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Case Summary — Macklin, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued to enforce payment under a promissory note executed on 2 January 1933 by defendant 2 on behalf of the suit shop for Rs. 5,400. The note contained three endorsements; the last endorsement, in defendant 2's handwriting, stated that Rs. 75 was paid on 13 October 1935. The plaintiff filed the present suit on 13 October 1938 in the Nasik Court. On 29 November 1939 the Nasik Court held it had no jurisdiction and ordered the plaint returned. The plaint was endorsed as returned on Saturday, 9 December 1939, and was re-filed in the Nadiad Court on Monday, 11 December 1939.

On the merits the plaintiff had succeeded in the lower Court, but the suit had been dismissed by that Court as barred by limitation and not saved by Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The plaintiff appealed against that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit was saved from the bar of limitation by Section 14 (with Explanation I) of the Limitation Act because time spent prosecuting the suit in the wrong (Nasik) Court should be excluded, and if so whether the re-filing date in Nadiad fell within the prescribed period.
  2. Whether the payment of Rs. 75 endorsed on the promissory note can save limitation under Section 20 of the Limitation Act as a payment of interest "as such".
  3. Whether the endorsement of payment could be treated as an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act and thereby save limitation.
  4. Whether, because the debtor was an agriculturist, Section 13(f) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act entitles the plaintiff to treat the payment as credited to interest and thus saved under Section 20.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff)

  • Relied on the plaint's statement that the Rs. 75 payment was credited towards interest and invoked Section 20 of the Limitation Act to save limitation.
  • Alternatively relied on Section 19, contending that the endorsement could be an acknowledgement (citing authority where similar endorsements were held to save limitation under S.19).
  • Later argued that, because the debtor was an agriculturist, Section 13(f) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act required the payment to be credited first to interest, thereby bringing Section 20 into play.

Respondents (Defendants)

  • Contended the suit was out of time and that time spent prosecuting the suit in the Nasik Court (which had no jurisdiction) could not be used to save limitation under Section 14; alternatively argued that the dates meant the re-filing was too late.
  • Denied that the Rs. 75 payment was towards interest and pointed out that the endorsement did not state it was payment of interest.
  • Asserted that there was no evidence that either defendant was an agriculturist at the time the payment was made (1935), so the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act could not be relied upon.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
42 Bom. L.R. 640 (Privy Council) The Privy Council refused to presume an intention on the part of the debtor to pay interest "as such" from the English rule that open payments are first credited to interest; distinguishes creditor appropriation to interest from debtor intention. The Court relied on this decision to hold that an appropriation to interest by the creditor alone will not save limitation under Section 20; the debtor's intention matters for "payment of interest as such."
25 Bom. L.R. 1444 Authority where payments endorsed in terms similar to the present case were held to save limitation under Section 19 (acknowledgement). The Court noted the decision but treated it as doubtful in light of later authority; it did not accept that the present endorsement amounted to an acknowledgement under S.19.
44 Bom. L.R. 4265 Holds that an acknowledgment of part payment implies a liability to pay more and that whether an endorsement amounts to an acknowledgment depends on its language. The Court applied this principle to conclude that the present endorsement did not in terms amount to an acknowledgment under Section 19, so S.19 did not help the plaintiff.
45 Bom. L.R. 178 Decision holding that where an agriculturist debtor makes a payment, Section 13(f) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act requires credit first to interest, affecting appropriation and limitation questions. The Court accepted this decision as correctly stating the law provided the debtor was an agriculturist at the time of payment, but declined to apply it because there was no evidence the defendants were agriculturists in 1935.
60 Cal. 11221 and 52 Bom. 4772 Examples on the question of which date should be taken for exclusion under Section 14 when a Court has declined jurisdiction (date of declining jurisdiction vs. date of actual return of the plaint). The Court cited these authorities to explain that it is permissible in a proper case to treat the date of actual return of the plaint as the limit for the exclusion under Section 14; here the Court treated the actual return date (9 Dec 1939) as appropriate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main lines of enquiry: first whether time spent prosecuting the suit in the wrong Court (Nasik) should be excluded under Section 14 (with Explanation I) of the Limitation Act; and second whether any of Sections 19 or 20 could save the suit from limitation.

