Thulasidas, J.:— Additional respondents 2 to 8 in R.C.A No. 59 of 1989 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Kollam, are the petitioners in this revision. They are the legal representatives of one Pappu Raghavan, against whom the respondents herein filed R.C.P No. 18 of 1982 before the Rent Control Court, Kollam, for eviction under sections 11(2), 11 (3) and 11(4)(ii) and (iii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 2 of 1965, hereinafter referred to as the Act.

2. It was alleged that the petition schedule premises with the machinery and accessories for a saw mill were leased to Raghavan by one Narayanan, grandfather of the first respondent, on a monthly rent of Rs. 525/- on 14-1-1970 for a period of two years. On 1-5-1978, the rent was enhanced to Rs. 675/-. Raghavan committed default in payment of rent from 1st of May, 1979 onwards. He was also alleged to have used the saw mill and accessories in an irresponsible and negligent manner that reduced their utility materially and permanently. He had his own building and land suitable for to run a saw-mill. The lessor-Narayanan and the first respondent, to whom the petition-schedule property was allotted in partition, issued a notice to Raghavan on 14-7-1979 demanding surrender of the premises and payment of arrears of rent. It was stated that the premises were required by the first respondent to run a saw-mill. But Raghavan did not pay heed to the demands made in the notice. Narayanan died in 1981 and the application for eviction was filed on 19-3-1982, where it was alleged that the premises were required for the use of the son of the respondents, who is unemployed and dependent on them. Raghavan contested the petition. He denied that rent was kept in arrears and claimed that large amount was due to him from the landlord. The claims made under sections 11(3) and 11(4)(ii) and (iii) were also disputed and he urged that the petition lacked bona fides. By order dated 23-10-1986 the Rent Control Court allowed the petition only under section 11(2)(b) of the Act.

3. The petitioners before the Rent Control. Court filed R.C.A No. 59 of 1989 and the tenant filed R.C.A No. 60 of 1989 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Kollam. Pending appeal the tenant died and his legal representatives, the present petitioners, were impleaded on 12-2-1990 as per order on I.A No. 981 of 1989. The two appeals were heard together and by a common judgment dated 30-6-1990 the Rent Control Appellate Authority dismissed R.C.A No. 60 of 1989 and allowed R.C.A No. 59 of 1989 in part. The findings under sections 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(ii) and (iii) of the Act were confirmed. But relief was granted under section 11(3) of the Act. The judgment bf the court below granting eviction under section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act is under, challenge in this revision.

4. Several grounds have been urged in the Memorandum of Revision. Exception has been taken to the finding under section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act. It was submitted that relevant materials had been misconstrued. A plea of non-joinder of Ravi Industries and Saw Mills, which is stated to be the tenant of the premises, was also urged as a ground to contend that the petition is bad, and unsustainable.

5. Heard counsel for the petitioners and the respondents.

6. In our view, there is no merit in the contention that the rent control petition is bad for non-joinder of Ravi Industries and Saw Mills. The petition schedule premises were entrusted to Raghavan by Narayanan, the grand-father of the first respondent. Ravi Industries and Saw Mills is a firm of which Raghavan was the Managing Partner. There was no entrustment to the firm. It was under Ext. A2 that the premises were held. No doubt, rent had been enhanced from 1-5-1978 and the landlord also accepted rent from Ravi Industries and Saw Mills. That was not enough to indicate a fresh rental arrangement as alleged. We are unable to find any infirmity in the finding that the petition was not bad for non-joinder of parties.

