1. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, who are the applicants, have taken out this Chamber Summons dated 17th June 1987 for being added as a party to this reference under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

2. The facts that give rise to this Chamber Summons are that the Special Land Acquisition Officer (I) issued notifications for acquisition of the land in question as the same was required for the benefit of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. In pursuance of the notices served, Indian Hume Pipes Company Limited, who are the owners of the land and claimants in this reference appeared before the Special Land Acquisition Officer and were duly heard. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, however, served no notice on the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, perhaps because they had no proprietary interest in the land in question. Nontheless, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, the applicants appeared before him and made some submissions. The Special Land Acquisition Officer then proceeded to make an award dated 23rd September 1986. Being aggrieved by the award, Indian Hume Pipes Co. Ltd., the claimants, sought a reference. This reference has come to be numbered as Land Acquisition Reference No. 25 of 1986. This reference was on Board on several occasions and came to be adjourned from time to time for various reasons. Since the matter came to be ripe for hearing, issues came to be framed on 23rd April 1987 and the matter was proceeded with. To prove their case, the claimants examined one witness. An application was then made by Mr. Thakore, Advocate who was then appearing for the Special Land Acquisition Officer that in view of the evidence given as to the quality of the land which was technical in character, it was not possible for him to cross-examine the claimants' witness in the absence of assistance from the experts from the Special Land Acquisition Officer's side, and the matter should be adjourned for the said purpose. With a view to ensure that the case of the Special Land Acquisition Officer should not go by default, and in view of the handicap of Mr. Thakore, Advocate, the matter was adjourned to enable the Special Land Acquisition Officer to secure necessary assistance so that the Special Land Acquisition Officer's counsel Mr. Thakore could cross-examine the claimants' witness. Pending this further hearing, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (hereinafter referred to as the applicants) have now taken out the present Chamber Summons to be made parties to the land reference. The Chamber Summons is resisted by the claimants.

3. At the outset, it may be stated that there is no dispute on the point that the applicants are a “party interested” and as such would be entitled to make an application for being added as a party. The point, however, involved in this Chamber Summons is whether the applicants should be joined as parties to this reference under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure or as to whether they should appear only to the extent which Section 50 sub-clause 2 of the Land Acquisition Act permits them to do so. The applicants have maintained that the applicants must be joined as parties under the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the Special Land Acquisition Officer has supported the applicants. The claimants have, on the other hand, maintained that the applicants can only appear to the extent to which Section 50 sub-clause 2 of the Land Acquisition Act permits and no more. Case law has been cited on both sides in support of the arguments and I shall hence straightaway turn to the case law.

4. In the case of Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begam, AIR 1958 SC 886 (V 45 C 122), the question of addition of parties arose in a suit proceeding. The ratio laid down in the said case is that (a) in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject matter of the litigation and (b) that if a court was of opinion that by adding that party it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy, then leave must be granted under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the addition of such a party.

4A. In Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Devasthanam Charities v. Srila Sri Ambalawana Pandara Sannadhi, AIR 1981 Madras, 42, the facts were that the land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for the Devasthanam. An award came to be passed and the land owner preferred an appeal. A judgment in the appeal was also rendered. Thereafter, the Devasthanam for whose benefit the land was acquired applied for being impleaded as a party-respondent. In that case, it was held that the provisions of the Act would clearly indicate that there could only be two parties to the reference viz., the Collector and the owner of the property. That under proviso to Section 50(2), the Devasthanam for the benefit of which land was being acquired had no locus standi to demand a reference under Section 18, after the award was passed and could only appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining compensation, under proviso to Section 50(2) of the said Act. Moreover, since the Devasthanam was not a party before the Collector, it could not be impleaded as party-respondent after the appeal stood disposed of.

