on registration of the sale deed. The defendant failed to execute the sale deed, prompting the plaintiff to file the suit. The defendant denied the agreement of sale and claimed that the land was mortgaged to the plaintiff in samvat year 2031-32 for Rs. 14,500, with possession delivered to the plaintiff. The defendant asserted that the mortgage deed was recorded in the plaintiff's Bahi (account book) and was to be redeemed after five years. Upon expiry, the defendant sought possession back but was unsuccessful and filed an application to recover possession. The plaintiff allegedly fabricated the sale agreement to defeat this suit.

During trial, the defendant applied for production of the mortgage deed, which the plaintiff denied existed. Subsequently, the defendant sought permission to adduce secondary evidence to prove the mortgage deed. The plaintiff objected, arguing the mortgage deed was unstamped and unregistered, and thus secondary evidence was inadmissible under the Stamp Act and Registration Act. The trial court allowed the defendant's application under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. The plaintiff filed a revision against this order, which was heard ex parte due to the defendant's absence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the defendant to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of an alleged mortgage deed that was unstamped and unregistered.
  2. Whether secondary evidence is admissible when the original document is not duly stamped as required under the Stamp Act.
  3. Whether the existence of the original mortgage deed must be established before secondary evidence of its contents can be admitted.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The trial court committed material illegality by allowing secondary evidence without determining the existence of the alleged mortgage deed.
  • The mortgage deed was allegedly recorded in the plaintiff's Bahi and was unstamped and unregistered, making it inadmissible.
  • Permitting secondary evidence to prove an unstamped mortgage deed violates the Stamp Act and Registration Act provisions.
  • Reliance was placed on Section 65 of the Evidence Act and Section 35 of the Stamp Act, as well as various precedents, to argue that secondary evidence cannot be admitted for unstamped documents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Champa Lal v. Panna Lal Contents of a document required to be stamped cannot be proved by secondary evidence if unstamped or insufficiently stamped. Supported the principle that original unstamped documents cannot be validated by secondary evidence.
Mool Chand v. Laxman Section 36 Stamp Act applies only when the unstamped instrument itself is produced; secondary evidence cannot be admitted if the original is not produced. Confirmed that secondary evidence is inadmissible when the original unstamped document is not produced.
Kartar Singh v. Mohinder Singh Secondary evidence is not permitted for documents inadmissible in evidence, such as unstamped rent notes executed in Bahi. Court declined permission to admit secondary evidence of an unstamped document executed in Bahi.
Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Section 35 of the Stamp Act bars admission of unstamped instruments and their secondary evidence unless the original is before the court and deficiency is remedied. Held that secondary evidence cannot substitute for the original unstamped document; proviso applies only when original is produced.
Poonamchand v. Moti Lal Before admitting secondary evidence, the existence of the original document must be established. Reinforced that secondary evidence requires prior proof of the document's existence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the provisions of Chapter V of the Evidence Act, particularly Sections 64 and 65, which regulate proof of documents. Section 64 establishes the rule that primary evidence (original document) is required except in certain cases where secondary evidence may be allowed under Section 65. However, Section 65 mandates proof of the document's existence before secondary evidence is admissible.

The court found that the trial court failed to determine whether the alleged mortgage deed existed, despite the plaintiff's categorical denial. This omission rendered the impugned order legally flawed.

Further, the mortgage deed was alleged to have been executed in the plaintiff's Bahi on unstamped paper, making it unstamped and unregistered. Section 35 of the Stamp Act prohibits admitting any instrument chargeable with duty unless duly stamped. The proviso allowing admission of unstamped instruments upon payment of duty and penalty applies only when the original document is produced before the court.

Since the original mortgage deed was not produced and was unstamped, the proviso was inapplicable. Consequently, secondary evidence to prove such a document’s contents is inadmissible. The court relied on precedents to affirm that secondary evidence cannot be admitted in respect of unstamped documents not produced in original form.

Thus, the court concluded that permitting secondary evidence in these circumstances was illegal and required correction.

Holding and Implications

The revision is allowed and the impugned order dated August 4, 1984, permitting secondary evidence to prove the mortgage deed is set aside.

The defendant's application dated April 16, 1984, for permission to produce secondary evidence is dismissed. No order as to costs was made.

This decision directly affects the parties by invalidating the trial court’s permission to admit secondary evidence of the unstamped mortgage deed and does not establish any new precedent beyond reaffirming existing principles regarding documentary evidence and stamp duty compliance.

    Ram Pratap v. Nar Singh Lal (43)

    S.S Byas, J.:— This is a plaintiff's revision against an order of the Addl. District Judge, Baran dated 4.8.1984 by which the defendant's application under Section 65 of the Evidence Act was allowed and he was permitted to adduce secondary evidence to prove a mortgage.

