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Case Number

S.B Criminal Misc. Petition No. 6 of 1993

Advocates

M.L Garg, for Petitioner
R.S Rathore, Public Prosecutor

Judges

Mr. Rajendra Prasad Saxena

Acts

Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205
provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code,
provisions of Section 467(2)(c) Cr. P.C
provisions of Section 470(3) Cr. P.C
provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(i)
Section 468(1) of the Code
Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr. P.C
Section 468 Cr. P.C

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rajendra Saxena, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenges two orders of the learned A.M.J.M. No.1, Bikaner: the order dated 18.2.92 taking cognizance of offences under Sections 218 and 193 IPC against the petitioner Dr. Liyaqat Ali Gauri, and the order dated 9.10.92 rejecting the petitioner's application dated 30.4.92 seeking discharge.

Material factual background (as stated in the opinion):

On 25.6.88 an oral report by Jetha Ram led to FIR No. 58 at Police Station Ganga Shahar, Bikaner, and registration of a case under Sections 324 and 307 IPC against Bhura Ram for allegedly attempting to murder his wife Smt. Hema (infliction of axe blows to the neck).
On 25.6.88 petitioner Dr. Liyaqat Ali Gauri (Medical Jurist, P.B.M. Hospital, Bikaner) examined Smt. Hema and recorded four injuries (detailed in the record). X-rays taken 7.7.88 revealed no bony injury; the Radiologist opined the injuries to be simple in nature.
After investigation, a challan against Bhura Ram was filed on 4.8.88; the case was committed to Sessions and after trial Bhura Ram was acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge on 27.10.90 because prosecution witnesses (including the injured) did not support the prosecution.
On 23.7.88 Champalal (brother of Smt. Hema) alleged that the Medical Jurist had wrongly stated the injuries to be caused by a blunt object and requested constitution of a Medical Board and prosecution of the doctor. A Medical Board examined Smt. Hema on 1.8.88 and opined one injury to be grievous and that the injuries “appeared to have been caused by a sharp weapon” (the Board's opinion was not stated to be conclusive).
Applications by Champalal led to registration of Crime No. 71 on 18.3.89 for offences under Sections 218 and 192 IPC (allegedly relating to preparation of false M.L.R). The Superintendent of Police sought sanction for prosecution from the State Government on 14.11.89; the State accorded sanction on 10.5.91 to prosecute the petitioner for Sections 193 and 218 IPC.
Police submitted a challan against the petitioner on 18.2.92 and the learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance on 18.2.92. The petitioner applied on 30.4.92 contending (inter alia) that cognizance under Section 193 could not be taken because the document (M.L.R.) had been produced in the earlier Sessions trial and no complaint in writing had been made by that Sessions court as required by Section 195(1)(b)(i), and that proceedings under Section 218 were barred by limitation. The Magistrate rejected the application by order dated 9.10.92. This petition followed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the learned Magistrate was legally competent to take cognizance of an offence under Section 193 IPC when the allegedly false document (the M.L.R.) had been produced in earlier court proceedings and the earlier court (the Sessions Court) had not made a written complaint as required by Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C.
Whether the Magistrate's taking of cognizance for the offence under Section 218 IPC was barred by the period of limitation prescribed by Section 468 Cr.P.C. (specifically the three-year period specified in Section 468(2)(c)), and whether the time taken for procuring sanction under Section 197/197 Cr.P.C. could be excluded under Section 470(3) (i.e., whether exclusion of such time was appropriate in the facts of this case).
Whether the learned Magistrate committed error by taking cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation without issuing notice to or affording an opportunity of hearing to the accused, and by rejecting the petitioner's application without considering the alleged infirmities.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Petitioner's) Arguments — Mr. M.L. Garg

The M.L.R. (medical legal report) prepared by the petitioner was produced in the earlier Sessions trial (marked Ex. P.13) and the Sessions Judge, who tried and acquitted Bhura Ram on 27.10.90, did not hold that the M.L.R. was false, fabricated or incorrect nor did he direct filing of any criminal complaint against the petitioner. Therefore, under Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance of an offence under Section 193 IPC except on the written complaint of that court.
Although prosecution sanction was accorded by the State Government on 10.5.91 (within three years of the alleged offence), the police filed the challan only on 18.2.92—after the three-year limitation period had expired—and no explanation for this delay was given in the challan nor was any application for condonation of delay made by the prosecution. Consequently Section 470(3) Cr.P.C. could not be invoked to exclude time and the cognizance under Section 218 IPC was barred by limitation.
Evidence at the earlier Sessions trial showed the injured (PW 9) disowned the police statement and the dying declaration and stated Bhura Ram did not inflict the injury; the Sessions Judge did not find the M.L.R. false. These facts support the contention that cognizance under Section 193 was not maintainable.