5. In Khurshad Bagh Co-operative Housing Society Ltd, Lucknow v. Smt. Satya Devi, AIR 1971 Allahabad 426 (V 58 C. 112), the facts were that a small piece of land was acquired by the State Government for the Society. The Society had already executed an agreement in favour of the State Government in accordance with the provisions of Section 39 of the Land Acquisition Act and had also made the necessary deposit. The validity of the acquisition proceedings which were then pending for disposal before the appropriate authority was challenged by the respondents before the Lucknow Bench of the same Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 786 of 1970. The appellants-society was not made a party to the said writ petition and hence applied that they be impleaded as party to the said writ petition asserting that they were necessary parties. This application was rejected by the single Judge. Being aggrieved by the same, the society preferred an as party in the Writ Petition under the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

6. In the State of Orissa through the Land Acquisition Collector, Sambalpur v. Amarandra Pratap Singh, AIR 1967 Orissa 180 (V 54 C 78), the facts were that the land in question was being acquired for the benefit of a company and the grievance of the company was that it was obligatory that a notice of reference should be given to the company. In considering this argument, the Court considered the provisions of Sections 3(b), 18, 20, 21 and 50 of the Land Acquisition Act and went on to reject the argument that without a notice of the reference being given to the company, the right to appear and adduce evidence given to it becomes illusory more particularly in view of the clear provision that no such company shall be entitled to demand a reference under Section 18, and since Section 20 makes no provision for issue of a notice to the Company. That if no notice was given to the company, no injustice can be said to be caused thereby. The Court further held that it was for the State acquiring the land in question for the benefit of the company to safeguard the interest of the Company and to give it necessary intimation regarding the pendency of the proceedings under Section 18 for adducing evidence, if any.

7. In the case of Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Francis V. Coutinho, AIR 1971 Bombay 341 (V 58 C 58), the facts were that three petitioners who were brothers were the owners of certain lands at village Majas Mogra, Jogeshwari, Bombay. The Himalayan Tile and Marble (Pvt.) Ltd., were respondent No. 3 in the petition. This company carried on business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles. They had a factory on a land adjoining the land under acquisition. Sometime in 1957 or 1958, the law was set in motion at the instance of the said company for the acquisition of the petitioners' land. The usual notices under Sections 4 and 6 were issued, and finally, an award came to be made on the 11th of December 1961. The same was published in the gazette on the 18th of April 1961. On the 11th of December 1961, a letter was written on behalf of the Government to the first respondent in the petition threatening to take possession of the land acquired. Thereupon, the petitioners presented a writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings. In this writ petition, Himalayan Tile and Marble (Pvt.) Ltd., for whose benefit the land was to be acquired were made the 3rd respondents, the first two respondents being the State of Bombay and the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The writ petition stood disposed of Being aggrieved by the judgment of the single Judge, the Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Pvt.) Ltd., preferred an appeal. In appeal, a preliminary objection was taken viz., that the company i.e Himalayan Tile and Marble (Pvt.) Ltd., had no locus standi whatsoever except as provided under Section 50(2) to intermediate in the acquisition proceedings. That the said company would not even be entitled to prefer a reference under Section 18, and if this was so, then, the said company could hardly come by the back door and purport to challenge the acquisition proceedings indirectly in a writ petition. That the appeal preferred by the said company was not maintainable. In dealing with the various arguments and the law cited, the Court held that when a party for whom (in this case the said company) the acquisition proceeding is being undertaken had no locus standi to claim to set aside the award under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (1894), such a party would not be entitled to challenge the acquisition proceedings in a writ petition. This decision was appealed against, and the twin questions that arose before Their Lordships in the Supreme Court (vide Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Pvt.) Ltd v. Francis Victor Coutinho, (1980) 3 SCC 223 : AIR 1980 SC 1118) were whether a company, for whose benefit the acquisition proceedings had been taken, is “a person interested,” and secondly, whether it had a right to prefer an appeal to a higher forum against an order adverse to its interests. Both these questions were unreservedly decided in favour of the appellant-company with the following observations:

“It seems to us that the definition of ‘a person interested’ given in Section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the lands were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the company under the agreement entered into between the company and the Government. Thus it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this purpose, the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of compensation.”

