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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 561-A of the old Code)
  • Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. Misappropriation
  • provisions of Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 561-A of the old Code)
  • Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. Misappropriation
  • provisions of Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking quashing of criminal proceedings in Case No. 422 C of 1979 pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dibrugarh and challenging the order dated 12.9.1980 which framed a charge under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner.

The factual matrix, as narrated in the opinion, is as follows: In March 1977 the petitioner was President of the District Congress Committee (D.C.C.), Dibrugarh, and was allotted an Ambassador car (No. WMC 7307) by the All India Congress Committee (A.I.C.C.) for use by the D.C.C. On 21.3.1978 the petitioner left the Congress and joined the Janata Party. It was alleged that after ceasing to be President he did not return the car to the D.C.C. despite repeated reminders. A complaint was filed by the successor President, Sonaram Phukan, who alleged that the petitioner continued to use the car dishonestly and did not hand it over to the duly elected Vice‑President. The Magistrate examined two prosecution witnesses (the complainant Sonaram Phukan and Prodush Choudhury, an office‑bearer of the D.C.C.), who stated that the petitioner did not return the car and that A.I.C.C. advised legal steps; the witnesses referred to the car's market value as Rs. 40,000/-. On this basis the Magistrate held a prima facie case under Section 406 and framed the charge (the framed charge text is reproduced in the opinion). The petitioner challenged the framing of charge by filing the present petition under Section 482.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Magistrate correctly framed a charge under Section 406 IPC against the petitioner on the basis of the prosecution evidence.
  2. Whether the essential ingredient of dishonest intention (mens rea) required under Section 406 IPC is established by the prosecution evidence such that criminal proceedings should be permitted to continue.
  3. Whether, in exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court should quash the criminal proceedings and the order framing charge dated 12.9.1980 as an abuse of the process of the court or in the interests of justice.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. R. Gogoi, submitted that the essential ingredients of an offence under Section 406 IPC were absent from the prosecution evidence and that the Magistrate framed the charge without applying judicial mind to the presence of those ingredients.
  • It was argued that even assuming the prosecution witnesses' statements are taken at their face value, they do not establish the element of dishonesty, which is essential for Section 406; mere misappropriation without dishonest intention is insufficient.
  • Reference was made to cross‑examination answers indicating a factional dispute within the Congress committee and pending civil matters about ownership and rights over properties; it was submitted that the dispute was at most a civil matter and the complainant could seek civil relief rather than criminal prosecution under Section 406.

The opinion does not set out any detailed, adversarial legal argument advanced on behalf of the prosecution in response to the petition; the factual testimony of the two prosecution witnesses is described, but formal prosecutorial submissions are not recorded in detail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : AIR 1977 SC 1489 High Court's power under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings where continuation would be an abuse of process of court or where ends of justice require quashing; courts should prevent proceedings being used as weapon of harassment; material and nature of prosecution may justify quashing. The Court relied on this authority to affirm that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings at an early stage where the prosecution is a veiled weapon or the material on which it rests does not justify continuation; it supported the exercise of inherent powers to prevent abuse and to protect the accused from harassment.
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 Test for quashing at the initial stage: whether the uncontroverted allegations, taken prima facie, establish the offence; court may consider special features and whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue. The Court applied this test to determine that the uncontroverted allegations in the present record did not prima facie establish the offence under Section 406 IPC and that special features (the nature of the dispute) made it expedient in the interest of justice to quash the prosecution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying and analyzing the legal ingredients of an offence under Section 406 IPC. It observed that Section 406 (criminal breach of trust) requires: (a) entrustment of custody or management of property to a person, (b) misappropriation, conversion to one's own use, or disposal in violation of any legal direction or contract, and (c) that the misappropriation or conversion be accompanied by a dishonest intention. The Court emphasized that misappropriation simpliciter, without mens rea (dishonesty), would not attract Section 406.

On scrutiny of the material placed before the Magistrate — the complaint, the evidence of the two prosecution witnesses, and the order framing charge — the Court found that the element of dishonest intention was not shown. The opinion states that neither the evidence nor the impugned order contains a word about dishonest intention. The Court concluded that the learned Magistrate failed to apply judicial mind to this essential ingredient before framing the charge.

