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  • Ss. 420 and 471 I.P.C and S. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • provisions of cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 469 of the Code.
  • cl. (c) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 468 of the Code.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Ss. 420 and 471 I.P.C and S. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • provisions of cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 469 of the Code.
  • cl. (c) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 468 of the Code.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was the accused in C.C.N. 10 of 1975 before the Special Judge, Bangalore, and was convicted by the trial court on 28 June 1976 for offences punishable under Ss. 420 and 471 IPC and S.5(2) read with S.5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The trial court sentenced him to one month rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100 for each offence (substantive sentences to run concurrently), with default terms. The appellant appealed (Cr. A. No. 563 of 1976) to this Court, which set aside the sentence because the appellant had not been heard under S.248(2) Cr.P.C., and remanded the matter to the trial court for hearing on sentence. The Special Judge re-heard sentence and on 28 March 1977 awarded a sentence of 5 days' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100 (with default terms) for each of the three offences, concurrent. The appellant filed the present appeal challenging that decision.

Substantively, while working as a Lascar in No. 26 Equipment Depot, Air Force, H.A.L., Bangalore, the appellant applied for medical advance (Ex. P.1) on 14-11-1971 for treatment of his wife and received Rs. 250 on 16-11-1971. He later filed a medical reimbursement claim (Ex. P.2) on 9-2-1972 for Rs. 293.40, enclosing prescription chits, cash bills and an essentiality certificate purportedly signed by a hospital medical officer. After adjustment for the earlier advance, Rs. 43.40 was paid on 28-3-1972. A CBI enquiry (preliminary enquiry registered 30-7-1973) and subsequent investigation led to registration of a case (2-7-1974) and charge-sheet (21-7-1975), alleging that the applicant had submitted forged documents and obtained the sums by false representation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in view of the amendment to S.195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C., prosecution for forgery under S.471 IPC in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a court (where that document is the subject-matter of the prosecution) requires a complaint in writing by the court before cognizance can be taken.
  2. Whether the offence under S.471 IPC was barred by limitation under S.468(2)(c) Cr.P.C., given the dates of commission alleged and the provisions of Section 469 regarding commencement of the period of limitation.
  3. Whether there was evidence to prove that the appellant presented the medical advance and reimbursement applications (Exs. P.1 and P.2) and received the amounts claimed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant's defense was one of total denial: he denied filing the medical advance and reimbursement applications and denied having received any amount.
  • At hearing, counsel for the appellant (Shri B.E. Kottiyan) raised two preliminary legal points: (a) that after the amendment to S.195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. a complaint in writing by the court was necessary for a prosecution under S.471 IPC in respect of a document produced in court; and (b) that the prosecution under S.471 was time-barred under S.468(2)(c) because cognizance was allegedly taken after the three-year limitation period.
  • On the merits, counsel contended there was no evidence to show the appellant presented Exs. P.1 and P.2 or received amounts under those applications.

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The prosecution relied on oral and documentary evidence: Exs. P.1 and P.2 (the applications) and various supporting documents (Exs. P.3–P.9, P.10(a), P.62, etc.).
  • Witnesses from the appellant's establishment (P.W.1 S. Vijayender Rao and P.W.2 Smt. A. George) identified the signatures on Exs. P.1 and P.2 as the appellant's.
  • P.W.14 (Accounts Officer) testified to payments: Rs. 250 advance and payment of Rs. 43.40 after adjustment, with acknowledgements recorded in the accounts (Ex. P.10(a)).
  • Hospital and expert witnesses (P.W.5, P.W.6, P.W.10, P.W.16, P.W.17) were relied on to show that Exs. P.3–P.9 were forged and that there was no hospital in-patient entry corresponding to the claimed treatment (P.W.15).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Criminal Appeal No. 617 of 1976 (reported: 1978 Cri LJ 1632) The decision held that when a document produced or given in evidence in a court is the very subject-matter of the prosecution for forgery under S.471 IPC, no complaint in writing by the court under S.195 Cr.P.C. is necessary for taking cognizance of that offence. The court applied the same reasoning to the first preliminary point in the present appeal and held that the bar in S.195 Cr.P.C. was not applicable to this case; accordingly prosecution under S.471 IPC could proceed without a court's written complaint in the circumstances of this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in structured stages:

  1. First preliminary point (S.195 Cr.P.C.): The court referred to and followed the reasoning in Criminal Appeal No. 617 of 1976 (1978 Cri LJ 1632), concluding that the amendment to S.195(1)(b)(ii) did not bar prosecution under S.471 IPC where the forged document produced in court was the very subject-matter of the prosecution. On that basis the court held the bar in S.195 was not applicable to the present case.
  2. Second preliminary point (limitation under S.468 and commencement under S.469 Cr.P.C.): The court analysed the statutory scheme: S.468(2)(c) prescribes a three-year limitation for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year but not exceeding three years; S.469(1)(b) provides that limitation may commence on the first day on which the commission of the offence comes to the knowledge of the aggrieved person or any police officer, where the commission was not otherwise known. The court accepted the prosecution chronology: alleged offences occurred between Nov. 1971 and Apr. 1972; the police officer P.W.18 first came to know of the commission on 30-7-1973 when a preliminary enquiry was registered; a regular case was registered on 2-7-1974 and the charge-sheet was placed on 21-7-1975. Because cognizance was taken on the charge-sheet dated 21-7-1975, which was within three years of P.W.18's knowledge (30-7-1973), the court concluded the prosecution was within the statutory limitation period under S.468(2)(c), read with S.469.
  3. Merits — evidentiary analysis:
    • The court noted there was no contest that the appellant was a public servant or that sanction for prosecution was lacking; those points were not pressed.
    • The primary factual dispute was whether Exs. P.1 and P.2 were presented by the appellant and whether he received payment on their basis. The court summarised the prosecution evidence: P.W.1 and P.W.2 (colleagues) testified they recognized the appellant's signatures on Exs. P.1 and P.2; P.W.14 (Accounts Officer) testified to payment of Rs. 250 (advance) and later payment of Rs. 43.40 after adjustment (with entries and acknowledgements recorded); P.W.20 and P.W.21 produced the appellant's personal file (Ex. P.62) and the trial judge compared signatures and accepted the testimony that the applications were signed and filed by the appellant.
    • On the documentary side, Ex. P.1 stated the wife was admitted as an in-patient at the Bowring and Lady Curzon Hospital on 11-11-1971. P.W.15 (hospital clerk) testified there was no in-patient entry for her. The appellant himself admitted his wife was not treated as an in-patient. Hospital documents (Exs. P.3–P.9) were proved to be forged by evidence of P.W.5, P.W.6, P.W.10, P.W.16 (handwriting expert) and P.W.17.
    • Having assessed the witnesses' credibility (including the lack of serious challenge to signature evidence and the Accounts Officer's incontrovertible evidence of payment), and the expert/hospital evidence showing the supporting documents were forged, the court concluded that the appellant knowingly used forged documents to obtain Rs. 293.40 from the defence establishment by dishonest inducement.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The appellant's conviction for offences under Ss. 420 and 471 IPC and S.5(2) read with S.5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was affirmed on the evidence; the appeal against conviction and sentence failed.
  • The appellant was ordered to surrender to his bail and undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence, if any.

Broader implications:

The opinion resolves the specific preliminary legal questions raised in this case by (a) applying the Court's earlier decision in Criminal Appeal No. 617 of 1976 to hold that S.195 Cr.P.C. did not bar prosecution under S.471 IPC in the factual circumstances of this case and (b) interpreting S.468 and S.469 Cr.P.C. to conclude the prosecution was within the statutory limitation period. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new, general legal principle beyond applying the earlier cited decision; the direct consequence is the upholding of the conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court on re-sentencing.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Nateshan v. The State Of Karnataka .

