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  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • provisions of s. 63 of the Amending Act,
  • s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • s. 63 of the Amending Act XX of 1929.
  • s. 17 of the Indian Registration Act
  • s. 63 of the Amending Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • provisions of s. 63 of the Amending Act,
  • s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • s. 63 of the Amending Act XX of 1929.
  • s. 17 of the Indian Registration Act
  • s. 63 of the Amending Act
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The subject property is a paddy field. In 1879 the owner, Babaji Surve, mortgaged it by a possessory mortgage to Grondhalekar (ancestor of respondents Nos. 1 and 2). In 1890 the equity of redemption was sold in execution of a money decree and purchased by Mahadev Khare (father of respondents Nos. 10 and 11). In 1902 Mahadev Khare sold the equity of redemption to Laxmanrao More (father of respondent No. 3) by an unregistered sale-deed (exhibit 84) for a consideration of Rs. 75. Laxmanrao redeemed the mortgage, obtained possession from the mortgagee, and he and his son (respondent No. 3) have remained in possession since that time.

In 1930 respondents Nos. 10 and 11 purported to sell their rights to the present appellant, who then sued to redeem the mortgage. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the 1902 purchase of the equity of redemption by Laxmanrao More was proved and valid, and thus the appellant acquired nothing by his purchase. The trial judge considered only whether the 1902 sale-deed required registration under s. 17 of the Indian Registration Act and did not consider s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The present, second appeal (heard by Broomfield, J., with Macklin, J. concurring) raised two principal points: (1) whether the equity of redemption in a usufructuary mortgage is "tangible immoveable property" so as to permit transfer by an unregistered deed when value is less than Rs. 100; and (2) whether s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (enacted by Amending Act XX of 1929; in force 1 April 1930) is to be regarded as retrospective.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the equity of redemption in the case of a usufructuary mortgage is "tangible immoveable property" so that it can be transferred by an unregistered deed where the value of the property does not exceed Rs. 100.
  2. Whether s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (added by Amending Act XX of 1929, in force 1 April 1930) is retrospective in operation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant challenged the validity of the 1902 unregistered sale on the ground that, if the equity of redemption is treated as tangible property, delivery was necessary to complete the transfer where there is no registered deed; delivery could not be effected by the vendor because the mortgagee was in possession.
  • The appellant invoked the proviso to s. 53A, arguing that his rights were not affected because he was a transferee for consideration who had no notice of the earlier contract or of its part performance.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents relied on proof of the 1902 sale to Laxmanrao More and his subsequent redemption and possession, asserting that this sale was valid and gave them title.
  • Respondents also relied on s. 53A (part performance) to validate an unregistered transfer where the transferee had taken or continued possession in part performance of a contract; they further contended that the appellant had notice (actual or constructive) of the earlier sale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal (Full Bench) Majority held that sale by a mortgagor of his interest where he has made a usufructuary mortgage is a sale of "tangible immoveable property." The District Judge relied on the majority view; Broomfield J. examined the majority and dissenting reasoning and ultimately agreed the majority decision is correct; the court adopts the reasoning that the mortgagor's transfer may be regarded as sale of tangible property.
Ramasami Paltar v. Chinnan Asari Earlier High Court views (Allahabad and Madras) that equity of redemption in a simple mortgage is tangible because mortgagor is in possession, but in a usufructuary mortgage it is intangible because mortgagor is not in physical possession. Cited as prior contrasting authority; the opinion discusses the reasoning but prefers the view that the mortgagor's transfer can be regarded as sale of tangible property despite possession issues.
Sibendrapada Banerjee v. Secretary of State for India in Council Holding that if on the date of sale the vendee gets possession of the property with the assent (expressed or implied) of the vendor, that amounts to delivery of property within s. 54. Applied to hold that Laxmanrao More paid off the mortgage on the same day, obtained possession with vendor's assent, and thus delivery occurred for the purposes of s. 54.
Suleman v. Patell Held that s. 53A is retrospective (as applied by Mr. Justice B.J. Wadia). Used as authority supporting retrospective application of s. 53A; counted among cases favoring retrospectivity.
Cooverjee Plumber v. Vasant Society Mr. Justice Murphy expressed the opinion that s. 53A has no retrospective effect. Mentioned as a contrary view; the opinion notes lack of discussion of s. 63 of the Amending Act in that decision.
Sk. Mahammed v. Jamini Nath (Calcutta High Court) Held that s. 53A applies in the case of a suit brought after 1 April 1930. Cited as recent authority supporting retrospectivity where suit is brought after the commencement date; the present court follows the same view.
Wakefield v. Kumar Rani Sayeeda Khalun Expressed the view that s. 53A is retrospective (applies to suits after commencement). Cited as supporting the retrospective application of s. 53A.
Kanjee and Mooljee Bros. v. Shanmugam Pillai Held that s. 53A has no application to an agreement made prior to 1 April 1930. Mentioned as one of the decisions taking the contrary view; the present court prefers the reasoning of cases holding retrospectivity.
Tota Ram v. Ram Lal (Full Bench) Held s. 92 retrospective; reasoning based on construction of s. 63 of the Amending Act XX of 1929. The court regards the reasoning in Tota Ram as persuasive and applicable by analogy to s. 53A when considering s. 63 of the Amending Act; the decision is preferred to contrary authorities.
Isap v. Umarji Followed reasoning of Tota Ram v. Ram Lal regarding retrospectivity of certain sections. Noted that N.J. Wadia J. approved Tota Ram in Isap v. Umarji; the present court records having been party to that decision and aligns with Tota Ram's reasoning.
Jagdeo Sahu v. Mahabir Prasad Earlier decision referred to; point not discussed with reference to s. 63. Mentioned as a case where the point was not really discussed and there was no reference to s. 63—less persuasive for present purpose.
Subraya v. Timmanna Recent decision preferring Tota Ram and Sk. Mahammed over other contrary authorities on retrospectivity. Referenced to show recent judicial preference for the reasoning that supports retrospectivity of relevant sections.
Lahshmi Amma v. Sankara Narayana Menon One of the cases taking a different view on retrospectivity of provisions. Mentioned among a group of authorities where s. 92 was held not to be retrospective; present court prefers the contrary line of authorities.
Ko Pu Kun v. C.A.M.A.L Firm One of the cases holding that s. 92 is not retrospective. Mentioned as part of contrary authorities which the present court does not follow.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in two linked parts corresponding to the principal issues.