On Section 14: the Court rejected the respondents' contention that the date of the order declining jurisdiction (29 November 1939) necessarily fixed the limit of the excluded period. Drawing on authorities, the Court held that in a proper case the date of the actual return of the plaint may be taken as the appropriate limit for exclusion under S.14, provided the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence in the intervening period. Finding no negligence here, the Court treated 9 December 1939 (date of actual return) as the endpoint of the excluded period. By application of Explanation I to S.14 the Court excluded the entire period from 18 October 1938 to 9 December 1939 inclusive, and also excluded the following Sunday, so that a plaint filed on Monday, 11 December 1939, could be deemed filed exactly three years after the date of the payment (13 October 1935). Thus the time spent in the wrong Court did not by itself render the action barred.

On Section 20 (payment of interest "as such"): the Court examined the endorsement which the plaint alleged was credited towards interest. The defendant's written statement denied that it was payment towards interest and observed that the endorsement did not state it was for interest. The trial Court found that the endorsement could not be regarded as payment towards interest "as such," and that there was no evidence that it was payment towards principal. The appellate Court upheld that approach, stressing the legal distinction (drawn from authorities) between an appropriation by the creditor to principal and an appropriation by the creditor to interest. The Court explained that while a creditor's appropriation to principal (if made within the prescribed period) may save limitation even if not notified until after the period, an appropriation by the creditor to interest will not save limitation unless the payment is by the debtor "as such" or the debtor's intention to pay interest can be clearly inferred. The Court relied on the Privy Council decision (42 Bom. L.R. 640) to support the rule that debtor intention is decisive for Section 20.

On Section 19 (acknowledgement): the Court considered the argument that the endorsement could be an acknowledgement within S.19 (citing 25 Bom. L.R. 1444). It observed that later authority (44 Bom. L.R. 4265) casts doubt on the earlier decision and establishes that whether an endorsement constitutes an acknowledgement depends on its language. The Court found that the present endorsement — recording that "Rs. 75 was paid on 13th October, 1935, in the hand of Motibhai..." — did not amount in terms to an acknowledgement of liability to pay the unpaid balance, and thus S.19 did not assist the plaintiff.

On the agriculturist argument and Section 13(f) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act: the plaintiff relied on the proposition (from 45 Bom. L.R. 178) that when an agriculturist debtor makes a payment, the Dekkhan statute requires credit first to interest, which would make the payment a payment of interest "as such" for S.20 purposes. The Court stated it considered that decision to state the law correctly, but only where the debtor was an agriculturist at the time the payment was made. The Court examined the evidence: the Nasik Court had found defendant 1 was an agriculturist in 1939 but indicated he was not an agriculturist before 1936; defendant 2 was not an agriculturist. The appellate Court held there was no evidence that either defendant was an agriculturist in 1935 when the payment was made, and therefore the presumption relied upon could not be drawn. Although the Court recognized it might have been possible to remand for a finding, it emphasized that it was the plaintiff's burden to make out the point and that the plaintiff had failed to raise or put in evidence on this issue in the lower Court when it could have been done.

