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  • provisions of Section 115(5) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956,
  • Section 115(5) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956.
  • SECTION 115 STATES REORGANISATION ACT 1956
  • provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution.
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  • provisions of Section 115(5) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956,
  • Section 115(5) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956.
  • SECTION 115 STATES REORGANISATION ACT 1956
  • provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Grover, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a female officer who obtained an M.Sc. in Botany in 1941 and entered college teaching service in 1941–43 (appointed part‑time Demonstrator in 1941 and Lecturer in Biology in 1943). After formation of the erstwhile Pepsu State, separate provisional seniority lists for the Education Department (Men's Branch and Women's Branch) were issued; the petitioner appeared in various lists at different positions, sometimes in lists headed "Women" and in other official lists in the Men's cadre (Annexures B, C, D, II and F are described). A final integration resolution of 23 September 1954 (published 25 September 1954) reconstructed cadres effective 1 September 1954 and in Annexure II headed "Men" the petitioner appeared at No. 3 under Professors; subsequent notifications likewise placed her among the Men's Branch in 1954.

In 1956 pay scales were revised, and the petitioner alleges that the Men's cadre Principals had a higher grade (350–1200) than the Women's cadre (400–850). In 1956 she learned the Pepsu Government intended to place her in the Women's cadre; she wrote representations (e.g., 26 April 1956) and received communications from officials. By memorandum dated 6 July 1956 (Annexure J / list Annexure K) the petitioner was included at No. 2 in a Women's cadre seniority list, which she challenged as discriminatory on the ground of sex under Article 16. Correspondence and representations continued through merger of Punjab and Pepsu (effective 1 November 1956), with various communications received up to the 1960s.

The petitioner was transferred on 26 April 1961 to Government College for Women, Patiala (which she asserts was the first time she was assigned to a Women's‑cadre post); she later worked at Government College, Dharamshala (from 10 July 1961 to 30 April 1963) and as Circle Education Officer, Ambala Division. On 22 May 1965 she was informed that her representation had been considered and rejected (Annexure X). In October 1965 she filed the present petition under Articles 226 and 227 seeking quashing of the orders dated 6 July 1956 (Annexure J) and 22 May 1965 (Annexure X) and a direction to be placed in the Men's cadre with seniority fixed accordingly.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner, a P.E.S. Class I officer, was accorded discriminatory treatment solely on the ground of sex in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution (the main issue framed by the Court).
  2. Whether delay or laches precludes judicial relief under Article 226 in this case (respondents raised limitation / delay as a preliminary objection).
  3. Whether the integration and final gradation lists prepared after merger (including integration under the advisory process mandated by Section 115(5) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and notification under Article 309) conclusively fixed the petitioner’s cadre/seniority and barred reopening the matter.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner's placement in the Women's cadre in 1956 was made solely on the ground of sex and therefore discriminatory and violative of Article 16.
  • She had consistently been posted to and worked in men's colleges and had been treated as if she belonged to the Men's cadre; she suffered prejudice to her promotion prospects by being placed in the Women's cadre (selection grade prospects differed materially).
  • If the 1956 order was void for unconstitutionality under Article 16, it could be ignored and the remedy under Article 226 remained available notwithstanding delay.

Respondents' Arguments (as set out in the return)

  • When the petitioner was first appointed there were no separate cadres (no women's college in erstwhile Faridkot at that time); the statements that she was placed in Men's cadre by Annexure B were denied.
  • For Degree Colleges, there were no separate cadres when the provisional and final seniority lists were made; the petitioner’s grade and postings (including Principal's grade allowed from 1 July 1955) are admitted, but it is denied that she ever belonged to the Men's cadre.
  • There was delay in finalizing the petitioner’s case, but the delay was due to unavailability of records and the need for careful consideration; no discrimination was practised.
  • Paragraph 16(v) of the return states that the petitioner was integrated in P.E.S. Class I (Women's Branch) with effect from 1 November 1956 by the Government of India; consequently, chances of promotion in Men's cadre did not arise and the final gradation fixed her position.

Counsel Submissions of Note

  • Mr. M.S. Pannu (for respondents) argued the petition is belated and should be dismissed for delay and laches; relied on the standard that the period of limitation for civil suits is a useful benchmark and that excessive delay may be unreasonable. He also contended integration concluded the matter and relied on the Advisory Committee under Section 115(5) and the final gradation notification under Article 309.
