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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Braund, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a first appeal from a decree of the Second Civil Judge of Gorakhpur delivered on 19 July 1935. The underlying litigation is a mortgage suit involving a series of transactions affecting two one-anna shares in property in the village of Madhopur.

Key chronological facts (as pleaded and found in the opinion):

  • 26 March 1913 — Lala Batuk Sahai (first defendant) executed a mortgage of two one-anna shares in favour of Sheikh Muhammad Husain, to secure Rs. 2,000 and interest (the opinion notes the real mortgagee was Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin Sahib).
  • 15 June 1914 — Lala Batuk Sahai executed a second mortgage of the same two one-anna shares in favour of the appellant, Lala Himmat Sahai (fourth defendant).
  • 14 May 1915 — The mortgagor sold one of the two one-anna shares to Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin (document Ex. 12). The deed made no express reference to the 1913 mortgage and recited a cash consideration of Rs. 1,500 (Rs. 400 paid earlier and Rs. 1,100 on registration) and declared the purchaser absolute owner of that share.
  • 1920 — Two further mortgages affected the remaining one-anna share.
  • 22 July 1925 — A further mortgage (the 1925 mortgage) was executed by Lala Batuk Sahai (with his son added as co-mortgagor) reciting the 1913 mortgage and acknowledging the debt then due (Rs. 3,300 plus expenses) and charging the remaining one-anna share; this instrument is described as a renewal of the 1913 mortgage.

Plaintiffs are four children of Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin (deceased). Defendants include the mortgagors and various mortgagees: the appellant (fourth defendant) is mortgagee under the 1914 mortgage; the fifth defendant is mortgagee under 1920 and 1925 mortgages. The plaintiffs sued to enforce the 1925 mortgage (seeking a mortgage decree for sale of the one-anna share comprised therein) and claimed the full outstanding sum (pleaded as Rs. 5,250).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the earlier mortgage of 26 March 1913 can be deemed to have been kept alive so as to protect the plaintiffs (and their predecessors) against the appellant's 1914 mortgage and other intervening encumbrances.
  2. Assuming the 1913 mortgage is kept alive, whether the sale of one one-anna share on 14 May 1915 to the mortgagee extinguished a pro rata portion of the mortgage debt (so that plaintiffs could not properly claim the whole outstanding debt against the remaining one-anna share), or whether the plaintiffs could claim the full amount under the 1925 mortgage.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Contentions

  • The plaintiffs sued to enforce the 1925 mortgage and claimed the full outstanding principal and interest (pleaded as Rs. 5,250) as chargeable on the one-anna share comprised in the 1925 mortgage.
  • The plaint also pleaded that the 1925 mortgage was a renewal of the 1913 mortgage and that the 1913 mortgage had been kept alive; thus plaintiffs relied on the continued existence of the 1913 mortgage as protection against intervening encumbrances.

Fourth Defendant (Appellant)'s Contentions

  • First, the appellant claimed that his 1914 mortgage had priority over the plaintiffs' 1925 mortgage.
  • Second (and centrally), the appellant argued that the 14 May 1915 sale of one of the two one-anna shares to the mortgagee extinguished pro rata part of the mortgage debt — i.e., that by purchasing the equity of redemption as to that share the mortgagee extinguished half the mortgage debt so that only the balance could be charged against the remaining one-anna share.
  • The appellant also argued it would be unfair and impermissible for the plaintiffs to throw the whole original mortgage debt onto the remaining share, thereby burdening the appellant (a second mortgagee of that remaining share) to twice the extent previously borne.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bisheshur Dial v. Ram Sarup (1900) I.L.R 22 All. 284 Recognizes that when a mortgagee purchases part of the mortgaged property, a proportionate part of the mortgage debt is ordinarily extinguished by fusion of interests; it rejects valuative approaches that would allow extinguishment more than the proportion of property purchased. The court treated this case as illustrating the normal rule that purchase by the mortgagee of part of the mortgaged property ordinarily wipes out a corresponding portion of the mortgage debt. The judge found the case not directly determinative here but acknowledged it supports the principle of pro rata extinguishment.
Jasodha Kumar Dey v. Kali Kumar Dey A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 619 States the principle that if a mortgagee purchases only the equity of redemption he must allow proportionate reduction of the mortgage debt; but if the purchase is of the entire interest free from encumbrances, the mortgage debt is not extinguished proportionately. The court relied on this decision as a clearer illustration of the principle and as support for treating the issue as one of fact (whether the mortgagee bought only the equity of redemption or the entire interest). It adopted the line that the burden is on the mortgagee to show special circumstances when he seeks to enforce the entire debt after purchasing part.
Lakhmidas v. Jamnadas (1896) I.L.R 22 Bom. 304 (Referenced as a leading Full Bench authority followed by Bisheshur Dial) Supports the principle applied in Bisheshur Dial regarding proportionate reduction when mortgagee purchases part. Cited (indirectly) through Bisheshur Dial as part of the body of authorities establishing the governing principle; used to show consistency of authority.
Krishna Chandra Bhoumik v. Pabna Model Company Ltd. (1931) I.L.R 59 Cal. 76 Affirms the same legal principle as the Calcutta decisions: proportionate extinguishment unless the circumstances show a purchase free from encumbrances. The court cited it as further confirmation that courts treat the question as one of fact and that the ordinary consequence of a mortgagee purchasing part is pro rata extinguishment unless a contrary bargain or circumstance appears.
Gokaldas Gopaldas v. Puranmal Premsukhdas (1884) I.L.R 10 Cal. 1035 Affirms that equitable principles derived from English law regarding keeping securities alive are applicable in India; directs attention to intention of party paying off the charge (whether to extinguish or keep it alive). The court invoked this Privy Council-recognized authority to support the proposition that the 1913 mortgage could be kept alive by the later 1925 instrument as a matter of equity and intention, and as an accepted rule of Indian law.
Adams v. Angell (1877) 5 Ch.D. 634 Establishes the equitable doctrine that a later document may keep an earlier security alive as a pro tanto protection; used for the principle that a renewal can preserve prior security for protection against intervening encumbrances. The court applied this principle (and treated it as affirmed for India) to hold that the 1913 mortgage remained on foot as a pro tanto protection to the mortgagee of 1925 against intervening encumbrances; the 1925 deed amounted to a renewal/acknowledgment.
Gopal Chunder Sreemany v. Herembo Chunder Holdar (I.L.R 16 Cal. 523) Illustrates proper pleading and form of decree where a party relies on both earlier and later mortgages; shows the decree should enforce the earlier mortgage primarily and the later to the extent necessary. The court relied on this case to justify granting relief based effectively on the 1913 mortgage (kept alive) even though the plaint formally sought relief under the 1925 mortgage; it instructed a decree in the form outlined in that case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands corresponding to the two central issues.