The Court therefore concluded that neither Section 20 nor Section 19 saved the suit from limitation in the present circumstances, despite the Court's earlier conclusion that the period spent in the wrong Court was properly excluded under Section 14.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed and the decision of the lower Court is upheld. The plaintiff failed to show that limitation was saved by Section 20 (payment of interest "as such") or by Section 19 (acknowledgement). Costs were awarded against the appellant and the attachment was set aside.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiff's suit to enforce the promissory note remains dismissed as barred by limitation; the lower Court's order is affirmed and the attachment is vacated.
  • The Court clarified that time spent prosecuting an action in a wrong Court may, in a proper case and absent negligence, be excluded under Section 14 (with Explanation I) up to the date of actual return of the plaint rather than the date the Court declined jurisdiction.
  • The Court reaffirmed the distinction between appropriation to principal and appropriation to interest for limitation purposes: an appropriation to interest will not save limitation unless it reflects the debtor's intention (payment "as such"), whereas appropriation to principal by a creditor within the prescribed period can save limitation even if notice is given later.
  • The Court accepted that an agriculturist's statutory rights under Section 13(f) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act may give rise to a presumption that payments are to be credited to interest, but only if the debtor was, in fact, an agriculturist at the time of payment; absent proof of that status, no such presumption arises.
  • The Court noted that subsequent legislative amendment in 1942 would have altered the result (making creditor appropriation to interest sufficient to save limitation), but emphasized that the amendment is not retrospective and did not assist the plaintiff in this case.

    Harkubai Fakirchand Shet v. Shankerbhai Zaverbhai Gujarati

    Macklin, J.:— This appeal by the plaintiff in a suit to enforce payment under a promissory note has led to an interesting discussion of the law of limitation. On the merits the plaintiff has succeeded in the Court below; but his suit has been dismissed as barred by limitation and not saved by the provisions of Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

    2. On 2nd January, 1933, the promissory note for Rs. 5400 now sued upon was executed by defendant 2 on behalf of the suit shop. It contains three endorsements, of which the last is an endorsement of the payment of Rs. 75 on 13th October, 1935, in the handwriting of defendant 2. On 13th October, 1938, exactly three years after, the present suit was brought in the Nasik Court. On 29th November, 1939, it was held by that Court that the Court had no jurisdiction, and the plaint was ordered to be returned. On Saturday 9th December, 1939, the plaint was endorsed as returned to the plaintiff's pleader, and on Monday 11th December, 1939, it was re-filed in the Court at Nadiad. The point of limitation taken in the Court below arose out of Section 20 of the Limitation Act. Section 20, so far as it is material, provides that:

    “Where interest on a debt is, before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid as such by the person liable to pay the debt, or by his agent duly authorised, or where part of the principal of a debt is, before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid by the debtor or by his agent duly authorised, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made;”

    and then follows a proviso with which we are not now concerned. The plaint stated that the payment of Rs. 75 was credited towards interest but did not in terms say that interest had been “paid as such” within the meaning of S. 20. The written statement of defendant 2 denied that it was paid towards interest and pointed out that the endorsement did not say that it was paid towards interest. The trial Court held that it could not be regarded as a payment towards interest as such, and it also held that there was no evidence from which the Court could come to the conclusion that the payment was made towards principal. On the contrary it pointed out that the plaintiff himself in his plaint having stated that it was credited towards interest it would be difficult for him to establish a case of its having been paid towards principal. On that ground alone the suit was dismissed, and the plaintiff now comes in appeal.

