N.C Jain, J. — This judgment of mine would dispose of Regular First Appeal Nos. 185 to 188 of 1983 as they arose from a common award rendered by the District Judge, Ropar on September 18, 1982. Land measuring 8.8 acres situated in village Moroli Kalan, tehsil and district Roper adjoining to Morinda town, were acquired by issuance of a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act’) dated July 9, 1979. The purpose of the acquisition was the need of the land for augmentation of water supply project to Chandigarh. The award was rendered by the Collector on 28-3-80. The land Acquisition Collector determined the market value of ‘Chahi’ ‘Gair mumkin’, Tubewell and Chahi, at the rate of Rs. 18,200/- per acre. The Land Acquisition Court under the award which is subject matter of challenge before this Court on reference under section 18 of the Act, determined the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 25,000/- per acre. Aggrieved against this award of the District Judge, the claimants have preferred the appeals which are being disposed of by this judgment
2. The learned District Judge while determining the market value of the acquired Chahi land at Rs. 25,000/- has placed reliance upon Exhibit P-6 a copy of the mutation. Before examining the legality and validity of the findings recorded by the District Judge, it is necessary to observe that the claimants produced mutations Exhibit P-1 to P-8. The counsel for the claimants filed an application for additional evidence for producing seven sale-deeds corresponding to all the mutations except Exhibit P-3. In that application notice was issued by this court on 15-10-1989 and it was ordered that the application would be decided along with the main appeal. Since it has been ruled by a full Bench of this court that mutations are inadmissible in evidence, and since in other judicial pronouncements sale-deeds were allowed to be produced in First Appeals, I hereby allow the application for additional evidence and exhibit the sale-deeds as Exhibits P-1.A, P-2.A, P-4.A to Exhibit P. 8.A These sales-deed which have been exhibited by me today correspond to mutation Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-4 to P-8, respectively.
3. At the time of hearing of these appeals Mr. R.L Sharma, learned counsel for the claimants has vehemently argued that the learned District Judge while placing reliance upon Exhibit P-6.A corresponding to mutation Exhibit P-6 has committed an error in holding that land forming part of sale-deed Exhibit P. 6.A was better situated and that some discount was to be allowed for better situation of the land forming part of Exhibit P-6.A. It has further been argued that the acquired land of the claimants was better situated and in any case, both the acquired land and the land forming part of mutation Exhibit P-6.A had similar advantages as regards situation and therefore, sale-deed Exhibit P-6.A deserves to be relied upon as a safe guide for determining the market value of the acquired land. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, on peiusal of evidence I had a look at the Aks Shajra of the village marked R/1. The acquired land is depicted in red colour. Abadi is shown in yellow colour. Adjacent to the Abadi of the village, there is National High way Chandigarh-Ludhiana main road. Thereafter, the land forming part of Exhibit P-6.A is situated. The acquired land apparently is near the Abadi if not very close by. The land forming part of Exhibit P-6.A is across the main Chandigarh Ludhiana road. Page: 536away from Abadi. If the land forming part of Exhibit P-6.A has got the advantages as regards situation, being located across the main Chandigarh-Ludhiana road, the acquired land had got the advantages near the Abadi of the village. The exact distance between Abadi of the village and the acquired land is not given. Similarly no distance between the main Chandigarh-Ludhiana road and the land forming part of Exhibit P-6 has been given. In the Aks Shajra the distance between Exhibit P-6 and acquired land has been stated as 730 karams. This does not lead the Court an where. The perusal of Exhibit P-1 has left an impression upon this Court that the distance between Exaibit P-6.A and the main road which is adjacent to Abadi and the distance between village Abadi and the acquired land is by and large all the same. The two witnesses who stepped into witness-box, one behalf of the claimants and the other on behalf of State, have not stated in their statements as to which land is better situated. On these premises, if can safely be concluded by applying all guess work that both the lands are similarly situated. No other conclusion in my view is possible. Once this court has come to a definite conclusion that the situation of both the acquired land and the land forming part of Exhibit P-6 is having equal advantages, there is no difficulty in determining the market value of the acquired land on the date of notification. Exhibit P-6.A was executed and registered on 10-10-1977 whereas notification under section 4 of the Act in the instant case was issued on 9-7-1979 i.e after a period of 21 months. The land was sold vide Exhibit P-6.A at the rate of Rs. 24,368/- per acre. After giving necessary increase of 12% per annum for the price rise as has been laid down in Inder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1988 (2) PLR 190 the market value of the land acquired stands determined at Rs. 29,485/- which can be rounded off at Rs. 29,500/-.
4. Having determined the market-value of the acquired land it remains to be seen that as to what statutory benefits the claimants are entitled to. As has been observed in the opening part of this judgment, the land was acquired by the Collector by issuance of a notification under section 4 on July 9, 1979 and the award was given by the Collector on 28-3-1980. In other words, no proceedings for determining the market value of the land were pending before the Collector on April 30, 1982. In view thereof, the claimants are not entitled to the statutory benefits of section 23(1-A) as has been ruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Mr. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, JT 1989 (4) S.C 529. (Civil Appeal No. 4802 of 1989) decided on 30-11-1989. In that case, before the Apex Court, the award by the Land Acquisition Collector was rendered on 5-3-1969 with the result that on April 30, 1982 no proceedings were pending before the Collector. The facts in the present case are similar. It was held by the Apex Court as under:—
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21. Entitlement of additional amount provided under section 23(1-A) depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings as on 30 April, 1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date. section 30 sub-section (1) (a) provides that additional amount provided under section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on 30 April 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date. If the Collector has made the award before that date then, that additional amount cannot be awarded. section 30 sub-section (1) (b) provides that section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after 30 April, 1982 irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made an award or Page: 537not before 24 September, 1984. The final point to note is that section 30 sub-section (1) does not refer to court award and the court award is used only in section 30 sub-section (2).
22. In the case before us, on 26 October, 1967, the notification under section 4 was issued. On 5 March, 1969 the Collector made the award. The result is that on 30 April, 1982 there was no proceedings pending before the Collector. Therefore, section 30 sub-section (1) (a) is not attracted to the case. Since the proceedings for acquisition commenced before 30 April, 1982, section 30 sub-section (1) (b) is also not applicable to the case. Here, the case is really gone by both ways. It cannot be served from Scylla or Charyabdis. The claimant is, therefore not entitled to additional amount provided under section 23(A).
5. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court the claimants are not entitled to the statutory benefits of section 23(1-A). However, they are held entitled to the grant of benefits of the amended provisions of section 23(2) and section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. The appellants would have the proportionate costs.