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  • sec. 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 hereinafter called the Act)
  • provisions of sec. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • provisions of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,
  • sec. 114 of the Transfer of property Act
  • sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • sec. 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 hereinafter called the Act)
  • provisions of sec. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • provisions of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,
  • sec. 114 of the Transfer of property Act
  • sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion (Bhargava, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal by the defendant (the appellant) against the judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City dated 8 October 1960 confirming the decree of the Additional Munsiff, Jaipur in a suit for ejectment.

Key factual allegations and procedural steps (as stated in the opinion):

  • The appellant was the tenant of the premises described in the plaint, paying a monthly rent of Rs. 45 plus Rs. 3/8 and Rs. 2 per month for electricity and water charges.
  • The plaintiff filed the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent on 30 August 1956 on grounds of subletting, personal necessity, and default in payment of rent. It was alleged the defendant was an habitual defaulter with more than three defaults in payment of rent for two months on several occasions between 5 November 1952 and 5 December 1955.
  • The defendant admitted the tenancy but denied the grounds for ejectment, asserted he had made payments (last payment on 20 September 1955) and sent rent by money order on 28 November 1955 and 19 January 1956.
  • The defendant deposited the whole amount of rent with interest and costs as determined by the court under sec. 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (the Act), and contended that on such compliance the suit should be dismissed under sec. 13(4). The suit was instituted before the Amendment Act No. XXIV of 1958 to sec. 13.
  • During the pendency of the suit the plaintiff abandoned the grounds of personal necessity and subletting, leaving the primary contest focused on whether payment under sec. 13(3)/13(4) entitled the tenant to protection and dismissal of the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a tenant who deposits the arrears, interest and costs as directed by the court under sec. 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 is entitled to the protection of that provision and the suit for ejectment must be dismissed.
  2. Whether sub-section (5) of sec. 13 (which denies the benefit of sub-sec. 4 where the tenant contests the suit) applies in the present case — i.e., the scope of “contest” contemplated by sub-sec. 5 and whether it extends to contests on grounds other than liability for rent.
  3. Whether the proviso added to sec. 13(4) by Act No. XXIV of 1958 (which denies protection to tenants who default in payment for any two months on three occasions within eighteen months) is declaratory and retrospective and therefore applicable to suits instituted before the amendment.
  4. Whether the appellant could claim relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent under sec. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act where the tenancy was said to be determined by notice under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • On compliance with the court's order under sec. 13(4) (i.e., depositing the arrears, interest and costs as directed), the appellant contended the court had no option but to dismiss the suit for ejectment; the appellant claimed entitlement to the protection of sec. 13(4).
  • The appellant relied on the Full Bench decision in Daulat Ram v. Lakhu Mal for the proposition that sec. 13(4) is applicable even if the tenant had committed defaults covered by the second proviso to sec. 13(1) as it stood prior to the 1958 Amendment.
  • The appellant further sought relief against forfeiture under sec. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • The appellant also argued that the proviso added by Act No. XXIV of 1958 should be regarded as declaratory and retrospective (i.e., it merely declared the law as it previously stood) and therefore could be applied to proceedings instituted before the amendment; alternatively, that the appellate court could take notice of changes in the law during the pendency of the appeal.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent contended that the appellant had admitted that he had not paid rent since 5 April 1955 and had therefore committed more than three defaults in payment for two months within 18 months, bringing the case within the exclusionary proviso.
  • It was urged that sec. 13(4) did not apply because the appellant had contested the suit on substantive grounds (for example, that the notice determining tenancy was invalid and that the premises were not sublet or needed for personal use), and reliance was placed on Shambhoo Ram v. Mangal Singh and the unreported Vishambharlal v. Mohanlal to support the proposition that contesting the suit (other than mere arithmetical calculation) precludes the benefit of sub-sec. 4.
