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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • rule 5.32 (c) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume II, and rule 25.2 (c) (i) of the Punjab Tahsildari Rules
  • SECTION 82 PUNJAB REORGANISATION ACT 1966
  • provisions of the State Reorganisation Act of 1956
  • Sub-section (6) of Section 82
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • rule 5.32 (c) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume II, and rule 25.2 (c) (i) of the Punjab Tahsildari Rules
  • SECTION 82 PUNJAB REORGANISATION ACT 1966
  • provisions of the State Reorganisation Act of 1956
  • Sub-section (6) of Section 82
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Bal Raj Tuli, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This order disposes of several Civil Writ petitions consolidated because they involved common questions of law and fact: Civil Writs Nos. 2027 of 1967 (Amar Singh v. State of Haryana and Others), 25 of 1968 (Banwari Lal v. State of Haryana and Others), 919 of 1968 (Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana and Others), 1464 of 1967 (Sant Singh v. State of Haryana and Others), 1693 of 1967 (Ram Kishore Bhardwaj v. State of Haryana and Others), and 1773 of 1967 (Chaman Lal Setia v. State of Haryana and Others).

The petitioners had been appointed as temporary Block Development and Panchayat Officers (BDOs) by the State of Punjab on recommendations of the Punjab Public Service Commission, while retaining li'en in their parent State service posts. Appointments placed them on two years' probation (extendable), with reversion or termination possible if work/conduct were unsatisfactory; no maximum probation period was prescribed. Appointment letters specified that confirmation as BDO would depend on the post becoming permanent and passing departmental examinations and stated the post was temporary but likely to continue.

For example, a communication dated April 22, 1964 (concerning Amar Singh) certified completion of probation from 27 January 1964, but expressly stated that confirmation would depend on availability of permanent posts and that the certificate would not bar the State from taking action if conduct was actionable.

By an order of the Governor of Haryana dated July 4, 1967 (communicated July 10, 1967), four of the petitioners were reverted to their parent departments on the ground that their services were no longer required. These reversions and, in one case, a termination, were challenged by the petitioners by filing the cited writ petitions. Written statements were filed in response.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether reversion or termination of the petitioners from their temporary BDO posts, while junior officers were retained, violated Article 16 of the Constitution (equal opportunity) or otherwise invalidated the orders.
  2. Whether the State of Haryana had jurisdiction to pass impugned orders in respect of officials provisionally allocated to Haryana under Section 82 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (i.e., whether provisional allocation prevented Haryana from taking the impugned action).
  3. Whether the termination (as distinct from reversion) of Sant Singh — a permanent Government servant with a li'en in the Education Department — without following the procedure under Article 311 of the Constitution, was lawful.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • That Block Development and Panchayat Officers junior to the petitioners were retained in service while the petitioners were reverted or their services terminated, and that this denial of continued employment or reappointment was impermissible under Article 16 (equal opportunity).
  • In the case of Banwari Lal, that the State of Haryana lacked jurisdiction to pass the impugned order because, on the date of that order, the petitioner's allocation to Haryana was only provisional under Section 82 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents relied on the Supreme Court's observations in Union of India v. Prem Parkash Midha (1969 S.L.R. 655) to argue that Article 16 does not guarantee continued employment or that termination cannot occur while juniors are retained; mere termination does not deny equal opportunity to hold public service.
  • With respect to the provisional allocation point, respondents relied on Division Bench authority in P.D. Shakir Consolidation Officer v. The State of Haryana and Others (1968 S.L.R. 235), which construed Sections 82 and 83 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act as leaving provisionally allocated officials governed by existing conditions of service and held that the successor State (Haryana) was competent to deal with disciplinary and service matters, subject to any central government approvals required by the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Prem Parkash Midha, 1969 S.L.R. 655 Principle that Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity for appointment/employment but does not guarantee continued employment merely because juniors remain in service; termination does not in itself deny equal opportunity. The Court accepted this observation and held that the petitioners' contention based on Article 16 (that retention of juniors invalidated their reversion/termination) had no merit in view of this authority.
P.D. Shakir Consolidation Officer v. The State of Haryana and Others, 1968 S.L.R. 235 Interpretation of Sections 82 and 83 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966: a person provisionally allocated to a successor State continues to be governed by the same conditions of service as before the appointed day; successor State is competent to exercise service/disciplinary powers, subject to central government approval for adverse changes. The Court relied on these observations as a "complete answer" to the petitioner's argument that Haryana lacked jurisdiction because allocation was provisional, and rejected that submission.
V.K. Balakrishnan Nair v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 Madras 769 Held in different context (State Reorganisation Act of 1956) that until final allocation by Central Government, a person remained in service of the original State and proceedings continued; cited by petitioners to argue successor State was not competent. The Court considered this case but distinguished it: it declined to apply the principle in support of the petitioners' contention, observing that invoking that authority would lead to administrative chaos and that successor State must be competent to deal with officials allocated to it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first consolidated and addressed petitions raising common legal questions about reversion and termination of temporary BDOs who retained li'en in parent departments.