1. Whether the 1915 sale extinguished part of the mortgage debt

  1. The court framed the core factual-factual legal inquiry as whether the 1915 purchase by the mortgagee must be taken to have involved any part of the mortgage money as part of the purchase consideration — in other words, whether the mortgagee purchased merely the equity of redemption or the entire unencumbered interest free from encumbrances.
  2. The court surveyed authority (including Bisheshur Dial, Jasodha Kumar Dey and related Calcutta decisions) and distilled the governing principle: where a mortgagee purchases part only of the mortgaged property, the normal rule is that a pro rata portion of the mortgage debt is extinguished unless the circumstances show the mortgagee bought the entire interest free from encumbrances or there was a special bargain to that effect.
  3. The judge emphasized that the inquiry is essentially one of fact: did the purchase price or surrounding circumstances indicate that the mortgagee took account of his existing mortgagor interest (i.e., effectively allowed the mortgagor the benefit of an extinguishment), or did he pay as if buying a free unencumbered interest?
  4. Applying that test to the evidence, the court found the evidence "very scanty" and observed there was "not a syllable" to show the purchase of 14 May 1915 was anything other than an ordinary purchase of the equity of redemption. The deed (Ex. 12) made no reference to the existing mortgage, and the entire Rs. 1,500 was paid in cash, but there was no evidence that the mortgagee paid with any allowance for the outstanding mortgage debt or that there was a special bargain.
  5. The judge concluded that the burden lay heavily on the mortgagee/plaintiff to show that no part of the mortgage debt was extinguished, and that burden had not been discharged. Accordingly, the court held that, at least as between the parties and on the assumption the 1913 mortgage remained in force, only a pro rata extinguishment (half) of the 1913 secured principal should be credited to the purchaser date.
  6. The court further found the appellant’s equitable argument persuasive: it would be inequitable to allow the plaintiffs to throw the entire original mortgage debt on to the remaining share to the detriment of the appellant who had taken his mortgage in 1914 upon the expectation that each one-anna share bore its rateable portion of the first mortgage.

2. Whether the 1913 mortgage was kept alive by the 1925 instrument

  1. The court treated this question as straightforward in principle: it relied on established equitable doctrines (recognized in India via Privy Council and English authority) that a later instrument can evidence an intention to keep an earlier security alive as a matter of equity, justice and good conscience.
  2. The 1925 mortgage recited the 1913 mortgage, acknowledged the debt, and expressly stated a renewed obligation and charge — facts from which the court ascribed the intention to keep the older mortgage alive. The judge referred to Gokaldas Gopaldas v. Puranmal Premsukhdas and the principle in Adams v. Angell to hold the 1913 mortgage remained on foot as a pro tanto protection to the mortgagee of 1925, particularly as it benefitted that mortgagee to keep the prior security alive to guard against intervening encumbrances.
  3. Two ancillary objections were considered and rejected on the facts: limitation (the court found no issue under Limitation Act because of the 1925 acknowledgment) and the objection that the 1925 mortgage covered only one one-anna share whereas the 1913 mortgage originally covered two; the court held that as a practical matter the 1913 mortgage already covered only the one remaining one-anna share by virtue of the 1915 sale, and in any event taking a later mortgage covering part of the same security can keep alive the previous mortgage.