  • The respondent also relied on the 1958 amendment (Act No. XXIV of 1958), arguing its proviso should exclude the appellant from protection (the argument regarding retrospectivity was advanced implicitly by reliance on the effect of the proviso).
  • With respect to relief against forfeiture, the respondent relied on Jagannath Prasad v. Suraj Lal to support the proposition that sec. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act does not apply where the tenancy is determined by notice as provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Daulat Ram v. Lakhu Mal (Full Bench) Held that sec. 13(4) is applicable even if the tenant has made the defaults mentioned in the second proviso to sec. 13(1) as it stood prior to Amendment Act No. XXIV of 1958. The appellant relied on this decision to argue entitlement to protection under sec. 13(4) despite alleged defaults. The court acknowledged the decision but proceeded to interpret sub-sections 4 and 5 in the statutory context of the present case.
Shambhoo Ram v. Mangal Singh Contains observations that where a tenant contests the suit on any ground whatsoever (except mere arithmetical calculations as to rent) he cannot claim the benefit of sub-sec. (4). The court read those observations in context and held they applied where the contest related to liability for rent. The court limited their scope and rejected the respondent's broad reliance on them for depriving the appellant of sub-sec. 4 protection in the present case.
Vishambharlal v. Mohanlal (unreported, Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 69 of 1958) Held that where the defendant raised several points of contest (including denial of liability to pay rent), the case fell within the mischief of sub-sec. 5 and the defendant could not claim benefit of sub-sec. 4; deposits under sub-sec. 4 would not constitute a valid defence where the tenant had contested the suit. The court treated this as an instance in which the contest related to liability for rent. It distinguished the present case on the ground that the contest in the cited case was about liability for the amount, whereas in the present suit the sub-sec. 5 contest did not apply as interpreted by the court.
Moti Ram v. Parma Nand Observed that sec. 13(4) affords protection where tenant does not raise a contest except as to arithmetical calculations about the amount of rent; if a tenant denies liability to pay rent and fails, he cannot claim protection under sec. 13(4). The court relied on this statement to support its narrower construction of "contest" under sub-sec. 5 — namely, that the contest must relate to liability for payment of rent to attract sub-sec. 5, and not to other grounds of ejectment.
Sithies v. National Association of Operative Blasterers Principle that when vested rights have accrued a legislative provision expressed in words of futurity (e.g., "shall not") is not to be construed retrospectively so as to affect those vested rights unless clear terms compel such construction. The court invoked this principle while interpreting the proviso added by Act No. XXIV of 1958, concluding that the language ("shall not be entitled") indicates a prospective operation and does not divest rights already accrued at the time of amendment.
H.H. Maharaja Kami/Karni Singh v. Shri Pyarelal Gupta (Bench decision) Applied the doctrine that an appellate court can take notice of changes in law made during the pendency of proceedings to the extent those changes affect the rights involved (example: removal of cinema buildings from the Act where no rights had accrued to the defendant). The court distinguished that decision on its facts: in the cited case no vested right had accrued to the defendant and the amendment removed a ban on ejectment; in the present case the appellant had deposited the amount and thereby acquired a right which a subsequent non-retrospective amendment could not divest.
Jagannath Prasad v. Suraj Lal Referenced for the proposition that sec. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application where the tenancy is determined by notice as provided in sec. 106 of that Act (as relied upon by parties). The opinion records the reliance on this decision by the appellant in the argument about relief against forfeiture; the court noted the contention but resolved the case primarily on the operation of sec. 13(4) and the non-retrospective effect of the 1958 amendment.
Motiram v. Suraj Bhan Referred to for the general rule that an amendment to a statute does not operate retrospectively to affect accrued rights unless expressed or necessarily implied. The court cited this authority to support the conclusion that the proviso added by Act No. XXIV of 1958 did not operate retrospectively to divest the appellant's right to remain in possession after compliance with sec. 13(4).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion proceeds in two main strands of analysis: (A) statutory construction of sec. 13(4) and (5) of the Rajasthan Premises Act; and (B) whether the 1958 amendment is retrospective.