1. Whether the equity of redemption is "tangible immoveable property":

  • The court examined the definitions in the Transfer of Property Act: s. 54 defines "sale" as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price, and indicates that transfers of tangible immoveable property of value less than Rs. 100 may be effected by delivery rather than registration; s. 58 defines "mortgage" as a transfer of an interest.
  • Broomfield, J. considered the majority full-bench reasoning in Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal which treated a mortgagor's transfer of his interest in a usufructuary mortgage as a transfer of tangible immoveable property. He contrasted that with the dissent (Sulaiman Ag. C.J.) which considered such interest intangible because not capable of immediate delivery. Broomfield J. concluded the majority decision is correct, reasoning that the definition of sale focuses on transfer of ownership and does not make immediate possession a precondition for being tangible; therefore the mortgagor's transfer may be regarded as a sale of tangible property.
  • The court addressed the appellant's contention that delivery was impossible because the mortgagee was in possession. It found that the contract contemplated payment off the mortgage and transfer of possession. The vendee paid off the mortgage on the same day (endorsement on the mortgage deed evidences this) and obtained possession with the assent of the vendor. Applying Sibendrapada Banerjee, the court held that possession taken with vendor assent constitutes delivery under s. 54.
  • Macklin, J. concurred, adding that in practical and consequential terms a purchaser who redeems the mortgage and exercises the purchased right would be excluded from possession only in the most artificial construction; thus such a sale is of tangible immoveable property and delivery by redemption is sufficient.

2. Whether s. 53A is retrospective:

  • The court examined s. 53A (inserted by Amending Act XX of 1929, effective 1 April 1930), which protects transferees who have taken or continued possession in part performance of a contract even where the contract is not registered.
  • Broomfield, J. reviewed conflicting authorities on retrospectivity but concluded that the better view is that s. 53A is retrospective, largely by analogy to conclusions drawn about s. 92 and the construction of s. 63 of the Amending Act. He cited Tota Ram v. Ram Lal (full bench) and related decisions construing s. 63 to mean that sections not specifically excluded by s. 63 were intended to operate retrospectively except as to proceedings pending in court on the commencement date.
  • The court noted several authorities supporting retrospectivity (including Suleman v. Patell and Sk. Mahammed v. Jamini Nath) and acknowledged authorities to the contrary (e.g., Kanjee & Mooljee Bros. v. Shanmugam Pillai and others) but preferred the reasoning that treats s. 53A as retrospective when the suit was instituted after 1 April 1930.
  • On the facts, the court addressed the proviso to s. 53A (protecting transferees for consideration who have no notice of the contract or of part performance). The appellant's admissions in cross-examination (acknowledging knowledge of defendant No. 3's possession and statements) led the court to find that the appellant had at least constructive notice of the 1902 sale to defendant No. 3; therefore the proviso did not protect the appellant.