3. Pleading and form of relief

The court observed a technical pleading issue: the plaint formally sought relief only under the 1925 mortgage, while the plaintiffs had in fact relied on the continued existence of the 1913 mortgage. The court held that, although the plaint's formal relief was limited, paragraph (4) clearly pleaded the continued existence and renewal of the 1913 mortgage. The defect in form did not mislead the appellant, and equity required that plaintiffs be given the relief to which they were entitled in substance. Relying on Gopal Chunder Sreemany, the judge indicated the proper decree should enforce the prior mortgage primarily and the later mortgage to the extent necessary.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court allowed the appeal in part, set aside the decree of the lower court and directed a new decree to be drawn in accordance with the directions in the judgment. Specifically:

  • The court declared that by virtue of the sale dated 14 May 1915 (Ex. 12) the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 17–23 (as mortgagees) are entitled to enforce the security constituted by the mortgages dated 26 March 1913 and 22 July 1925 only after giving credit, as from 14 May 1915, for the principal sum of Rs. 1,000 (being half the principal secured on the 26 March 1913 mortgage) together with interest proportionate to that principal sum.
  • The court next declared that, subject to that credit, the plaintiffs are entitled to a mortgage decree for the balance of principal and interest claimed by them in respect of the 1913 and 1925 mortgages in priority to all subsequent encumbrances created after 22 July 1925, on the footing that the 1913 mortgage was kept alive by the 1925 mortgage.
  • The remainder of the decree is to be a preliminary mortgage decree and the proper form is the one outlined in Gopal Chunder Sreemany v. Herembo Chunder Holdar; the court directed a new decree be drawn up accordingly.
  • There was no order as to costs in either court below or in the present appeal.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Plaintiffs obtain a mortgage decree in priority to encumbrances arising after 22 July 1925, but must give credit for half the 1913 principal (Rs. 1,000) plus proportionate interest from 14 May 1915. The appellant (second mortgagee of the remaining one-anna share) succeeds to the extent that the plaintiffs cannot charge more than the balance after that credit; the appellant therefore achieves a partial vindication of his contention regarding pro rata extinguishment.
  • The court did not announce any new legal principle but applied and reconciled existing equitable rules: (a) where a mortgagee purchases part of the mortgaged property, a proportional extinguishment of the mortgage debt is ordinarily warranted absent evidence of a purchase free from encumbrances or a different bargain; and (b) a later mortgage may keep a prior mortgage alive as a pro tanto protection if the circumstances and instrument indicate such an intention. The judgment directs that pleadings should reflect the substantive claim (i.e., reliance on both earlier and later securities) though relief will be granted in substance despite a drafting defect.

If any difficulty arises in drawing up the decree in accordance with these directions, the case may be restored to the judge's list for settling the decree.

    Himmat Sahai v. Muhammad Moin

    Braund, J.:— This is a first appeal from a decree of the Second Civil Judge of Gorakhpur delivered on the 19th of July, 1935-rather over five years ago.

    The suit was a mortgage suit and the circumstances are a trifle complicated. On the 26th of March, 1913, Lala Batuk Sahai, who is the first defendant to the suit, executed a mortgage of two one-anna shares in a certain property in the village of Madhopur in favour of one Sheikh Muhammad Husain, to secure a principal sum of Rs. 2,000 and interest thereon. I do not know why the mortgage was taken in the name of Sheikh Muhammad Husain as the mortgagee, but it is admitted for the purpose of the present suit that the real mortgagee was one Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin Sahib, the brother of Muhammad Husain.

    The next event in the order of date is that on the 15th of June, 1914, the same mortgagor, Lala Batuk Sahai, executed a second mortgage of the same two one-anna shares in favour of the present appellant, Page: 222Lala Himmat Sahai who is the fourth defendant to the suit. It covered all the sir and khudkasht lands which had been mortgaged under the mortgage of 1913.

    The next thing that happened was that on the 14th of May, 1915, the mortgagor, Lala Batuk Sahai, sold to the mortgagee, Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin Sahib, one of the two one-anna shares which was subject to the mortgage of 1913. It is the effect of this transaction which constitutes the bone of contention in this suit and it is necessary, therefore, that I should refer to its contents a little carefully. The document is before me as Ex. 12. In form, it makes no reference at all to the mortgage of 1913 and on its face might be referring to an unencumbered property. It begins by setting out certain reasons why the mortgagor desired to raise money and it goes on to explain that he has for these reasons “made a sale and permanent transfer of a one anna” share in the zamindari in question to Sheikh Muhammad Mohsin in consideration of the payment of Rs. 1,500 in cash by the purchaser to him, Rs. 400 of which was paid on or before the execution of the deed and a further Rs. 1,100 at the time of its registration. He went on to say: “From this day I have ceased to have any concern with the share and land sold and the said vendee has become and shall continue to be the absolute and permanent owner in possession thereof. I, the executant, or my heirs neither have nor shall have any concern with the ownership or possession of the property….”

    Finally, he acknowledges the receipt of the full amount of the consideration in cash.

    So much, therefore, for the sale of 1915 of one out of the two one-anna shares mortgaged by the mortgages of 1913 and 1914. In the year 1920 there were two further mortgages, one in favour of “the fifth defendant, Sheikh Kariman, and the other one in Page: 223favour of somebody else, which is now vested in Sheikh Kariman also. Those mortgages affected the remaining one-anna share only.

