"Article 226 of the Constitution, widely worded as it is, confers on this Court power of very comprehensive magnitude, and save for the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided therein, there seems to be no other restriction imposed by the Constitution. But absence of express constitutional limitation by no means implies that this power must be exercised whenever it is invoked merely because it is permissible on the language of the Article to do so. Indeed, the general words of this Article in which the power is conferred on this Court, have a content and a significance, covering the core of reality and justice as enshrined in the preamble of our Constitution. That content and significance, as I understand it, is enforcement of the rule of law and furtherance of the cause of substantial justice according to law. This must inevitably leave the question of interference under this Article to the judicial discretion of this Court on the facts and circumstances of each given case. All laws are meant to be operative, as this thesis also constitutes one of the important facts of the rule of law. This Court as the final and the highest Court of law and justice in the State, being invested by the Constitution with practically unrestricted power of issuing writs, orders and directions, is apparently expected not to decline exercise of this power arbitrarily if the true dictates of justice, consistently with the rule of law, in a given case, demand its exercise to further the cause of justice. On this premise, the conclusion is irresistible that mere existence of an alternative remedy cannot be itself or per se enjoin this Court to decline interference on the writ side, but that the Court must consider and weigh in a disciplined and responsible manner according to the rules of reason and justice all the facts and circumstances before it and eliminating prejudice and sympathy, judicially determine whether or not interference would further the purpose of securing justice to the citizens for which this power is conferred." 14. Considering all facts and circumstances of the instant case I hold that the petitioner not having exhausted remedy available to him under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Com. & Reh.) Act does not debar me from pronouncing on the merits of this case. I hold that the said remedy would not have been equally efficacious and adequate. This objection of the respondents' counsel is overruled. 15. The second preliminary objection raised by Mr. Nehra is that the petition should be dismissed as it involves a disputed question of fact. The disputed question is said to be as to whether the jamabandi for the year 1943-44 or that of the year 1946-47 is the latest jamabandi of the village in question. I do not think the controversy in this case involves any disputed question of fact of the kind which may disentitle the petitioner to claim relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 16. The stage is now clear for dealing with the merits of the case. Mr. Wasu the learned counsel for the petitioner has firstly contended that it was the right of Ralla Ram and now the right of the petitioner to get the land left behind in village Gaga valued according to the description of the land contained in the latest jamabandi which was prepared before the creation of Pakistan. There is no dispute that the latest jamabandi prepared before the partition of the country was of 1943-44 and if entries of the same are taken into account the petitioner's claim is well-founded. The same applies to the latest khasra girdawari for the year 1944-45, copies of which have been verified by the respondents to be correct. 17. The contention of Mr. D.S. Nehra as brought out in the written statement and strongly pressed before me is that the latest jamabandi does not mean latest before the partition of the country but jamabandi which was prepared after July, 1948 in pursuance of international agreement arrived at between the Government of Pakistan and the Government of this country on 1st July, 1948. Copy of the said agreement has not been produced before me. Mr. Nehra has relied on the following passage contained in para 23, page 44 of Tarlok Singh's Land Resettlement Manual for displaced persons in Punjab and Pepsu :- "The bulk of the claims of displaced persons have been assessed on the basis of entries in copies of jamabandis received from the West Punjab Government. These copies were prepared in accordance with the agreement between the East Punjab and the West Punjab Governments dated the 1st July, 1948 by which copies of the following records were to be prepared :- (i) x x x x x (ii) Complete Jamabandis latest of village in which more than 75% of the land is held by Muslims or non-Muslims, (iii) x x x x x (iv) Copies of all loose mutations entered before the 15th August, 1947 whether decided or pending X X X X X." 18. There does not appear to be any dispute about the fact that rights of the parties were being determined in accordance with the above said international agreement. The correctness of the above passage in Tarlok Singh's book has not been disputed. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held this book to be a book of authority for matters covered by it. From the above passage it appears to be abundantly clear that what had to be done in pursuance of the international agreement of 1st July 1948 was not be prepare fresh revenue record after 1st July, 1948 which would have been wholly irrelevant but to merely prepare copies of the latest revenue records which existed before 15th August, 1947. This is also obvious from clause (iv) of para 23 quoted above. Even mutations subsequent to 15th August, 1947, were not to be taken into account and only those mutations which had been entered into prior to that date were to be considered and their copies prepared. It does not appear conceivable that it was intended to allow the two respective countries who were not seeing eye to eye on many things on 1st July, 1948 to prepare fresh records on their own. Clearly at the time of the preparation of the four yearly jamabandis, the landowners concerned have to be present and objection to any entry sought to be made in the revenue records have to be heard and decided. This could not possibly be done after 15th August, 1947 effectively or according to any principle of natural justice in view of the evacuation of the persons who were no more in either of the two respective countries where their lands had been left. It has been observed by a Division Bench of this Court (Mehar Singh and Mahajan, JJ.) Zora Singh v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, LPA No. 148 of 1961, decided on 24th November, 1961 in connection with the mood of the Pakistan authorities reflecting on the preparation of copies of revenue records just before the partition of the country as follows :- "It is well known that just before the partition of the country there were many things that were done adversely to those who were likely to be affected by the partition and there were many omissions made detrimental to their interest." 