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  • India Ferries Act, 1978 and the Control and Management of Ferries Rules, 1968
  • Assam Co-operative Societies Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • India Ferries Act, 1978 and the Control and Management of Ferries Rules, 1968
  • Assam Co-operative Societies Act
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — Lahiri, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns the settlement of a ferry (described as Dibru Sonati Burisuti Ferry) for the period 1.4.81 to 31.3.82 under the Northern India Ferries Act, 1978 and the Control and Management of Ferries Rules, 1968. Respondent No. 1 (the Executive Engineer or the authority responsible for inviting and receiving tenders) issued a tender notice stating tenders would be received up to 12 noon on 27th February 1981 and would be opened at that hour; tenderers or their authorised agents/representatives could be present at opening.

The petitioner is a registered Co-operative Society under the Assam Co-operative Societies Act and claims to have submitted a tender offering Rs. 6 lakhs through Shri Lakshmidhar Bora Deori. The petitioner alleges that although Shri Deori was recorded as present at 12 noon, Respondent No. 1 did not allow him to put the tender into the tender box, made an endorsement that it was received at 12:05 P.M., and consequently the petitioner's tender was not considered. A comparative statement prepared later (7.3.81) omitted the petitioner’s name and offer.

The petitioner challenged the settlement made in favour of Respondent No. 2 as violative of principles of procedural fairness/natural justice. The court examined whether the statutory public authorities acted fairly in leaving out the petitioner's tender and whether the settlement should be quashed or other relief moulded to protect public interest.

The petition was allowed to the extent indicated by the court's directions (see Holding). The records were ordered sent down and there was no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statutory public authorities, in the process of settling the ferry contract, were obliged to act fairly and observe the norms of procedural fairness or natural justice.
  2. Whether the authorities acted fairly in excluding or not considering the petitioner's tender which (the petitioner contends) was submitted before the 12 noon deadline.
  3. What relief is appropriate where an administrative decision is found to have been taken without observing procedural fairness but where quashing the decision could adversely affect public interest (i.e., whether and how relief should be moulded).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as represented by Mr. P.C. Kataki)

  • Statutory authorities settling ferry-boats exercise public functions affecting public interest and therefore must act fairly and quasi-judicially.
  • The procedure for settlement must conform to norms of procedural fairness; the authorities were obliged to act fairly and not arbitrarily exclude the petitioner's tender.
  • The petitioner’s tender was submitted in time (before 12 noon) through Shri Lakshmidhar Bora Deori, who was recorded as present, but was nonetheless not permitted to deposit the tender in the box and was thereafter excluded from consideration.

Respondents' / Other Parties' Submissions

  • The learned Advocate General for Nagaland conceded that the petitioner ought to have been fairly treated but argued that declaring the settlement void and quashing the order would create administrative chaos and adversely affect public interest. He noted Respondent No. 2 had been running the ferry satisfactorily and had invested substantial funds.
  • Learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 urged that, in reconsidering, the authority should take into account (i) that the term expires on 31.3.82, (ii) whether public interest would be upheld by settling the ferry with a person other than Respondent No. 2, and (iii) Respondent No. 2's investments and period already worked out — all relevant considerations in determining the settlement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Re Pergamon Press, 1970 (3) All E.R. 525 (541-543) It is not necessary to label proceedings as judicial/quasi-judicial/administrative; characteristics of the proceedings determine the applicable rules. The court relied on this to support the view that procedural fairness applies according to characteristics of decision-making bodies rather than labels.
Ridge v. Baldwin (1953) 2 WLR 935 An authority may be required to observe principles of natural justice even though the power is not judicial in character. Used to illustrate that administrative powers can attract natural justice/fairness obligations.
Re H.K. (An Infant) (1967) 2 WLR 962 Even if an administrative authority is not acting judicially it ought to act fairly; the concept of fairness favoured over rigid rules of natural justice. Invoked to show English acceptance of fairness in administrative decision-making.
R. v. Liverpool Corporation, Ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Owners Assn (1972) 2 Q.B. 299; Maxwell v. Deptt. for Trade and Industry (1974) Q.B. 523 Reiteration of the principles that administrative bodies should act fairly. Cited as further reinforcement of the trend toward procedural fairness.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) Rejecting restrictive concepts that certain dispensations (licenses/benefits) are mere privileges not attracting procedural protections. Referred to indicate the U.S. Supreme Court's movement away from privilege-right dichotomy in favour of procedural safeguards.
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) The Court rejected the idea that constitutional rights depend on characterization as right or privilege. Used to show erosion of privilege-right dichotomy and support for procedural protections.
Rajkumar Dilip Narayan Singha v. Assam Board of Revenue & ors., 1980 ILR Gauhati 99 (opinion by Lahiri, J.) Discussion of developments of fair play; State must act within rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standards and not arbitrarily in dispensing licences/contracts. Referred to for Indian authority (by the same judge) that administrative action must be structured by rational and non-arbitrary standards.
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 Administrative action may be subject to natural justice; failure to act fairly can be a standalone ground of challenge apart from Article 14. Relied upon to show that natural justice/fairness is an independent rule of administrative law applicable to settlements like tenders.
Maneka Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC 597 Illustration where the Court declined to make a consequential order to avoid administrative disruption. Used to support the proposition that a court may refuse to quash an administrative order where immediate quashing would cause public harm.
S. L. Kapoor, AIR 1981 SC 136 After holding an order invalid, the Court expressed concern about reinstatement leading to confusion/chaos; relief may be limited. Invoked to show caution in issuing consequential relief that might disrupt administration.
Swadeshi Cotton Mills, AIR 1981 SC 818 Even where principles of natural justice were violated, the Court refused to quash a takeover but directed a fresh, fair hearing within a time-frame. Applied as precedent for moulding relief: directing a fresh hearing instead of immediate quashing to avoid administrative chaos.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by characterising the nature of the function: settlements of ferry-boats under the Act and Rules are public/state functions affecting public interest and involving disposal of rights (toll collection) by public tender. Because these are public duties, the responsible public servants must "act fairly and reasonably" and the procedure must conform to procedural fairness.