A. Interpretation of sec. 13(4) and sec. 13(5)

  1. The court began by identifying the purpose and textual relationship between sub-sec. 4 and sub-sec. 5 of sec. 13: sub-sec. 4 empowers the court, in suits based on clause (a) of sub-sec. 1 (non-payment/tender for any two months), to fix arrears and order deposit by a date; sub-sec. 5 addresses situations where the tenant expresses an intention to contest "such a suit".
  2. The court held that sub-sec. 5 must be read with sub-sec. 4 and is not independent of it. If sub-sec. 5 were read to cover every contest on any ground, sub-sec. 4 would be rendered nugatory because landlords could plead additional grounds to force a contest and defeat the protective mechanism of sub-sec. 4.
  3. The court interpreted the word “contest” in sub-sec. 5 as referring narrowly to a contest concerning the tenant's liability to pay the arrears (i.e., liability/amount of rent), not to contests about other grounds of ejectment under sec. 13(1) such as subletting or personal necessity.
  4. The court examined the decisions relied upon by the respondent (Shambhoo Ram and Vishambharlal) and concluded those authorities were correctly applied in contexts where the contest related to liability for payment of rent; they do not support the proposition that any contest on any ground excludes sub-sec. 4 protection.
  5. Applying this construction to the facts, the court found sub-sec. 5 was not attracted in the present case and, because the appellant complied with the court's order under sec. 13(4) by depositing the requisite amount within the time fixed, he was entitled to have the suit dismissed.

B. Whether Act No. XXIV of 1958 is declaratory and retrospective

  1. The court recited the general presumption against retrospective operation of statutes unless clearly intended or where the statute is declaratory. It quoted the conventional rule that statutes are to be construed prospectively if fairly capable of either interpretation.
  2. The court examined Act No. XXIV of 1958 and observed that the amendment (which omitted provisos to sec. 13(1)(a) and added a proviso to sec. 13(4) disqualifying tenants with specified defaults) contained language indicating futurity — notably the phrase “shall not be entitled.”
  3. The court reasoned that the language of the new proviso, the absence of a preamble declaring the Act to be declaratory, and the statements of objects and reasons (which do not demonstrate an intention to make the amendment retrospective) all pointed to a prospective operation.
  4. The court distinguished the bench decision in H.H. Maharaja Karni/Kami Singh v. Pyarelal Gupta: that case involved an amendment which removed a ban and affected a category (cinema buildings) where no vested rights had accrued; by contrast, in the present case the tenant had, by depositing the amount as directed, acquired a right to remain in possession prior to the amendment.
  5. Relying on the principle in Sithies and on Motiram v. Suraj Bhan, the court concluded that subsequent non‑retrospective amendment could not divest the appellant of a right which had accrued when he complied with the court's order under sec. 13(4).

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; judgment and decrees of the lower courts set aside; plaintiff's suit for ejectment dismissed.

Direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • The appellant's second appeal succeeds; the decree for ejectment confirmed by lower courts is set aside and the suit is dismissed.
  • The appellant is entitled to costs of all the courts from the respondent.
  • Leave to appeal to a Division Bench was granted to the respondent's counsel.

Broader implications: The court construed sub-sec. 5 of sec. 13 narrowly to mean contest as to liability for rent, not any contest on other grounds of eviction, and held that the proviso added by Act No. XXIV of 1958 operates prospectively and does not, on its language, divest rights already accrued by compliance with sec. 13(4). The opinion does not state that it is laying down a new general precedent beyond the presented statutory interpretations; it applies the stated legal principles to the facts of this appeal and resolves the parties' rights accordingly.

    Labhchand v. Ganpatlal

    Bhargava, J.:— This is a second appeal by the defendant against the judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur city dated 8th October, 1960 confirming the decree of the Additional Munsiff, Jaipur in a suit for ejectment.

    2. The appellant was the tenant of the premises mentioned in paragraph (1) of the plaint on a monthly rental of Rs. 45/- plus Rs. 3/8/- and Rs. 2/- p.m for electricity and water charge. The present suit for ejectment and arrears of rent was filed against him on 30th August, 1956 on several grounds namely of subletting, plaintiff's personal necessity and default in payment Page: 459of rent by the defendant. It was alleged that the defendant was an habitual defaulter and had committed more than three defaults in the payment of rent for two months, on several occasions between 5th November, 1952 and 5th December, 1955.