Combining these analyses, the court concluded that (a) the 1902 sale was a valid sale of tangible immoveable property effected by delivery (through redemption and taking possession), and (b) even if registration were required and the sale were invalid for want of registration, s. 53A (as interpreted to be retrospective for suits instituted after 1 April 1930) would operate in favour of the respondents because the appellant had notice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications:

  • Direct consequence for the parties: The judgment below is upheld; the appellant's suit to redeem the mortgage is defeated and the defendants (respondent No. 3 and those claiming under the 1902 sale) are entitled to resist the appellant's claim.
  • The court applied and endorsed the view that a sale by a mortgagor of his equity of redemption in a usufructuary mortgage may be treated as a sale of tangible immoveable property (and that delivery can occur by the vendee redeeming the mortgage and taking possession with the vendor's assent).
  • The court further held, following a line of authorities and a construction of s. 63 of the Amending Act XX of 1929, that s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act should be regarded as retrospective in application to suits instituted after 1 April 1930; on the facts the appellant was not protected by the proviso to s. 53A because he had notice of the earlier sale.
  • The opinion records preference for certain precedents (notably Tota Ram v. Ram Lal and related cases) over others on the question of retrospectivity; the result in this appeal is dismissal with costs and enforcement of the 1902 sale as against the appellant.
Appeal dismissed.

    Tukaram Ganpatrao Surve v. Atmaram Vinayak Gondhalekar

    Broomfield, J.:—

    The two principal points in this second appeal are: (1) whether the equity of redemption in the case of a usufructuary mortgage is tangible property so that it can be transferred by an unregistered deed where the value of the property does not exceed Rs. 100, and (2) whether s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, which came into force on April 1, 1930, is to be regarded as retrospective.

    The facts so far as it is necessary to mention them are as follows:—The property in suit is a paddy field. In 1879 the owner Babaji Surve mortgaged it by a possessory mortgage to Grondhalekar, the ancestor of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. In 1890 the property, that is to say the equity of redemption, was sold in execution of a money decree against the mortgagor and it was purchased by Mahadev Khare, the father of respondents Nos. 10 and 11. In 1902 Khare sold it to Laxmanrao More, the father of respondent No. 3, by an unregistered sale-deed, exhibit 84. The consideration for the sale was Rs. 75. Laxmanrao redeemed the mortgage and got possession of the property from the mortgagee, and he and his son respondent No. 3 have been in possession ever since. In 1930 respondents Nos. 10 and 11, the sons of Mahadev Khare, purported to sell their rights to the present appellant, who sued to redeem the mortgage.

    The suit was dismissed on the ground that the purchase of the equity of redemption 1902 was proved and valid and that therefore the appellant acquired nothing by his purchase from respondents Nos. 10 and 11. The trial Judge only considered the question whether the sale-deed required registration under s. 17 of the Indian Registration Act and did not consider s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The latter section provides as follows:—

    “‘Sale’ is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.

    Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument.

    In the case of tangible immoveable property, of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property.”

    The District Judge in first appeal held that the sale by Khare to the father of respondent No. 3 in 1902 was a sale of tangible immoveable property and that as the value was less than Rs. 100 a registered deed was not required. He based his decision on the judgment of the majority of the full bench in Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal. It was there held by Mukerji and Kendall JJ. that the sale by a mortgagor of his interest in the property of which he has made a usufructuary mortgage is a sale of “tangible immoveable property.” The basis of this decision, to put it very briefly, is that the mortgagors, in spite of executing a mortgage, whether it be a simple mortgage or a usufructuary mortgage, is still the owner of the property so mortgaged, and if he makes a transfer of his interest he makes a transfer of the property itself and not merely of an abstract right or of “certain rights out of his total bundle of rights” originally owned by him. Sulaiman Ag. C.J differed from the other Judges on this particular point, and his reasons for doing so may be said to be summed up in what he says at p. 1003 of the report:—

    “The interest which the mortgagor possesses is not itself capable of being touched, nor is it such that an actual delivery of its possession can be effected by the mortgagor to the mortgagee. It seems difficult to conceive of a thing as being tangible when it is not capable of actual delivery of possession. Although, therefore, the mortgagor is the legal owner of the usufractuarily mortgaged property, whatever rights he possesses, so long as the mortgage subsists, cannot be treated as; ‘tangible.’ The subject-matter of ownership is ‘tangible’, but the interest which the mortgagor can transfer is ‘intangible.’”