    1. The appellant in this appeal was the accused in C.C.N 10 of 1975 on the file of the Special Judges Bangalore, He was convicted for offences punishable under Ss. 420 and 471 I.P.C and S. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act as per his judgment dated 28th June 1976 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- and in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 15 days for each of the offences and directed the substantive sentences to run concurrently. The appellant challenged the said conviction and sentence in Cr. A. No. 563 of 1976 on the file of this court. This court set aside the sentence on the ground that the appellant was not heard as required by S. 248(2) of the Cr. P.C and remanded the matter to the trial court to hear the appellant regarding the sentence and then dispose of the matter. Thereupon, the learned Special Judges heard the appellant on the question of sentence and awarded a sentence of 5 days' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for five days for each of the three offences and directed the substantive sentences to run concurrently as per his judgment dated 28-3-1977. The appellant has filed this appeal questioning its correctness.

    2. The appellant was working as Lascar in 26, Equipment Depot, Air Force, H.A.L, Bangalore, As a public servant he was entitled to claim medical advance and medical reimbursement for the treatment of himself or any member of his family or his dependents. On 14-11-1971, the appellant presented an application for medical advance of Rs. 500/- for the treatment of his wife Smt. Chinna Kolandai. The advance was sanctioned and ordered to be paid in two Instalments of Rs. 250/- each, A sum of Rs. 250/- was paid to the appellant on 16-11-1971. The appellant filed the medical reimbursement application, for Rs. 293-40 on 9-2-1972 enclosing the prescription chits, cash bills and essentiality certificate purported to have been signed by P.W 17 Dr. Mir Asaf Ali, Medical Officer, who was working in the Bowring and Lady Curzon Hospital, Bangalore. A sum of Rs. 293-40 was ordered to be paid to the appellant towards medical reimbursement as claimed by him. After adjusting the advance of Rs. 250/- taken by the appellant, a sum of Rs. 43-40 was paid to him on 28-3-1972. On receipt of information, P.W 17 M.L Narasimha Murthy, Inspector of Police, S.P.E, Central Bureau of Investigation, conducted a preliminary enquiry which revealed that the appellant Page: 1643had filed false application enclosing forged prescription chits, cash bills and the essentiality certificate. He registered a case in R.C No. 19/74 against the appellant and submitted the F.I.R Part of the investigation was conducted by P.W 19 Aswatharamaiah. Later P.W 18 M.L Narasimha Murthy, took up the investigation and after completing the investigation, placed a charge-sheet against the appellant.

    3. The defence of the appellant was one of total denial. He denied filing of application for medical advance and also medical reimbursement. He denied having received any amount.

    4. The learned Special Judge, rejecting the defence and accepting the prosecution case, found the appellant guilty of the offences charged, convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid.

    5. Shri B.E Kottiyan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant raised two preliminary points, which he has not traversed in the grounds of appeal, at the time of arguments. As the questions raised being questions of law of some importance, he was permitted to do so.

    6. The first point canvassed was that in view of the amendment made under S. 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr. P.C 1973 (shortly called the ‘Code’) by deletion of the words “by a party to any proceedings in any court”, a prosecution for the offence of forgery under S. 471 I.P.C in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in court being the subject matter of the prosecution, cannot be taken cognizance by the court unless a complaint in writing is filed by that court. This legal question was elaborately argued in Criminal Appeal No. 617 of 1976: (1978 Cri LJ 1632) and a decision was rendered by me today holding that no complaint in writing by the court for taking cognizance of an offence under S. 471 I.P.C was necessary in a prosecution for the offence of forgery under S. 471 I.P.C committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence to court which was the very subject matter of that prosecution. The same reasons would hold good in answer to the first point canvassed in this appeal also. Hence, I hold that the bar contained in S. 195 of the Code would not be applicable to the case on hand.

    7. The second point canvassed was that the offence under S. 471 I.P.C for which the appellant was convicted was barred by S. 468 of the Code as the learned Special Judge took cognizance of that offence beyond the period of limitation of three years prescribed under cl. (c) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 468 of the Code. The material portion of S. 468 reads thus:

    “468 (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-sec. (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

    2) The period of limitation shall be.—

    a) xxxx

    b) xxxx

    c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding the year but not exceeding three years.