    3. The defendant contested the suit and while admitting the tenancy denied the grounds on which the ejectment from the premises was sought. It was pleaded that he had not made defaults in the payment of rent but had been making regular payments, the last payment of rent being made on 20th September, 1955. Thereafter, once on 28th November, 1955 and again on 19th January, 1956, he sent the amount of rent by money order to the plaintiff. Besides as he deposited the whole amount of rent along with interest, costs etc. determined by the court under sec. 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 hereinafter called the Act) the suit for ejectment on the ground set forth in sec. 13(i)(a) was liable to be dismissed despite the alleged defaults on three occasions within the period of 18 months. Reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Daulat Ram v. Lakhu Mal, (1) wherein it was held that:—

    “The second proviso to s. 13(1)(a) does not prevail over sec. (4) but on the other hand, sec. 13(4) is applicable when the tenant does not take advantage of the first proviso or is prevented from taking advantage thereof owing to defaults mentioned in the second proviso. In other words, the tenant is entitled to the protection provided by sec. 13(4) even if he has made the defaults mentioned in the second proviso to sec. 13(1) as it stood prior to Amendment Act No. XXIV of 1958”

    It may be mentioned that the present suit was filed before the amendment of sec. 13 by Act No. XXIV of 1958. As the plaintiff during the pendencey of the suit gave up other grounds for ejectment namely of his personal necessity and that of sub-letting by the defendant the only point which now needs consideration is whether in view of the payment in full of the amount determined by the court under sec. 13(3) of the Act he is entitled to the protection afforded by this provision and the plaintiff's suit is liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that as soon as he complied with the order of the court made under sec. 13(4) there was no option for the court but to dismiss the suit for ejectment. It was also contended that in the circumstances of the present case the appellant was entitled to relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent under the provisions of sec. 114 of the Transfer of property Act. On the other hand it is urged on behalf of the respondent that it is not open to the appellant to dispute that he was not a defaulter inasmuch as both in his written statement and statement before the court he admitted that he had not paid rent since 5th April, 1955. He had, therefore committed more than three defaults in the payment of two months' rent during the period of 18 months. It is next urged that provisions of sec. 13(4) were not applicable in the present case as the appellant had contested the suit on the ground that the notice determining the tenancy was not a valid one and that the premises were not sublet or required for the personal use of the plaintiff. Reliance is placed on the following observations in Shambhoo Ram v. Mangal Singh, (2).

    “Therefore, as soon as the tenant contests the suit on any ground whatsoever except as to the matter of arithmetical calculation of the amount of rent due up to date or interest or costs, he cannot claim the benefit of sub-sec. (4). The suit then becomes contested and has to be disposed of in such manner as the court deems fit according to the general law.”

    and on an unreported decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 69 of 1958 (Vishambharlal v. Mohanlal) decided on 10th March, 1960, wherein a suit for ejectment the defendant resisted the suit and raised the plea that he had given a post dated cheque to the plaintiff and thereby had made a valid tender for the arrears of rent. He also pleaded that the tenancy had not been terminated by a valid notice of ejectment in accordance with the provisions of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the course of this judgment it was observed that:—

    “The only question which then remains to be decided is whether the present case falls within the mischief of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 13. As to this I have no doubt whatsoever that it does; in as much as the defendant filed a written statement in which he raised several points of contest which have already been set out above and therefore, this was a case of which it can not be said that the defendant had not raised a contest therein, That being so it must follow that he was not entitled to the benefit of sub-sec. (4) of sec. 13 and any deposit made by him under that provision cannot afford him a valid defence against a decree for ejectment.”

    Another ground urged is that by Act No. XXIV of 1958, a proviso has been added under sec. 13(4) according to which the tenant is not entitled to the benefit of sub-sec. 4, if he has made default in the payment or tender of the amount or rent due from him for any two months on three occasions within a period of eighteen months. Learned counsel urges that this proviso is retrospective in its operation inasmuch as this proviso was added to remove doubts Page: 460created by the conflicting decisions of this court with regard to the applicability of sub-sec. 4 incase second proviso to sec. 13(1) applied to the case. It is urged that the amendment introduced by adding proviso to subsec. 4 only declares the law as it existed before the amendment and as such it should be held to be retrospective and applicable even to cases which were filed before the amendment. It is next urged that even during the pendency of the appeal which is a continuation of the suit the court can take notice of the changes made in the law and can give effect to it. Reliance was placed on a Bench decision of this Court in D.B Civil First appeal No. 39 of 1956 (H.H Maharaja Kami Singh v. Shri Pyarelal Gupta), decided on 16th February, 1960 to which I was a party.

    4. As regards the appellant's claim for relief on the ground of forfeiture for nonpayment of rent it is urged that sec. 114 of the Transfer of property Act has no application where the tenancy it determined by a notice as provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Reliance is placed on Jagannath Prasad v. Suraj Lal, (3).