Respondent (State/Public Prosecutor) Arguments — Mr. R.S. Rathore

The Public Prosecutor conceded that the challan did not explain the delay nor was any condonation application filed, but otherwise reiterated the reasonings given by the learned trial Magistrate (i.e., the Magistrate's approach to limitation and exclusion of time).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State of Punjab v. Sarvan Singh	Explains that the bar on limitation of prosecution aligns with fair trial principles (Article 21); where limitation has expired the court must consider whether there are valid grounds for condonation or extension and must issue notice and opportunity to the accused before taking cognizance.	The court relied on this principle to hold that where the period of limitation had expired, the Magistrate should have considered grounds for condonation and given the accused notice and an opportunity; absence of such procedure rendered the cognizance void.
Panney Singh v. State of Rajasthan	Affirms legislative interdiction under Section 468 Cr.P.C. against taking cognizance after expiry of limitation; court must examine sufficiency of grounds for condonation or extension, and the accused is entitled to notice and hearing. It also notes that delay may be explained in the chargesheet itself.	The court applied these holdings to conclude that the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance after limitation expired without any explanation in the challan and without issuing notice or giving opportunity to the accused; thus cognizance was improper and void.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands corresponding to the alleged offences under Sections 193 and 218 IPC.

On Section 193 IPC and the applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C.:

The court observed that Section 195(1)(b)(i) prohibits any court from taking cognizance of offences under Sections 193–196 IPC (among others) when such offences are alleged to have been committed in relation to proceedings in any court, except on a complaint in writing of the court before which the document was produced (or a subordinate court).
The M.L.R. of Smt. Hema dated 25.6.88 (allegedly false) had been filed along with the challan against Bhura Ram and had been marked as Ex. P.13 in the Sessions trial. The injured (PW 9) disowned earlier statements and was hostile; the Sessions Judge, however, did not find the M.L.R. to be false, incorrect or fabricated and did not direct a criminal complaint against the petitioner.
Given the absence of any written complaint by the Sessions Court and the Sessions Judge's failure to make a finding of falsity, the court concluded that the learned Magistrate committed a patent illegality in taking cognizance of the offence under Section 193 IPC against the petitioner in the present proceedings.
The court also noted the Medical Board's opinion (formed after an examination 37 days post-injury) was not a definite and conclusive opinion that the injuries were caused by a sharp weapon—supporting the view that the question of falsity was not conclusively established in the earlier proceedings.

On Section 218 IPC and limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. (and exclusions):

The court applied Section 468(1) and (2)(c) Cr.P.C., noting that the period of limitation for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year but not exceeding three years is three years. It held that the period commenced when the offence came to the knowledge of the investigating officer, which on the facts was 4.8.88 (date the Medical Board report was received by the I.O.), making the limitation period expire on 3.8.91.
Although the State accorded prosecution sanction on 10.5.91 (within the three-year period), the police filed the challan only on 18.2.92—after the limitation period had expired. No explanation for this delay appeared in the challan and no application for condonation of delay was filed by the prosecution.
The court considered whether time consumed in procuring sanction could be excluded under Section 470(3) Cr.P.C. and concluded it could not be pressed into service in the present case because the period of limitation had already commenced and does not stop once it commences. The court explained that exclusion would only be applicable where the sanction itself was obtained after expiry, which was not the case here.
Relying on the precedents cited (State of Punjab v. Sarvan Singh and Panney Singh v. State of Rajasthan), the court emphasized that when cognizance is sought after expiry of limitation, the court must examine sufficiency of grounds for condonation/extension and must issue notice to the accused and afford him opportunity of hearing before taking cognizance. None of this procedure had been followed.
Consequently the court held that the order taking cognizance dated 18.2.92 was ab initio void and illegal because of both defects: impermissible cognizance under Section 193 in the absence of a written complaint by the Sessions Court, and taking cognizance under Section 218 after expiry of limitation without explanation or notice.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition is allowed. The court QUASHED the impugned orders dated 18.2.92 (order taking cognizance) and 9.10.92 (order rejecting the petitioner's application), and DROPPED FURTHER PROCEEDINGS against the petitioner Dr. Liyaqat Ali Gauri. The petitioner is discharged of the offences under Sections 193 and 218 IPC.