    8. The other section which is relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal is S. 469 which reads thus:

    “469. Commencement of the period of limitation.—

    1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender shall commence.—

    a) on the date of the offence; or

    b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or

    9. Undoubtedly, the offence under S. 471 I.P.C for which the appellant was convicted in this case, falls within the ambit of cl. (c) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 468 of the Code as the punishment prescribed for that offence is exceeding one year but not exceeding three years as provided under S. 471 read with S. 465 I.P.C According to the prosecution, the offence in question was committed by the appellant during the period Nov. 1971 and April 1972 while he was working as a Lascar in the Equipment Depot, Air Force, H.A.L, Bangalore by submitting false medical advance application on the basis of forged medical certificate for the alleged treatment of his wife as an in-patient in the Bowring and Lady Curzon Hospital, Bangalore and dishonestly and fraudulently induced the authorities to pay him an advance of Rs. 250/- and also further submitting application for reimbursement of medical charges of Rs. 293-40 enclosing forged essentiality certificate, prescription chits and cash memos and thereby induced the authorities to sanction his reimbursement claim of Rs. 293-40 and got adjusted Page: 1644the same against the advance amount of Rs. 250/- already drawn by him and collected the difference of Rs. 43-40 and thereby got pecuniary advantage to the tune of Rs. 293-40. On receipt of information regarding misuse of medical advance and reimbursement amount paid by No. 26, Equipment Depot, Air Force, H.A.L Bangalore, M.L Narasimha Murthy, P.W 18, Inspector of Police, S.P.E, Central Bureau of Investigation registered a preliminary enquiry on 30-7-1973 vide No. P. 13/73 against the appellant and one Azizuddin. After conducting a preliminary enquiry, he submitted a report to the S.P.E, Bangalore for permission to register a regular case. On getting clearance, P.W 18 registered a case against the appellant on 2-7-1974 and a charge-sheet was placed against him after completing the investigation on 21-7-1975. Thus it is clear from the above facts that though the offence in question was committed between Nov. 1971 and April 1972, P.W 18 came to know of the commission of the offence only on 30-7-1973 when he registered a preliminary enquiry. In fact, the case was registered against the appellant on 2-7-1974 based on the preliminary enquiry and the charge-sheet was placed within a year thereafter. Undoubtedly, the trial judge took cognizance of the offences including the offence under S. 471 I.P.C against the appellant on the charge-sheet placed before him on 21-7-1975 which was within three years from the date of the knowledge of the commission of the offence by P.W 18 who was the police officer who initiated the proceedings against the appellant on receipt of the information about the commission of the offence in question. The Defence Department which was aggrieved by the offences committed by the appellant did not come to know of them till P.W 18 initiated the proceedings. P.W 18 came to know of the commission of the offence on 30-7-1973. That being so, taking cognizance of the offence by the learned Special Judge on the basis of the charge-sheet placed before him on 21-7-1975 was within the period of three years as provided in cl. (c) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 468 of the Code. That it is as it ought to be in view of the provisions of cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 469 of the Code. In that view of the matter, I hold, that there is no substance in the ‘second preliminary objection raised on behalf of the appellant.

    10. This will take me straight to the merits of the appeal. It was not contended that the appellant was not a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the I.P.C It was also not contended that the prosecution of the appellant was bad for want of valid sanction.

    11. The only point canvassed by Shri B.E Kottiyan, learned counsel for the appellant was that there is no evidence to show that the appellant presented the applications Ex. P. 1 for medical advance and Ex. P. 2 for the reimbursement of the medical expenses and that he received any amount on the basis of those applications either by way of advance or reimbursement.

