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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Patkar, A.C.J. (with Barlee, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff instituted a suit seeking a declaration that the defendant was not the natural born son of Irsangappa bin Muchkhandeppa Kupsad. The plaintiff was the son of Irsangappa by his first wife; the defendant was the son of Nilgangawa, Irsangappa's second wife. Irsangappa died on 6 February 1926, and the defendant was born on 4 January 1927 (332 days after Irsangappa's death).

In his written statement the defendant contended that the property in question exceeded Rs. 5,000 in value and therefore the suit was not triable by the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge at Bagalkot. The learned Subordinate Judge held that his Court had jurisdiction and, on the merits, gave a declaration in favour of the plaintiff that the defendant was not the natural born son of Irsangappa.

On appeal to the District Judge, the District Judge (while expressing that the Bombay High Court decision in Bai Machhbai v. Bai Hirbai might require review in light of the Privy Council's observations in Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao) held himself bound by Bai Machhbai and maintained that the suit was maintainable in the Second Class Subordinate Judge's Court. The present opinion reviews the jurisdictional question and modifies the appellate order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge at Bagalkot had jurisdiction to try the declaratory suit under section 25 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, i.e., whether the value of the subject-matter exceeded Rs. 5,000 thereby conferring special jurisdiction on a First Class Subordinate Judge.
  2. What rule governs the valuation of a simple declaratory suit for the purposes of jurisdiction — whether the valuation is determined by the notional value used for fixed court-fees under the Court-fees Act or by the real value of the property likely to be affected by the declaration (as indicated by Privy Council authority).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the declaration sought did not relate to any property worth more than Rs. 5,000 within the meaning of section 25 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act; accordingly the Bagalkot Second Class Court was the proper forum.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent contended that the District Judge's approach — deciding jurisdiction by reference to the pecuniary value used for court-fees — was erroneous.
  • The respondent relied on the Privy Council decision in Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao to argue that, in a simple declaratory suit, valuation for jurisdiction should be the real value of the property affected and not a notional valuation used for fixed court-fees; therefore, where the property (or the defendant's share) exceeds Rs. 5,000 the First Class Subordinate Judge would have jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bai Machhbai v. Bai Hirbai (Bombay High Court) The decision was treated by the District Judge as binding and, on its face, suggested valuing declaratory suits as had been done in that case; it was relied on for the proposition that the suit might be triable in a Second Class Court. The High Court distinguished Bai Machhbai because that case did not involve a dispute about land or an interest in land; it also held that if Bai Machhbai is read to mean valuation for jurisdiction is determined by the Court-fees Act, that view is inconsistent with the Privy Council decision in Rachappa Subrao and therefore could not be followed.
Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao (Privy Council) Held that the practice of adopting a notional valuation (e.g., Rs. 130) for a declaratory suit in order to fix a fee was illegal and misconceived; in a simple declaratory suit the real value of the property, not a notional fee-based value, should determine valuation for jurisdiction. The court followed the Privy Council's reasoning, held that the notional valuation for fixed court-fees does not determine jurisdictional valuation, and concluded that the Bagalkot Court lacked jurisdiction where the real value exceeded Rs. 5,000.
Dayaram v. Gordhandas Where rules under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act have not been framed, the value for the purposes of jurisdiction must be determined judicially by the Court. The court relied on this principle to explain that, absent local rules fixing valuation, the court must determine the real value judicially for purposes of jurisdiction.
Vasireddi Veeramma v. Butchayya For a mere declaratory suit concerning adoption, the valuation for jurisdiction must be based on the market value of the lands or houses likely to be affected, not on the plaintiff's chosen valuation or on the ad valorem fee basis. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that a declaratory suit should be valued by reference to the market value of property likely to be affected, reinforcing the rule that real value controls jurisdictional valuation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court commenced with the statutory text of section 25 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act which gives a First Class Subordinate Judge special jurisdiction over suits where the subject-matter exceeds Rs. 5,000 arising within the local jurisdiction of Second Class Courts. The pivotal question was whether the subject-matter of this declaratory suit exceeded Rs. 5,000 in value for the purpose of conferring that jurisdiction.

The Court then analyzed the relationship between three statutory regimes:

  • The Court-fees Act (Schedule II, Article 17) which prescribes fixed fees for simple declaratory suits;
  • The Suits Valuation Act (in particular sections 4 and 8) which governs valuation rules where court-fees are ad valorem and provides that where local rules fixing value are absent, the Court must determine value judicially; and
  • Section 25 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act which allocates jurisdiction by reference to the value of the subject-matter.

The Court observed that in a simple declaratory suit where no consequential relief is asked, the Court-fees Act often prescribes a fixed fee (not ad valorem), and section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act will not apply to force ad valorem valuation. Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act, however, directs that when a suit in Schedule II, Article 17 relates to land or an interest in land and local rules have determined value, the jurisdictional valuation shall not exceed that determined value. Since no local rules had been framed under section 3, the value must be determined judicially (following Dayaram v. Gordhandas).

