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  • HINDU SUCCESSION ACT 1956
  • provisions of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 176 of the Limitation Act,
  • Art. 171 of the Limitation Act,
  • sec. 5 of the Limitation Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • HINDU SUCCESSION ACT 1956
  • provisions of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 176 of the Limitation Act,
  • Art. 171 of the Limitation Act,
  • sec. 5 of the Limitation Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal was filed by plaintiffs Jawarimal and Pukraj against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Merta City, dated the nth November, 1954, in a suit for damages for breach of contract. The trial court had decreed the suit but the lower appellate court dismissed it. Both brothers described themselves throughout as owners and managers of a joint Hindu family business carried on in the name of "Jawarimal Pukhraj" at Nagour.

Jawarimal died in or about November 1958. He was survived by his son Faquir Chand, his widow Mst. Chunnibai and two married daughters Msts. Mina and Basanti, as well as by his brother and co-appellant Pukhraj. The legal representatives other than Pukhraj were not substituted on the record within the prescribed time. On 4 April 1960 the respondents applied to dismiss the appeal as having abated. The appellants replied (6 April 1960) asserting that Pukhraj, the surviving manager, adequately represented the joint Hindu family and thus no abatement could arise. During argument, the appellant Pukhraj sought to show the married daughters had no right by tendering an affidavit of one daughter (Basanti) and argued for permission to bring the deceased's legal representatives on record belatedly together with condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act; the respondents opposed on grounds of delay.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal abated on the death of one of the appellants (Jawarimal) because his legal representatives (including his married daughters) were not brought on record in accordance with Order XXII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the surviving appellant, as manager (Karta) of the joint Hindu family, could represent all of the deceased appellant's legal representatives—in particular his married daughters—or whether married daughters fall outside the manager's representative authority.
  3. Whether Order XLI, Rule 4 (enabling one of several plaintiffs/appellants to appeal on behalf of all) can be invoked to avoid abatement where one appellant has died and legal representatives have not been brought on record.
  4. If abatement applies to the deceased appellant, whether the abatement is limited to that appellant alone or must result in abatement of the entire appeal.
  5. Whether the belated application (filed in August 1960) to bring the deceased's legal representatives on record should be allowed and the delay condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as recorded)

  • The suit and appeal were instituted and prosecuted by Jawarimal and Pukhraj as owners/managers of a joint Hindu family business; therefore the surviving appellant Pukhraj fully and effectively represented the family's interests and the deceased appellant's estate.
  • It was argued that the married daughters had no right or interest in the joint family firm; an affidavit of one daughter (Basanti) was produced to that effect, and it was asserted that Mina likewise had no claim (although her affidavit was not produced because she was stated to be living in Assam).
  • A belated application was made to substitute the deceased's legal representatives on the record and to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act so that they might be brought on record now.

Respondents' Arguments (as recorded)

  • The respondents applied to dismiss the appeal as having abated because the deceased appellant's legal representatives (other than Pukhraj) had not been brought on record within the time prescribed by law.
  • The respondents opposed the belated application for substitution and condonation, urging that the delay was inordinate and that no sufficient grounds had been shown for condoning it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ranjitsingh v. Mst. Narmadi Support for the proposition that the status of "legal representative" depends on whether the estate of the deceased devolves on a person as a matter of law. Quoted as authority for reading clause (ii) of Section 2, CPC and for the proposition that entitlement by law to the estate (not necessarily possession) makes a person a legal representative.
Roop Chand v. Mitha Lal That the expression "legal representatives" should be read broadly to cover multiple legal representatives in their entirety. Relied on to support the conclusion that, where there are multiple legal representatives, all such representatives ordinarily must be brought on record under Order XXII, Rule 3 CPC.
Padmaram v. Surja Whether Order XLI, Rule 4 can be invoked to avoid abatement caused by the death of an appellant whose legal representatives have not been brought on record. The court adhered to its prior conclusion in Padmaram that Order XLI, Rule 4 cannot override the mandatory provisions of Order XXII, Rules 3 & 4 CPC, and thus cannot be used to avoid abatement where legal representatives were not brought on record after death.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the abatement point as a preliminary and limited the factual recital to what was necessary for that issue. The reasoning proceeds in a sequence:

  1. Applicability of Order XXII, Rule 3 CPC: The court held that on the death of appellant Jawarimal, the right to continue the appeal did not survive in favour of the surviving appellant Pukhraj alone for the purposes of Order XXII, Rule 3. Ordinarily, therefore, the legal representatives of the deceased should have been brought on record within the time allowed by law; absent that, the appeal abates so far as the deceased appellant is concerned.
  2. Effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956: The court observed that the Act (which came into force 17 June 1956) changed the devolution of interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary when the deceased left female relatives in Class I. Section 6 and accompanying provisions (Secs. 9 and 10 cited) meant that daughters (married or unmarried) are heirs who inherit equally and absolutely. Consequently, Jawarimal's married daughters were among his heirs at law and thereby fell within the definition of "legal representatives" under Section 2, clause (ii) CPC. The court emphasised that being entitled in law to an estate suffices to render a person a legal representative — possession is not a prerequisite.
  3. Manager's authority vis-à-vis married daughters: The court accepted that the surviving manager (Pukhraj) could represent joint family members who remained part of the joint family after Jawarimal's death (for example, the son and perhaps the widow). However, the court analysed the legal position of married daughters: under Hindu law, a daughter ceases to be a member of her father's joint family upon marriage and becomes a member of her husband's family. Therefore, a manager of the father's joint family lacks legal authority to represent those daughters who are not members of that family. The court gave a practical example: a compromise by the manager of the father's family could not bind married daughters who are not parties, because the manager has no authority to represent them.
  4. Concluding breach of mandatory procedure: Given the daughters' legal status, the non-substitution of all legal representatives (including married daughters) was a breach of mandatory provisions of Order XXII, Rule 3 read with Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly the appeal abated in respect of the deceased appellant.
  5. Interaction with Order XLI, Rule 4: The court rejected the contention that Order XLI, Rule 4 could be used to override the mandatory provisions of Order XXII. Referring to its earlier decision in Padmaram v. Surja, the court reiterated that the enabling provision in Order XLI, Rule 4 cannot be invoked to avoid abatement where legal representatives of a deceased appellant were not brought on record.
  6. Whether abatement is total or partial: Applying the established test (whether the appeal can be finally decided as to all parties in the absence of the deceased's legal representatives without producing inconsistent decrees), the court concluded that allowing the appeal to proceed would risk producing two inconsistent decrees (one for the appellants if this Court accepted the appeal, and the extant adverse decree of the lower appellate court as regards the deceased appellant's unrepresented interests). To avoid such a result, the court held that the abatement had to extend to the entire appeal.
  7. Condonation application under Section 5 Limitation Act: The court analysed limitation periods: under Article 176 of the Limitation Act an application to bring legal representatives on record should have been filed within 90 days of the death (which expired end-February 1959), and an application to set aside abatement under Article 171 would have had to be made within 60 days of abatement (by end-April/beginning-May 1959). The belated application was filed in August 1960. The court found no adequate explanation for the delay — the appellants' reliance on the surviving manager's representation was not a sufficient cause. The court noted that the Succession Act had been in force since 1956, and the appellants and advisers should have appreciated the changed rights of daughters; that failure did not justify granting relief under Section 5. Hence condonation was refused.
  8. Result: On these bases the court held that the preliminary objection succeeded and dismissed the appeal as having abated in its entirety. Costs were ordered to be borne by the parties themselves and leave to appeal was refused.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The appeal is dismissed as having abated in its entirety for failure to bring the deceased appellant's legal representatives (including his married daughters) on record in accordance with Order XXII, Rules 3 and 11, CPC.

Consequent orders recorded in the opinion:

  • The preliminary objection of the respondents is upheld and the appeal is dismissed as having abated.
  • The parties are directed to bear their own costs before this Court.
  • Leave to appeal is refused.