    Finally, on the 22nd of July, 1925, came the further mortgage which is the one which has given rise directly to this suit. It is a simple mortgage by the same mortgagor, Lala Batuk Sahai together with his son who this time is added as co-mortgagor. Nothing, however, turns upon that. It begins by reciting the mortgage of the 26th of March, 1913, under which Rs. 2,000 had been borrowed. I should perhaps have said at an earlier stage that it was a term of the 1913 mortgage that the principal money and interest secured thereby should not become payable for a period of three years. It goes on to recite that the principal and interest under the 1913 mortgage had become due, and it says: “As the period stipulated therein was for three years, which has expired, and the debt could not be paid as yet, and as repeated demands are being made on behalf of the creditor and I have got no money to pay and thereby redeem my share, we the extenuates, on our admission of the liability of the debt above mentioned, have made the creditor agreeable to change the document…”

    It then goes on to explain, in effect, that the principal and interest due on the 1913 mortgage amounted to Rs. 3,300 and it proceeded, in the form of a fresh mortgage, to charge the remaining one-anna share with payment of that sum of Rs. 3,300 together with a further sum of Rs. 40, which may, I think, be taken to represent the expenses of the transaction. The operative part of the deed actually says: “Accordingly both of us, the executants, have, of our free will and accord, changed the former document, and having added the present amount of debt therein, covenant that we shall pay up in full the amount of Rs. 3,340 to Sheikh Muhammad Mohsin, son of Sheikh Muhammad Gada Husain, deceased, resident of mohalla Nizampur, Page: 224Gorakhpur, within the period of three years without any hesitation, that till the payment the same rate of interest, i.e, 8 annas per cent, per mensem, shall be charged, and that in lieu of the principal amount and interest our one-anna zamindari share in the partitioned mahal No. 2, with all the rights, situate in mauza Madhopur… shall stand, as before, mortgaged and hypothecated.”

    Those were the materials upon which the suit was brought. The plaintiffs are four of the children of Maulvi Muhammad Mohsin Sahib who had died in the meantime. The defendants Nos. 17-23 inclusive are his remaining children and between them, it is admitted that they are entitled to all his rights as mortgagee in the property mortgaged by the mortgage of 1925, and the mortgage of 1913, so far as the latter is still in existence and capable of taking effect. The first defendant is the original mortgagor under the 1913 mortgage and one of the two mortgagors under the 1925 mortgage, while the second defendant, Lala Adya Prasad, is the other of the two mortgagors under the 1925 mortgage. The third defendant is an infant child of the second defendant who is said to have acquired an interest in the property. The fourth defendant, who is the appellant in this case, is the mortgagee under the mortgage of 1914 and it is with his interest in the property that this appeal is directly concerned. The fifth defendant is the mortgagee under the mortgages of 1920 and 1925 and he stands or falls by the decision, whatever it may be, in respect of the fourth defendant. There are other defendants but it is not necessary for me to deal with them in any way.

    Now, to put the matter as simply as it can be put, the plaintiffs have brought this suit in the form of a suit to enforce the mortgage of 1925 by asking for a mortgage decree for sale of the one-anna share which is comprised in it. They have been met by the Page: 225contention of the fourth defendant, who is the appellant before me, first that his mortgage of 1914 has priority over the mortgage of 1925 and secondly that, whether that is so or not, the effect of the sale of the one-anna share under the transfer of the 14th of May, 1915, was, not only to take that one-anna share out of the security, but to extinguish half of the mortgage debt. The purpose of the plaintiffs in this suit is to obtain a mortgage decree against the one-anna share comprised in the mortgage of 1925 in respect of the whole amount of the principal and interest, which had been brought forward from the mortgage of 1913, of which the mortgage of 1925 was a renewal, together with the additional Rs. 40. As I have explained, the fourth defendant contends that, as against him it is impossible in the circumstances of this case, even assuming that the 1913 mortgage is still on foot in the sense that it can serve as a protection against his mortgage of 1914, for the mortgagee to contend that the whole of the mortgage money and interest secured by the 1913 mortgage is still outstanding. On the contrary, he says, the effect of the sale in 1915 was to extinguish so much of it as was proportionate to the value of the share sold and that, upon any footing, there can only now remain due, and there can only be a preliminary mortgage decree in respect of the balance. The two principal issues, therefore, in this appeal are first whether the mortgage of 1913 can be deemed to have been kept alive at all so as to serve the present plaintiffs as a protection from the appellant's mortgage of 1914 and secondly whether, even if it can, it is open to the plaintiffs to claim a mortgage decree in respect of the whole of the outstanding amount of principal and interest secured by the 1925 mortgage.

    At that point I propose to refer to the plaint. Now it must be admitted at once that, so far as the actual particulars of the mortgage contained in paragraph (2) are concerned, the plaint is only founded upon the Page: 226mortgage of 1925 and so far as the actual relief is “concerned, I think that in form it must be taken actually to ask only for relief under the 1925 mortgaged. The plaint begins by stating that the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos. 17-23 inclusive are the mortgagees of the property and by paragraph No. (2) it sets out the relevant particulars of the 1925 mortgage expressing the mortgaged property to be a one-anna share comprised therein. The actual amount of the principal and interest alleged to be outstanding is the sum of Rs. 5,250.

    Paragraph (3) deals with those of the defendants who are said to be “subsequent transferees” which includes the appellant in this appeal.