7. Concurrently relief was granted under section 11(2)(b) of the Act. Prior to the institution of the proceedings a notice had been sent by Narayanan and the first respondent, which was marked as Ext. B2 where reference was made that rent was in arrears from May 1979 onwards. It is admitted that the tenant had sent rent by money order, which was however refused. No reason was given for the refusal. No doubt the tenant had claimed set off of certain amounts allegedly due to him by the landlord. It is unnecessary now to go into the details. The rent control court found and which is not under challenge that Rs. 920/- remained to be adjusted by the landlord as on. 1st April, 1979. The amount sent by money order and that which was liable to be adjusted could have satisfied the claim of rent made by Ext. B2 notice. In our view the courts below granted relief under section 11(2)(b) of the Act without reference to what had been claimed in Ext. B2. There was indeed failure to advert to the proviso to section 11(2)(b) of the Act. The rent that had fallen due after notice could not have been considered as arrears of rent as had been held by the Supreme Court in Prakash Mehra v. K.L Malhotra . (1989) 3 SCC 74 : AIR 1989 SC 1652. We hold that the grant of relief under section 11(2)(b) of the Act was not proper and the same is, accordingly, set aside.

8. The substantial question that was argued was as to the correctness of the finding under section 11(3) of the Act. No doubt, what was urged in Ext. B2 was that the premises were required for the first respondent, who wanted to modernise and run the saw-mill herself for which she had made the necessary arrangements. The tenant did not send a reply to the notice. In the petition which was filed on 14-3-1982 what was canvassed was the need of Suju, the son of the respondents, who, it was alleged, was unemployed and dependent on them. According to the petitioners, the diverse claims projected in Ext. B2 and the petition indicated lack of bonafides. It was also urged that Suju is a student who is incapable of running a saw-mill himself. Besides the project would be bogged down by financial constraints which were not easy to get over. It was submitted that the plea of the landlord was a ruse for eviction.

9. The trial court had considered the rival contentions of the parties in paragraphs 15 and 16 of its order and found against the claim of the landlord. The court below had re-examined the contentions in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the judgment and held that the finding of the trial court is unsustainable. It seems to us necessary to consider the matter in some detail.

10. Ext. B2 was sent at a time when Suja was student. It was not disputed that he is unemployed and is dependent on the landlord his mother, the first respondent. She has indeed a right to see him self-reliant and not as a burden to her or her husband, the second respondent. There was nothing strange in the demand for surrender of the premise for the use of the son of the respondents.

11. sub-section (3) of section 11 of the Act says that the landlord is entitled to an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of the family dependent on him. (This is no doubt subject to the several conditions in the four provisos of the sub-section). As already stated, what was stated in Ext. B2 was the need of the first respondent which she gave up impliedly in the petition and chose to canvass that of her dependent son. The question for consideration is whether by such change the need erased to be bona fide and the landlord forfeited her claim for eviction.

12. It cannot be denied that issuance of a notice, except in a case covered by section 11(2) of the Act, is not mandatory for eviction under section 11(3) of the Act. The court has to consider the claim in the light of the evidence and circumstances to find whether the plea is bona fide or not, which is a question of fact. In our view in considering the plea of the landlord a realistic and not a pedantic approach is what is called for. Even in the matter of construing the pleadings a liberal approach is necessary, as otherwise there would be the risk of justice becoming a causality.

13. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the bona fide need of the landlord for his own occupation is distinct and different from the need of any member of his family dependent on him. These according to him, are exclusive and independent in their nature and content, and in support he relied upon the decision of this court in Avanasalingam Chettiar v. Chunilal Samji (ILR 1980 (1) Kerala, 310. That was a case where eviction was sought under section 11(3) of the Act. A notice had preceded the petition where surrender of the building was sought for the petitioner's son. But, in evidence the petitioner stated that the need is hers, which was also endorsed by her son who was examined as a witness. The Rent Control Court dismissed the petition holding, that the petitioner did not establish bonafides in the claim on the ground of the discrepancies in the case set out in the notice and the petition. The appellate authority as also the revisional court endorsed the dismissal. This Court held:

“Admittedly eviction was sought under section 11(3) of the Act. Under sub-section (3) the tenant can be dispossessed only if the landlord bona fide needs the building (i) for his own occupation or (ii) for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him. The two are distinct. Bonafide need for own occupation of any member of his family who wants to have separate residence. Again, it is ‘any member of, his family’. Occupation by the landlord and occupation by a member of the family who wants to reside separately are different. In the latter case, the landlord will not be shifting to the building. So, if the landlord is to succeed in his attempt to get back possession he should have a definite and consistent case from the very beginning. A landlord connot blow hot and cold in the same breath by changing his stand from his own occupation to the occupation of his sons or one of his sons. When two needs which are different and distinct in character are put forth the one thing that will be lacking is bonafides. In such a case the need will cease to be a bona fide need under the sub-section. The words used are ‘for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family’. It is ‘or’ and not ‘and’ that is used.”