    3. I do not propose to go as fully into the discussion that has taken place as I should otherwise have done, since the appeal in our view must fail on a question of fact. I shall however briefly indicate the lines which the discussion has taken. In support of the decree it has been argued on behalf of the defendants-respondents that, quite apart from Section 20 of the Limitation Act, the suit is out of time because the period spent in prosecuting the suit in the Nasik Court, which had no jurisdiction to entertain it, is in this case incapable of saving limitation in spite of Section 14 of the Act. The argument takes two forms. In the first place it is pointed out that the order of the Court declining jurisdiction was passed on 29th November, 1939, but the suit was not re-filed in the Nadiad Court until 11th December so that having been originally filed on the last day of limitation it was at least 12 days out of time. Alternatively it is argued that if the date endorsed on the plaint as the date of return, namely 9th December, is taken to be the date up to which the plaintiff was prosecuting with due diligence his action in a Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain it, even so the suit is out of time because, it having originally been filed on the last day of limitation, it was not possible to file it two days after the plaint was returned and still save limitation. We do not think that in this case the date of declining jurisdiction should be taken to be the extreme limit of the period during which the plaintiff can be taken to have been prosecuting his suit with due diligence in the wrong Court. It is true that it is not in every case that the date of the actual return of the plaint should be taken to be the date on which the plaintiff could be taken to have been prosecuting his suit; see, for example, 60 Cal. 11221 and 52 Bom. 4772. But the authorities make it clear that in a proper case it is open to the Court to treat the date of actual return as the limit of the period to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, rather than the date on which the Court passes orders declining jurisdiction, though of course it would not do so if it thought that in the interval the plaintiff had been guilty of negligence. In this case we do not see any reason for supposing that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence; and that being so, we think that the date of the actual return of the plaint can be taken to be the appropriate date for the purposes of S. 14. If that is so, then by reason of Explanation I to S. 14 the entire period from 18th October, 1938 to 9th December, 1939, (both days inclusive), must be excluded. The following day, which was Sunday, also must be excluded; and a plaint filed on Monday 11th December, 1939, can be deemed to have been filed exactly three years to a day after the date of the payment. The fallacy in the argument addressed to us on behalf of the defendants lies in its failure to notice the effect of explanation I to the section.

    4. But the real question is whether limitation is saved by Section 20 of the Act. The plaint seeks to save limitation by the application of the section with reference to payment of interest. Although it is open to a creditor to treat a payment as payment towards interest or as payment towards principal provided he makes the appropriation within the period of limitation (see, 42 Bom. L.R 6403,) he obviously cannot be allowed to appropriate it towards principal during the course of the suit when he has in fact appropriated, and notified to the defendant that he has appropriated, to interest. Mr. Desai argues on the authority of the decision of the Privy Council in 42 Bom. L.R 640 that an appropriation by the creditor to interest when the debtor has indicated no intention one way or the other is “a payment towards interest,” and, if the appropriation is made within the period of limitation (as in the case here), it will save limitation. But that is not the effect of the decision, and their Lordships make it perfectly clear that there is a definite distinction for the purpose of saving limitation between an appropriation by a creditor to principal and an appropriation by a creditor to interest. An appropriation by a creditor to principal will save limitation if the appropriation is made within the prescribed period, even though the appropriation is not notified until after the prescribed period. But an appropriation to interest will not save limitation if made by the creditor alone, because the words of the section “payment of interest as such” are a clear indication that the intention of the debtor making the payment is what counts; and if the debtor has not indicated any intention that his payment should go towards interest, it is not open to the creditor to make up his mind for him.

    5. Alternatively it is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the payment can be treated as an acknowledgment within the meaning of S. 19, and for this reliance was placed on 25 Bom. L.R 1444, where payments endorsed in similar terms to the payment in this suit were held to save limitation under S. 19. The endorsement in question is simply an endorsement that “Rs. 75 was paid on 13th October, 1935, in the hand of Motibhai Sd. Shankarbhai Javerbhai, the handwriting of Motibhai Jeverbhai” (Shankarbhai being defendant 1 and Motibhai being defendant 2). There is in terms no acknowledgment of any liability, nor any promise to pay the unpaid balance. But the authority of 25 Bom. L.R 144 has been doubted in a later decision of this Court, 44 Bom. L.R 4265, where it was pointed out that an acknowledgment of a part payment does imply a liability to pay something more and is therefore an acknowledgment of the right of the creditor to recover something more, and whether in any particular case the endorsement amounts to an acknowledgment must depend on the language of the endorsement. It is pointed out that a statement that something has been paid “in respect of a promissory note” does not involve any admission that something more remains due on the promissory note. On the other hand, a payment made “in part payment” or “towards”, as distinct from “in respect of” a promissory note does imply an admission that something more is due. In the present case it is not possible to infer any admission that anything more was due, though in fact it is probable that a good deal more was due. It follows that on this statement of the law neither S. 19 nor Section 20 of the Limitation Act, will help the plaintiff.