    Paragraph (4) is, however, important and I propose to set it out in full: “4. First of all, under a hypothecation deed, dated the 26th of March, 1913, defendant No. 1 borrowed Rs. 2,000 and mortgaged his two-anna share in mauza Madhopur. Out of the two-anna share mortgaged, he sold, under a sale deed dated the 14th of May, 1915, his one-anna share for Rs. 1,500 in cash, to the father of the plaintiffs. Only a one-anna share remained mortgaged under the former bond, which having been renewed and the mortgage debt due under it having been kept alive, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 executed the hypothecation bond, dated the 22nd of July, 1925, sued on, in favour of the father of the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 17 to 23. Accordingly the entire burden of the former debt has, according to law, fallen on this one-anna share, mentioned in the bond, dated the 22nd of July, 1925. The plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 17 to 23 are competent to realise their amount of debt from this one-anna share. The period stipulated in the bond sued on was three years which has elapsed. In spite of repeated demands, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 or any other defendant has, not paid (it) till now, hence this suit.”

    Now that quite plainly pleads not only the existence of the 1913 mortgage, but also that the 1925 mortgage was a renewal of it and that it was the intention of the parties that the 1913 mortgage should be kept alive. It is, I think, important to realise that, because of the suggestion which has been made and with which I shall have to deal in due course that inasmuch as the plaintiff actually only asks for relief under the 1925 mortgage he cannot be heard in any way to set up the 1913 mortgage and to claim relief which involves, in substance, treating that mortgage as still alive. I point out at this stage that whatever the form of the plaint may be and in whatever form the relief has been asked for, paragraph (4) in substance and in fact does plead and does rely upon the continued existence of the 1913 mortgage.

    Those are the facts, and I propose first to deal with the appellant's contention that upon any footing only a proportion of the mortgage money secured by the mortgage of 1913, and now incorporated in the mortgage of 1925, can be deemed to be outstanding because of the sale in 1915. For this purpose I am for the moment assuming that the 1913 mortgage was kept alive. To put it shortly, what the appellant says is that, when the one-anna share was purchased by the mortgagee on the 14th of May, 1915, for Rs. 1,500 in cash, what the mortgagee was purchasing was the equity of redemption in that one-anna share and that, accordingly, there was, not only a merger of the mortgage in the security in respect of that share, but that there was an extinguishment of a pro rata portion of the mortgage debt. To put that in other words, he says that the consideration for the purchase of the unencumbered one-anna share was not only the sum of Rs. 1,500 in cash but also the extinguishment of a portion of the principal and interest secured, on the mortgage. Page: 228I may say at this stage that it is common ground that the whole of that Rs. 1,500 was paid in cash.

    There have been a number of authorities which have dealt with this and similar questions. I do not propose to refer to many of them but there are a few with which I must deal and the first of them is the Full Bench case of Bisheshur Dial v. Ram Sarup (1900) I.L.R 22 All. 284. I do not myself think that this case has any particular relevance to the actual question before me. In this case there was a mortgage of the year 1885 in favour of the plaintiffs of the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest to secure a sum of Rs. 1,000. In 1893 a decree-holder who had a decree against the mortgagor put up the property for sale in execution and one-half of it was sold, being purchased by the plaintiffs, who were the mortgagees, for Rs. 1,500. Now in that case it was, as I read the report, admitted by the mortgagees that their mortgage debt was extinguished to the extent of one-half. The real point in the case was that it was said against them that their mortgage was extinguished, not only to the extent of one-half, but to the extent of the whole, upon the ground, as I think, that the half which they had actually purchased was in fact worth a sum equal to the whole of the principal and interest due upon their mortgage and, therefore, they must be taken to have received the whole of it. The judgment in this case is concerned in pointing out the fallacy of that. What it establishes is that in assessing what part of the mortgage debt must be deemed to be satisfied you must have regard only to the value of the proportion of the mortgaged property sold to the value of the whole of the mortgaged, property and not to the actual circumstance that what the mortgagee purchased was, or may be, in fact sufficient to satisfy the whole or some particular part of what was due to him under the mortgage. I have dealt with this case because it has Page: 229been freely relied upon in argument, but I do not myself think that it really deals with the same point as that with which I am concerned in this appeal. On the contrary, it appears to admit, upon the facts of the case, the very point which is in issue in this case. Its only relevance to this case is that it does appear to recognize that the normal rule is that where a mortgagee is found to have purchased part of the mortgaged property and thus “the rights of the mortgagee and the mortgagor, as regards the portion purchased, become vested in the same person” the result is “that a part of the mortgage debt is wiped out by reason of the fusion of interests and the balance only is recoverable from the remainder of the mortgaged property.” (Vide page 290.)

    A case, however, which illustrates much better the point to be determined here is Jasodha Kumar Dey v. Kali Kumar Dey A.I.R 1930 Cal. 619. In that case the defendant appellant had mortgaged five properties in favour of the plaintiff. Subsequently he sold one of those properties to the plaintiff mortgagee for Rs. 200. On the same day the plaintiff mortgagee conveyed to the mortgagor another piece of land belonging to him for the same sum of Rs. 200. The plaintiff mortgagee then brought a suit against the defendant to recover the entire mortgage debt out of the remaining four pieces of property. In other words, he contended that no part of the mortgage debt had been extinguished by the purchase by him of the piece of land for Rs. 200. The defendant, on the other hand, contended that the mortgagee was bound to allow him a proportionate reduction, the proportion being such an amount of the mortgage debt as was equal to the proportion in value of the land sold to the whole of the mortgaged property. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court, who heard Page: 230the appeal, then set opt the principle in these words: They say:—