    2. Stated in short; the relevant facts are that the plaintiff instituted a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale pertaining to Khasra No. 123 comprising an area of 16.3 bighas. It was alleged that on 24.5.1980 the defendant entered into agreement with him to sell his aforesaid agriculture land to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 17,000/-. A sum of Rs. 15,201/- was paid by the Page: 134plaintiff to the defendant in cash on that every day and the remaining amount of Rs. 1,799/. was agreed to be paid at the time of the registration of the sale deed. The defendant did not turn up for execution of the sale deed. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit for the specific performance of the agreement of sale in the court of the Addl. District Judge, Baran. The suit was resisted by the defendant. He denied to have made any agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. He came out altogether with another story and alleged that he had mortgaged Khasra No. 123 with the plaintiff in samvat year 2031-32 for a sum of Rs. 14,500/- and delivered its possession on the same day to the plaintiff. It was further averred that he (defendant) had executed the mortgage deed in the Bahi of the plaintiff. The mortgage was to be redeemed on the expiry of 5 years. On the expiry of 5 years, the defendant approached the plaintiff to relieve Khasra No. 123 from the mortgage and deliver its possession back to him. The attempt proved abortive. He then submitted an application in the court of the Assistant Collector to recover possession over the aforesaid field. In order to defeat that suit pending in the court of the Assistant Collector, the plaintiff has invented and fabricated the false story of the agreement of sale. The trial court framed the necessary issues. The plaintiff adduced the evidence and his evidence was completed. The case was then fixed for the defendant's evidence. The defendant submitted an application in the trial court on 17.2.84 for issuing notice to the plaintiff to produce the mortgage deed alleged to have been scribed and written in his Bahi. The plaintiff denied the existence of any such document in his Bahi and categorically stated that no such document was ever scribed, written or executed by the defendant in his favour. The defendant there after submitted an application on 16.4.1984 in the trial court praying permission to lead secondary evidence to prove the mortgage deed alleged to have been written in the plaintiff's Bahi. The plaintiff in his reply denied the existence of any such document in his Bahi-He also raised objections that since the alleged mortgage deed was not scribed or written on the stamp paper of requisite value, no secondary evidence could be permitted to be addued to prove it in view of the provisions of the Stamp Act and the Registration Act. The ttial court heard the parties and by the impugned order, allowed the defendant's application as indicated at the very outset. Aggrieved, the plaintiff has come up in revision. Despite serviee of notice on the defendant, nobody appeared on his behalf. As such the revision was heard exparte against him. 1 have heard Mr. R.R.L Gupta learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned order.

    3. It was strenuously contended by Mr. Gupta that the court below has acted with material illegality in permitting the defendant to lead secondary evidence in proof of the alleged mortgage deed. The court below has not determined the existence of the alleged mortgage deed. The mortgage deed even according to the averments of the defendant was scribed and written in a Bahi. The document was thus unstamped and unregistered. When the original document is executed on a paper without stamps of the requisite value, no se condary evidence can be permitted to prove its execution. Permitting a party to adduce secondary evidence in proof of an unstamped mortgage deed would defeat the provisions of the Stams Act and the Registration Act. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on Sec. 65 of the Evidence Act and Sec: 35 of the Stamp Act. Reliance was also placed on Champa Lal v. Panna Lal (1), Mool Chand v. Laxman (2), Kartar Singh v. Mohinder Singh (3) and Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata (4). I have bestowed my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by Mr. Gupta. The contentions raised by him have considerable force. The matter may be a examined at some length.

    4. Chapter V of the Evidence Act pertains to documentary evidence and lays down the rules in respect of the proof of documents. Sec. 64 of the Evidence Act speaks that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or Page: 135by secondary evidence. Sec. 64 lays down that documents may be proved by primary evidence except in the cases mentioned therein. Sec. 65 relates to the cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given. Sec. 64 lays down the cardinal rule of evidence that the party should produce the best evidence to prove the contents of a document. Sec. 65 lays that where the original document is not forth-coming, secondary evidence to prove its contents may be permitted to be adduced. Sec 65 starts with the words that the secondary evidence may be given to prove the existence condition or contents of a document. This section makes it amply clear that before secondary evidence of a document can be let in, the existence of the document should be proved. If the existence of the document in question has not been proved, permission to lead secondary evidence of its contents cannot be given. I am fortified in my view by a Division Bench decision rendered by this court in Poonamchand v. Moti Lal (5).

    5. Unfortunately in the instant case, the court below has not at all decided the question whether any mortgage deed existed as alleged by the defendant. A specific object was raised by the plaintiff categorically denying the existence of any mortgage deed in his Bahi. Jt is lamentable that despite a specific objection raised by the plaintiff about the non-existence of the mortgage deed, the Addl. District Judge did not at all deal with it. This makes the impugned order bad in law.

