- The learned counsel for the parties are agreed that on account of the identity of facts and the contentions raised, these 18 Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 611, 4266, 5218, 4767, 4900, 4544 to 4550 and 5033 to 5088 of 1982 can conveniently be disposed of through a common order. I proceed to do that. 2. These petitions are on behalf of the persons in whose favour the Amritsar Improvement Trust had made allotments of respective residential plots in the area covered by the Ajnala Road Development Scheme. These allotments admittedly, in view of the letters of allotment and the rules governing these allotments, known as the Utilisation of Land and Allotment of Plots by the Improvement Trust Rules, 1975, were subject to the final approval of the State Government. It is not a matter of dispute; rather it is conceded by the respondent, that is, the State Government as well as the Trust that the petitioners were eligible in all respects for the allotment of these plots and it was on consideration of their eligibility for these allotments that the Trust, respondent No. 2, had resolved to allot these plots to them. These allotments have been rejected or not approved by the State Government by passing a blanket order in September, 1980 (now impugned in all these petitions) which reads as follows :- "To the Administrators, All Improvement Trusts in the State :- No. 5037-3 CII-80/7096. Dated Chandigarh, the September, 1980. Subject : Allotment of plots out of Government quota. Reference subject noted above. 2. "All recommendations made by the former Chairmen of Improvement Trusts for allotment of plots to various persons out of Government quota have been considered and rejected by the Government." This will be applicable to all categories of plots of all Improvement Trusts which are yet to be allotted out of Government quota. 3. You are also advised that fresh applications may be called within two months and thereafter after proper scrutiny, recommendations may be made by you as per rules in vogue. Your are also requested to allot serial umber of each application according to the order in which it is received in your office. Sd/- Under Secretary Local Government (Rules). No. 5037-3CII-80. Dated 9-1980." It was in pursuance of this order that the respondent Trust issued individual letters to the petitioners conveying the cancellation of the allotment in their favour. The petitioners, as already indicated, besides impugning the above-noted order of the State Government, also impugn the respective orders passed by the Trust qua them. 3. The short but precise submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the action of the State Government in passing the impugned blanket order, is wholly arbitrary and discloses a clear non-applicability of mind to the facts of each case. As against this what has been repeated on behalf of the respondents ad nauseam in the written statements as well as before me now that is all those allotments in favour of the petitioners were subject to the approval of the State Government and the State Government was well within its rights not to approve the same even by passing a one single consolidated order. It deserves to be highlighted here that neither in the impugned order nor in the returns filed on behalf of the respondents particular the State Government has any reason whatsoever been stated, which led to the passing of the blanket order concerning all the Trusts in the State. Not only that, as is clear from the later part of paragraph 2 of the order, it even cancels or disapproves the future allotments or allotments yet to be made. If at all one has to spell out reasons for passing of this blanket order, the same appears to be contained in the first part of paragraph 2 of the same and is that the recommendations or allotments had been made by the former Chairmen of the Improvement Trusts." Nothing more than this has been said in the order or in the written statements. 4. No doubt, these allotments, in order to be effective had to have the approval of the State Government but this approval essentially had to be guided and exercised within the framework of the rules referred to above. It cannot possibly be imagined that after the State Government had framed "the Rules" for the guidance of the Improvement Trusts for the allotment of plots, it in its capacity to supervise the working or carrying out the requirements of the rules by the Trusts would itself not be guided by the said rules. All that the State Government can examine or go into before granting or not granting its approval is to see as to whether the various Trusts have acted within the frame-work of rules while making allotments. It just cannot disapprove or decline or grant approval for any reason or no reason. Apparently the impugned order appears to be in the nature of a Farman-e-Shahi. It cannot thus be styled as anything else than 'arbitrary'. By now it is well laid down that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or making allotments or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences, allotments etc. must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government is liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. Any such action on the part of the Government would be violative of the equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. This is what has been ruled by the Supreme Court in this regard in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 :- "This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14. It is now well settled as a result of the decisions of this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 2 SCR 318 : AIR 1974 SC 556 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978(1) SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non- discriminatory. It must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant consideration, because that would be denial of equality. The principle of reasonableness and rationally which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is projected by Article 14 and it must characterise every State action, whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law. The State cannot, therefore, act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise, with a third party, but its action must conform to some standard or norm which is rational and non-discriminatory." It is thus patent in the light of the above noted authoritative pronouncement that the impugned blanket order of the Government which, as already pointed out, is not supported by any rational or logic or reason leading to the passing of the same, is wholly arbitrary. In the light of this conclusion of mine, I need not go into other assertions levelled on behalf of some of the petitioners that the whole basis of the reasons for the passing of this order is the change of the Government which had taken place between the dates of the allotments in favour of the petitioners and the date of the passing of this order. 5. In all fairness to the learned counsel for the respondents it may be pointed out here that the Division Bench of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 3231 of 1982 (Jagdish Rai Chawla v. The State of Punjab, etc., 1984 R.R.R. 474), decided on May 18, 1983 [1983(11) LLR 352] on which firm reliance is placed by them to contend that the petitioners in the case in hand do not deserve to be heard as no legal right had come to vest in them prior to the passing of the impugned order by the State Government, does not apply to the facts of these cases. In that case not only the very eligibility of the petitioner for allotment of a plot in his favour was lacking but the action of the State Government was also taken under section 72-C of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. All that has been laid down in this judgment is that before annulment or cancellation of the resolution of the Trust by the State Government in exercise of its statutory powers under the above noted section, the petitioner who claimed to have derived some benefit under the resolution of the Trust was not entitled to be heard. No such situation exists in these cases. Here the challenge of the petitioners to the impugned blanket order is not on the ground that they have not been heard before the passing of that order. Rather their whole challenge is that the order itself is arbitrary and violative of the principle laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 6. For the reasons recorded above, I allow these petitions and set aside the above noted blanket order passed by the State Government in September, 1980 and the individual order passed by the Trust cancelling the allotments made in favour of the petitioners. They are also held entitled to the costs of this litigation which I determine at Rs. 300/- in each case. Petitions allowed.