Implications:

Direct effect: The immediate consequence is that criminal proceedings against Dr. Liyaqat Ali Gauri under Sections 193 and 218 IPC as initiated by the impugned cognizance are terminated and the petitioner is discharged.
Procedural guidance: The judgment reinforces that (i) Section 195(1)(b)(i) bars cognizance for alleged fabrication of documents produced in earlier court proceedings unless a written complaint is made by the court before which the document was produced, and (ii) courts must guard against taking cognizance after the expiry of statutory limitation without proper explanation, condonation or prior notice and opportunity to the accused (as required by the precedents cited).
Scope: The opinion does not purport to lay down new law beyond applying existing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to the facts of this case; the decision's practical effect is to quash the particular orders complained of and to discharge the accused in these proceedings.

This summary has been prepared solely from the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion's text has been added or inferred.

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Liyaqat Ali Gauri v. The State Of Rajasthan

Rajendra Saxena, J.:— This petition filed under Sec. 482 Cr. P.C has been preferred against the orders dated 9.10.92 and 18.2.92 passed by the learned A.M.J.M No. 1, Bikaner, whereby he took cognizance for the offences u/ss. 193 and 218 IPC by the first order and rejected petitioner's application dated 30.4.1992 by the second order.

2. The skeletal facts necessary for disposal of this petition are that on an oral report lodged by Jetha Ram on 25.6.88, FIR No. 58 was drawn at Police Station, Ganga Shahar, Bikaner and a case u/ss. 324 and 307 IPC was registered against Bhura Ram for attempting to commit murder of his wife Smt. Hema by inflicting axe blows on her neck. On 25.6.88, petitioner Dr. Liyaqat Ali Gauri, who was posted as Medical Jurist in the P.B.M Hospital, Bikaner, examined her & found the following injuries on her person:—

“1. A lacerated wound of 6 × 1/5 cm obliquely placed on neck on right lateral aspect 3 cm below right ear;

2. Abrasion of 4 × 0.25 cm just below right ear;

3. A lacerated wound of 3.5 cm × 0.25 cm on right lateral aspect of neck;

4. Injured Smt. Hema complained of chest pain.

Her skigram of skull and chest were taken on 7.7.88, which did not reveal any bony injury and, as such, the Radiologist opined that the injuries No. 1 to 4 of Smt. Hema were simple in nature.

3. After completion of investigation on 4.8.88, a challan was filed against Bhura Ram for the offences u/ss. 324 and 307 IPC in the court of learned AMJM No. 1, Bikaner, who in turn, committed that case to the learned Sessions Judge vide his order dated 18.8.88 The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bikaner, to whom the said case was transferred, framed charges for the offences under Ss. 323 and 307 IPC against Bhura Ram and after trial by his judgment dated 27.10.90 acquitted Bhura Ram because all the prosecution witnesses including injured Smt. Hema did not support the prosecution case and were declared hostile.