    6. Admittedly, according to the defendant himself, the mortgage deed was written or scribed of executed in the Bahi of the plaintiff. It was unstamped and unregistered. The court below has also recorded a finding that the alleged mortgage deed was unstamped and unregistered. Otherwise too, a mortgage deed scribed in the Bahi in always on a non-stamped paper.

    7. The clinching issue before me is whether secondary evidence can be permitted to prove the contents of mortgage deed which has not been written or scribed on stamp papers of requisite value.

    8. Section 35 of the Stamp Act 1899 clearly lays down that-no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose unless such instrument is duly stamped. The proviso appended to it lays down that such an unstamped instrument may be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty and penalty as mentioned therein. Now the duty can be levied only on the original document. If the original document is not on the stamp, the duty and penalty mentioned in the proviso of Section 35 of the Act cannot be charged, collected or levied. If the document is not on stamp paper and the duty cannot be charged, collected or levied for one reason or the other, no secondary evidence can be permitted to prove its contents. The law contained in Sec. 35 of the Stamp Act forbids the letting of any secondary evidence in prooff of its contents.

    9. In Champa Lal's case (supra), the view expressed is as under;

    “It is settledlaw that the contents of a document which is required to be executed on a, stamp, if not stamped or is insufficiently stamped cannot be proved by secondary evidence 26 I.A 262, (The Rajaji of Bobbili v. Inuganti China Sitarasami Guru). It is the original document which, if stamped or insufficiently stamped, can be validated by payment of stamp duty and penalty under S. 35 of the Stamp Act.”

    10. In Moolchand's case (supra), it was observed;

    “The contents of a document which is required to be executed on a stamp, if not stamped, cannot be proved by secondary evidence. Section 36 Stamps Act, is applicable only when an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument has to be admitted in evidence but where the instrument it self is not produced, the section has no application to the secondary evidence.”

    11. In Kartar Singh's case (supra), the rent note was alleged to have been executed in Bahi. It was thus, on a plain paper and not on the stamp paper of requisite value. Permission was sought to prove its contents by secondary evidence. As it was not forth-coming, the permission was declined and it was observed;,

    “It is undisputed that no secondary evidence can be permitted to be led regarding a document., which itself is not admissible in evidence. The alleged rent note in the Bahi of the plaintiff, undoubtedly, required Stamp duty. According to Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped. There are certain exceptions given in this section, but the present case is not covered by any of them. That being so, the alleged rent note was inadmissible in evidence. If the alleged original is itself inadmissible in evidence, then no secondary evidence regarding its contents can under the; law, be given.”

    12. In Jupudi Kesava Rao's case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under;

    “The first limb of Section 35 clearly shuts out from evidence any instrument chargeable with duty unless it is duly stamped. The second limb of it which relates to acting upon the instrument will obviously shutout any secondary evidence of such instrument, for allowing such evidence to be let in when the original admittedly chargeable with duty was not stamped or insufficiently stamped, would be tenamount to the document being acted upon by the person having by law or authority to receive evidence. Proviso (a) is only applicable when the original instrument is actually before the court of law and the deficiency in stamp with penalty is paid by the party seeking to rely upon the document. Clearly secondary evidence either by way of oral evidence of the contents of the unstamped document or the copy of it covered by Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act would not fulfil the requirements of the proviso which enjoins upon the authority to receive nothing in evidence except the instrument itself.”

    13. The law on the point may be crystallized thus that a party seeking leave to prove the contents of a document must first establish (1) the existence of that document and (2) its admissibility is otherwise not forbidden by the provision of any law. Where the original document is inadmissible as being not duly stamped, secondary evidence of its contents cannot be allowed to be recei-. ved. The proviso contain in Sec. 35 of the Stamp Act is applicable only where the original document is there before the court. This proviso contained in Section 35 of the Stamp Act has no applicability in a case where the original document is not before the court. Here in the instant case the alleged mortgage deed is said to have been executed in the plaintiff's Bahi. It was thus alleged to have been executed on a blank paper and not on the stamp paper of requisite value. It is not forthcoming and has not been produced in the court. The proviso contained in Sec. 35 of the Stamp Act has no applicability and the defect cannot be cured by charging, collecting or levying any penalty. Therefore, in such a situation permission cannot be given to adduce secondary evidence to prove its contents. The court below committed an illegality in permitting the defendant to let in the secondary evidence to prove its contents. This error on the part of the court below requires correction.

    14. In the result, the revision is allowed and the impugned order of the learned Addl. District Judge, Baran dated August 4, 1984 is set aside. The defen dant's application dated 16.4.1984 for permission to produce secondary evidence shall stand dismissed. No order for costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ram Pratap v. Nar Singh Lal (43)
    (Jul 26, 1988)