    Prior to this full bench case the view taken by the Allahabad High Court and also by the Madras High Court in Ramasami Paltar v. Chinnan Asari was that the equity of redemption in a simple mortgage is tangible because the mortgagor is in possession, but in a usufructuary mortgage it is intangible because he is not in physical possession. Conversely, as to the mortgagee's interest, it is intangible if the mortgage is a simple mortgage, but tangible if the mortgage is a usufructuary mortgage. But “sale” is defined in s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act as a transfer of ownership and “mortgage” is defined by contrast in s. 58 as a transfer of an interest, and having regard to these definitions the basis of the distinction sought to be made is not very obvious. There is no difficulty about the interest of a simple mortgagee. That is clearly intangible property; but the real reason is, I should say, not that the mortgagee is not in possession of tangible property but that he is not the owner. The interest which he owns is a right to recover his money out of the property. But can it be said that the usufructuary mortgagee is in any better position in this respect? It is true that he is in possession of tangible property but he is not the owner of it and cannot transfer the ownership of it. What he owns and can transfer is an interest in the property entitling him to remain in possession and enjoy the profits until the debt is paid, and that is intangible. On the other hand, the mortgagor is the owner of the property itself, and can transfer the property itself subject to the mortgage, and whether the mortgage is with or without possession, if the mortgagor transfers his rights that may well be regarded in my opinion as a sale of tangible property. The definition of sale says nothing about possession, and though the purchaser is normally entitled to get possession of the property sold at once it is not always or necessarily so. No doubt it is correct to say, as Sulaiman Ag. C.J says in Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal, that a tangible thing must be capable of being possessed, but to say that in the case of a sale it must be capable of being immediately possessed by the transferee seems to me to be adding something to the definition of sale for which there is no warrant. As at present advised, therefore, I am of opinion that the decision of the majority of the Court in Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal is correct.

    The next point taken by the appellant was that even if the property be regarded as tangible property, since there is no registered deed, delivery is necessary to complete the transfer and there could be no delivery by the vendor because the mortgagee was in possession. “Delivery” is defined in s. 54 where it is provided: “Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.” In the present case it was provided in the contract of sale that the vendee was to pay off the mortgagee and enjoy the property. That shows that it was in the contemplation of the parties that he should get possession of the land. He did in fact pay off the mortgage, as the endorsement on the mortgage deed shows, on the very same day and he got possession, and it has remained with him ever since. It may fairly be held therefore that he got possession with the assent of the vendor, and according to the decision in Sibendrapada Banerjee v. Secretary of State for India in Council that is enough. It was held there that if on the date of the sale the vendee gets possession of the property with the assent expressed or implied of the vendor, that amounts to delivery of property within the meaning of the section.

    Even if I am wrong as to the question whether it can be regarded as a sale of tangible property, there remains the point taken by the respondents based on s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. This section, which was added by the Amending Act XX of 1929 which came into force on April 1, 1930, provides:—

    “Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty,

    and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract,

    and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:

    Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.”

    There is considerable conflict of authority as to whether this section can be regarded as retrospective. But on the whole, I think the better view is that it should be so regarded. It was held to be retrospective by Mr. Justice B.J Wadia in Suleman v. Patell. In Cooverjee Plumber v. Vasant & c. Society, Mr. Justice Murphy expressed the opinion that the section has no retrospective effect. It does not appear however, that the authorities on the point were cited, nor was there any discussion of the provisions of s. 63 of the Amending Act, on which the decision of the question must mainly depend. In a recent case of the Calcutta High Court, Sk. Mahammed v. Jamini Nath, it has been held that s. 53A applies in the case of a suit brought after April 1, 1930. The same view has been taken in Wakefield v. Kumar Rani Sayeeda Khalun. The only case to which our attention has been drawn in which a different view has been taken after argument is Kanjee and Mooljee Bros. v. Shanmugam Pillai, where it was held that s. 53A has no application to an agreement made prior to April 1, 1930.

    There are a number of cases on s. 92 of the Act which has been held to be retrospective for reasons which apply equally to the case of s. 53A. Tota Ram v. Ram Lal(4) is a full bench case in which that view has been taken, mainly as the result of the construction of s. 63 of the Amending Act XX of 1929. This section begins by saying that certain provisions of the amending act (which do not include s. 92 or s. 53A) shall not be deemed in any way to affect the terms or incidents of any transfer of property made or effected before April 1, 1930, or to affect the validity or invalidity, effect or consequences of anything done or suffered before the aforesaid date. The second portion of the section says this:—

    “… and nothing in any other provision of this Act shall render invalid or in any way affect anything already done before the 1st day of April 1930, in any proceeding pending in a Court on that date: and any such remedy and any such proceeding as is herein referred to may be enforced, instituted or continued, as the case may be, as if this Act had not been passed.”