The Court then reviewed procedural safeguards applicable to framing of charge: it cited Section 245 CrPC (duty to discharge if no case is made out on prosecution evidence) and explained that framing a charge is a serious step affecting personal liberty and must be supported by reasons; a Magistrate cannot blindly accept the prosecution's view that a case exists.

The Court relied on the Supreme Court authorities (State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and Madhavrao Scindia) to articulate the standard for quashing at an early stage — namely, whether the uncontroverted allegations taken prima facie establish the offence and whether allowing the prosecution to continue would be an abuse of process or serve no useful purpose. Applying those principles to the facts, the Court concluded that the material disclosed at the stage did not establish the necessary criminal mens rea and instead indicated a dispute that could be civil in nature.

On that basis the Court held that the proceedings were of the type where criminal prosecution was not justified and that continuation would be an improper use of criminal process; therefore, the Court exercised its power under Section 482 to quash the proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings in Case No. 422 C of 1979 pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dibrugarh, including the order dated 12.9.1980 framing a charge under Section 406 IPC, are quashed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the accused (the petitioner) will not be required to stand trial on the framed charge under Section 406 IPC arising from the facts described in the complaint.
  • The Court determined that the facts as alleged, if proved, may amount to a civil wrong (recoverable in civil proceedings) but do not prima facie establish the criminal element of dishonest intention required for Section 406; accordingly criminal process was inappropriate in this matter.
  • The opinion applies established Supreme Court tests for early quashing under Section 482 CrPC; the decision does not purport to create new legal precedent but applies existing principles to the facts to prevent perceived abuse of criminal process.

This summary is strictly limited to the material and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or arguments beyond that source.

    Dipak Moormoo (Accused)- v. Sonaram Phukan (Complainant)-Opposite Party.

    1. This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of criminal proceedings in Case No. 422 C of 1979 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dibrugarh and the order dated 12.9.1980 passed in the said case framing charge under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner.

    2. The facts of the case in brief may be stated thus. On March, 1977 the petitioner, who was the President of the District Congress Committee (D.C.C, in short), Dibrugarh was allotted an Ambassador Car bearing No. WMC 7307 by the All India Congress Committee (A.I.C.C in short) for use in the said D.C.C The Car was being used as such. However, on 21.3.1978, the petitioner left the Congress and joined Janata Party. The allegation is that after leaving Congress and ceasing to be the President of the D.C.C the said Car was not returned to the D.C.C despite repeated reminders. A complaint was filed by the President of the D.C.C Dibrugarh. Shri Sonaram Phukan, the successor in office and in the complaint, it was alleged that though the petitioner ceased to be a member of the Congress Party and the President of the D.C.C Dibrugarh, he did not hand over the car to the complainant who was the duly elected Vice-President of the said Committee and took away the car and since then had been using it dishonestly as if the car was his own inspite of repeated requests to return the same. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations process was issued under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code by the Magistrate. The Magistrate examined two prosecution witnesses. One was the complainant himself, Sonaram Phukan, and the other Prodush Choudhury, an Office bearer of the D.C.C Both of them in their evidence narrated the background of the petitioner, the posts he was holding and that as he left the Congress Party he ceased to be the President of the D.C.C Both these witnesses deposed that as the petitioner did not return the car, they were asked by A.I.C.C to take legal steps against the petitioner for not returning the car the market value of which was Rs. 40,000/-. On the basis of the aforesaid statements made by the two prosecution witnesses in their deposition the learned Magistrate held that a prima facie case under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code was established against the petitioner and framed charge under that section. The charge was in the following language:

    “In March 1977 you being the President of D.C.C Dibrugarh were entrusted with Ambassador Car No. WMC 7307 by A.I.C for use of the said D.C.C and on 21.3.1978 you left the Congress and defected to the Janata Party without returning the said car to the D.C.C Dibrugarh and thus you committed criminal breach of trust of that car and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. And I hereby direct that you be tried by the said Court on the said charge.”