The court surveyed a series of authorities (English, American and Indian) to establish the contemporary principle that procedural fairness applies to a wide range of decision-making bodies and that labels (judicial/quasi-judicial/administrative) are less important than the characteristics of the proceedings. The opinion cites Ridge v. Baldwin, Re Pergamon Press, Re H.K., Goldberg v. Kelly, Sugarman v. Dougall, Ramana Dayaram Shetty, and other cases to show that the requirement of fairness has been judicially evolved and is applicable to administrative actions, including tenders and settlements.

Turning to the facts, the court noted:

  • The tender notice stated the deadline (12 noon) and allowed tenderers or their authorised representatives to be present at opening, but it did not specify that tenders had to be placed in any particular box or prescribe an alternate deposit procedure.
  • Shri Lakshmidhar Bora Deori (the petitioner's secretary) was recorded by the Executive Engineer as being present at the time of opening (12.00 noon), and Mr. Deori swore that he had attempted to deposit the tender at about 11:55 but was not allowed to put it in the box and that the Executive Engineer recorded the envelope as received at 12:05 P.M.
  • The Executive Engineer filed no affidavit to counter Mr. Deori's sworn statement despite having personal knowledge; contemporaneous Annexure 'A' recorded Mr. Deori's presence at 12 noon.
  • There was no averment that the petitioner's tender contents (the Rs. 6 lakhs figure) were filled in after seeing other offers; nor any indication that the petitioner had not come prepared to deposit the tender.

From these facts the court concluded that the petitioner's tender had in fact been brought to and presented at the office before the deadline and that the Executive Engineer's insistence upon a later recorded time (12:05) and absolute non-consideration of the tender without recording reasons was arbitrary and unfair. The court emphasised that if a new internal practice (such as requiring deposit in a specific box) had been adopted, it should have been notified in the tender notice; absent such notice, the respondents could not defeat a tenderer's claim by creating a self-imposed rule.

The court observed that the proper course would have been to accept and open the tender, record the offer and, if necessary, endorse reasons for any non-consideration and leave the determination of validity to the settling authority. The omission to even record or consider the tender constituted a breach of fair play.

Despite finding the non-consideration and the impugned settlement illegal and violative of natural justice, the court weighed public interest considerations and precedents where courts have declined to grant immediate consequential relief to avoid administrative paralysis (citing Maneka Gandhi, S. L. Kapoor, Swadeshi Cotton Mills). The court therefore exercised its remedial discretion to mould relief that would vindicate fairness while mitigating disruption to ferry services and public convenience.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court held that the impugned order of settlement was violative of the principles of natural justice and that the absolute non-consideration of the petitioner's tender by the authorities was unfair and illegal.