    5. Before I take up the question whether the proviso added to Sub-sec. 4 of sec. 13 by Act No. XXIV of 1958 is retrospective, or not and can be applied in the present case which was instituted before this amendment it is proper to determine whether the provisions of sub-sec. 5 are at all attracted in the present case. Sub-sec. 4 applies where the suit for eviction is instituted on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 13 i.e, where the tenant has neither paid or tendered the amount of rent due for any two months. If the said suit is filed on this ground alone the court is empowered under the said sub-section to fix the amount of arrears along with interest thereon and costs of the suit on the first day of the hearing of the suit and direct the tenant to deposit the said amount on or before the date fixed by it. In sub-sec. (5) there is a further provision for the same type of suit when the tenant expresses his intention to contest the same. The words ‘such a suit’ occurring in sub-sec. 4. Which again means a suit based on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 14 sub-sec. 4 and 5 are to be read together and sub-sec. 5 is not independent of sub-sec. 4 because in sub-sec. 5 there is nothing to indicate the type of suit it is dealing with. If sub-sec. 5 were to be read independently of sub-sec. 4 as the learned counsel for the respondent desires it to be read, the provisions of sub-sec. 4 would be rendered nugatory as it would be very easy for the landlord to found his claim on other grounds mentioned under sec. 13 besides the one falling under sub-clause (a) in order that the tenant may be forced to contest the suit. To read sub-sec. 5 independently of sub-sec. 4 and to hold that its application is not confined to suits based on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 13 but to all cases in which the tenant contests the suit based on any ground under sec. 13(1) would lead to absurdity and would completely deprive the tenants of the protection which was intended to be given to them under sub-sec. 4. In my opinion the contest referred to in bub-sec. 5 is only that which relates to tenants' liability for the payment of the arrears of rent land not to contest with regard to the other grounds set forth by the plaintiff for the ejectment of the tenant. In Shambhoo Ram's case (2) suit was based on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 13 and the tenant denied his liability to pay the rent at the enhanced rate. It was therefore a case to which sub-sec. 5 applied and the above mentioned observations on which reliance is placed on behalf of the respondent should be read in that context. These observations do not mean that the contest can be on any ground not falling within clause (a) of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 13. This becomes clear from observations that “if the contest is on any ground whatsoever except as to the matter of arithmetical calculation of the amount of rent due up to date or interest or costs, he cannot claim the benefit of I sub-sec. 4.” It therefore, follows that the contest which has been referred to, means the contest about the amount of rent. Similarly in the unreported case of Vishambharlal v. Mohanlal, the tenant had raised the plea that he had given a post-dated cheque to the plaintiff and had made a valid tender for the arrears of rent and had not admitted his liability for the amount of rent. It was in those circumstances that it was held that the tenant had contested the suit and the case fell within the mischief of sub-sec. 5 of sec. 13. In this connection reference may be made to Moti Ram v. Parma Nand, (4) wherein it was observed that:—

    “Sec. 13(4) affords protection to a tenant in those cases, where he does not raise a contest, except as to arithmetical calculations about the amount of rent. If a tenant denies his liability to pay rent and joins issue on that matter and subsequently fails, it is not open to him to claim protection under sec. 13(4).”

    Apart from any consideration of absurdity or hardship, it is clear upon the language of sub-sec. 5 itself that it refers to suits contemplated by sub-sec. 4 and that the contest should Page: 461be with regard to the liability to pay rent and not in respect of any other ground set forth in the plaint i.e under sec. 13(1)(b)(h) for the eviction of the tenant. In my opinion sub-sec. 5 did not apply in the present case so as to deprive the appellant of the benefit under sub-sec. 4 of sec. 13. As the appellant complied with the order of the court and deposited the whole amount within time specified by the court he was entitled to ask the court to dismiss the suit.

    6. Whether Act No. XXIV of 1958 is declaratory and retrospective in operation, is now to be determined. It is not necessary to state the general principles of legal interpretation of statutes with regard to their retrospective operation because as stated in Statute Law by Craies that:—

    “Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so to impair an existing right or obligation otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect can not be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactments expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.”