14. We do not think section 11(3) of the Act makes ‘an absolute’ distinction between the needs of the landlord himself and that of any member of his family dependent on him. In our view, the need of the dependent who is a member of the family can also be that of the landlord because the need is related to dependents. The question would be one of bona fides of the claim and if it is not in doubt, the claim must succeed. But, then, the bona fides cannot be doubted and the claim cannot fail for the only reason that in the notice the need canvassed in the petition was not projected. With respect, we are unable to hold that Avanashalingam v. Chettiar Samji ILR 1980 (1) Kerala 310, lays down the correct law.

15. In Narayana Pillai v. Ponnappan Achari, 1980 KLT 871, it was held:

“Though in strict legal parlance dependence may mean looking up for support or maintenance, in the context in which that term appears in S. 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act it connotes a wider concept and covers a larger field. It takes in a person who is not financially dependent upon the landlord but who would in the normal course look up to the landlord to provide him with the facility of a building possessed by the landlord. Whether the landlord would do so or not to such a dependent would depend on various facts and circumstances including the financial situation in which the landlord is placed, the degree of closeness or intimacy with the dependent who seeks the provision of such building and other similar matters of relevance”.

16. In Dr. Syed Sibgathulla v. C.N Abdul Azeez Khan, 1983 (1) RCJ (Karnataka) 516, the question that arose for consideration was whether—

“in an application made by a landlord under section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, which enables the recovery of possession of a premises from the tenant if it is bona fide and reasonably required by the landlord for occupation “by himself”, an order for recovery of possession tan be made if it is made out that the premises is required for the residence of his major son”.

17. It was held:

“the construction sought to be placed or the word ‘himself’ by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that it only refers to the landlord in person or his dependents, who reside with him and not separately. Such a construction, in our view, is too technical and artificial as it would rob the provision of its real intention and purpose and it does not merit acceptance. Under variety of circumstances, the actual occupation of the premises by another has to be regarded constructively as the occupation by the ‘emanation’ of the landlord himself”.

18. In Shri Batha Singh v. Shri H.V Nayar, 1983 (1) RCJ 158, (Delhi), the Delhi High Court held:

“If the children of a landlord have no accommodation of their own for residence, they would depend upon parents for residence. Further it would be reasonable to construe the word ‘himself’ in section 14(1)(c) of the Act to include the family of the landlord including his son, son's wife and their children”.

19. The court below found that it would not be difficult for Suju to run the saw-mill in the premises because he could legitimately expect help from Ms parents. There would not be lack of funds for the enterprise, which was seen to have Been decided upon with all seriousness. The problem if at all which Suju might have to face would certainly not be insurmountable.

20. There was indeed delay to file the petition for eviction, which was not a circumstance to suspect the bona fides of the claim. The evidence showed that Raghavan who was employed by Narayanan on being asked to vacate the premises had sought time to do so on the ground that he was on the look out for a suitable place to shift his business willy-nilly, the matter got delayed. Narayanan died sometime after Ext. B2. Suju completed his education and came of age to earn a living. The delay to file the petition was perhaps incidental and was certainly not serious enough to disbelieve the case of the respondents.

21. The petitioners have a place of their own near Kadappakkada junction, which they had let out on a fat annual rent. For obvious reasons the defense rested upon the first and second provisos to sub-section (3) of section 11 was not claimed. The revision memorandum also is silent about it. In our view the court below has considered all the relevant aspects and rightly ordered eviction under section 11(3) of the Act. We see no infirmity in the finding to merit interference.

22. While we vacate the relief granted under section 11(2), we affirm the order passed under section 11(3) of the Act. The revision is, accordingly allowed in part. We make no order as to costs.