4. It appears that on 23.7.88, Champalal, the brother of injured Smt. Hema, filed an application before the Superintendent of Police, Bikaner, alleging that on the night intervening 24th and 25.06.1988, her brother-in-law Bhura Ram had inflicted axe blows on the neck of his sister Smt. Hema, but the Medical Jurist Dr. L.A Gauri in the M.L.R wrongly mentioned that injuries sustained by Smt. Hema were caused by blunt object. Thus, he said doctor had fabricated false evidence with an intent to save the accused Bhura Ram. He, therefore, requested that a Medical Board be constituted and Dr. L.A Gauri be prosecuted. The S.P, Bikaner forwarded the said application alognwith the case diary to the learned A.M J.M No. 1, Bikaner, who by his order dated 27.7.88, directed the Superintendent, Associate Group of Hospitals to constitute a Medical Board. Accordingly, a Medical Board of three doctors was constituted, which, on 1.8.88, examined Smt. Hema, perused her Bed Head Ticket and operation notes dated 25.6.88 and opined that the injury No. 1 namely slightly curved linear scar with stitch marks measuring 3 cm obliquely placed retroauricular on right mastoid region and adjoining back of pinna of ear and injury No. 3 namely slightly curved linear scar with stitch marks measuring 2.5cm placed on lateral aspect of base of neck on right side, were simple in nature and that injury No. 2 to wit linear scar with stitch marks placed slightly obliquely nearing to transverse plane extending from anterior border of right sternomastoid muscle to posteriorly, on the neck at junction region of upper and middle 1/3 of neck, was dangerous to life because it was extensive and implicating external jugular vein and other vessels of neck and, as such, it was grievous in nature. The Board further opined that as per description of injuries in local examination, the extent and structure involved in the injuries in operation notes and the scars of linear type were found, those injuries appeared to have been caused by a sharp weapon. It appears that on 3.3.89, the said Champalal again submitted an application to the S.P, Bikaner for registering a case against the petitioner Liyaqat Ali Gauri for the offences u/ss. 218 and 192 IPC, which was sent to the S.H.O, P.S Sadar, Bikaner whereupon Crime No. 71 dated 18.3.89 was registered for the offences u/ss. 218 and 192 IPC. On 14.11.89, the S.P, Bikaner requested the State Govt. to accord sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. The Personnel (A-3) Department of the State Govt. vide its order dated 10.5.91 accorded sanction to prosecute the petitioner for the offences u/ss. 193 and 218 IPC. Thereafter, the police submitted challan against the petitioner on 18.2.92 in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Bikaner, who by his order dt. 18.2.92 took cognizance against the petitioner for the offences u/ss. 218 and 193 IPC. On 39.4.92, the petitioner submitted an application before the learned trial Magistrate alleging that the police after investigation had filed challan against accused Bhura Ram, wherein the injury report and x-ray report and report of the Medical Board of Smt. Hema were filed; that the said case was tried by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and decided by his judgment dated 27.10.90 acquitting the said accused and, therefore, in view of the provisions of Sec. 195(1)(b)(i) Cr. P.C, no cognizance u/s. 193 IPC against the petitioner could have been taken against him, except on the complaint in writing by that court. It was further submitted in that application that the offence u/s 218 IPC was punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to three years or with fine or with both; that the alleged offence i.e preparing a false M.L.R was committed on 25.6.88 and that as per provisions of Section 467(2)(c) Cr. P.C the period of limitation for taking cognizance of such an offence was three years only, which expired on 25.6.91 and, as such, the impugned order dated 18.2.92 taking cognizance against the petitioner was illegal and barred by limitation and prayed that he may be discharged. The learned trial Magistrate vide his impugned order dated 9.10.92 rejected that application on the ground that by excluding the period from 14.11.89 to 14.5.91 which was consumed in procuring the sanction under S. 197 Cr. P.C, there was no bar in taking the cognizance against the petitioner for the offences u/ss. 218 and 193 IPC. The learned Magistrate also observed that since he had already taken cognizance of the said offences against the petitioner vide his order dated 18.2.92, the same could not be reviewed. He, accordingly, rejected the said application. Hence this petition.

5. I have heard Mr. M.L Garg learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.S Rathore, Public Prosecutor at length and carefully perused the record of the learned lower court as also the record of Sessions Case No. 9/89, decided by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bikaner, in extenso.