Consequential relief and implications:

  • The court did not quash the impugned settlement order outright in order to avoid administrative chaos and prejudice to the public interest.
  • The court directed Respondent No. 1 to consider the petitioner's tender along with the other tenders and to dispose of the question of settlement afresh within 1 (one) month and 15 (fifteen) days from the date of the order, making such just and proper order as it deems fit.
  • The court expressly maintained the status quo: Respondent No. 2 shall continue to run the ferry on the existing terms and conditions of settlement until a fresh order is made.
  • If, upon reconsideration, the order is in favour of Respondent No. 2, such settlement shall be treated as a continuation of the previous settlement made in his favour by the authorities.
  • No order as to costs was made; records were to be sent down forthwith.

The decision vindicates the petitioner's right to have its tender fairly considered while moulding relief to protect public interest and avoid immediate administrative disruption; the court did not purport to lay down any new principle beyond applying established authorities on procedural fairness and remedial discretion.

    Uattar Paria Brahmaputra Jala Paribahan Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Executive Engineer, Inland Water Transport Division, Ulubari, Gauhati & Ors.

    Lahiri, J.:-

    The authorities empowered to settle Ferry-boats under the Northern India Ferries Act, 1978 and the Control and Management of Ferries Rules, 1968 are statutory authorities. They determine matters affecting -'public interest". The subject matter of settlements are "ferry-boats" for the public. The right to collect tolls are sold by "public tender'' and they are settled by "public authority". Therefore, it is a public duty of the public servants to "act fairly and reasonably". Naturally, the procedure for settlement must be in consonance with the norms of "procedural fairness". The combustive effect of the nature of the right, the manner of disposal of tenders, the nature and character of the power conferred aid the duties imposed on the authorities under "the Act" and "the Rules" are so articulated that it is obvious that they obligate the selling authorities "to act fairly and quasi-judicially". These are the submissions made by Mr. P.C. Kataki learned counsel for the petitioner while questioning the validity of the settle ment made in favour of Respondent No. 2.

    2. The new judicial trend is for procedural fairness; in all disciplines. The procedural fairness according to new jurispru dence is omnipresent in all decision-making bodies, At present it is unnecessary to label the proceedings judicial, quasi-judicial administrative, investigatory. We are tempted to quote the relevant statement of law laid down by Lord Justice Sachs in Re Pergamon Press, 1970 (3) All E.R. 525 (541-543) :-

    "...it is...not necessary to label the proceedings 'judicial' 'quasi-judicial/'administrative' 'investigatory', it is the characteristics of the proceedings that matter, in the precise compartment or compartments into which they fall"
    .

    Of course, the new trend emerged in Britain with the House of Lords' decision in Ridge vs. Baldwin (1953) -2 WLR 935. The decision propounded that an authority may be required to observe the principles of natural justice even though the power exercised by it "is not ex facie of a judicial character". It was observed :

    "from now on label consciousness and word worship may be less conspicuous features of administrative law in the courts......"
    .

    In Re H.K. (An Infant) (1967) 2 WLR 962, it was observed :

    "even though an administrative authority is not acting judicially it ought to act fairly (i.e. observe fair proce dure). The notion of "fairness" in preference to the rules of natural justice is gaining general acceptance in England" In R.V. Liverpool Corporation Ex-parte Liverpool taxi flee top. Assn, (1972) 2 Q.B. 299, Maxwell vs. Deptt. for Trade and Industry (1974) Q.B. 523, the principles have been reiterated.

    3. The American Court in Goldberg vi. Kelly, 297 U.S. 254 (1970) extricated the courts from the restrictive cobweb of analytical concept that conferment of licenses or settlements, operating in the field inherently inimical to the public welfare, is not a right but a privilege. The Supreme Court of America in Sugarman vs. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (544) (1973) held:

    "this court now has rejected the concept that consti tutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a right or as a privilege"
    .

    The privilege-right dichotomy is in the process of being completely eroded in America. In Rajkumar Dilip Narayan Singha vs. Assam Board of Revenue and ors. 1980 ILR Gauhati 99 one of us (Lahiri, J.) detailed the developments of the principles of fair play and observed as follows :

    "...In India it is now settled, that it is a rule of administrative law which has been judicially evolved by the Supreme Court as a check' against arbitrary power by the executive authority. The State policy being for the attainment of socio-economic justice, in every sphere of his activity an ordinary citizen comes into relation ship or direct encounter with State power holders. The Government in our State, is the regulator and dispenser of almost all services and dispenser of a large number of benefits like jobs, contracts, licenses, quotas, and so forth. The "valuables" dispensed by the Government is the nation's wealth. It is true that the Government is free as a private individual in selecting recipient for its largess. But the Government is still the Government and must be subject to restraints. Democratic Government cannot lay down arbitrary and capricious norms and standard for the choic3 of persons. Even in th3 matter of granting licenses quotas or largess, the Government can not act arbitrarily as it pleases. It must act within cer tain bounds, structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard- Any departure from such norm would be liable to be struck down unless it is shown that the act was not arbitrary but was based on valid principles "