  • Mr. Hira Lal Sibal (for petitioner) argued that the 6 July 1956 order was void and ineffective as it contravened Article 16, and a void order can be ignored so that delay/laches would not bar relief under Article 226 when the petitioner is materially affected.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 1006 Principle that although the Limitation Act does not directly apply to Article 226, the maximum period fixed for civil suits is an ordinary benchmark to measure unreasonable delay in petitions under Article 226; where delay exceeds the civil limitation period it will almost always be treated as unreasonable. Used to frame the respondents' delay/laches objection and to assess whether the petitioner’s delay could be held unreasonable; the Court considered this authority when analyzing delay but held that if the impugned order is void for violating Article 16, delay would not bar relief.
Rajinder Parshad v. The Punjab State, 1966 A.I.R. 185 (P&H) : 1966 P.L.J. 28 (P&H) Full Bench guidance on effect of delay in Article 226 petitions: facts and circumstances must be considered and where relief sought would be barred if commenced as a suit, delay is likely unreasonable. Cited by the Court in assessing the delay question; the Court noted that within the limitation period facts and circumstances must be considered and reiterated that if a suit for identical relief would be time‑barred, the petition is likely to be regarded as unreasonably delayed.
Narayani Devi v. State of Bihar (Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1964) Authority referred to in the context of the legal approach to delay in Article 226 petitions. Referenced along with other authorities when considering whether delay should bar relief; formed part of the line of authorities guiding the Court's exercise of discretion on laches.
General Manager Southern Railway v. Rangachari, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 36 Held that "matters relating to employment" under Article 16 include not only initial appointment but also terms and conditions of service (salary, increments, leave, pension), and that promotion to a selection post is included within matters relating to employment; Article 16(1) guarantees equality of opportunity in such matters. The Court relied on this decision to conclude that shifting the petitioner from Men's cadre to Women's cadre affected her future promotion prospects (a matter relating to employment) and therefore engaged Article 16; applied to hold the 1956 action discriminatory and void in its effect on the petitioner’s promotion opportunities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured way:

  1. Framed the primary question as whether the petitioner was discriminated against solely on the ground of sex in violation of Article 16.
  2. Addressed the preliminary objection of delay/laches:
    • Recounted the authorities (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai; Rajinder Parshad; Narayani Devi) laying down that delay may render a petition unreasonable and that the civil limitation period is a useful benchmark.
    • Accepted petitioner's counsel's submission that if the 1956 order was void for violating Article 16, it could be ignored and delay would not bar relief when the petitioner is materially affected now. The Court found no infirmity in that contention and held that laches could not be sustained if the order was shown to be violative of Article 16 and void.
  3. Considered the respondents' contention that integration and the Advisory Committee's process finalized the petitioner’s placement:
    • Observed that paragraph 16(v) of the return referred to integration and that a published final gradation list (1957) placed the petitioner in the Women's Branch.
    • Found that the return gave only a sparse account (paucity of material) and that it was impermissible for respondents to rely on additional facts not in the return that the petitioner could not controvert.
    • Analyzed the limited role of the Advisory Committee under Section 115(5) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 — the Committee's function was to ensure integration according to the statute and rules, not to adjudicate constitutional invalidity of prior orders (i.e., whether the Pepsu Government's July 1956 orders were void under Article 16). The Court therefore rejected the contention that integration conclusively barred reopening the petitioner's specific claim of constitutional violation.
  4. Turned to substantive constitutional analysis under Article 16:
    • Reproduced Article 16(1) and (2) and relied on General Manager Southern Railway v. Rangachari to treat promotion and selection grade prospects as matters falling within "matters relating to employment" protected by Article 16.
    • Found that if the petitioner was in the Men's cadre by virtue of the 1954 reconstruction but was shifted to the Women's cadre in 1956 on the stated ground that the Government accepted the prevailing Punjab practice of separate men's and women's cadres, that shift was essentially and principally on the sole ground of her being a woman.
    • Noted the uncontroverted admission that continuation in the Men's cadre would have entitled the petitioner to a selection grade appointment shortly, whereas remaining in Women's cadre would delay promotion for years; this established concrete prejudice to her promotion prospects.