On the Article 16 point (challenge that the petitioners were denied equal opportunity because junior officers were retained), the Court examined the Supreme Court's reasoning in Union of India v. Prem Parkash Midha. That authority was reproduced and relied upon to the effect that Article 16 confers equality of opportunity in matters of appointment/employment but does not confer a right to continue in service merely because juniors remain. Applying that principle, the Court found no merit in the petitioners' submission that retention of juniors invalidated their reversion/termination.

On the jurisdictional point raised in Civil Writ No. 25 of 1968 (Banwari Lal) — namely, that Haryana lacked competence because allocation under Section 82 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act was provisional — the Court reviewed and accepted the reasoning of a Division Bench in P.D. Shakir Consolidation Officer v. State of Haryana. That authority construed Sections 82 and 83 to mean that provisionally allocated officials continued to be governed by their prior conditions of service and that the successor State (Haryana) was the competent authority to exercise service or disciplinary powers, subject to any central government approval required by the Act. The Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on V.K. Balakrishnan Nair as not supporting the extreme contention that disciplinary authority lay elsewhere; to accept it would produce administrative chaos.

The Court treated Sant Singh's case differently. Sant Singh had been a permanent Government servant (Headmaster) in the Education Department with a li'en on his post when appointed temporarily as BDO. His appointment terms allowed reversion to the parent post without assigning reasons, but he was not merely reverted: the State of Haryana terminated his services as "no longer required" by an order dated July 4, 1967, granting one month's pay in lieu of notice. The Court concluded that this termination was passed under a mistake of fact because, as a permanent servant holding li'en in the Education Department, his services could not be terminated without following the procedural protections of Article 311 of the Constitution. Because the termination did not comply with Article 311, the order was illegal and liable to be quashed. The Court allowed the respondents liberty to pass another order in accordance with law to revert him to his parent post if his services were not required as BDO.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
- For the petitions challenging reversion/termination of the temporary BDOs (including Amar Singh, Ram Kishan, Ram Kishore Bhardwaj, Chaman Lal Setia and others), the Court found no merit in the Article 16 and jurisdictional submissions and dismissed those petitions. Dismissal was ordered without any costs.

- In Civil Writ No. 1464 of 1967 (Sant Singh v. State of Haryana and Others), the Court held the termination order illegal for non-compliance with Article 311 and accepted Sant Singh's petition; the impugned order was quashed (again without any order as to costs) and respondents were permitted to pass a lawful order reverting him to his parent post if appropriate.

Implications:

  • The immediate effect is that the petitions contesting reversion/termination (except Sant Singh's) were dismissed, leaving the impugned gubernatorial/reversion orders in force; no costs were awarded in those matters.
  • In Sant Singh's case, the direct consequence is quashing of the termination order and the respondents' permission to take lawful action consistent with Article 311 and the appointment terms (including reversion to the parent post if services as BDO are not required).
  • The opinion applies and follows existing authorities on Article 16 and on the effect of provisional allocation under the Punjab Reorganisation Act; the Court did not purport to lay down any novel or broader precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts. The opinion does not discuss any new, sweeping legal principle beyond its applications to the parties' circumstances.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in that text.

    Amar Singh v. State Of Haryana Etc.