    The most reasonable interpretation of the provisions of this section certainly seems to be that the sections of the Transfer of Property Act not specifically mentioned in s. 63 of the Amending Act were intended to be retrospective except in the case of proceedings pending in a Court on April 1, 1930.

    This Allahabad case was approved of by N.J Wadia J. in Isap v. Umarji I myself was a party to the decision in that case, and at that time I preferred not to express a decided opinion on the question whether s. 92 is to be regarded as retrospective, although I agreed with my learned brother that the reasoning of the Allahabad High Court in Tota Ram v. Ram Lal is preferable to that in Jagdeo Sahu v. Mahabir Prasad, which was also cited but in which the point had not really been discussed and there was no reference to s. 63 of act xx of 1929. Still more recently in Subraya v. Timmanna disposed of by Mr. Justice Sen and myself we preferred to follow Tota Ram v. Ram Lal and Sk. Mahammed v. Jamini Nath,(5) rather than Lahshmi Amma v. Sankara Narayana Menon,(6) Kanjee and Mooljee Bros. v. Shanmugam Pillai(7) and Ko Pu Kun v. C.A.M.A.L Firm,(8) where it has been held that s. 92 is not retrospective.

    It has been argued for the appellant that his rights ate not affected by reason of the proviso to s. 53A which says that “nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.” But in view of the admissions made by the appellant in cross-examination there is no substance in this argument. He says:—

    “Thikans Nos. 1 and 3 are in defendant No. 3's name in the Botkhat and he pays the dost. I know of this state of things existing for the last 40/50 years. Defendant No. 3 is in actual possession. I did not personally inquire of Gondhalekar. Before my sale-deed I went to defendant No. 3 and made inquiries. He said I am in possession as owner.”

    Under the circumstances it must be held in my opinion that the appellant had at any rate constructive notice of the sale of the equity of redemption to defendant No. 3 in 1902.

    I hold therefore that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

    Macklin, J.:—I agree. Apart from the authorities it seems to me that in a case of a sale of this kind it must be taken that what is sold is the actual physical property and not merely a tangible right with respect to property, and I say this not because in practice such sales are usually expressed to be in terms of land itself but because the consequences of such a sale seem to me, without exception, to have an effect upon the ownership of the property itself and consequently sooner or later upon the physical possession of the property. Assuming (which is not the case here) that a sale of the equity of redemption were so expressed and that the mortgage on the property were even a usufructuary mortgage, (as to which it has been held that the mortgagor's right is merely intangible), it seems to me inconceivable for the vendee, having exercised the right which he has purchased in redeeming the mortgage, to be then excluded from possession on the ground that his sale, being in terms of the equity of redemption only, gave him no right with respect to the property itself. In such a case there can be no doubt that the redeeming vendee would be able to resist possession even against the vendor upon the strength of his purchase; and if that is so, I do not see how it can be said that what is sold is not property itself, which is a tangible thing. I think, therefore, that even in the case of a sale of property subject to a usufructuary mortgage the sale is of tangible immoveable property and can be effected in the case of a sale less than Rs. 100 by delivery of possession.

    In the present case upon the facts I have no doubt that the vendee did in the end get possession by virtue of his purchase; and the manner in which he obtained it shows, I think, that it was by delivery of possession within the meaning of s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act as interpreted in that respect by Sibendrapada Banerjee v. Secretary of State for India in Council. The sale in my view is therefore a valid sale and the defendants are entitled to resist the suit upon that ground.

    But even if the sale were invalid for want of registration, I think that the defendants' reliance on the doctrine of part performance as expressed in s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is justified. As my learned brother has stated, there is some conflict of judicial opinion upon the point. But I agree in thinking that the better opinion is that in the case of proceedings instituted after the enactment of s. 53A the section is retrospective in its effect. I do not think that it is necessary to deal further with the authorities beyond saying that the reasoning expressed in Tota Ram v. Ram Lal, with respect to s. 92 of the Act [a case that was followed in Isap v. Umarji], commends itself to me in preference to the ruling of the Madras High Court in Kanjee and Mooljee Bros. v. Shanmugam Pillai, and that I am not able to apply a different form of reasoning to s. 53A from that which has been applied in this case to s. 92. Upon the facts it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to plead want of notice, and he is therefore bound by the sale to defendant No. 3 in 1902.

    The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

    Appeal dismissed.
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    Tukaram Ganpatrao Surve v. Atmaram Vinayak Gondhalekar
    (Apr 5, 1938)