AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the decision of the Joint Judge of Thana concerning a claim by the Secretary of State for India for repayment of approximately Rs. 37,000 paid to the defendant under the Land Acquisition Act. The payment was made as compensation for land acquired by the Government under the Act. The defendant’s claim to compensation arose from a series of historical land grants and sales dating back to 1803, involving the East India Company, Luke Ashburner, Cawasjee Manekjee, and their successors. The Government notified the land for acquisition in 1906, describing it as “Bhandup Khoti Khajan,” indicating it was not Government land. Compensation was initially fixed at Rs. 4 per acre, later increased to Rs. 14 and then Rs. 50 per acre after appeals. The Government paid the defendant Rs. 37,731 following these proceedings. The plaintiff alleges the payment was made under a mistake of fact, claiming the land always belonged to the Government and seeks recovery of the sum as money paid under mistake. The District Judge dismissed the Government’s claim, holding the matter was res judicata, that the land did not belong to the Government, and that the defendant had a claim by adverse possession. The present appeal challenges that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government can recover compensation paid under the Land Acquisition Act on the ground that the payment was made under a mistake of fact.
  2. Whether the Government’s claim is barred by the principle of res judicata due to prior land acquisition proceedings and judgments.
  3. Whether there was a total failure of consideration that would entitle the Government to recover the money.
  4. Whether the Government is estopped from recovering the compensation due to its prior representations and conduct during the acquisition proceedings.
  5. Who bears the burden of proof regarding title to the land and whether the defendant held title by grant or adverse possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Government) Arguments

  • The payment of compensation was made under a mistake of fact as the land belonged to the Government, not the defendant.
  • There was a total failure of consideration for the payment as the Government did not receive the land it purported to acquire.
  • The payment was not made under a valid decree or legal process binding on the Government, thus recovery is permissible.
  • The Government was not bound by prior land acquisition proceedings as the Secretary of State for India was not a party, and the Collector’s representation should not bind the Crown.

Respondent's (Defendant) Arguments

  • The compensation was paid under the compulsion of legal process following adjudication under the Land Acquisition Act, barring recovery.
  • The defendant held possession of the land for over sixty years, establishing title by adverse possession against the Crown.
  • The Government is estopped from recovering the money due to its prior representation that the land was not Government land and the defendant’s consequent alteration of position.
  • There was no total failure of consideration since the Government obtained possession and extinguished the defendant’s claim through the acquisition proceedings.
  • The burden of proof lies on the Government to establish lack of title in the defendant, which it failed to discharge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Marriot v. Hampton Money paid under compulsion of legal process cannot be recovered as money had and received. Applied to hold that payment under the Land Acquisition Act order precludes recovery on mistake grounds.
Kishen Sdhai v. Bakhtawar Singh Application of Marriot v. Hampton principle in Indian context. Supported the view that money paid under legal compulsion is not recoverable.
Moore v. Vestry of Fulham Principle that money paid under pressure of legal process cannot be recovered. Reinforced the principle irrespective of whether the payment was made under a judgment or other legal compulsion.
Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao Distinction between award under Land Acquisition Act as not a decree but adjudication of title as between parties. Considered in relation to whether Government was bound by land acquisition proceedings.
Mathura Nath Kundu v. Steel Article 96 of Indian Limitation Act applies to suits based on Section 72 of Indian Contract Act; sums recovered under decrees cannot be recovered again. Supported argument that remedy lies in review of decrees under Land Acquisition Act, not fresh suit for money paid under mistake.
Tofa Lal Das v. Syed Moinuddin Mirza Followed Mathura Nath Kundu v. Steel on limitation and recovery principles. Confirmed that recovery of money paid under decree must be sought through appropriate proceedings under Land Acquisition Act.
Wolf & Sons v. Dadyba, Khimji & Co. Similar principle on recovery of money paid under legal process. Reinforced the approach that recovery must be through Land Acquisition Act procedures.
Secretary of State for India v. Ghellikani Rama Rao Burden of proof on showing that title was extinguished by adverse possession. Referenced in relation to burden of proof on Government to establish title in this case.
Nabakishore v. Upendrakishore Burden on appellant to show judgment appealed from is wrong; mere balance of probabilities insufficient. Applied to hold that plaintiff failed to prove title and thus failed on merits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the nature of the payment made by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act and concluded that the payment was compelled by legal process following adjudication by the High Court. It relied on established principles from Marriot v. Hampton and related cases that money paid under compulsion of legal process cannot be recovered on grounds of mistake. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the Land Acquisition Act award was not a decree, emphasizing that the principle applies to any payment under legal compulsion.