And again;

“…How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital? For instance, the land acquisition proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given to him. Similarly, if such a person is not heard by the Collector or a court, he may have to pay a very heavy compensation which, in case he is allowed to appear before a court, he could have satisfied it that the compensation was far too heavy having regard to the nature and extent of the land. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, local authority or a person for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are satisfied that such a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property as also in the compensation to be paid therefor, because both these factors concern its future course of action and if decided against him seriously prejudice his rights. Moreover, in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, we hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by Section 18(1) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it had no locus to file an appeal before the Bench.”

“It would be manifest from the aforesaid enunciation of the law that it must now be held that a Company for whose benefit the land is acquired, is both a ‘person interested’ in the acquisition proceedings and is further entitled to maintain an appeal in its own right.”

8. The next decision that needs to be considered is the case of the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel, (1970) 1 SCWR 183. In that case, the Supreme Court in a short order whilst upholding a preliminary objection against the maintainability of an appeal, held that the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad for whose benefit the land had been acquired could not maintain an appeal in the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court setting aside the notification, and their Lordships failed to see what interest the Municipal Corporation (for whose benefit the land was being acquired) had which would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the landowners.

9. Whilst I have referred to the various cases decided by the various High Courts on the point, it is the decision of the apex Court that must prevail, but then, in the two cases referred to hereinabove, viz., (1) Himalaya Tiles and Marble (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho and (2) The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel, there appears to be a divergence of views. The question must now arise as to which needs to be accepted. This very question pertaining to these very two judgments arose before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Indo Swiss Time Limited v. Umrao, AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 213. The facts in that matter were that the land was being acquired for the benefit of a company and an application was preferred by the company to be impleaded as a party under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to a reference under Section 18. This application was opposed. The matter was carried to the Full Bench and the questions that needed to be decided were (a) whether the company for whose benefit the land was acquired should be impleaded as a party under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure or (b) if such a company had only a right under Section 50 sub-clause (2) of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) for the purposes of determination of the amount of compensation and should be allowed to appear only for the exercise of that right and (c) as to which decisions out of the said two decisions of the Supreme Court should the lower Courts follow. In dealing with these aspects of the matter, the Full Bench of the said Court scanned the several judgments of the other High Courts on the points, and finally the majority of the Judges of the Full Bench held that an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being impleaded as a party by the Company for whose benefit the land is acquired was not legally maintainable. The company was not an interested person so as to give it a right to become a party to the proceedings in reference. That the only right given to the company for whose benefit the land was being acquired was under Section 50(2) viz., to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determination of the amount of compensation. That for the exercise of such a right, it was not necessary nor was there any provision in the Act which would entitle the company to ask for being impleaded as a party under the provisions of Order I, Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code. In dealing with the question as to which of the two decisions of the Supreme Court should the lower Court follow, the majority of the Judges of the Full Bench held that if there was a direct conflict between two decisions of co-equal Benches and which cannot possibly be reconciled, the Courts must follow the judgment which appears to them to state the law accurately. Since the case law covering on all these points has been extensively dealt with by the Full Bench it is unnecessary to dwell upon this case law herein, suffice to state that I have considered the case law referred to in this decision at some length and I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the majority of the Judges of the Full Bench.

10. I hence, direct that the applicants in this case be allowed to be on record of the case but not as a party defendant or claimants to the proceedings. The applicants shall be allowed to appear only for adducing their evidence as contemplated under Section 50 sub-clause (2) of the Land Acquistion Act so much so as to enable them to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the claimants and also advance arguments in the manner for that limited purpose. In the circumstances, I make no order on the Chamber Summons. The Government Pleaders office will amend the proceedings by bringing on record the applicants herein but not as a party and or claimants to the proceedings. The applicants will file their affidavit in reply within 10 days from today. I here will be no order as to costs.

Order accordingly.