6. Mr. M.L Garg has strenuously canvassed that admittedly the injury report of Smt. Hema, which was prepared by the petitioner, her x-ray report and the report of the Medical board were submitted alongwith the challan by the S.H.O, P.S Ganga Shahar, Bikaner against the accused Bhura Ram in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, who committed that case to the learned Sessions Judge. After trial, the learned Sessions Judge by his order dated 27.10.90 acquitted accused Bhura Ram and did not make any observation that M.L.R Ex. P. 13 of Smt. Hema was either a false or fabricated or incorrect document and also did not direct for filing a criminal complaint against the petitioner. In such circumstances, in view of the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code, the learned Magistrate was not legally competent to take cognizance of the offence u/s. 193 IPC against the petitioner. His another limb of argument is that the sanction for prosecution against the petitioner was accorded by the State Govt. on 10.5.91 i.e within three years from the date of the alleged offence still then the challan was filed as late as on 18.2.92 and no explanation whatsoever for the delay in filing the challan after the prescribed period of limitation, was mentioned in the challan nor any application for condonation of delay was filed by the prosecution and in such circumstances, the provisions of Section 470(3) Cr. P.C for exclusion of time cannot be pressed into service and the learned Magistrate committed patent illegality in taking cognizance against the petitioner after the expiry of period of limitation. In that case, PW 9 Smt. Hema, injured, has specifically deposed that accused Bhura Ram did not inflict any injury to her and that when she sustained the injuries on her neck and near her ear Bhura Ram was not present in the house. Thus, she did not support the prosecution story and was declared hostile. She also disowned her police statement Ex. P. 11 and the dying declaration. During that Sessions trial, injury report of Smt. Hema dt. 25.6.88 was marked as Ex. P. 13. The learned Sessions Judge) vide his judgment dated 27.10.90 acquitted Bhura Ram of the offences u/ss. 307 and 323 IPC.

7. Mr. Rathore, learned Public Prosecutor has clearly conceded that neither any explanation for the delay in filing challan has been mentioned in the challan itself nor any Application for condonation of delay was filed by the prosecution. He has, however, reiterated the reasonings given by the learned trial Magistrate.

8. I have bestowed my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made before me. Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr. P.C proclaims that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under any of Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 and 228 of the I.P.C when such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceedings in any court except on the complaint in writing of that court or of some other court to which that court is subordinate. Apparently, the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(i) are intended to obviate the possibility of two conflicting findings being recorded by two courts, one before which the document is produced in the course of the proceeding and the other trying the complaint regarding the fabrication of false and incorrect document. Admittedly, the alleged to be incorrect and false document prepared by the petitioner namely the M.L.R of Smt. Hema dt. 25.6.88 was filed alongwith the challan papers against the accused Bhura Ram and the said M.L.R was marked as Ex. P. 13 by the learned Sessions Judge. Injured Smt. Hema was examined as PW 9 in that trial, wherein she has specifically deposed that her husband Bhura Ram did not inflict any injury to her and that when she received injuries on her neck and near her ear, he was not present there. She was declared hostile. Petitioner was not examined as a prosecution witness in that trial. The learned Sessions Judge did not give any finding that the M.L.R of Smt. Hema Ex. P. 13 was either a false, incorrect or fabricated document or that it was wrongly mentioned therein that the injuries sustained by Smt. Hema were caused by blunt object. The learned Sessions Judge also did not direct for filing a criminal complaint against the petitioner nor any such complaint was filed before the court. Apart from it, the Medical Board examined Smt. Hema on 1.8.88, whereas she had sustained injuries on the night intervening 24th and 25.06.1988 i.e after thirty seven days. The injuries of Smt. Hema were stitched on 25.6.88 It was on the basis of the entries in the Bed Head Ticket of Smt. Hema, who was admitted in the hospital on 25.6.88 and discharged on 8.7.88, that the Medical Board opined that as per description of injuries in local examination, the extent and structures involved in the injuries in operation notes and the scars of linear type found on the person of Smt. Hema, her injuries appeared to have been caused by a sharp weapon. Thus, it was also not a definite and conclusive opinion that the injuries sustained by Smt. Hema were caused by a sharp weapon. In such circumstances keeping in view the provisions of Sec. 195(1)(b)(i) Cr. P.C as also on the basis of the evidence collected by the Investigating Officer, the learned Magistrate committed patent illegality in taking cognizance of the offence under S. 193 IPC against the petitioner.