Regarding failure of consideration, the Court found that the Government obtained possession of the land and extinguished the defendant’s claim through the acquisition proceedings, thus there was no total failure of consideration. Partial failure is insufficient to support recovery.

On the issue of mistake, the Government failed to prove that the payment was made under a mistake of fact. The evidence showed that relevant documents were in Government custody at the time of notification, and the local Collector, who advised the Government, likely considered the defendant’s possession sufficient to justify the acquisition and payment. The Court declined to infer a mistake merely because the Government now challenges the defendant’s title.

The Court also upheld the defendant’s estoppel argument, reasoning that the Government’s notification describing the land as “Khoti Khajan” implied it was not Government land. The defendant altered his position by claiming compensation and relinquishing possession in reliance on this representation. The Government cannot now contradict that representation to recover the money.

Although the District Judge had held the claim barred by res judicata, the Court expressed doubt on that point, noting that the Secretary of State for India, as plaintiff, was not a party to the original acquisition proceedings and thus may not be bound by them. However, this was not decisive given the other grounds for dismissal.

On the merits of title, the Court found the evidence inconclusive and noted the burden of proof was on the Government to establish that the defendant lacked title. The Government failed to discharge this burden, and thus the claim failed on the merits.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED THE APPEAL WITH COSTS, thereby affirming the decision of the Joint Judge of Thana.

The direct effect is that the Government cannot recover the compensation paid to the defendant under the Land Acquisition Act on the grounds of mistake or failure of consideration. The defendant’s title, whether by grant or adverse possession, stands unchallenged in this suit. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming established legal principles that payments made under legal compulsion are generally not recoverable as money had and received, and that estoppel may prevent recovery where the paying party’s conduct induces reliance to their detriment.

    Secretary Of State For India In Council v. Shrimant Tatyasaheb Yeshwantrao Holkar Of Indore

    Beaumont, C.J:—

    This is an appeal from the decision of the Joint Judge of Thana. The plaintiff, the Secretary of State for India, claims the repayment of a sum of Rs. 37,000 and odd as money paid under a mistake, which, is alleged, was discovered in 1922.

    The moneys were paid in respect of a claim by the defendant under the Land Acquisition Act, and the facts giving rise to the claim were these. In the year 1803 the East India Company made a grant to one Luke Ashburner of certain lands in Bhandup village and other villages. In the year 1817 Luke Ashburfter sold his estate to Cawasjee Manekjee. In the year 1838 Cawasjee Manekjee applied to the Government for a grant of certain other lands, and the Collector recommended to the Government that a grant should be made, and in 1843 a grant was made, although the actual document is not now forthcoming. In the year 1879 there was an administration suit in this High Court in respect of the estate of one Cursetjee Cawasjee, who was the son of Cawasjee Manekjee. In that suit, in the year 1884, the estate was sold to the son of Cursetjee, viz., Dadabhai, and the conditions of sale and particulars used for the purpose of that sale are in evidence, and the suggestion is that what was sold to Dadabhai was everything included in the grant of 1803 and 1838. In the year 1886 the defendant in the present suit obtained a decree against Dadabhai, and in execution of that decree he purchased the estate which Dadabhai had acquired in the Court sale. In the year 1906 the Government of Bombay notified certain land for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, and the particular land which is in question in this suit was described as “Bhandup” (that is the name of the village) “Khoti Khajan”, which denotes the character of the land, and shows that it was not Government land. The area required was mentioned as 480 acres and odd. The land acquisition officer awarded the sum of Rs. 2,210 and odd, which was at the rate of Rs. 4 an acre. Dadabhai and the defendant both claimed the compensation money, and defendant requested the Collector to refer the questions both of title and of amount of compensation to the Courts. There were accordingly two references one as to the amount of compensation, and the other as to the title to the compensation. The District Judge increased the amount to Rs. 14 per acre, and decided the question of title in favour of the defendant, the result being that the defendant became entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 14 per acre. There were three appeals from the decision of the District Judge. The first was an appeal by Dadabhai against the defendant and the Collector of Thana. In that appeal Dadabhai's case was that the 480 acres in question were not included in the sale to the defendant. That appeal was dismissed. The second appeal was by the defendant against the special officer of building sites of Thana claiming increased compensation, and in that appeal the High Court raised the amount of compensation to Rs. 50 per acre. The third appeal was by the Collector against the defendant and Dadabhai asking to have the amount of compensation reduced, and that appeal was dismissed. Those appeals were disposed of in the year 1912. Following on the disposal of those appeals the Government paid to the defendant in this suit the amount of Rs. 37,731 and odd which is claimed in this suit.