Implications: The direct effect is the dismissal of the appeal and the maintenance of the lower appellate court's decree insofar as the unrepresented interests are concerned. The court applied existing procedural provisions (Order XXII CPC) together with the statutory changes effected by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and relied on prior authorities (including Padmaram v. Surja) in reaching its conclusion. The opinion does not purport to create a novel legal principle beyond applying and clarifying the interaction between succession law and procedural requirement for substitution of legal representatives; accordingly, the decision operates as an application of existing law to the facts of this case and results in dismissal on a preliminary point.

    Jawari Mal v. Mangi Lal

    Modi, J.:— This second appeal by the plaintiffs Jawarimal and Pukraj is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Merta City, dated the nth November, 1954, in a suit for damages for breach of a contract.

    2. The appeal, in my opinion, must stand concluded by a preliminary objection as to its abatement, and, therefore only a few facts having a bearing on this question require to be stated. The plaintiffs Jawarimal and Pukraj were both brothers, being sons of one Shivlal. They brought the present suit as owners and managers of a joint Hindu family which carried on business in the name of Jawarimal Pukhraj at Nagour. This allegation is contained in paragraph one of the plaint. The suit was decreed by the trial court but dismissed by the lower appellate court. Thereupon the present appeal was filed by both Jawarimal and Pukhraj. Again they described themselves as owners and managers of the joint Hindu family firm Jawarimal Pukhraj while filing the appeal. Jawarimal admittedly died some time in November, 1958. It is also admitted that apart from the other appellant Pukhraj, Jawarimal was survived by his son Faquir Chand, his widow Mst. Chunnibai and two married daughters Msts. Mina and Basanti. As all these legal representatives other than Pukhraj had not been brought on the record in place of the deceased Jawarimal within the time prescribed by law, an application was moved on behalf of the defendants respondents that appeal be dismissed as having abated. This application is dated the 4th April, 1960. To this a reply was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs appellants on the 6th April, 1960, in which it was admitted that Jawarimal had died about a year and a half ago leaving behind the aforesaid heirs, but it was contended that it was not necessary to bring on record the deceased's widow and his son and the daughters because the present suit had been brought by Jawarimal and Pukhraj in their capacity as managers and owners of a joint Hindu family business, and the appeal had also been brought by both of them as owners and managers of the said business and that as the surviving appellant Pukhraj adequately and affectively represented the appellants' firm, no question of abatement could arise, and therefore, it was prayed that the objection as to abatement be dismissed. It is in these circumstances that the question arises for determination as to whether the present appeal has abated at all, or in its entirety and should, therefore, be dismissed as such.

    3. During the course of the arguments an application was further moved on behalf of Pukhraj appellant that Jawarimal's daughters Msts. Mina and Basanti had no right or interest in the joint family firm Jawarimal Pukhraj, and in support of this an affidavit of one of them viz., Mst. Basanti, was also submitted swearing that she had no right in the property of her deceased father, and, as for Mst. Mina, it was submitted it was not possible to submit her affidavit as she was living far away in Assam. But an attempt was made through Mst. Basanti's affidavit to show that Mst. Mina had also no right in the property of her deceased father. It was further prayed that in any case if this Court should be pleased to hold that the aforesaid widow, son and the daughters of the deceased Jawarimal should have been substituted for the deceased as his legal representatives, their names might be permitted to be brought on record even now and the benefit of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act be allowed to them. This application Page: 133delayed one and that behalf of the respondents and it is urged that the application was a very was opposed on no sufficient grounds had been made out for condoning the delay.

    4. Be that as it may, the first question for determination is whether the aforesaid heirs of the deceased Jawarimal and in particular his married daughters must have been brought on the record on his death in accordance with the provisions of O. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or whether it was unnecessary to do so as the surviving appellant Pukhraj being the manager of the joint Hindu family firm fully represented the estate of the deceased.