    “Now the principle of law which should govern a case like the present is firmly established by innumerable authorities. It is not necessary to refer to all of them except to the leading cases on the point. The point was carefully considered in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Bisheshur Dial v. Ram Sarup (1900) I.L.R 22 All. 284, which followed the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Lakhmidas v. Jamnadas (1896) I.L.R 22 Bom. 304. In that case the mortgagee had purchased one of the mortgaged properties in an auction sale in execution of a decree. It was contended there on behalf of the mortgagor that the mortgagee should not throw the entire burden of the mortgage debt upon the remaining property but was bound to allow proportionate reduction from the mortgage debt. It was, held that if the mortgagee purchased the equity of redemption he must allow proportionate reduction of the value of the property purchased by him; but where the circumstances under which the purchase was made show that it was purchased free-from all encumbrances, the plaintiff can enforce his entire security against the remaining property…. The following principles seem to have been laid down in that case on a consideration of all the authorities on the subject: (1) that, there is no distinction on principle between a private sale and an execution sale; (2) the real distinction as to the application of the law exists between a purchase of the equity of redemption and a purchase of the entire interest in the property; (3) if the circumstances show that the purchase by the mortgagee was a purchase of the entire interest free from all encumbrances, the mortgage debt will not be extinguished to the extent of the original charge borne by the property purchased.”

    The learned Judges then went on to consider—and I think, they considered it as a question of fact—whether in that particular case what the mortgagee had purchased was merely the equity of redemption or the whole of the property, and they came to the conclusion that what he had purchased was the whole property and not merely the equity of redemption. They based that conclusion upon the peculiar nature of the-particular transaction in that case, which was really an exchange. They found that the mortgagor by his Page: 231conduct had impliedly agreed that he was receiving the full value of the property and that no portion of the mortgage debt should be extinguished.

    Again, in the case of Krishna Chandra Bhoumik v. Pabna Model Company Ltd. (1931) I.L.R 59 Cal. 76 two Judges of that Court affirmed the same principle.

    It appears to me that the real question which one has to consider can best be expressed in the form of inquiry whether, for the purpose of the purchase in question, the mortgagee purchaser must in the circumstances of the particular transaction be taken to have had resort to any part of the mortgage money as part of the consideration for the purchase. I think that is what is really meant when the distinction between purchasing an equity of redemption and purchasing the whole of the mortgaged property is mentioned. The equity of redemption—assuming that term can be properly used in India—represents, of course, all that the mortgagor has left in him and is therefore all that he has to sell, and therefore it is at the first sight, I think, curious to find a suggestion that the mortgagor may be selling something more than the equity of redemption. What, I think, has to be looked at is whether, in selling the equity of redemption and thereby vesting in the mortgagee the whole unencumbered interest in the property, the calculation of the purchase price takes into account the value of that interest which the mortgagee already has vested in him, namely the mortgaged interest. That is why, I think, it really comes down, as the Calcutta High Court has in effect treated it, to a question of fact. The question is what was bought. Did the mortgagee make an allowance for the mortgage money, or part of it, which was due to him, in calculating the consideration for the sale? And, for the purpose of determining that question, it is, I think, relevant to look at all the circumstances and facts of the case.

    It must be concede, I think, that a mortgagee who purchases part of the mortgaged property does so in most cases upon the footing that he is purchasing the, equity of redemption only. He already has an interest in the property by virtue of his mortgage and all he lacks is the equity of redemption. The common case is, therefore, that he purchases from his mortgagor only those surplus rights which still remain with the mortgagor, that is to say, only the right to redeem. He thereby extinguishes the mortgage because the mortgagee interest and the equity of redemption coalesce in his own hands. That is what happens in a simple case. And in the vast majority of cases no further question arises because the whole mortgage is put an end to. It is only in a case in which part only of the mortgaged property is purchased that this difficult question arises, as to what has happened to the remainder of the mortgage money. If a mortgagee, after such transfer as there has been in this case constituting a purchase by him of a part only of the mortgaged property, comes to the court and claims to enforce his entire mortgage against the remaining portion of the property in respect of the whole unabated mortgage debt, I think that the burden must be heavily upon him of showing that special circumstances existed, or that there was some form of special bargain in the particular transaction between him and the mortgagor, from which it must be concluded that no part of the mortgage debt was to be extinguished. That is what was done in the case in the Calcutta High Court to which I have referred. Now, turning to the evidence in this case, I find that it is very scanty and that there is not a syllable in it from first, to last to show, or even to attempt to show, that the purchase of 1915 was anything but an ordinary purchase of an equity of redemption—an ordinary getting in by the mortgagee from his mortgagor of those surplus rights which remained with the mortgagor, in consideration Page: 233partly of a sum paid to him, representing the value of those rights, and partly of a pro rata extinguishment of the mortgage debt. If I am right in thinking that the onus lay upon the plaintiff to establish that the 3 whole of his debt remained outstanding, then, in my view, he has signally failed to do so. The learned Civil Judge of Gorakhpur, however, appears to have taken an opposite view. He says: “…. Where the mortgagee purchases the portion of the mortgaged property the determination of the question whether the whole of the mortgage debt is chargeable on the remaining property mortgaged depends on whether the mortgagee purchased only the equity of redemption or the entire interest of the mortgagor, and in the latter case no portion of the mortgage debt is extinguished. The sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs' father does not say that the property was being sold subject to any encumbrance. A 2 anna share had been mortgaged in 1913 for Rs. 2,000. In 1915 half of it was being sold for Rs. 1,500 paid in cash. It has already been mentioned that no portion of the consideration went to satisfy any portion of the mortgage money of 1913. The probabilities are that the entire interest of the mortgagor and not only the equity of redemption was being purchased… I have some difficulty in accepting that conclusion as right. It is perfectly true that the sale deed on the face of it does not refer to the mortgage at all, but the learned Judge appears to base his calculation upon the assumption that, if a two-anna share was mortgaged in 1913 to secure Rs. 2,000, then Rs. 1,500, the amount actually paid in cash in this case, must be taken to represent, not merely the value of the surplus Tights of the mortgagor, but the value of the whole unencumbered interest in the one-anna share of the property. He seems to assume that the Rs. 2,000 secured upon the two-anna share in 1913 must necessarily have represented its full value for, security purposes. There is nothing to indicate that was Page: 234so. The property might well have been worth Rs. 5,000, or even Rs. 10,000 and indeed, we find that it was of sufficient value to support a considerable second mortgage a year later. And, even so, the learned Judge only treats it as a “probability”. Having regard to the fact that, as I think, the burden lay upon the mortgagee to establish that the transaction was not the normal transaction of purchasing the entirety of the property in the sense that I have explained, I do not myself think that this conclusion of the learned Judge was wholly justified by the evidence or by the facts of this case.