    It appears to me that as a result of those proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, there was an adjudication by the High Court that this sum of Rs. 37,000 and odd was payable by the Government to the defendant, and the Government as a result of those proceedings became entitled to take possession, and did take possession, of the land in question under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.

    The plaintiff in this suit says that the defendant was not entitled to the land for which he was paid, but that the land in fact all the time belonged to Government, and he says that the payment of the Rs. 37,000 and odd, therefore, can be recovered as money had and received to the use of the plaintiff. The Advocate General based his claim on two grounds: first, that there was total failure of consideration; and, secondly, that the payment was made by mistake so that the money is repayable under section 72 of the Indian Contract Act.

    The learned District Judge held, in the first place, that the claim of Government was res judicata having regard to the land acquisition proceedings. He held, secondly, that on the merits the land did not belong to the plaintiff at all; and he held, thirdly, that the defendant had been in possession of the land for sixty years before the action was brought and, therefore, at any rate, had a good claim by adverse possession against the Crown, and from that decision this appeal is brought.

    Now there seem to me many difficulties in the way of the Crown. In the first place, in my view, the whole action is misconceived. The claim of the Crown is that they paid this money under a mistake. But as I view the facts they paid the money not under any contractual, or supposed contractual liability, but because they were bound to pay it under the order of this Court in the land acquisition proceedings. It is laid down in the leading case of Marriot v. Hampton that where money has been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant under the compulsion of legal process, which is afterwards discovered not to have been due, the plaintiff cannot recover it back in an action for money had and received. The case of Kishen Sdhai v. Bakhtawar Singh is an authority in which that principle was applied in India. The learned Advocate General says that the principle does not apply here, because the order of this Court under the Land Acquisition Act, as it stood in the year 1912, was not a decree. But even assuming that to be so, the fact does not, in my opinion, exclude the principle of Marriot v. Hampton, since, as was pointed out by Lord Halsbury in Moore v. Vestry of Fulham, the principle of law is not that money paid under a judgment, but that money Paid under the pressure of legal process, cannot be recovered. In that case a summons had been issued by the Vestry of Fulham for recovery of money and the money wag paid on the service of the summons and before any further proceedings were taken. Now here undoubtedly under the land acquisition proceedings there was an order of this Court under which the Government were bound to pay this money as a condition of their getting possession of the land. Whether if the amount had not been paid it would have been necessary, as the learned Advocate General suggests, to bring a suit founded on the judgment of the Court, I do not pause to inquire. I will assume that would have been necessary. But even so, if a suit had been brought, it must necessarily have succeeded, and it would not have been open to the Government in that suit to challenge the proceedings and the judgment of this Court in the land acquisition case. I think, therefore, that the money was paid under the pressure of legal process, and that this action for money had and received does not really lie.

    If, however, I am wrong on that point there are other objections to the Government's claim. So far as the claim is based on a total failure of consideration, the answer seems to me to be that there was not a total failure of consideration, and an action for money had and received does not he if the consideration fails only in part. It is not disputed here that the defendant was in possession of the land in question at the time of the notification, and there can be no question that the Government succeeded in recovering possession of the land and in getting rid of whatever claim the defendant had to the land, by means of these proceedings and by means of the payment. It is, therefore, in my opinion, impossible to say that there was no consideration for the payment.