    5. Now, I have no doubt whatever that on the death of the appellant Jawarimal, the right to sue did not survive in favour of the surviving appellant alone within the meaning of O. 22, R. 3 C.P.C and consequently, ordinarily speaking, an application to bring the legal representatives of the deceased Jawarimal on record should have been made within the time allowed by law; and then only the appeal could have been proceeded with; and as such an application has not been made, the appeal is bound to abate so far as the deceased appellant is concerned, and it would be a further question to consider whether the appeal should so abate with respect to the deceased appellant only or must abate in its entirety. It has been contended by learned counsel, however, that although this would be the normal course of things, the present case is somewhat different and falls outside the general rule inasmuch as this litigation had been brought by the two brothers Jawarimal and Pukhraj as managers of a joint Hindu family business and that on the death of Jawarimal, the surviving manager Pukhraj could and would adequately represent the estate of the deceased. This, in my opinion, would have been a sufficient answer to the question of abatement; but unfortunately a further difficulty arises in the way of the appellants as a result of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Act of 1956), and it is strongly contended in this connection that although the surviving manager Pukhraj would represent the interest of the deceased Jowarimal's son and perhaps his widow, he could not possibly represent the interest of his married daughters who were heirs of the deceased under the Act of 1956, and these daughters could not possibly be said to be members of the joint Hindu family whose Karta the surviving manager Pukhraj was, and these would be members of the joint Hindu families of their respective husbands. This contention, to my mind, has force. According to Sec. 6 of the Act of 1956, when a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act. There is, however, a proviso enacted to this section, and that is that if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I of the Schedule (or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative — with which situation we are not concerned in the present case) the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Then there is an explanation to this section which provider that for the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.

    6. Now a daughter is one of the heirs mentioned in class (i) of the Schedule and the daughter whether married or unmarried inherits simultaneously with a son or widow or other heirs specified in class (i) of the Schedule and each daughter takes a share which would be equal to that of a son and takes that share absolutely and not as woman's estate (See secs. 9 and 10 in this connection). It follows, therefore, that the daughters of Jawarimal deceased (who had died after the commencement of this Act) were undoubtedly his heirs within the meaning of Sec. 6 of the Act of 1956. That being so, these daughters certainly appear to me to be the legal representatives of the deceased, among others, within the meaning of O. 22 R. 3 read with sec. 2 clause (ii) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression “legal representative” is defined in clause (ii) Sec. 2 of the Code and that definition is, to my mind, a very extensive one. The first part of this clause lays down that a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person would be his legal representative. There can be no question, therefore, that Jawarimal's daughters who are, among others, his heirs at law must be accepted as falling within the class of legal representatives recognized in this clause. It also seems to me that in order to invest a person with the status of a legal representative of the deceased, it is not necessary that he should be in actual possession of the assets of the deceased if he is entitled to the deceased's estate in law, and it should be sufficient if he is Page: 134entitled to the possession thereof and happens to be a person upon whom the estate could devolve. In this connection, I would draw pointed attention to the qualifying phrase “who in law represents the estate of the deceased person”, occurring in clause (ii) after the words “a person” and, therefore, it clearly seems to me that the possession of the assets of the deceased by any of his heirs can hardly be accepted to be a condition precedent to his being accepted as a legal representative of the deceased person. What, therefore, to my mind, impresses upon a person the character of the legal representatives of a deceased person within the meaning of the first part of clause (ii) of Sec. 2 is whether the estate of the deceased in whole or in part devolves on him or not as a matter of law. If it does, he must be accepted as a legal representative of the deceased within the meaning of the provision of the first part of clause (ii), and if it does not, he would not be a legal representative unless he falls within the other two parts of clause (ii) of Sec. 2. See in this connection Ranjitsingh v. Mst. Narmadi (i). I may also add that the expression legal representatives” must, broadly speaking, where there are more legal representatives than one, such as we have the case here, be read to cover the various legal representatives in their entirety and not only one or some of them. See Roop Chand v. Mitha Lal (2). I do not think, therefore, that, in this state of the law, the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents that as one of the daughters of the deceased Jawarimal claims no share in the property of the deceased or for that matter both of them may not so claim, they are not his legal representatives within the meaning of the legal provisions with which we are concerned, is without force; and normally speaking, all such legal representatives would, in my opinion, be required to be brought on the record in compliance with R. 3 of O. 22 C.P.C within the time limited by law, and if that is not done, the suit is bound to abate so far as the deceased is concerned.

