Harbans Singh, J. - The petition under articles 226 & 227 of the constitution has been filed by Assistant Sub-Inspector Nand Singh challenging the legality of departmental enquiry directed against him on charges of corruption. 2. Leaving out the detailed background given by the petitioner showing that the Superintendent of Police of his district was not well disposed towards him, the relevant facts, as alleged in the petition, are that in 1961, when he was attached to the C.I.A. Staff at Barnala, he registered a case under Section 19 of the Arms Act for possession of a c-untry made pistol against one Shamsher Singh. In the course of the investigation of that case, a complaint was made to S. Harjit Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police that the petitioner had accepted an illegal gratification to the extent of Rs. 300/- from Shamsher Singh promising not to challan him but to substitute some other accused in his place. S. Harjit Singh, after investigation in that case, directed the cancellation of the challan against the aforesaid Shamsher Singh and made a complaint on the basis of which First Information Report No. 169 was registered on 5th of November, 1961, at Barnala under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act against the petitioner. On 24th of November, 1961. No proceedings took place against him, either departmentally or in Court, till 1963. The petitioner's case is that as a result of the investigation in the corruption case against him, a challan was actually sent on 28th of January, 1963. The petitioner's case is that as a result of the investigation in the corruption case against him, a challan was actually sent on 28th of January, 1963 but the same was recalled at the instance of the Superintendent of Police who directed that the matter should first of all be enquired into departmentally and after the departmental enquiry was over, criminal proceedings may be started against him. The Superintendent of Police, therefore, sent a memorandum recommending this course of action to the Deputy Commissioner who gave sanction without independently applying his mind to the facts of the case and exercising his discretion which he was bound to do under the relevant police rules. The enquiry was entrusted to a Deputy Superintendent of Police who made a report on the basis of which a notice was given to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed. The petitioner has filed this petition, inter alia, challenging the legality of the enquiry. 3. The main two contentions of behalf of the petitioner are as follows :- (i) That under sub-rule (1) of rule 16.38 whenever any complaint is received by a Superintendent of Police against a Police official in relation to his conduct with the public, the matter has to be brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner to decide "whether investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer or made over to a selected Magistrate having first class powers" and that in the present case no such action was taken; (ii) that under sub-rule (2) of the aforesaid rule when the result o the investigation of such a complaint establishes a prima facie case a judicial prosecution is normally to follow and the matter can be disposed of departmentally only "if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be recorded" and that this provision was also not complied with and consequently the departmental enquiry directed against the petitioner is null and void. 4. In the return filed by the Superintendent of Police with regard to the above-mentioned two matters (vide paragraph 16(i) and (ii) of the return), the position taken is all as follows :- (i) The provisions of rule 16.38(1) are not attracted in this case because no complaint was received by the Superintendent of Police and it was only S. Harjit Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who, as gazetted Officer incharge of illaqa, submitted the cancellation report in the Arms Act case and got F.I.R. No. 169 under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act registered against the petitioner. Thereafter the investigation into the case proceeded according to law. (ii) The provisions of rule 16.38(2) had been duly complied with because a self-contained memorandum giving detailed facts of the case against the petitioner was submitted to the District Magistrate, Sangrur as required by Police Rules, 16.38(2). The District Magistrate, Sangrur, applied his mind independently to the facts of the case and after duly considering them accorded sanction under the said rule 16.38(2) * * * It was not necessary for the District Magistrate to give detailed reasons in his order. It was conceded on behalf of the Deputy Advocate-General, appearing for the State, that the word "complaint" in rule 16.38(1) is used in the sense of accusation. His contention, however, was that where an accusation against a police officer is not received directly by the Superintendent of Police, this rule does not apply. He contended that in the normal course any accusation with regard to the commission of a cognizable offence is to be registered by the State House Officer on the accusation being made to him. Thus, if a member of the public, who has an accusation against a police officer, approaches the station House Officer, and the Station House Officer registers a case, rule 16.38(1) is inapplicable. Similarly, if the Station House Officer refuses to register a case and the aggrieved person approaches the Deputy Superintendent of Police, under whose direction the State House Officer then records the report the position is the same as in the first case. If, however, the aggrieved person approaches the Superintendent of Police either because the Station House Officer or the Deputy Superintendent of Police does not care to listen to him or because, for any other reason, he considers it better to approach him direct and the accusation against the Police Officer is thus reported to him in the first instance, this rule will apply even if he directs the accusation to be registered as a first information report by the Station House Officer concerned. 