    With regard to the claim of mistake, in my opinion the Government do not prove that they made the payment under a mistake. The only witness called was a Mr. who was the officer of Government employed to work this case up. He says in his evidence that he commenced investigation in 1916 and completed it in 1922. He admits in cross-examination that all the papers, from which he had got the map which he has prepared and on which he based his case, were in Government custody when the notification was issued. He further admits that there is no document directly showing that the land belonged to Government. Now the officer who was advising Government at the time of land acquisition proceedings appears to have been the local Collector, that is, the Collector of Thana, and it seems to me that Government have not proved that the Collector of Thana was under any mistake. He had got all the documents available, and if he had looked at them he could have found out what the position as to title was. He may well have looked at them, and have come to the conclusion that the title on paper was doubtful. But he may have been satisfied that in fact the defendant or his predecessors-in-title had been in possession, as the defendant claims in his written statement, from, at any rate, the year 1839-1840, if not from the year 1803. He may have been satisfied that if the defendant were put to the proof he could prove possession for sixty years against the Crown, and the Collector may very well have taken the view that it would be cheaper and more expeditious to deal with the matter under the Land Acquisition Act instead of risking the bringing a suit against the defendant. It seems to me that we should not be justified in inferring that the Collector in 1906 must have made a mistake, merely because it is now suggested that the defendant had no good paper title to the property.

    Another objection raised by the defendant to the Government's claim is based on estoppel and I think that claim is also well founded. Having regard to the terms of the Government notification which described the land in such a manner as to negative the suggestion that it was Government land, and having regard to the whole course of the land acquisition proceedings which were utterly inconsistent with the land being Government land, I think the Government must be taken to have represented that in 1906 the land did not belong to Government. The learned Advocate General did not really dispute this, but says that assuming that to be so, there is no evidence that the defendant altered his position as a result of that representation. But to my mind the defendant clearly did alter his position. If the Government had said in 1906 that the land was their land, it appears to me obvious that there would never have been any proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, and the defendant, therefore, would never have made the claim he did make and would not have given up possession under the Act. He could have said, “I am in possession of the land and if Government claim it they must bring a suit against me.” The whole course of conduct by the defendant was altered by the fact that the Government represented that the land was not their land, and I see no reason why they should be allowed now to contradict that representation on which the defendant has acted to his detriment. I would point out, because this is relevant on the various defences, that there is no suggestion of any fraud or any suppression of facts by the defendant. The Government had in their possession all the material documents in 1906 and the whole difficulty has arisen because, as is suggested by them, they did not take the trouble to find out what their own title was.

    Another point which was taken against Government and on which the learned District Judge decided in favour of the defendant is the issue of res judicata. It is not really necessary, in the view which I take of the other defences, to deal with that defence. But as it has been raised I will say that my present view is that the plaintiff is not barred by res judicata. This suit is brought by the Secretary of State for India in Council and having regard to section 79 of the Civil Procedure Code he is the only person who could bring the suit. In the land acquisition proceedings the Secretary of State for India was not a party, but the land acquisition officer, that is the Collector of Thana, was a party to the proceedings and in all the appeals to this Court. The learned trial Judge takes the view that Government were parties to the land acquisition proceedings, and that it is a mere matter of form whether they are represented by the Secretary of State or by a local officer. I am not, however, satisfied that it is only a matter of form. It may very well be that the Secretary of State for India has machinery for dealing with suits in which he is a party and that machinery may not be applicable to suits in which a local Government officer is a party. I think that it would not be right to hold that the Secretary of State is barred by res judicata, the bar being based on previous proceedings in which he himself was not a party, though some local Government representative may have been.

    With the actual merits of the dispute, I will deal very shortly. Having looked at the various documents in the case to which the learned Advocate General referred us, particularly the grant of 1803 and the application and recommendation of the Collector of 1838, I think it is a matter of grave doubt what land was granted to the predecessor-in-title of the defendant. I am disposed to think that the party on whom the burden of proof rests of proving title to this particular land must fail. No doubt in the land acquisition proceedings, if the defendant's title had been challenged, the burden would have been upon him to show that he had got title, either by grant or by adverse possession. But in this suit in which the plaintiff is claiming repayment of moneys paid under a mistake, the burden is upon him to prove his case and in order to discharge that burden he must prove that the defendant had not got title either by grant or by adverse possession. In my view he does not succeed in discharging that burden.