9. There is no dispute that the offence under S. 218 IPC is punishable with imprisonment or with fine or with both. Section 468(1) of the Code provides that except as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Code, no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. Sec. 468(2)(c) proclaims that the period of limitation shall be three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. The period of limitation in relation to an offender shall commence on the date of the offence or where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier. In the instant case, Smt. Hema was examined by the petitioner on 25.6.88 and the alleged to be incorrect document namely M.L.R was prepared on 25.6.88 The Board vide its report opined that the injuries sustained by Smt. Hema appeared to have been caused by a sharp weapon. This report was received by the I.O on 4.8.88 Thus, at the most it can be said that the offence u/s. 218 IPC came to the knowledge of the I.O on 4.8.88 Thereafter the period of limitation commenced against the petitioner and which came to an end on 3.8.91 The Superintendent of Police approached the State Govt. for according the sanction u/s. 197 Cr. P.C for prosecution of the petitioner on 14.11.89 and the said sanction was granted by the State Govt. vide order dated 10.5.91 i.e within the prescribed limitation of three years. The police however despite the issuance of prosecution sanction dated 10.5.91 did not care to file the challan against the petitioner within the prescribed period of limitation and submitted the same as late as on 18.2.92 In the challan, no explanation has been given as to why the challan could not be filed from 10.5.91 to 18.2.92 nor an application was given by the prosecution for condonation of such an inordinate delay. The object of prescribing limitation for taking cognizance of certain offence under Chapter XXXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar on limitation of prosecutions is clearly to prevent filing cases after a long time as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions.

10. In State of Punjab v. Sarvan Singh (1), the Apex Court has held that the object of Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar on limitation of prosecution is also in consonance with the concept of fair trial as enshrined in Article 21. If the period of limitation has expired then it is the primary and fundamental duty of the court to see as to whether there exist valid and sufficient grounds for condonation of delay or for extension of the period of limitation and also to issue a notice to the accused and to provide him an opportunity of hearing before taking cognizance of an offence against him in such case. This Court has held in Panney Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2), that there is legislative interdiction under Section 468 Cr. P.C for taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation and that if the court finds that period of limitation has expired, the court shall see as to whether there are sufficient grounds for condonation of delay or extension of period of limitation. It has also been held that it is not necessary that there should be a separate application moved by the prosecution u/s. 473 Cr. P.C and that the delay may be explained in the chargesheet itself or the grounds for extension of the period of limitation may be stated therein. It has been emphasized that the court should not, subsequent to the passing of the order taking cognizance, condone the delay and extend the period of limitation and that before taking cognizance of an offence after expiry of period of limitation, the accused is entitled to be given a notice and opportunity of hearing.

11. Since in the case on hand, the sanction for prosecution u/s. 197 Cr. P.C was accorded by the State Govt. vide order dated 10.5.91 i.e well within the prescribed period of limitation, there was no question for exclusion of time taken in procuring the prosecution sanction u/s. 470(3) Cr. P.C, because once the period of limitation commences, it does not stop. Had the prosecution sanction been accorded after the expiry of period of limitation, then definitely the time taken in procuring such sanction was liable to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. Therefore, in this case, the provisions of Sec. 470(3) Cr. P.C cannot be pressed into service. The challan against the petitioner for the offence under S. 218 IPC was filed after the expiry of prescribed period of limitation of three years and no explanation whatsoever was given for the inaction and delay in not filing the challan till 18.2.92 i.e for a period of about six and a half months. Before taking the cognizance, the learned Magistrate also did not issue any notice to the petitioner nor afford him any opportunity of hearing. Thus, the order taking cognizance against the petitioner dated 18.2.92 for the offences u/ss 193 and 218 IPC was ab initio void and illegal. The learned Magistrate also committed grave illegality in rejecting petitioner's application dated 30.4.92 pointing-out the inherent infirmities and illegalities in the order taking cognizance against him. Therefore, the impugned orders dated 18.2.92 and 9.10.92 amount to abuse of the process of the court and to secure the ends of justice, those cannot be sustained.

12. The upshot of the above discussion is that this petition is allowed and the impugned orders dated 18.2.92 and 9.10.92 passed by the learned A.M.J.M No. 1, Bikaner are hereby quashed and further proceedings against the petitioner Dr. Liyaqat Ali Gauri are hereby dropped and he is discharged of the offences under Ss. 193 and 218 IPC.

Liyaqat Ali Gauri v. The State Of Rajasthan

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rajendra Saxena, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Petitioner's) Arguments — Mr. M.L. Garg

Respondent (State/Public Prosecutor) Arguments — Mr. R.S. Rathore

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Liyaqat Ali Gauri v. The State Of Rajasthan

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