    • Concluded that the 1956 exclusion from the Men's cadre was therefore discriminatory under Article 16(2) (prohibition of discrimination on grounds including sex) and that the order was void and ineffectual as against the petitioner.
  5. Remedial conclusion:
    • Because the 1956 order was void for violating Article 16 and produced prejudicial consequences for the petitioner, she was entitled to have the consequential effects set aside and her position restored/fixed in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed. The Court directed that the orders dated 6th July, 1956 embodied in Annexure "J" and 22nd May (as referred to in the opinion) contained in Annexure "X" be treated "as null, void and ineffective" so far as they affect the petitioner, and that the respondents fix the petitioner’s position in the appropriate cadre in accordance with law. The Court made no order as to costs. (Mehar Singh, Acting C.J., concurred.)

Implications:

  • The direct practical consequence is that the specific 1956 action which placed the petitioner in the Women's cadre (and the later referenced order in Annexure X) is set aside insofar as it affects her; the respondents are directed to place her in the appropriate cadre and fix seniority according to law.
  • The Court did not purport to lay down a new, broad precedent beyond applying established authorities (notably General Manager Southern Railway v. Rangachari) to hold that cadre assignment which prejudicially affects promotion prospects solely on the ground of sex violates Article 16; in this case the Court treated the specific administrative orders as void as applied to the petitioner.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the facts, arguments, authorities and conclusions contained in the provided opinion and does not infer or add materials beyond the text of the judgment.

    H.M. Dhillon v. State Of Punjab And Another

    Grover, J. - The main point for determination in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is whether the petitioner, who is a member of P.E.S. Class I, has been accorded discriminatory treatment only on the ground of sex in violation of the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioner, who passed the M.Sc. examination in Botany of the Punjab University with distinction in 1941 and who was appointed a part-time Demonstrator in Botany Department of the Government College, Lahore in the same year, was appointed as a Lecturer in Biology in Brijindra College Faridkot, by means of an order dated 31st December, 1943 (Annexure A). After the formation of the erstwhile Pepsu State, a provisional seniority list was issued by the Pepsu Government on 24th May, 1949. This list was issued separately with regard to gazetted officer of the Education Department (Men's Branch) and (Women's Branch). The petitioner's name appeared in the women's list at No. 1. She was transferred as Professor of Biology to Mahendra College, Patiala, in 1949 and was the only woman Professor on the staff of the College. According to the petitioner, she made a representation to the Pepsu Government against her having been placed in the Women's cadre which was accepted and the Director of Public Instruction, Pepsu, published a list of postings and nomination of gazetted officers of the Education Department (Annexure B). In this she appeared at No. 8 among the Heads of Departments in Colleges carrying a grade of 350-750. There was another lady Miss B. Kaku Singh who appeared in the same list at No. 9. A provisional seniority list of all the officers intergrated in Patiala and East Punjab States Union Education Service (PUES) Class I and Class II was issued by means of a memorandum dated 11th March, 1954 vide Annexures C and D. In this seniority list the name of the petitioner appeared under the head "Professors and Heads of Departments of the Colleges PUES Class I and this list apparently was of the cadre assigned to men because there was a separate cadre of women as is clear from page 4 of Annexure D. According to Annexure C, if any officer had an objection to the position assigned in the list to him or her, that could be submitted within a specified period. In the Extraordinary Gazette dated 25th September, 1954 the resolution relating to the final integration of the Education Service dated 23rd September, 1954 was published and it was stated that after a careful consideration of the appeals of the incumbents His Highness the Rajpramukh was pleased to resolve as follows :- "(a) the scales of pay of different kinds of posts in the Patiala Union Education Service together with the sanctioned strength shall be as specified in Annexure I to this Resolution. (b) Annexure II shows the list of officers integrated in different classes of the service with effect from Ist September, 1948 and their order of seniority". It was further resolved that the orders regarding reconstruction of the cadre were to take with effect from 1st September, 1954. In Annexure II which was headed "Men" the petitioner was shown at No. 3 under Professors. The women's cadre was different and the name of the petitioner did not appear in that cadre. A notification was actually issued in the Extraordinary Gazette of 27th September, 1954 (Annexure F) showing the reconstruction and reorganisation of the P.U.E.S. Service and there also the name of the petitioner appeared at No. 2 in the list pertaining to the Men's Branch whereas the names under the Women's Branch were of ladies other than the petitioner. 