    7. The presumption that statutes are not to operate retrospectively, however, cannot be made applicable in construing statutes which are declaratory in nature. As we look at Act No. XXIV of 1958, we find that it nowhere says that it declares the law as it was on the date of its commencement. By this Act both the provisos under sec. 13(1)(a) are omitted and under sec. 13(4) the following proviso was added namely:—

    “Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to the benefit of protection against eviction provided by this sub-section if he has made default in the payment or tender of the amount of rent due from him for any two months on three occasions within a period of eighteen months.”

    The language of the new proviso clearly indicates that it was to apply in future and was not intended to apply to the past transactions. The words ‘shall not be entitled’ used in the proviso clearly point out that it was not intended to have any retrospective operation. If the Legislature intended that the proviso should apply retrospectively, it could have been expressed in a clear and positive language. The language used in the proviso does not indicate the intention of the Legislature that it was to apply retrospectively. In Sithies v. National Association of Operative Blasterers(5) where the Act of the Parliament contained the words “an action against the trade union………shall not be entertained,” it was held that:—

    “Where vested rights have already accrued, and legislation is passed which uses words expressive of futurity, such as ‘shall not’, which prima facie would appear to be meant to be applicable to future cases, it is not to be construed retrospectively so as to affect those vested rights, unless terms are used which clearly compel the Court to give it that construction. This is only to impute common sense to the Legislature; any reasonable person would say that clear terms ought to be used, if it is intended to divest a vested right.”

    There is no preamble to the Act and its title only shows that it was an amending Act and not a declaratory one. Learned counsel referred to the statements of objects and reasons for which this law was enacted. Although the statements of objects and reasons are not admissible in aid to the construction of the statute yet they can be referred to ascertain the conditions prevailing at the time when Act No. XXIV of 1958 was introduced. However, it appears from the statements of objects and reasons that it was with a view to set at rest the conflict of decisions and removing discrepancies pointed out by the courts that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, was proposed to be suitably amended by Act No. XXIV of 1958. Even from these statements of objects and reasons it does not appear that the Act was intended to be applied retrospectively. It is only an amending Act and the language of the new proviso also shows that it was to apply in future. Therefore, there is no force in the contention that the Act is declaratory and should apply retrospectively, to these proceedings. In this connection learned counsel pressed into service a bench decision of this Court H.H Maharaja Karni Singh v. Shri Pyarelal Gupta mentioned above, and urged that the appellate court can take notice of the changes made in the law and can give effect to them. Learned counsel suggests that as the proviso under sec. 13(4) is now in force this court should take notice of it and give effect to it in the present case. The case referred to by the learned counsel is clearly distinguishable. There at the time of the commencement of the action for ejectment the law was applicable to cinema buildings, but during the pendency of the appeal the law was amended and the cinema buildings were taken out of the mischief of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the ground for ejectment mentioned in sec. 13 of the Act. But at the time of the hearing of the appeal it was pointed out that as the law had been amended and the Act no longer applied to cinema buildings, relief could be given to the plaintiff. It was under these circumstances that relief was granted Page: 462to the plaintiff and the suit was decreed in appeal. It was clearly pointed out in that case that no rights had accrued to the defendant and the amendment did not take away any rights. There was a certain ban on the rights of the landholders to eject their tenants, imposed by sec. 13 of the Act which on the date of the hearing of the appeal had been removed and therefore, relief could be granted to the plaintiff. In the present case the appellant in compliance with the order of the Court under sec. 13(4) deposited the amount and the suit was liable to be dismissed on that ground. On depositing the amount determined by the Court, the appellant acquired a right to remain in possession of the premises and no subsequent change in the law unless it had retrospective operation, could divest him of that right on the ground of default in payment of rent. That case too, therefore, does not help the respondent and the general rule that the amendment would not operate retrospectively would apply even though the proceedings may be pending before the appellate court unless of course it is expressly made retrospective or its retrospective operation follows as a matter of necessary implication—(See Motiram v. Suraj Bhan (6)).

    8. This appeal is, therefore, allowed, judgment and decrees of the lower courts are set aside and the plaintiff's suit for ejectment is dismissed. Appellant will get his costs of all the courts from the respondent.

    9. Learned counsel prays for leave to appeal to a Division Bench. Leave is granted.

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    Labhchand v. Ganpatlal
    (Apr 14, 1961)