    The quaint essence of the judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court after Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. Interna tional Airport Authority of India AIR 1979 SC 1628 in the filed of administrative law is that in administrative action may be held to be subject to the requirement of natural justice, because either it affects rights of interest or it may be simply held that it automatically involves a duty 'to act fairly" and in accordance with natural justice. It has been held in Ramana (supra) that the challenge against an order being violative of the principles of natural justice or failure to act fairly can be supported apart from Article 14. It has been thus observed by Bhagawati J. :

    "It has an independent existenc3 apart from Article 14 , It is a rule of administrative law which has been judicially evolved as a check against exercise of arbitrary power by the executive authority"
    (Emphasis added).

    4. Counsel for the parties do not dispute the correctness of the propositions of law. The only question is whether in the instant case the statutory public authorities have acted fairly in leaving out of consideration the tender submitted by the petitioner

    5. The petitioner is a registered Co-operative Society under the Assam Co-operative Societies Act and its members belong to the 'Listed Classes'. Respondent No. 1 issued a notice inviting tenders for settlement of Ferry styled as Dibru Sonati Burisuti Ferry for the period from 1.4-81 to 31.J.82. Indeed there was a clause in the Tender Notice reading

    "the tenders will be received up to 12 noon of 27th February 81 in the office of the undersigned and will be opened on the same day and hour. The tenders or their authorised agents/representatives may be present at the time of opening of tenders"
    . (Emphasis added)

    There are some clauses which provided that the tender would not be accepted on failure t6 comply with certain terms, however, there is nothing to show that submission of tender beyond 12 noon would be rejected. There was no direction in the Tender Notice that the tenders were required to be put in any box. The petitioner claims that upon ful filment of all the conditions it submitted its tender offering Rs. 6 lakhs through Shri Lakshmidhar Bora Deori but he was not allowed by Respondent No. 1 to put the tender in the Tender Box on the ground that he was late by 5 minutes and Respondent No. 1 made an endorsement on the envelope that the same had been received by him at 12.05 P.M. In terestingly, as required under the Tender Notice the presence of the tenderers/their authorised agents/representatives was recorded by Shri P. K. Banerjee, Executive Engineer (Respon dent No. 1) thus :

    "the following" persons are present at the time of opening Ferry Tenders at 12.00 noon on 27th February, 1981 :

    * * * * *

    6. Sd/-

    Lakshmidhar Bora Deori This shows that Shri Lakshmidhar Bora Deori, Secretary of the petitioner society was shown present at 12.00 noon either as the tenderer or agent or representative. The said Lakshmidhar Bora Deori has made a sworn statement before us that he wanted to present the tender in the box shown to him at 11-55 P.M. but his tender was received by Respondent No. 1 who did not allow him to put it in the box. Interes tingly, Shri P. K. Banerjee, Executive Engineer has not filed any affidavit countering the statements made by Shri Deori that he had presented the tender 5 minutes before the deadline. No explanation has been offered by the respondents as to why the Executive Engineer who had personal knowledge could not counter the allegations. From contemporaneous documents namely, Annexure 'A' it clearly appears that Shri Deori was recorded as an authorised person present at 12 noon. There fore, the Executive Engineer's own admission as to the status of Shri Deori as representative of the tenderer is well established by Annexure 'A'. It follows, therefore, that the tender of the petitioner had been received by the Executive Engineer before 12 noon. Surely Shri Deori did not present himself at 12 noon to show his face but with a definite purpose. Either he had the tender with him or he had presented the tender. So his presence was recorded by Respondent No. 1 as a ten derer/representative/agent. There is no way but to conclude that the tender of the petitioner was submitted "in the office of the Executive Engineer by 12 noon of 27th Feb. '81". Annexure 'A' clearly shows that the tender was submitted by the petitioner before 12 noon. It must have been received in the office of the Executive Engineer prior to 12 noon but the Executive Engineer might have personally received it at 12.05 P.M. and recorded the time. There is no averment that the petitioner's tender was written and the figure of Rs. 6 lakhs was put in after Shri Deori had seen the offers made by the other tenderers. There is no averment made that the petitioner did not come with the tender in the office of the Executive Engineer (Respondent No. 1) for depositing the same. Admittedly the office of the Executive Engineer was responsible for the delay caused to the petitioner, if there was any, in prescribing a new rule of putting the tenders in the Tender Box. This condition was not there in the tender Notice. Therefore, by a self-created rule of putting the tenders in a Tender Box, without intimating the same to the petitioner, the respondents cannot throw out the claims of the petitioner, even if there was a slight delay in putting the tender in the "box". In our opinion, the Tender Notice should have clearly indicated about the positive place for judgment of tenders, it should not have been left to the arbitrary discretion of the authority to defeat the claims of the tenderers. In any view of the matter, the Executive Engineer should have accepted the tender, opened the same, and, should have recorded the offer made with an endorse ment why the offer could not be accepted by him. The com parative statement was prepared as late as on 7.3.81 but the name of the petitioner and his offer are conspicuously absent in the statement. The least that should have been done was to open the tender of the petitioner, record the offer being about 50 thousand more than Respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 1 should have recorded the reasons for non-consideration of the tender, if any and left it to the settling authority to decide the validity of the tender. In our opinion, fair play in the administrative as well as quasi-judicial action was conspicuously absent in the instant case in so far as the petiti oner was concerned.