3. According to the petitioner, in the erstwhile Pepsu State the Education Department had bifurcated the cadres of the Education Service - one being of men and the other of women - and that she had been placed in the cadre of men because she was always posted to and worked at men's college or institution. By means of a resolution dated 5th February, 1956 (Annexure "G"), the pay scales were revised. The revised pay scales in terms of the resolution dated 1st October, 1955 were as follows :- "Designation Present Grade Revised Grades EDUCATION Principal 350-900 350-40-950/50-1200 Do 350-800 (Men) 350-40-750/40-950/50-1200. Do 350-700 400-25-625/25-850 (Women) Heads of Departments 350-750 350-40-750/40-950. Do 200-600 200-25-550/25-750 (Men) Principals 200-600 550/30-650 [Women] Lecturers. 200-400 x x x x". According to the petitioner, she was working in Men's cadre and was entitled to the grade meant for the Principal which was 350-1200. In the Women's cadre the grade for the same class of post was 400-850. 4. The petitioner says that in the year 1956 she came to know that the Pepsu Government intended putting her in the Women's cadre of PUES Class I. She addressed a letter dated 26th April, 1956 to the Education Minister when she was Principal, Rajindra College, Bhatinda, (Annexure "H"). This is what she said in that letter. "Ever since I joined Rajindra College Faridkot in 1943 I have been working in men's colleges and have been enjoining the same grade and privileges as men officers. On the formation of Pepsu in 1948 when provisional seniority list was drawn up my name was shown in the women's cadre. I submitted representation to the Government for rectifying this mistake and place me in men's cadre as a result of which I was given my due and my name was included in men's cadre. Ever since then I have always been shown as a member of men's cadre in the Education Department". According to her, any such proposed action would be violative of the equility of status guaranteed by the Constitution. She received a reply from the Director of Public Institution dated 7th July, 1956 (Annexure "I" saying that the Government had decided to accept the prevailing practice in the Punjab and in view of the decision no action could be taken. Thereafter the Pepsu Government issued a seniority list of the Women's cadre (Annexure "K") by a memorandum dated 6th July 1956 (Annexure "J") and the petitioner's name was included at No. 2 in this cadre. She sent a representation to the Chief Secretary to the Pepsu Government dated 24th July, 1956 (Annexure "L") stating her entire case pointing out that she had been given Principal's grade i.e., 350-800 with effect from 1st July, 1955 vide notification dated 22nd December, 1955 and after the revision of the grades with effect from 1st January, 1956 she was entitled to Rs. 350-1200 grade in which the Principals of men's college were placed. She made a categorical statement that during her entire service she had always been working in men's colleges and that the decision to put her in the women's cadre was made on the sole ground of sex which was discriminatory and violative of Article 16. She was informed by the Director of Public Instruction by his letter dated 13th August, 1956 and also by his letter dated 1st October, 1956 that her case was receiving active consideration of the Government (Annexures "N" and "O"). According to the petitioner, the Legal Remembrancer's Office also gave opinion in her favour but meanwhile Punjab and Pepsu were merged with effect from 1st November, 1956 and the petitioner's case came up before the Punjab Government for decision. She was informed by means of a communication dated 29th October, 1956 (Annexure "P") that the same was receiving consideration. The petitioner then received a letter from the Director of Public Instruction dated 19th February, 1957 (Annexure "Q") that her representation could not be entertained as the Men's and Women's cadres in the erstwhile State of Pepsu had been bifurcated by the competent authority before merger so as to bring the position in conformity with the Punjab pattern. 5. The petitioner persisted in her claim that she should not have been taken out of the Men's cadre and put in the Women's cadre by the erstwhile Pepsu Government and she sent a representation to the Secretary, Education Department, Punjab Government dated 6th March, 1957 (Annexure "R"). The Secretary with the Director of Public Instruction on 20th September, 1957 that the petitioner's representation had been considered and filed (Annexure "S"). The petitioner made a representation to the Education Minister by means of a letter dated 4th October, 1957 (Annexure "T"). The Minister informed her that representation had been sent to the Education Department. He sent a reply on 17th October, 1957 (Annexure "U"). A good deal of correspondence followed extending over a long period between the office of the Minister and the petitioner on the one hand and the Director of Public Instruction and the petitioner on the other. According to the petitioner, she was informed by the Minister that since the Department had not submitted the comments the matter was still not disposed of. In the year 1961 she was again informed that her case was under active consideration. 