    In my judgment, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

    Broomfield, J.:—The trial judge has held in this case that the plaintiff's suit is barred by res judicata by reason of the course of the acquisition proceedings in the year 1906 and the following years and especially by reason of the judgment of the High Court in those acquisition proceedings in appeal No. 191 of 1910. That conclusion the learned Advocate General has attacked on the ground that in a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act Government could not put forward its own title, the title of the claimants in the proceedings being for the purposes of these proceedings assumed. It has been held by the Privy Council in Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao that, although an award under the Act is not a decree, and not an adjudication of title so far as it merely determines the amount of compensation to be paid, a decision as to the apportionment of the money is an adjudication of title as between the parties interested. But the Advocate General says that this cannot affect Government's position in the present case because Government did not at the time of these acquisition proceedings put forward any claim to title on its own account. The question of Government's title according to him did not arise at all, and it would, not have been open to Government to put forward its present case in the land acquisition proceedings. In that connection he referred to section 48 of the Act which provides: “Except in the case provided for in section 36 (with which we are not concerned) the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.” In the present case possession of the land had been taken and therefore it was not open to Government to withdraw from the proceedings, and the setting up of title in Government itself as a ground for getting the award of compensation to the defendant set aside would have been, it is suggested, tantamount to withdrawal from the proceedings. A further point has also been made that under section 79 of the Civil Procedure Code: “Suits by or against the Government shall be instituted by or against the Secretary of State for India in Council.” This is a mandatory provision and it is urged that the Secretary of State could not be bound by any decision passed against the Collector of a District. Mr. Thakor who appears for the defendant argues that section 79 of the code does not apply, because proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are not suits, and in proceedings under that Act Government is represented by the Collector. There is, however, section 141 of the code which lays down that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. In my opinion the arguments of the learned Advocate General on this point ought to prevail. I think the learned Joint Judge was wrong in treating the matter as one of form and not of substance. It is true in a sense that the Collector in the land acquisition proceedings and the Secretary of State in a suit both stand for Government or the Crown, but it by no means follows that all decisions binding upon the Collector should be regarded as binding upon the Secretary of State. If the Crown is not properly represented that is not a matter of form.

    On the other hand, I consider that there is considerable force in Mr. Thakor's contention that the principle of estoppel applies, although the principle of res judicata does not. The representation by Government which is relied on by the defendant as constituting an estoppel is the notification of this land as khoti khajan land, which description implies that it was land not belonging to Government, and the whole course of the land acquisition proceedings presupposed that Government had no claim to the land and that it belonged to one or other of the claimants. Mr. Thakor rightly points out that if instead of instituting acquisition proceedings Government had challenged the defendant's title, it would have been necessary to bring a regular suit, and if that had been done in 1906 the defendant would have been in a better position than he now is to prove his case, at any rate, so far as possession of the land is concerned. Besides, the defendant, spent money in litigation in order to establish his claim as against Dadabhai in the land acquisition proceedings, which he need not have done if Government had not taken steps to acquire the land on the basis that it belonged to the defendant. Under the circumstances I cannot agree with the trial Judge that the defendant has not altered his position for the worse, and I think Government may fairly be held to be estopped from recovering the compensation money.

    The learned Advocate General has admitted that his cause of action in this suit must be based either upon mistake or upon failure of consideration. The cause of action, if based on mistake, is to be derived from section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, which lays down that “a person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it.” On this point Mr. Thakor's argument is that the money cannot be recovered as having been paid under a mistake because it was paid under the order of the Court. He contends that the only remedy, assuming that one exists, would be under the Land Acquisition Act. Whatever Government's claim to title may be, and whether or no there was any mistake, Government cannot be entitled to get possession of the defendant's land by the summary procedure provided by the Land Acquisition Act and then afterwards recover the money which was paid for it. It has frequently been laid down that money which has been paid under the compulsion of legal process cannot be recovered on the ground that it was paid under a mistake. In Mathura Nath Kundu v. Steel the Court was dealing with a suit to recover money alleged to have been paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants in excess of the sum demandable by the latter from the former on account of road cess. The Court held that Article 96 of the Indian Limitation Act applied, that is the Article appropiate to a suit based on section 72 of the Indian Contract Act. Some of the payments referred to had been recovered under Court decrees and in respect of those sums the Court observed as follows (p. 534):—

    “We may observe that those sums, which are said to have been recovered under decrees, cannot be obtained back in the present suit. The proper course is to apply for a review of the decrees under which those sums were recovered, that is, if the plaintiffs are so advised, and if they are within time.”