    7. The further question which still falls to be considered in this connection is whether the aforesaid objection is met by the position taken up by learned counsel for the appellants that the deceased had brought the suit as also the appeal, as a manager of the joint Hindu family business, along with his brother Pukhraj, the surviving appellant, who was also a manager even during the life-time of his deceased brother, and, in any case, on the latter's death, and so the said Pukraj, as manager of the family, fully represents the same, and it was not necessary to bring on record all the other members of the family including the daughters. Now, as I look at the matter, this argument may hold good so far as the deceased's son and perhaps his widow are concerned, as they would still be members of the joint Hindu family of which, at any rate, after the death of the deceased Jawarimal, Pukhraj the surviving appellant, would be the Karta or the manager. The thing which creates serious difficulty in the way of the appellant is whether Pukhraj can be held to represent the married daughters of the deceased. It is well established that a joint Hindu family consists of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor and includes their wives and unmarried daughters. A daughter, however [ceases to be a member of her father's family on marriage and becomes a member of her husband's family. See para 212 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, 12th Edition. I am, therefore, unable to accept the position that the married daughters of Jawarmal were members of the joint Hindu family of Jawarimal and Pukhraj, which could only consist of themselves and their lineal descendants and their wives and their unmarried daughters; and the daughters as soon as they were married ceased to be members of the joint Hindu family and became the members of the families of their respective husbands. I am prepared to accept that on Jawarimal's death, his younger brother Pukhraj may indeed represent the joint Hindu family left behind by him, as manager of that family. And in that view of the matter, it may not be necessary to bring his son or widow on the record, who would still continue to be members of the joint Hindu family, unless a separation took place in the meantime which is not the case here and the appeal can certainly be proceeded With in their absence, by the successor manager, or as I may put it, the other manager being already on the record. But can such a manager be held to represent those who are not member of the joint Hindu family and yet are some of the legal representatives of the deceased in law. Having given my most careful and anxious consideration to this question, I have arrived at the conclusion that the manager of a joint Hindu family can only represent persons who fall within the ambit of the family and not those who fall outside it, howsoever closely related such persons may be to the family. I would illustrate what I mean by a simple example. Suppose on the death of a brother, the other brother becomes the manager of their joint Hindu family. The daughters of the deceased brother are also among the persons upon whom the estate of the deceased has partly devolved in law. Can the successor manager enter into a compromise with third parties relating to the assets of the joint Hindu family and Page: 135can he by such compromise bind the married daughters of the deceased, assuming all the time that they are not parties to the compromise themselves or through the manager of their families. To my mind, the correct answer to this question can only be in the negative, the reason being that the manager who enters into the compromise has no authority in law to represent them, they being not members of the joint Hindu family presided over by the said manager. If that is the correct position in law, as it seems to me it is, then the only possible conclusion to which I can come in a case like the present is that the daughters would not be bound by anything which a manager of their father's family may do, and so as inevitable corollary it must follow that such a manager cannot be held to represent the interest of the married daughters of the family who have on their marriage become members of the families of their respective husbands.

    8. As the result of the above discussion, I hold that there has been a breach of mandatory provisions of O. 22 R. 3 C.P.C in the present case read with R. 11 thereof, and, therefore, the appeal in so far as it relates to Jawarimal certainly abates.

    9. Three more questions arise for decision at the stage and I shall address myself to them now. The first is whether the conclusion at which I have come above is in any way affected by the provisions of O. 41 R. 4 C.P.C That rule provides that where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants any one of the plaintiffs or defendants may appeal from the whole decree and thereupon the appellate court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be. This question came up for consideration before me in Padmaram v. Surja (3), and after an elaborate discussion of all the relevant considerations bearing upon the matter, I felt presuaded to hold that the enabling provision contained in O. 41 R. 4 cannot be allowed to override the mandatory provisions of O. 22, RR. 3 & 4, and the application of the former provision must be limited to those cases where all the appellants are alive at the date of the decision by appellate court, cannot be invoked where one or more of them have died and their legal representatives have not been brought on record in accordance with the requirements of O. 22. I still adhere to the same view and think that O. 41 R. 4 cannot be invoked by the appellant in his favour to get over the hurdle of abatement.