    6. But he now relies mainly on the fact that this is a case of an agriculturist, and his learned advocate argues on the authority of 45 Bom. L.R 1786, that when an agriculturist debtor makes a payment, the money by reason of Section 13(f) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, has to be credited first in the account of interest notwithstanding any agreement between the parties as to the appropriation of the payment, so that the payment must be taken as having been made towards interest as such and therefore to be a good payment to save limitation under Section 20 of the Limitation Act. This is a decision of my learned brother Divatia sitting alone and it is not binding on us. As at present advised however and having heard arguments on the point at considerable length, we think that it lays down the law correctly, provided that the debtor making the payment was an agriculturist at the time the payment was made. If he was an agriculturist at the time the payment was made, then he may be presumed to have known at the time his rights as an agriculturist, to have intended to stand on his rights, to know the consequence of standing on his rights, namely that if the matter came to Court, any appropriation other than an appropriation towards interest would not be upheld, and, lastly, to have intended to abide by the consequences of standing on his rights, unless of course there was an agreement to the contrary at the time of making the payment, namely that it should be appropriated towards principal rather than interest. It is true that the Privy Council in 42 Bom. L.R 640, refused to presume an intention to pay interest as such from the English rule that, where interest is outstanding and a creditor receives an open payment without any appropriation as between principal and interest by either debtor or creditor, the presumption is that the payment is creditable in the first instance towards the outstanding interest. But that was because they refused to draw any inference as to the intention of the debtor from the rights of the creditor. Here we are drawing a presumption as to the intentions of the debtor from the rights not of the creditor but of the debtor himself. We do not however see how this presumption could arise in the case of a debtor who was not an agriculturist at the date of the payment. He may have ceased to be an agriculturist before the payment, or he may have become entitled to all the benefits provided by the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act after the payment. But if he was not an agriculturist at the time of making the payment, it is common sense that no presumption as to his state of mind could arise from rights which he did not then possess. In the present case it is argued on behalf of the defendants that there is nothing to show that either of the defendants in this case was an agriculturist at the time the payment was made; and with that contention we agree. In the Nasik Court it was held that defendant 1 was an agriculturist in 1939 and that defendant 2 was not an agriculturist at that time. But the Court made it clear that the reason for the finding was that since 1936 defendant 1 had no other source of income than agriculture. Prrma facie therefore defendant 1 was not an agriculturist before 1936, and defendant 2 never was an agriculturist. For the plaintiff it is argued that in taking accounts a Court is not entitled to consider the position of the parties at any period except at the date of the suit. But that is beside the point. It is not a question of taking accounts; it is a question of drawing a presumption of fact, and we are unable to draw any presumption in this case as to the agricultural status of the defendants in 1935 at the time when the payment was made.

    7. It is suggested that we might send the case back for a finding of fact on this point. But after all it is for the plaintiff to make out his case to save limitation, and merely because the decision in 45 Bom. L.R 178, was not published until after this case had been decided by the lower Court, it does not alter the fact that the law must be presumed to have been the same at the time of the institution of this suit as it was when the decision in 45 Bom. L.R 178, was published. It was for the plaintiff to take this particular point if it was open to him to take it. He did not take it in the lower Court when it was possible to take evidence. He cannot take it now as a new point, since it depends on evidence which is not available to us.

    8. The result is that on this ground the plaintiff must be held to have failed to show that limitation is saved. It is an unfortunate result, since on the law as now amended in 1942 appropriation by the creditor to interest—not merely payment by the debtor of interest as such — would save limitation; also even on the law as it stood in 1938 the creditor could have saved limitation by appropriating to principal instead of interest. But the law correcting this anomaly is not retrospective. We uphold the decision of the lower Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. The attachment is set aside.

    9. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Harkubai Fakirchand Shet v. Shankerbhai Zaverbhai Gujarati
    (Mar 10, 1943)