5. I regret, however, that I have not been able to follow the logic of the argument. The idea behind rule 16.38(1) is that where an accusation against the Police Officer regarding his conduct with the public comes to the notice of the Superintendent of Police, he should immediately obtain orders of the District Magistrate as to whether the enquiry into those accusations is to be made in the usual routine procedure by the Police, or, in view of the fact that the person involved is himself a Police Officer, the matter should be enquired into by an independent agency, namely, a Magistrate. It was urged by the learned Deputy Advocate General that this provision is meant for the protection of the public because if accusations against the Police Officer are, invariably, to be enquired into by the police department, the investigation may not be fair or in any case, it may not inspire complete confidence. It is not necessary, however, to go into the question whether this rule is for the benefit of the public or for the benefit of the accused. Possibly it is both for the benefit of the public as well as the accused, depending on the circumstances of each case. Ordinarily, it is true that a member of the public, who makes such a complaint, is at a disadvantage if the investigation is made by the officials of the department to which the accused belongs, but there can be cases where the accused police official feels that either his immediate officer or some of his colleagues are inimical to him and in such cases the rule would certainly be to the benefit of the accused. In the present case, for example, the complaint is made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, a gazetted officer incharge of the illaqa, and the accused may have very reasonable and genuine fears that the investigation done by the subordinate staff into the complaint would tend to endorse the view that has provisionally been taken by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in the course of the investigation of the complaint which resulted in the registration of the case. In any case, the rule does appear to be of a mandatory nature and any investigation carried out by the police in such a complaint against a police officer without getting a direction from the District Magistrate would be vitiated. However, in the present case, there is a further defect in the departmental enquiry which has followed the original investigation by the police into the charges alleged against the petitioner 6. The wording of sub-rule (2) of rule 16.38 may be reproduced with advantage :- "When investigation of such a complaint establishes a prima facie case, a judicial prosecution shall normally follow; the matter shall be disposed of departmentally only if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be recorded. When it is decided to proceed departmentally the procedure prescribed in rule 16.24 shall be followed." This sub-rule (1) of rule 16.38 came up for discussion before Grover, J., in Jagan Nath v. Senior Superintendent of Police, 1961 P.L.R. 860. The head-note, incorporating the decision, is as follows :- * * sub-rules (1) and (2) of rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules are mandatory in so far as they enjoin that the Superintendent of Police must forward the complaint to the District Magistrate who will decide whether the investigation should be conducted by a police officer or made over to the Magistrate and then after examining the result of such investigation the District Magistrate has to decide and has to give reasons in his decision for proceeding against the police officer departmentally and not prosecuting him judicially if the investigation establishes a prima facie case. Thus it is clear that a departmental enquiry can only be ordered by the District Magistrate after investigation of the complaint conducted by the Police Officer or the Magistrate to whom such a task is entrusted by the District Magistrate has been completed and the District Magistrate has applied his mind to the result of the aforesaid investigation. He has to keep in mind at the stage that normally a judicial prosecution should take place if a prima facie case is disclosed but it will be then his discretion to deviate from that normal rule and order a departmental enquiry. Under these rules the Superintendent of Police cannot take decision himself but must forward the complaint to the District Magistrate who has to exercise his discretion in accordance with the rule." All that I need say is that, with great respect, I entirely agree with the learned Judge and no other decision taking the contrary view was cited before me. In the present case, all the defects that were pointed out in the case referred to above do exist. Apart from the District Magistrate applying his mind independently to the facts of the case, as enclosed by the investigation and exercising his independent discretion as to why the normal course was not to be followed and the petitioner was to be tried departmentally, the Superintendent of Police in his so called "self-contained memorandum" had definitely made a suggestion that the petitioner should be proceeded against departmentally in the first instance and after the departmental enquiry was completed, he may be proceeded against in a Court of Law. All that the District Magistrate did was to write the word "allowed" on this memorandum. He gave no reasons for holding a departmental enquiry in preference to a judicial trial in a Court of law, and under the rules, he is bound to give these reasons. The position taken up by the Superintendent of Police that no separate reason need be given is untenable. In the serious case of corruption normally speaking, the accused should be tried by the Court of Law where he can expect and unbiased appraisal of the evidence that may be produced against him. 7. Another point raised by the learned Deputy Advocate-General was that this petition is premature, inasmuch as in reply to the show-cause notice the petitioner can represent to the Superintendent of Police that sub-rules (1) and (2) of rule 16.38 have been violated. I, however, feel that this petition is certainly not premature and in fact the petitioner may possibly be held guilty of laches. As soon as the departmental enquiry was ordered against him, he could have approached this Court seeking for directions to prohibit the department from going ahead with the enquiry which was illegal and in violation of the rules. It is absolutely useless for the petitioner to represent to the Superintendent of Police that he has violated the rules because, as already stated, the position of the Superintendent of Police, definitely, is that sub-rule (1) is not applicable to the facts of the case and that sub-rule (2) has been duly complied with. 8. In view of the above, therefore, I find that the entire enquiry being bad, it is a fit case in which the same should be quashed. Consequently, I accept this petition, make the rule absolute and, as prayed in the petition, quash all the proceedings relating to the departmental enquiry. No prayer in the Writ Petition has been made regarding the investigation and no order is made in that respect. In view of the fact that the decision of Grover, J., in Jagan Nath's case was given as far back as 21st of August, 1961 and the same was published in the Punjab Law Reporter of 1961, there is no justification for the department not to have followed the rules in terms of the observations made in the said judgment. I will therefore, direct that the petitioner will have his costs from the respondent, which are assessed at Rs. 250/- only. Petition accepted.