    3. The aforesaid has been challenged. Heard Mr. P.C Kataki, Senior Counsel and Mr. R. Gogoi, the learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. R. Gogoi, who argued the case, submitted that from a bare reading of the evidence of the two prosecution witnesses, it will be clear that the essential ingredients of an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code were totally absent and the charge was framed by the Court without applying its judicial mind in regard to the existence of the said essential ingredients. Mr. Gogol's submission, in other words, is that even if the statements made in the deposition of the two witnesses are taken on their face value, no case is made out of an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. It was pointed out that in order to bring a particular act within the purview of Section 406, it is necessary not only to establish misappropriation but also to prove that it was dishonest. Misappropriation per se will not attract Section 406 unless it is dishonest. It was submitted that the expression ‘dishonestly’ used in Section 406 cannot be ignored by the Court while deciding whether the ingredients of an offence were present or not, because that is one of the most essential ingredient. My attention was drawn to the cross examination of P.W 1 and P.W 2 wherein it was stated by the witnesses that there was some dispute regarding split of the Congress committee between two factions of the party and matters were pending in Court regarding ownership and rights over the properties. It was submitted by Mr. Gogoi that at the most the dispute may be a civil dispute and if the parties so desire they may approach the Civil Court for recovery of the car, but there is no case for filing of a complaint in Criminal Court for offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel. I have also perused the complaint, the evidence of the two witnesses, and the impugned order framing charge against the petitioner.

    4. It appears that the allegation in short is that the car allotted to the petitioner in his capacity as the President of the D.C.C, Dibrugarh was not returned by him after he ceased to be the President of the D.C.C and joined another party, despite repeated reminders and it was decided to take legal action for recovery of the said car. Filing of complaint, in the Criminal Court, it appears, was probably advised and action was taken accordingly.

    5. I have gone through the provisions of Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code which lays down the essential ingredients of an offence of criminal breach of trust. In order to constitute an offence under this section, it must be dishonest misappropriation, by a person in whom confidence is placed as to the custody or management of the property in respect of which the breach of trust is charged. There must be an en trust ment; there must be misappropriation or conversion to one's own use or use in violation of any legal direction or of any legal contract. Over and above, the misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest intention. Thus, from a reading of the section and perusal of the essential reqairements thereof, it is clear that dishonest intention is a necessary ingredient of an offence of criminal breach of trust as defined in Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. Misappropriation simpliciter would not attract the provisions of the said section. It is well settled that every offence of criminal breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of which the complainant may seek its redress for damages in the civil court, but every breach of trust, in the absence of mens rea, cannot legally justify a criminal prosecution.

    6. In the instant case, on a perusal of the facts as well as the order of the learned Magistrate, it appears that this aspect of the definition was completely lost sight of I do not find in the evidence as well as in the impugned order framing charge a word about dishonest intention.

    7. It is well settled that framing of a charge is serious matter and the Court has to apply its judicial mind before framing a charge, Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if upon taking all the evidence for proseoution under Section 244 the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate should discharge him, It is only when the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under that Chapter which in his opinion can be adequately punished by him, he should frame a charge against the accused. To come to the conclusion either way under Section 245 or 246 there must be material or record and the conclusion must be supported by reasons. It may be observed that the order framing a charge seriously affects a person's liberty and, therefore, it is the duty of the Court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. In this connection, the decision of the Supreme Court ia State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : AIR 1977 SC 1489 may be referred to. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court also held that in exercising power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 561-A of the old Code) the High Court can quash a proceeding if it comes to a decision that allowing the proceeding to continue will be abuse of the process of the Court or ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. It was also observed by the Supreme Court that “a Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding ia the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature”. The above legal position has also been reiterated in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692, dealing with the power of the High Court to quash a criminal proceeding at the initial stage it was observed:

    “The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage”.

    8. Applying the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the instant case. I am of the opinion that it is a fit case where the proceedings before the Criminal Court should be quashed. In a case of criminal breach of trust, as observed earlier, it is both civil and criminal wrong. There are situations where though it is preceded by civil wrong, it may or may not amount to criminal offence. The facts of the instant case clearly demonstrate that it is a case of the former type and not the latter. The facts, as alleged, if proved, may constitute a civil wrong and not a criminal offence. In view of what is stated above, the proceedings in Case No. 422 C of 1979 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dibrugarh including the order dated 12.9.80 are quashed.

    9. This petition is accordingly allowed.

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    Comments

    Dipak Moormoo (Accused)- v. Sonaram Phukan (Complainant)-Opposite Party.
    (May 31, 1989)