    10. The next question is whether the appeal having abated against Jawarimal, the abatement would be limited to Jawarimal alone or the appeal in its entirety abates. As held by me in Padmaram's case (3) cited above, the one test which has been almost universally employed to determine this question is whether it is possible to decide the entire appeal in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased appellant without producing two inconsistent decrees in the same litigation, as two such decrees militating against each other would virtually cancel themselves and reside in a futility. Now let us apply this test to the present case. Suppose this Court came to the conclusion on the merits that the plaintiffs' appeal should be accepted. This would result in a decree for the plaintiffs and against the defendants. But so far as the legal representatives of Jawarimal are concerned, the decree of the lower appellate court would still stand and that is a decree dismissing the plaintiff's suit and must operate in favour of the defendants. The result is that a hearing of the appeal on the merits may result in two inconsistent decrees and such a situation is not possible in law as I understand it. I, therefore, come to the conclusion that the abatement cannot be allowed to be limited to a case like the present to the deceased appellant alone but must result in the abatement of the appeal in its entirety. I hold accordingly.

    11. The only other question which remains to deal with is whether the prayer of the appellant Pukhraj that the legal representatives of the deceased Jawarimal including his two married daughters may be allowed to be brought on record even now deserve to be accepted, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. A few facts may be recalled in this connection. The objection as regards abatement was raised on behalf of the respondents on the 4th April, 1960 that Jawarimal appellant had died some time about Nov. 1958, and that as his legal representatives including his married daughters had not been brought on the record the entire appeal had abated. This application was resisted by the appellant Pukhraj and it was contended that he as manager fully and adequately represented the joint Hindu family consisting of himself and Jawarimal and, therefore, it was not necessary to bring the deceased's legal representatives on the record. It was only later during the course of arguments on the 22nd August, 1960, that a further application was filed for permission to implead the legal representatives of the deceased even at that stage, and a prayer was made that the delay in impleading Page: 136them be condoned under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. Now, the period of limitation prescribed for filing an application to bring the legal representatives of a deceased on record in such cases is 90 days from the death of the appellant under Art. 176 of the Limitation Act, this period certainly expired at the end of Feb. 1959. It was then open to the appellant to make an application for setting aside the abatement and the period of limitation for such an application, according to Art. 171 of the Limitation Act, is 60 days from the date of the abatement. In other words, such an application could have been made by the end of April or beginning of May, 1959. The application for condoning the delay has, however, been made in Aug., 1960. This brings me to O. 22 R. 9(2) C.P.C, which inter alia provides that the plaintiff may apply for setting aside the abatement, and the court must set it aside where it is proved that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit. (the word ‘suit’ must of course be understood to include the word ‘appeal’ by virtue of O. 22 R. 11 C.P.C), and it is further provided that the provisions of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to such an application. The question which thus arises for decision is whether the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause for not having taken timely steps to have the married daughter of Jawarimal brought on the record. No reason has been given in the application of the appellant dated the 22nd August, 1960, the delay deserves to be condoned except that it was mentioned that the appellant Pukhraj was the manager of the joint Hindu family Jawarimal Pukhraj and he effectively represented the interests of Jawarimal's legal representatives and, therefore, the application for substitution was not made earlier. This, in my opinion, is not an adequate reason at all. The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 had come into force on the 17th June, 1956. The deceased Jawarimal died some time in November, 1958, more than two years after the coming into force of the Act of 1956. The plaintiff appellant and his advisers should have known that the position of the daughters in the matter of inheritance had been radically changed and that their rights had been considerably enlarged as a result of the enactment of the Act of 1956, and if they failed to size up the correct situation for all this time, that in my opinion, is no reason for giving them the benefit of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. I am, therefore, unable to give the benefit of sec. 5 to the appellant.

    12. The net result is that the preliminary objection must prevail and this appeal must be held to have abated in its entirety in absence of the married daughters of the appellant Jawarimal having been brought on record in accordance with law. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, as having abated. As the appeal fails on a preliminary point, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.

    13. Leave to appeal is refused.

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    Jawari Mal v. Mangi Lal
    (Sep 2, 1960)