    That appears to me to support Mr. Thakor's argument that the plaintiff's remedy, supposing that there was any remedy open, was to recover the money under the Land Acquisition Act, that is by some application in the course of the proceedings taken under that Act. The case just cited was followed in Tofa Lal Das v. Syed Moinuddin Mirza, the relevant portion of the judgment being at p. 458, and there is a decision of our own High Court in Wolf & Sons v. Dadyba, Khimji & Co. to the same effect.

    The Advocate General has argued that in this case the payment was not really made under legal process. He says that an award under the Act is not a decree, or was not a decree at the time of which we are concerned, section 26(2) not being at that time part of the Act. That, however, appears to me to be a technical point and not a point of substance. Whether the award of the High Court could have been enforced as a decree or not, there is no doubt that Government was bound to pay the money. To all intents and purposes the money was paid under compulsion of legal process, and I consider that the authorities to which I have referred apply in principle. That being so, the plaintiff has no ground of action under section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, even it there was a mistake.

    But, further, the plaintiff has not satisfied us that there was a mistake as to the ownership of this land as a matter of fact. It is clear that in this suit Government must prove that they had a title to the land at the time of the land acquisition proceedings in 1906. Mr. Thakor has gone further and contended that it is necessary for Government to prove not only that they originally had a title, but that their title still subsisted in 1906, and had not been extinguished by the defendant's adverse possession. The latter proposition appears to me to be doubtful in view of the decision of the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. Ghellikani Rama Rao. But it is perfectly clear that the burden of proving title is upon the Government.

    Now the only evidence which has been produced to show that Government made a mistake is that of Mr. Antia who had no knowledge of the state of things in 1906, but who made inquiries in the year 1916, when Government received a certain communication from a private person alleging that the land for which compensation had been paid belonged to Government. It can hardly be said that Mr. Antia's evidence proves that a mistake was made in the year 1906. So far as the evidence goes it would appear to be at least a possibility that Government in 1906 may have thought that the defendant had a good possessory title and that the most expedient course was to buy him out at a cheap rate.

    The main grounds on which the learned Advocate General asks this Court to hold that the land in dispute belongs to Government are these. He refers first of all to the grant of the year 1803 in favour of Luke Ashburner. This grant is Exhibit 18. It refers in the commencement to the fact that “the said Luke Ashburner has been for some time and is at present in allowed possession of certain spots or parcels of ground situated in the limits of the villages of Bhandup, Navoor and Canjure”. It then proceeds:—“All and sundry of the above parcels or spots of ground situated in the said villages above recited are by these presents wholly and unalienably granted and made over to the said Luke Ashburner.” Neither the area nor the boundaries of the land so assigned are stated in Exhibit 18. All that document contains by way of specification of the land is the assessment, a certain number of measures of grain recorded in the revenue books. The Advocate General relies on this reference to the assessment of the land in order to show that it was, at any rate, cultivated land, and not salt or swampy land such as the land in dispute in the present case admittedly was. But it does not appear to be a necessary inference from the language used in this document that all the land covered by the grant was cultivated. There is a passage in Exhibit 18 in which reference is made to the fact that “a considerable part” of the ground included in the grant had been “brought into a state of great cultivation and consequent productiveness”. There is, however, nothing to show that the whole of the land had been developed or was under cultivation. Nor does it seem to be a necessary inference from the language used that no part of the land referred to was swampy ground.

    Exhibit 19 is the application made by Cawasjee Manekjee for the grant of further land in 1839. The language ??? in this application is important because the order passed on the application did not contain details but merely gratified to the applicant the land for which he had asked. The most material portion of Exhibit 19 for our purposes is the second paragraph:

    “I would at the same time beg to request that the whole of the swampy ground at present unoccupied and extending in a north-easterly direction from the Estate to low water-mark be also annexed to the Estate in perpetuity on the same conditions as the neighbouring ground of a similar nature had been made over to Framji Cawasjee.”

    According to the defendant this includes the land now in dispute.