6. By an order dated 26th April, 1961, the petitioner was transferred to Government College for Women, Patiala. The petitioner asserts that this was the first time that she was assigned a post which was in Women's cadre. She immediately represented to the Education Secretary as also the Education Minister that she should not be transferred to Women's cadre till her case was decided (Annexure "W"). At the interview which she had with the Minister she informed that she would not be sent to women's college but would be posted to men's college. Ultimately on 10th July, 1961 she was posted to Government College, Dharamshala where she worked up to 30th April, 1963 when she was posted as Circle Education Officer, Ambala Division. The petitioner again entered into correspondence for the purpose of seniority in the Men's cadre. According to her, she was informed on 22nd May, 1965 for the first time that her representation in the aforesaid matter had been considered by the Government and rejected (Annexure "X"). The present petition was filed in October, 1965 seeking the quashing of the orders of the Government dated 6th July, 1956 (Annexure "J") and 2nd May, 1965 (Annexure "X") and a further prayer was made that she should be directed to be put in the Men's cadre and her seniority be fixed accordingly. 7. In the return which has been filed on behalf of the respondents it was maintained that when the petitioner was appointed for the first time in Faridkot there was no question there being two cadres, namely, of men and women because there was no women's College in the erstwhile Faridkot State. It was denied that Annexure "B" contained any order whereby the petitioner was placed in Men's cadre. As regards the provisional joint seniority list which was prepared and circulated with memorandum dated 11th March, 1954 (Annexure "C"), it was stated that for Degree Colleges there were no separate cadres for men and women as there was no separate college for women at all that time. As regards the final seniority list which was notified on 23rd September, 1954, it was repeated that for Degree Colleges there were no separate cadres. It was stated with reference to the notification dated 24th September, 1954 published on 27th September, 1954 that the name of the petitioner appeared amongst P.U.E.S. Class I Heads of Departments in the grade of 350-750 and the posts of Heads of Departments in Degree Colleges were not separately shown for men and women. It was admitted that the petitioner had been posted as Principal Rajindra Government College, Bhatinda, on 18th October, 1954 and that she was allowed the Principal's grade viz. 350-800 with effect from 1st July, 1955. It was stated that the grade of pay of Principals in the men's as well as women's colleges was the same viz. 350-800. It was stoutly denied that the petitioner ever belonged to the Men's cadre and her seniority having been fixed amongst women's officers was fully justified. Various representations alleged to have made by the petitioner were not denied. It was admitted that there had been delay in finalising the case but it was claimed that such a delay was inevitable in view of the fact that the record in regard to the appointment etc. of the petitioner was not available. Moreover, the matter was a ticklish one and required consideration at length at various levels. It was asserted that no discrimination had been practised against the petitioner so as to entitle her to any relief. In paragraph 16(v) it was stated that the petitioner who did not belong to the Men's cadre was integrated in P.E.S. Class I Service (Women's Branch) with effect from 1st November, 1956 by the Government of India. In view of this the question of considering her chances of promotion in the Men's cadre did not arise. On the women's side her chances of promotion to the selection grade of 1250-1500 and even super time scale of 1800-2000 were open to the petitioner even in her present position. 8. In her replication the petitioner reiterated that although many vacancies had occurred in women's colleges in the erstwhile Pepsu State she had never been posted any of those colleges and had always been posted to a men's college. Even after 1956 the same position continued. It was submitted that the reply of the State that there was no Degree College for Women in Pepsu was not correct. It was pointed out that the Government College for Women in Patiala had been in existence since 1951 i.e. long before 19th March, 1954 when the provisional seniority list was issued. In paragraph 5 of the replication the necessary facts were stated to illustrate that Women's cadre in Pepsu was a separate cadre which was also clear from the notification of the Government dated 23rd September, 1954. In paragraph 16 of the replication it has been pointed out that if the petitioner remains in the Men's cadre, she will very shortly get the selection grade whereas if she remains in the Women's cadre she will have to wait for years before she gets the selection grade. 9. Although in the return no objection on the ground of delay and laches was raised but Mr. M.S. Pannu, learned counsel for the respondents, has sought to urge in arguments that the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground that it is very much belated. According to Mr. Pannu, the petitioner is really seeking to get rid of the orders contained in Annexure "J" dated 6th July, 1956 and even in she were to file a suit for a declaration that that order was bad for consequential relief for avoiding the effect of that order, that would have been barred under the law of limitation. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 1006, it was said that although the provisions of the limitation act did not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226, the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil Court must be brought might ordinary be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 could be measured. It was also observed - "This Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable". In Rajinder Parshad v. The Punjab State, 1966 A.I.R. 185 (P&H) : 1966 P.L.J. 28 (P&H), a Full Bench of five Judges had an occasion to consider the effect of delay on a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. After referring to the above decision of the Supreme Court and another decision of their Lordships in Narayani Devi v. State of Bihar (Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1964 decided on 22nd September, 1964), it has been said by my learned brother Mehar Singh, J. who delivered the main majority judgment that in deciding the effect of delay within the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act the facts and circumstances of a particular case will have to be considered for the exercise of Judicial discretion. It would, however, seem to be clear from the decision of the Supreme Court as also of the Full Bench that if the delay is of such a nature that even a suit seeking identical reliefs would be barred under the Limitation Act the same would be regarded as unreasonable. Mr. Hira Lal Sibal, learned counsel for the petitioner, points out that the order of July, 1956 of the erstwhile Pepsu Government was void and ineffective as it was hit by Article 16 of the Constitution. If it is a void order then it could be simply ignored by the petitioner and the question of laches, delay or bar of limitation would not arise and the petitioner could seek appropriate reliefs under Articles 226 as and when she was likely to be materially affected to her prejudice by such void order. Mr. Pannu has not been able to show any infirmity in his contention of Mr. Sibal and it is not possible to see how the objection on the ground of laches can be upheld if the petitioner succeeds in establishing that the order of July, 1956 was violative of Articles 16 of the Constitution and was wholly void and ineffective and that since her prospects in her matter of promotion to the selection grade are being affected only now it is open to her to seek the reliefs agitated in the petition irrespective of the point of time when the aforesaid order was made. 10. The next contention of Mr. Pannu which is also of a preliminary nature is based on paragraph 16(v) of the return. It is said that since the petitioner had been integrated in the P.E.S.I. (Women's Branch) with effect from 1st November, 1956 by the Government of India the question of her inclusion in a particular cadre stands concluded and settled and cannot be reopened. Mr. Pannu has produced an official publication of the joint seniority list of the Punjab Education Department P.E.S. (Women's Branch) as it stood on 1st November, 1956 which was printed in 1957. In this list the petitioner's name appeared at No. 6 in the grade of 400-25-625/650-25-850. According to Mr. Pannu, it was open to the petitioner to have made a representation for consideration of the Advisory Committee constituted by the Central Government in the matter of integration of services after the merger of the erstwhile Pepsu and Punjab States in 1956. It is also contended that it should be presumed that the seniority etc. of the petitioner was determined in accordance with the directions of the Advisory Committee of the Central Government constituted under Section 115(5) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. A copy of the Gazette notification dated 31st July, 1963 has been produced. It is stated therein that in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and in accordance with the decision of the Government of India under the provisions of Section 115(5) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the Governor of Punjab is pleased to publish the final gradation lists of P.E.S. Class I (Men's Branch) and (Women's Branch) of the Education Department which shall be in force retrospectively from 1st November, 1956. The name of the petitioner appears at No. 6 in the Women's Branch. These matters were not clearly and properly stated in the return in paragraph 16(v) which alone embodies the statements relating to the final list prepared after integration. 11. Now, owing to the paucity of the material facts stated in paragraph 16(v) of the return it is hardly open to Mr. Pannu to rely on additional facts and material which the petitioner has had no opportunity to controvert. At any rate, it is difficult to understand how the Advisory Committee of the Central Government constituted under Section 115 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 could go into the question whether the orders of the erstwhile Pepsu Government made in July, 1956 which had the effect of putting the petitioner in Women's cadre were void and unconstitutional being violative of Article 16. The function of the Advisory Committee was limited to seeing that integration of the services took place according to the provisions of the statute as also the rules and such other directions as were issued in the matter. It does not appear nor has it been shown that the case of the petitioner in particular was considered at any time by the Advisory Committee constituted by the Central Government and that any decision was given to the nature which is now sought to be invited by the petitioner. The objection of Mr. Pannu, therefore, that this Court should decline to interfere because of the reasons adverted to by him cannot be entertained. 