    6. For the foregoing reasons we have no hesitation to conclude that absolute non-consideration of the tender by the authorities was unfair and unjust and the impugned order of settlement is illegal. In the true tradition of the Bar the learned Advocate General, Nagaland also submitted that the petitioner ought to have been fairly treated on the facts and circumstan ces of the case but at the same time learned Advocate General has very rightly submitted that dispensation of justice should be to uphold the cause for justice to all and the cause of justice shall not be upheld in the public interest to declare the order of settlement as void and to quash the order of settle ment. It would create chaos and mismanagement in running of the Ferry-boat, a public conveyance. Further, the learned Advocate General submits that Respondent No. 2 is running the Ferry to the satisfaction of all, it is a short-term lease and Respon dent No. 2 has invested over a lakh of rupees and he should not be penalised for the remiss. The learned Counsel prays to mould the relief to meet the ends of justice according to the fact-situation of the case. The contention has a strong force.

    7. While dispensing justice some balancing is needed by the Court and the Court system must mould and project relief based on "fair play according to law". If we declare the entire order as void it would cause sufferance to the public. The authorities connected with the settlement would be incon venienced. It is necessary to protect "jus public" as the effect of declaration that the impugned order is void would fall heavily on the public exchequer and would adversely affect public interest. Respondent No. 2 would draw the benefit and might ask for damages for the loss and ultimately the members of the public shall have to pay.

    8. In Maneka Gandhi AIR 1978 SC 597 (sic) "declined to make a consequential order". In a plethora of cases their Lordships have refused to grant instant consequential order to avoid administrative crisis or paralysis or other causes which might adversely affect public interest. Further, it cannot be over-ruled that the authorities can take the same action again by removing the deficiency of non-consideration of the tender of the petitioner. In S. L. Kapoor AIR 1981 SC 136 after holding the order to be invalid, their Lordships expressed anxiety that if the Municipality was to be reinstated "it may lead to confusion and even chaos in the affairs of the Municipality . However in that case the Supreme Court was relieved of its anxiety in view of the appellant not pressing for such an order. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills AIR 1981 SC 818 the Supreme Court held that there was violation of the principles of natural justice but refused to quash the order of "take-over" but directed the Government to give "full, fair and effective hearing" to the undertaking within 3 months. The consideration for such a course of action appears to be that it would have created confusion and chaos if the undertaking was handed back to the owner and if after hearing the Government would have again passed "an order of takeover".

    9. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case we do not quash the order but direct Respondent No. 1 to consider the tender of the petitioner along with the other tenders within 1 month and 15 days from today. He shall make such just and proper order as it may deem fit. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 has very rightly contended that the authority should also take into consideration that (1) the term is going to expire by 31.3.82 ; (ii) whether public inte rest will be upheld in settling the ferry with any person other than Respondent No. 2 ; (iii) Respondent No. 2 had worked out the period and invested large amount for running the Ferry. Undoubtedly, these will be relevant considerations while considering the tenders of the parties.

    In the result, we hold that the impugned order was viola-tive of the principles of natural justice. However we main tain the "status quo" and direct Respondent No. 1 to con sider the tender of the petitioner along with other tenders and dispose of the question of settlement within 1 (one) month and 15 (fifteen) days from today. We make it clear that Respondent No. 2 shall continue to run the ferry on the terms and conditions of settlement until a fresh order is made. If the order is in favour of Respondent No. 2, the settlement shall be treated as a settlement in continuation of the pre vious settlement made in his favour by the authorities.

    The petition is allowed to the extent indicated adove. There is no order as to cost. Send down the records forthwith.

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    Comments

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