    For these reasons, I have come to the conclusion that upon no footing is it open to the plaintiffs, in this suit, to charge the remaining one-anna share with any part of the property secured upon the mortgage of 1913 and the interest attributable to that property in excess of one-half. I have, for this purpose, assumed that the value of the one-anna share sold in 1915 was equal to the value of the one-anna share which was not sold. It has not, up to this point, been suggested otherwise in this suit, and I do not propose at this stage to re-open that question.

    There is one other reason why I think that the conclusion I have arrived at is probably the right one in the circumstances of this particular case. The appellant, in addition to his contention with which I have just dealt, goes on to point out that, if it is true that the effect of the 1915 sale was to throw the whole of the mortgage money on to the remaining one-anna share, it puts a grievous additional burden on to that share, which is unfair to him as the mortgagee of it. He says, quite rightly, that he took his mortgage in 1914, supposing that, as between themselves, both shares were rateably liable to bear the first mortgage— that is, of course, as between the two shares themselves and not as between the mortgagee and the mortgagor. That was undoubtedly true, but he now finds that by Page: 235the voluntary act of the mortgagor—the act of selling one share—the other, share, the one of which he is the second mortgagee, has become burdened to twice the extent that it was burdened before. And he points out that cannot possibly be done to his detriment as a second mortgagee. I am considerably impressed with that argument and it confirms me in the view I had already formed, that in the circumstances of this case, at any rate, the plaintiffs cannot be assumed to have done that or be allowed to throw upon the remaining one-anna share in priority to the appellant anything more than that proportion of the principal and interest secured which I have already indicated.

    I now come to the question whether the mortgage of 1913 was kept alive at all. I do not propose to deal with this at the same length because, in my judgment, the question is quite simple. I need not recapitulate the well known principles, which are derived from English equity and from English cases, relating to the keeping alive of securities in certain circumstances, because those principles have been clearly recognized as part of the Law of India by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. I need not do more than refer to the well known case of Gokaldas Gopaldas v. Puranmal Premsukhdas (1884) I.L.R 10 Cal. 1035 (1046) in which their Lordships affirmed, or re-affirmed, that these principles are applicable in India as measures of equity, justice and good conscience. There is the well known passage from the judgment in this case: “The obvious question to ask in the interests of justice, equity and good conscience is, what was the intention of the party paying off the charge? He had a right to extinguish it and a right to keep it alive. What was his intention? If there is no express evidence of it, what intention should be ascribed to him? The ordinary rule is that a man having a right to act in either of two ways, shall he assumed to have acted according to his interest…”

    I need not, I think discuss the numerous authorities in which the same principle has been considered, and applied, in india since then. Nor need I discuss the? questions which have been debated about the “rebirth” of an earlier security as part of a later transaction. I do not myself like these coined expressions. They appear to me misleading. The present case is a very simple one. The mortgagee in 1925 took a mortgage which was an obvious renewal—and, indeed, in terms was a renewal—of an old one. The only addition was of a trifling sum which obviously represented the costs of the transaction. There is no actual evidence of what the intention was, and I have, therefore, to consider what intention must be ascribed to him. It was to his obvious benefit that the 1913 mortgage should be kept alive, because it was the only protection he would have against any intermediate encumbrances of which possibly he had no notice. I feel no doubt that the principle of Adams v. Angell (1877) 5 Ch.D 634, which has been affirmed as part of the law of India in the case in the Privy Council to which I have referred, is applicable here, and that the 1913 mortgage remained on foot as a pro tanto protection to the mortgagee of 1925 against any intervening encumbrances. Then two things are said against that. It is said first that even if that is so the mortgage of 1913 can only be effective if, and to the extent that, relief under it would not be barred by any statute of limitation, assuming a suit were brought upon it. The answer to that is, I think, that in this case no question under the Limitation Act arises in view, as the learned Judge has found, of the very obvious acknowledgment constituted by the deed of 1925 itself. The other point put on the appellant's behalf in this-connection is that there is a difference between the 1925 security and the 1913 security, which precludes the application of the doctrine of Adams v. Angell (1877) 5 Ch.D 634. It is pointed out that, whereas the 1913 mortgage embraced Page: 237two one-anna shares, the 1925 mortgage embraces only one. I think the short answer to that is this. At the time when the 1925 mortgage came into existence the 1913 mortgage did, in fact, embrace only one one-anna; share, because in 1915 the other one-anna share had been sold and had disappeared. Even apart from that, however, I should not be able to agree that it is impossible to keep alive a previous mortgage upon taking a subsequent mortgage covering only part of the same security.