12. Now, the real point which calls for decision is whether the implementation of the decision of the Pepsu Government as embodied in Annexure "J" was void and ineffective as against the petitioner on the ground that it was violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. The relevant part of that Article may be reproduced :- "16. (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be inelligible, for or discrimination against in respect of any employment or offices the State. x x x x x". In General Manager Southern Railway v. Rangachari, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 36, it has been laid down that matters relating to employment cannot be confined only to the initial matters prior to the act of employment. The other matters relating to employment would inevitably be the provision as to the salary and the periodical increments therein, terms as to leave, as to gratuity, as to pension and as to the age of superannuation. It has further been observed that any provision as to the qualifications for the employment or the appointment to office reasonably fixed and applicable to all citizens would certainly be consistent with the doctrine of the equality of opportunity; but in regard to employment, like other terms and conditions associated with and incidental to it, the promotion to a selection post is also included in the matters relating to employment, and even in regard to such a promotion to a selection post all that Article 16(1) guarantees is equality of opportunity to all citizens who enter service. The following observations of Gajendragadkar, J. at page 41 are pertinent :- "In this connection it may be relevant to remember that Article 16(1) and (2) really give effect to the equality before law guaranteed by Article 14 and to the prohibition of discrimination guaranteed by Article 16(1). The three provisions form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. If that be so, there would be difficulty in holding that the matters relating to employment must include all matters in relation to employment both prior, and subsequent, to the employment which are incidental to the employment and form part of the terms and conditions of such employment. Article 16(2) provides that no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex descent, place of birth residence or any of them, be inelligible for, or discriminated against in respect of any employment or office under the State. This sub-Article emphatically brings out in a negative form what is guaranteed affirmatively by Article 16(1). Discrimination is a double-edged weapon; it would operate in favour of some persons and against other; and Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination and thus assures the effective enforcement of the fundamental right of equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 16(1)". 13. If the petitioner was included in the Men's cadre as a result of the resolution relating to the final integration of the Education dated 23rd September, 1954 pursuant to which the cadre was reconstituted with effect from 1st September, 1954 and if she was shifted to the Women's cadre subsequently in the year 1956 on the ground that the Government had decided to accept the prevailing practice in the Punjab of separate cadres for men and women, there can be no escape from the conclusion that that was done essentially and principally on the sole ground that she was a women. Such an action immediately attracted the applicability of Article 16(2) inasmuch as her future chances of promotion were prejudicially affected. It is common ground and it has not been disputed by Mr. Pannu that if the petitioner had continued to remain in the Men's cadre she would be entitled to appointment to a post in the selection grade shortly but that if she remains in the Women's cadre she will have to wait for a number of years before she could get promoted to the selection grade. In view of this admitted position it is unnecessary to consider or dilate upon any other prejudice in the matter of annual increment, grade etc. which the petitioner would have to suffer owing to the action taken by the erstwhile Pepsu Government in 1956. The case of the petitioner consequently would be fully governed by the rule laid down by their Lordships in the above decision and it must, therefore, be held that the exclusion of the petitioner from the Men's cadre in the year 1956, was based solely on her sex. It must also be remembered that the petitioner throughout has been working as if she belonged to the Men's cadre because she never filled any post or appointment which was earmarked for the officers in the Women's cadre. The discrimination which was practised against the petitioner in the year 1956 by the erstwhile Pepsu Government solely on the ground of sex resulted in all the consequences which flowed from the decision taken in 1956 and, therefore, when that order was void and ineffectual the petitioner is fully entitled to ask for the setting aside of the consequential effect of what happened in 1956. 14. For the reasons given above, this petition is allowed and an appropriate writ or direction shall issue to the respondents to treat the orders dated 6th July, 1956 embodied in Annexure "J" in so far as it affects the petitioner and 22nd May, 1956 contained in Annexure "X" as null, void and ineffective and to fix the position of the petitioner in the appropriate cadre in accordance with law. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Mehar Singh Acting, C.J. - I agree. Petition allowed.

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    H.M. Dhillon v. State Of Punjab And Another
    (May 12, 1966)