    12. To prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution placed reliance on the oral as well as documentary evidence. The applications Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2 were signed by the appellant were spoken to by P.W 1 S. Vijayender Rao and P.W 2 Smt. A. George. Both of them were the employees of No. 26, Equipment Depot., Air Force, H.A.L, Bangalore where the appellant was also working as a Lascar. They have claimed that they were acquainted with the signature of the appellant as he used to sign in their presence on different occasions. Their evidence has not been seriously challenged in their cross-examination as to their knowledge about the signature of the appellant. Besides it is also seen from the evidence of P.W 14 S.K John, Accounts Officer working in the same Equipment Depot during the relevant period that the applications Exhibits P. 1 and P. 2 must have been filed by the appellant as stated by P.W 2 because he had the occasion to deal with those applications in the course of his official duties for payment of certain amounts to the appellant. Further P.W 20 Thakur P.D.I.A.F Police NCO and PW. 21 S. Girija Bai, clerk working in the same establishment who were dealing with the personal file of the appellant Ex. P. 62 have proved the signature of the appellant in his personal file. The learned Special Judge after comparing the signatures found on Exs. P. 1 and P. 2 with the signature of the appellant in his personal file Ex. P. 62 has expressed his view that he was satisfied that the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 about the signature of the appellant on Exs. P. 1 and P. 2 represents the truth. Thus, the above evidence adduced by the prosecution, in Page: 1645my view, establishes that Exs. P. 1 and P. 2 must have been presented by the appellant.

    13. Now regarding the payment made to the appellant on the basis of Exs. P. 1 and P. 2, P.W 14 has stated in unequivocal terms on the basis of the documents that he paid Rs. 250/- to the appellant by way of advance of medical charges as per the order on the application Ex. P. 1, after obtaining the signature of the appellant as per Ex. P. 1 (e). He has further stated in his evidence that he paid a sum of Rs. 43-40 as per the order on Ex. P. 2 after deducting the advance amount of Rs. 250/- as per the entry found at Ex. P. 10 (a) for which the acknowledgment from the appellant was obtained. There was no motive whatsoever for P.W 14 to give false evidence against the appellant who was an employee working in the same establishment. Thus, the evidence of P.W 14 clearly establishes that the appellant had received from the establishment a sum of Rs. 293-40 towards the medical reimbursement in respect of the alleged treatment of his wife in the Bowring and Lady Curzon Hospital, Bangalore.

    14. It is next to be seen whether the wife of the appellant was really treated in the Bowring and Lady Curzon Hospital, Bangalore, as claimed in the applications, Ex. P. 1 and P. 2. It is stated in Ex. P. 1 that Chinna Kulandai, wife of the appellant was admitted as an in-patient in the Bowring and Lady Curzon Hospital, Bangalore on 11-11-1971 for treatment of jaundice-koma. It is reiterated in Ex. P. 2 that she was being treated in the’ said hospital. As per the evidence of P.W 15 Thejakumar, I Division Clerk, working in the Bowring and Lady Curzon Hospital, there was no entry in the in-patient register to show that the wife of the appellant was admitted as an in-patient in the said hospital on 11-11-1971 or on any other date. The appellant also admitted during the course of the trial that his wife was not treated in the hospital as an in-patient. However, he has produced Exs. P. 3 to P. 9 in support of his application Ex. P. 2 for the treatment of his wife in the Bowring hospital It is proved beyond any shadow of doubt from the evidence of P.W 5 Dr. B. Hanumaiah, P.W 6 Dr. Erappa Reddy, P.W 10 S.T Arasu, P.W 16 A.K Gupta, hand-writing expert and P.W 17 Dr. Mir Asif All, who was once working in the Bowring hospital that Exs. P. 3 to P. 9 are forged documents. Undoubtedly the appellant used Exs. P. 3 to P. 9 knowing them to be forged in support of his claim for medical reimbursement and obtained a sum of Rs. 293-40 from the defence establishment by dishonestly inducing the authorities to part with the said sum for which he had no legitimate claim. The learned Special Judge, in my view rightly, on correct appreciation of the evidence on record, reached the conclusion that the appellant has committed all the offences for which he stood charged. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The appellant shall surrender to his bail and undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence if any.

    15. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Nateshan v. The State Of Karnataka .
    (May 4, 1978)