    There is, I think, only one more matter with which I have to deal before disposing of the appeal altogether. It relates to the form of the suit. As I have been at pains to point out in an earlier part of this judgment, the relief asked for by the plaint is, in form, I think, relief by way of enforcement of the 1925 mortgage only. And I think that the decree in the suit is actually based upon that footing. Now in this case what actually happened was that the mortgagee came to the court to enforce, it is true, his mortgage of 1925. At the same time, he did plead, and plainly pleaded, that he was still entitled to rely upon the mortgage of 1913. He was then met by the appellant with the mortgage of 1914 for which he (the appellant) claimed priority. Thereupon, the plaintiffs had resort to the 1913 mortgage, as they had foreshadowed in their plaint, as a shield or defence against the appellant's mortgage of 1914. In other words, the plaintiffs set up the 1913 mortgage as being still alive. Technically, it seems to me that what the plaintiffs are really enforcing in this suit is not the 1925 mortgage alone, but primarily the 1913 mortgage, which is still in existence, and, only in a secondary sense, the 1925 mortgage to the extent to which their claim is not covered by the relief under the 1913 mortgage. I think that, technically speaking, the plaint should have claimed relief upon the footing of both the 1913 mortgage and the 1925 mortgage. This, I think, is well illustrated by a case again in the Page: 238Calcutta High Court, Gopal Chunder Sreemany v. Herembo Chunder Holdar (1839) I.L.R 16 Cal. 523. That was a comparatively simple case in which a mortgagor had mortgaged property to a mortgagee. He then mortgaged the same property to another mortgagee, and finally he mortgaged it again to the former mortgagee, who, eventually, brought a mortgage suit. There was, therefore, exactly the same position there as there is in the suit before me. But the difference is that he based his relief, no only upon the latter of his two mortgages, but upon the former one as well. That, I think, was undoubtedly right, because, as I have pointed out, what he was really enforcing was primarily the former of his two mortgages. It will be seen from the form of the decree that was passed in that case, that what was actually enforced was the former mortgage together with the latter, to the extent to which it was necessary.

    Now, it is said in this case that for these reasons the plaint is defective, and that the plaintiffs ought not to have any relief, or, at any rate, that they ought to have no more relief than they can get strictly upon the 1925 mortgage. That, in my judgment, is taking altogether too strict a view. As I have more than once pointed out, the plaintiffs, in their plaint, have actually pleaded every fact necessary to enable them to succeed in the suit. Their only mistake, if they have made a mistake, is that in framing the actual relief they asked for they have incorrectly stated it. The appellant has in no way been misled by this, and it would amount to a denial of justice if I did not give to the plaintiffs the relief to which they are actually entitled and to which, in my view, the form of their plaint entitles them, in all but the actual words in which they have asked for the relief.

    In the result, therefore, I must allow this appeal and set aside the decree of the court below. A new decree will have to be drawn up.

    I shall first declare that, by virtue of the sale effected by the instrument dated the 14th day of May, 1915, which is Ex. 12 in the proceedings, the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos. 17-23, respectively as mortgagees are only entitled to enforce the security constituted by the mortgages dated the 26th of March, 1913, and the 22nd of July, 1925, to the extent claimed in the plaint, after giving credit as from the 14th day of May, 1915, for the principal sum of Rs. 1,000, being half the principal amount secured on the mortgage, dated the 26th of March, 1913, together with interest proportionate to that principal sum.

    And next, I shall declare that the plaintiffs are, subject as aforesaid, entitled to a mortgage decree for the balance of the principal and interest claimed by them in respect of the said mortgages dated the 26th of March, 1913, and the 22nd of July, 1925, respectively in priority to all subsequent encumbrances created after the 22nd July, 1925, and upon the footing that the former of the said two mortgages was kept alive and remained on foot, notwithstanding the execution of the latter of the two said mortgages.

    The remainder of the decree will be a preliminary mortgage decree, and I indicate that the proper form of the decree in this case is the one which is outlined in the case of Gopal Chunder Sreemany v. Herembo Chunder Holdar (1889) I.L.R 16 Cal. 523 (529-30). I, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the existing decree, and direct a new decree to be drawn up in this Court according to the foregoing directions.

    The result of this appeal has been that the appellant has partially succeeded and has partially failed. I think the proper result is that there shall be no order as to costs either in the court below or here.

    If there is any difficulty in drawing up the decree, the case can be restored to my list for the purpose of settling it.

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