    Bal Raj Tuli, J. - This order will dispose of Civil Writs Nos. 2027 of 1967 (Amar Singh v. State of Haryana and Others), 25 of 1968 (Banwari Lal v. State of Haryana and Others), 919 of 1968 (Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana and Others), 1464 of 1967 (Sant Singh v. State of Haryana and Others), 1693 of 1967 (Ram Kishore Bhardwaj v. State of Haryana and Others), and 1773 of 1967 (Chaman Lal Setia v. State of Haryana and Others), as common questions of law and fact are involved in all these petitions. Civil Writs No. 202 of 1967, 919 of 1968, 1693 of 1967 and 1773 of 1967 are against the same order and are dealt with in the first instance. These petitioners were appointed as temporary Block Development Officers by the State of Punjab on the recommendations of the Punjab Public Service Commission. They were already in the service of the State in various Departments where their liens were kept. On appointment they were placed on two years' probation on the condition that the post continued. The period of probation could be extended as and when considered necessary. No maximum period of probation, however, was prescribed. The petitioners were liable to be reverted even without notice if their work and conduct during the period of probation were not found to be satisfactory. It was further provided in the appointment letter that "the post is temporary but likely to continue. His confirmation on the post of Block Development Officer will be subject to condition that the post is made permanent and to his passing the departmental examination. After the expiry of the period of probation and before his confirmation as Block Development Officer, Chaudhry Amar Singh is liable to reversion from the post of Block Development Officer without assigning any reason on giving one month's notice." I have taken this condition from the appointment letter which was issued to Chaudhry Amar Singh petitioner. The appointment letters of other petitioners also contain a similar condition. On April 22, 1964, the following communication was issued, with regard to Chaudhry Amar Singh, by the Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department, to the Commissioner, Agricultural Production and Rural Development, Punjab :- "The Governor of Punjab is pleased to certify that Amar Singh, Block Development & Panchayat Officer, Baraguha, District Hissar, has completed his period of probation with effect from the 27th January, 1964. 2. This certificate is subject to the condition that Shri Amar Singh will not claim, on this account, his confirmation as Block Development and Panchayat Officer which will of course come to him only in accordance with his position in the Joint Seniority List and will be dependent upon the availability of permanent posts of the Block Development and Panchayat Officers and other factors. 3. The certificate is further subject to the condition that it will not debar the State Government from taking such action as is considered necessary against the said Amar Singh in case his previous or future conduct as a Government servant is found to be actionable." All the four petitioners were reverted to their parent department by the order of the Governor of Haryana dated July 4, 1967, which was communicated to them on July 10, 1967, on the ground that their services were no longer required. The petitioners have challenged their reversions to their parent departments in these petitions to which written statements have been filed. 2. It has been vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that Block Development and Panchayat Officers junior to the petitioners were retained in service while the petitioners were reverted. This fact is admitted in the written statements, but it is pleaded that the orders were valid and reliance is placed on the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Prem Parkash Midha, 1969 S.L.R. 655 which is reproduced below :- "The District Court also held that when the service of the respondent was terminated and officers junior to him were retained in service, the respondent was denied equal opportunity to hold public service under Article 16 of the Constitution. But there is nothing in Article 16 of the Constitution which supports the view expressed by the learned District Judge. By Article 16 all citizens are entitled to equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. By merely terminating the employment of the respondent, the respondent was not denied of equal opportunity to hold public service. Under Article 16 of the Constitution, it is not one of the fundamental rights that a person who is an employee of the State shall be entitled to continue in service and that his employment shall not be terminated so long as persons junior to him remain in service." In view of these observations, there is no merit in the submission made on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 3. No other point has been argued in these petitions. 4. For the reasons given above, I find no merit in these petitions which are dismissed but without any order as to costs. Civil Writ No. 25 of 1968. 