19. What has been stated above regarding the possibility and the manner in which records were prepared immediately prior to the partition of the country applies with greater force to the situation in and mood of that country after the partition of the undivided India. The alleged special jamabandis were prepared after July 1948 that the special records be allowed to be prepared by the Pakistan Government on the basis of which latest records, the right of the displaced persons were to be determined by the Indian authorities. According to the above said instructions contained in Tarlok Singh's book, the jamabandis to be taken into account were 'latest' jamabandis of the village concerned. 'Latest' must have relation at some point of time. It cannot be said that if Pakistan were to prepare today another set of records of Gaga, the petitioner's rights had to be determined on the basis of that jamabandi as that would be latest today. In the context in which the words occur, it appears that the true intention of the agreement was that the latest jamabandis which had been prepared before 15th August, 1947 subject to any mutation entries entered into till that date and decided or pending on that date, were to be the decisive factor in determining the rights of the displaced persons and that any special jamabandis prepared by Pakistan authorities after 15th August 1947 were wholly irrelevant. 20. Regarding determination of class of land, para 27 of the aforesaid book by Tarlok Singh lays down that for decision of class of land, the entry in the jamabandis was to be followed strictly. Read with para 23 (already quoted above) the jamabandis which were to be taken into account were the latest ones prepared before the partition of the country and not special jamabandis prepared for the purpose of causing loss to persons displaced from Pakistan. 21. Mr. Wasu has then relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Gulab Singh v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, 1964 PLR 953, wherein it was held that Rehabilitation Department obtained from Pakistan not the original records but copies prepared from the same and the chances of mistakes creeping in such copies are fairly great taking into consideration the great speed with which this stupendous task had to be finished. 22. From the above passage it is sought to be argued that what the Pakistan Government had to do in pursuance to the agreement was merely to prepare copies of the existing records and not to prepare the new revenue records. I find great strength in this argument. I do not, however, see any force in the contention of the learned counsel based on the above said observation in Gulab Singh's case that there was great possibility of the copy of the special jamabandi of 1946-47 being erroneous. According to the order of the Managing Officer these copies had been compared and verified at Wagha with the original special jamabandi and no discrepancy was detected between the two. On facts therefore, there appears to be dispute that if the special jamabandi stated to have been prepared by the Pakistan Government, (possibly with a sinister motive) is taken into account the description of the land contained therein would have to be taken as the decisive factor. If however it is only the copies prepared of the latest revenue records which existed prior to that date that have to decide the fate of the petitioner, there is no answer to his claim. 23. Mr. Wasu urged that the comparison at Wagha is not made with the original record and is made between the duplicate copies prepared by Pakistan authorities. It may be so, but this is contrary to what is recorded by the Managing Officer in his order. I need not decide this dispute in view of my finding on the first point. Mr. Wasu has argued that even if the entry in special jamabandi was taken into account, the value of the land could not have been zero as description in the special jamabandi does not prove the land to be ghair mumkin' (non-cultivable) land as defined in para 9 of Chapter III (page 67) of Land Resettlement Manual. In view of my finding on the first point, I am not deciding this dispute relating to the import, construction or meaning of the phrase ghair mumkin. The nature of the land described throughout is 'sailab' i.e. subject to floods. The entries in the special jamabandis appear to relate to a particular time when a large number of area was under floods. Whether a situation as on the date of the preparation of the jamabandi has to be taken into account or not is a question on which again I need not pronounce in the instant case. I, therefore, hold that the claim of the petitioner impugning the cancellation to give land to the petitioner in lieu of that left in village Gaga based on departmental instructions to rely on entries, in the special jamabandis cannot be sustained and must be set aside. 24. Against the order (annexure E-1) the only contention by Mr. Wasu, the learned counsel for the petitioner was that there is no limitation for making a representation of the kind which had been made by the petitioner and in that view of the matter the impugned order of the authorities (Annexure E-1) is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of record which has caused manifest injustice to the petitioner. The learned counsel for the respondents has not shown me any law prescribing any period of limitation for making a prayer of the kind which had been made by the petitioner in this respect. Order annexure E-1 has, therefore, to be set aside on account of being vitiated by the above said error of law apparent on its face. It would be open to appropriate authorities to decide the said prayer of the petitioner for exchange of the land on merits in accordance with law. This order would not debar them from taking any decision on merits in this matter, as the authorities may consider fit. 25. In fairness to the learned counsel for the respondents I must take notice of his argument to the effect that in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, this Court would not interfere on the question of construction of a revenue entry and that this would be a matter within the jurisdiction of the rehabilitation authorities. In this connection he has relied on the dictum of the Supreme Court in Sayed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishana, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 477, I have not based my decision on the interpretation of any entry and therefore there is no force in this objection of the learned counsel. 26. Consequently, I accept this writ petition and set aside the impugned order (annexure E) including the orders of the higher authorities upholding the same, as well as the order (annexure E-1) on the grounds mentioned above. The petitioner would be entitled to have the Gaga lands of late Shri Ralla Ram evaluated according to the relevant entries in the latest jamabandis of that village prepared before the partition of the country. In the circumstances of the case I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petition accepted.