    In the first paragraph of the application an area of about 20 bighas of land was asked for. On inspection it was found that the area of this portion really amounted to 40 bighas. The area referred to in, the second paragraph, described by the Collector in his letter Exhibit 20 as “salt marsh and unoccupied”, was estimated at about 75 bighas. The Collector's recommendation was that the whole of this land estimated at about 115 bighas should be granted, and Government in Exhibit 21 authorised the Collector to put the applicant in possession of the two pieces of ground applied for by him. Subsequently in 1843 it appears that a kowl or formal deed of grant was issued by Government. This may have contained details as to the area and boundaries of the land granted, but unfortunately the document is missing.

    Another document relied on by the Advocate General is the report of Lieut.-Colonel G.A Laughton, Superintendent of Salsette Estate Survey, dated 19th November 1873. It is printed in the Selections from the Records of the Government of Bombay and is quoted in the Joint Judge's judgment at p. 5 of the printed book. The material portion of the report is: “The waste lands which were granted to ??? in 1839-1840 were measured in 1858-1859 by the ??? Survey Department and divided into survey numbers and boundary marks were fixed according to rules; these numbers were classified and the rates of assessment fixed, but the latter will not come into force until 1883-1884.” It appears from the Survey Records which have been put in that the area of the land which was surveyed amounted to some 42 acres. But clearly the whole area granted in 1839-1840 was not surveyed. The surveyed area of 42 acres would seem to correspond to the area applied for in the first paragraph of Exhibit 19.

    In the year 1879 there was an administration suit in the High Court of Bombay relating to the estate of Cursetjee Cawasjee. In connection with that suit a map of the estate was made which is Exhibit 29. It does not contain the land in dispute and the Advocate General therefore argues that it formed no part of Cawasjee's estate at the time of the suit in 1879. This is perhaps the best piece of evidence in plaintiff's favour, but it loses a good deal of its force owing to the fact that the estate was described in the suit as including the entire village of Bhandup.

    In my opinion the evidence relied upon by the learned Advocate General is not sufficient to establish that the land in dispute is the property of Government. Even as regards the land originally granted in 1803 it cannot be said that it has been clearly identified. As regards the further land granted in 1839-1840 there is no clear explanation of what is meant by “low water-mark” in Exhibit 19 or of the expression “in a north-easterly direction from the estate”. As I have mentioned, the important kowl of 1843 is not forthcoming. One thing is perfectly plain and that is that there was a considerable area granted in 1839 for which Government cannot account. Out of the 115 bighas admittedly granted Government is not in a position to identify a greater area than 42 acres. (A bigha according to the Advocate General is 4/5 of an acre. The learned Joint Judge has taken it as the equivalent of an acre.) No doubt the difference between 42 acres and 115 bighas is much less than the difference between 115 bighas and the area of 480 acres which is the area of the land in dispute in this case. But after considering all the evidence this High Court in Appeal No. 191 of 1910 held that the whole of the Bhandup village was part of the Bhandup estate, that is the estate which now belongs to the defendant, and on the whole it seems to be just as reasonable to hold that the disputed area must have been granted, either in 1803 or in 1839-1840, as to hold the contrary.

    It has been held by the Privy Council that in appeals the burden of showing that the judgment appealed from is wrong lies upon the appellant. “If all he can show is nicely balanced calculations which lead to the equal possibility of the judgment on either the one side or the other being right, he has not succeeded” —Nabakishore v. Upendrakishore. On that principle it appears to me that the plaintiff has failed in this appeal even upon the merits.

    As regards the question whether the suit can be based upon failure of consideration, I think there is no doubt at all that it cannot. As I have mentioned, it is possible, so far as we know, that in 1906 Government may have supposed that the defendant had a good possessory title, whether or no his title could be made out from the documents. In any case it is not disputed that in 1906 the defendant was in possession. Government by taking proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act obtained possession of the land; they acquired whatever rights the defendant possessed in the land. It could not be said, therefore, that there was failure of consideration, even if the defendant was not really the owner.

    I agree that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

    Decree confirmed.
    J.G.R
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Secretary Of State For India In Council v. Shrimant Tatyasaheb Yeshwantrao Holkar Of Indore
    (Dec 11, 1931)