5. In Civil Writ No. 25 of 1968 (Banwari Lal v. State of Haryana and Others), the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued the point which has been discussed above and in addition thereto has argued that State of Haryana had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order because on the date of that order the petitioner's allocation to that State was only provisional and not final. In support of this view, reliance has been placed on the provisions of Section 82 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. This matter was considered by a Division Bench of this Court (S.B. Capoor and Shamsher Bahadur JJ) in P.D. Shakir Consolidation Officer v. The State of Haryana and Others, 1968 S.L.R. 235, wherein the learned Judges referred to Sections 82 and 83 of the said Act and observed as under :- "A bare scrutiny of these provisions would show that a person provisionally allocated to a successor State would continue to remain amenable to the same conditions of service to which he was subject before the appointed day. Sub-section (6) of Section 82 makes it clear also that an official allocated to a successor State shall continue to be governed by Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution, which is covered by Articles 308 to 314. An important proviso has been added that except with the approval of the Central Government no change to his detriment can be brought about in the conditions of service of a person allocated to a successor State. It is impossible to spell out from these provisions that the service rules embodied in rule 5.32 (c) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume II, and rule 25.2 (c) (i) of the Punjab Tahsildari Rules ceased to operate in cases of the petitioners who have been provisionally allocated to the Haryana State. It may be mentioned in passing that no change in principle is involved in the provisional or final allocation of services. As explained by the Advocate-General, an allocation in the first instance is provisional and if any representation is made by the person concerned, the Central Government, which has appointed advisory committees for dealing with such matters may change the allocation if considered necessary. No such representation appears to have been made by the petitioners and nothing really turns on the circumstances that the provisional allocation of the petitioner under sub-section (1) of Section 82 of the Act has not been made final under sub-section (2). The transcending consideration is that the petitioners would continue to be governed by the conditions of service as they existed on the appointed day namely, the Ist of November, 1966. Mr. Bali has invited our attention to a Division Bench authority of Chief Justice Rajamannar and Panchapakesa Ayyar J. in V.K. Balakrishnan Nair v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 Madras 769, for the contention that the State of Haryana is not competent to pass the impugned orders directing the petitioners to be retired compulsorily under the relevant service rules. In that case, the official concerned was under suspension at the time of the reorganisation of the States of Kerala and Madras and the final allocation of the person concerned had not been made. It was observed in the circumstances that :- `The position appears to be clear to us that till the appellant is finally allotted to another State by an order of the Central Government under Section 115(3), the appellant continues to be in the service of the State of Madras. The continuation of the proceedings against the appellant even after Ist November, 1956, was therefore, perfectly valid.' I do not think that the principle enunciated by the Division Bench based on the corresponding provisions of the State Reorganisation Act of 1956 can be invoked in support of the proposition contended for by Mr. Bali that the petitioners should be governed in disciplinary matters either by the State of Punjab or the Central Government. If such a situation was allowed to prevail, it would lead to administrative chaos. Persons who have been allocated to Haryana have to be dealt with by that State, which is the competent authority for the purpose under the relevant rules. Mr. Bali cannot seek support for his extreme contention in the accidental omission of the Act to define competent authority. From this omission it can be inferred that the successor State has been divested of any authority to exercise powers which undoubtedly vest in the appropriate authorities with regard to disciplinary matters relating to the officials under the two sets of service rules by which the petitioners are governed." In that case, some officials provisionally allocated to the State of Haryana were compulsorily retired on or after attaining the age of 55 years which order was upheld. These observations are a complete answer to the submission of the learned counsel which is, therefore, repelled. 6. The result is that this petition is also dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Civil Writ No. 1464 of 1967. 7. Sant Singh petitioner was serving as Headmaster of a Government High School in Tehsil Sirsa, District Hissar, when he was appointed as temporary Block Development and Panchayat Officer in 1961. His lien was retained in the Education Department. According to his conditions of appointment as temporary Block Development and Panchayat Officer, he could be reverted to his parent post at any time without assigning any reason. Instead of reverting him to his parent Department, the State of Haryana terminated his services as no longer required by order dated July 4, 1967, allowing him one month's pay and allowances in lieu of notice. This order was evidently passed under a mistake of fact because his services could not be terminated without following the procedure prescribed in Article 311 of the Constitution as he was a permanent Government servant in the Education Department where he held the lien on the post of Headmaster. As was provided in his appointment order, he could only be reverted to his parent department if his services were no longer required as Block Development and Panchayat Officer. The order terminating his services, is therefore, illegal and is liable to be quashed. The respondents will be at liberty to pass another order in accordance with law reverting him to the post of Headmaster in case his services are no longer required as Block Development and Panchayat Officer. This petition is therefore accepted and the impugned order is quashed, but without any order as to costs. Order accordingly.

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    Amar Singh v. State Of Haryana Etc.
    (Sep 24, 1971)