The Court then turned to Privy Council authority in Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao, which condemned the practice of inventing a notional value for declaratory suits to fit a fee bracket and held that the real value of the property — not a notional fee-based figure — should determine valuation for jurisdiction. The Court applied that principle here and rejected the notion that the notional Rs. 200 valuation (used to justify a fixed court-fee of Rs. 15) could determine jurisdiction.

The Court further distinguished Bai Machhbai v. Bai Hirbai on the ground that that case did not involve land or an interest in land; thus its reasoning was not dispositive on valuation where land was involved. The Court also cited Vasireddi Veeramma v. Butchayya as consistent authority applying market-value reasoning to declarations affecting property.

Applying these principles to the facts pleaded in the plaint — that the declaration related to land in the plaintiff's possession, that the land in the plaintiff's possession was worth more than Rs. 5,000, and that the defendant's share (if legitimated) would exceed Rs. 5,000 — the Court concluded that the real value of the subject-matter exceeded Rs. 5,000 and so the First Class Subordinate Judge had special jurisdiction under section 25.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court held that the Bagalkot Court (the Second Class Subordinate Judge's Court) had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the First Class Subordinate Judge at Bijapur had jurisdiction under section 25 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act.

Consequences and practical effects:

  • The High Court modified the order of the lower appellate Court: while the lower appellate Court's form of order returning the plaint to be filed in the proper Court was confirmed, the High Court specified that the proper Court is the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Bijapur (not the Second Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Athni).
  • The Court ordered that the costs of this appeal shall be costs in the suit.
  • The Court followed Privy Council authority in Rachappa Subrao; the opinion does not purport to set a new legal principle beyond applying existing authorities to the valuation/jurisdiction question in this case.

Disposition

Order modified. Barlee, J. agreed and had nothing to add. Costs of the appeal are made costs in the suit.

    Shivasangappa Irsangappa Kuppasad v. Muchkhandeppa Irsangappa Kupasad

    Patkar, A.C.J:—

    This was a suit brought by the plaintiff for a declaration that the defendant was not the natural born son of Irsangappa bin Muchkhandeppa Kupsad.

    The plaintiff is the son of Irsangappa by his first wife and the defendant is the son of Nilgangawa, the second wife of Irsangappa. Irsangappa died on February 6, 1926, and the defendant was born to Nilgangawa on January 4, 1927, that is, 332 days after the death of her husband. The defendant in the written statement contended that the property in respect of which the declaration was sought was worth more than Rs. 5,000, and therefore the suit would not lie in the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge at Bagalkot.

    The learned Subordinate Judge held that the Court had jurisdiction to try the suit but on the merits decided in favour of the plaintiff, and gave a declaration that the defendant was not the natural born son of Irsangappa bin Muchkhandeppa Kupsad.

    On appeal, the learned District Judge held, with respect to the objection to jurisdiction on the ground of the pecuniary value of the subject-matter of the suit, that though the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bai Machhbai v. Bai Hirbai might require to be reviewed in the light of the observations of the Privy Council in the case of Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao he was bound by the decision in Bai Machhbai's case, and held that the suit was maintainable in the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge [His Lordship after discussing the provisions of sections 20 and 21 of the Civil Procedure Code continued:—]

    It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondent that the view of the learned District Judge deciding the question of jurisdiction depending on the pecuniary value of the subject-matter of the suit is erroneous. It is contended that the case of Bai Machhbai v. Bai Hirbai turned on the peculiar facts of that case, and that in any event the view of the Privy Council in Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao ought to prevail, and that where the plaintiff brings a declaratory suit relating to property worth more than Rs. 5,000, the First Class Subordinate Judge at Bijapur would have jurisdiction to try the suit and not the Second Class Subordinate Judge at Bagalkot.

    Under section 25 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, a Subordinate Judge of the First Class, in addition to his ordinary jurisdiction, shall exercise a special jurisdiction in respect of such suits and proceedings of a civil nature, wherein the subject-matter exceeds five thousand rupees in amount or value, as may arise within the local jurisdiction of the Courts in the district presided over by Subordinate Judges of the Second Class. The question for determination in the case is whether the value of the subject-matter in the present suit exceeds five thousand rupees. A suit where the relief prayed for is a declaration and a consequential relief would fall under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, and the valuation for the purposes of court-fees and for the purposes of jurisdiction would be the same under section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act VII of 1887. The valuation for the purpose of court-fees in a simple declaratory suit is governed by Schedule II, Article 17, clause iii, which prescribes a fixed fee of Rs. 10 subsequently raised to Rs. 15. Under section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870, section 7, paragraphs v, vi and ix, and paragraph x, clause (d), court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. It would, therefore, follow that in a declaratory suit in which no consequential relief is asked, section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act would have no application as the court-fees are not paid ad valorem. Under section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act, where a suit mentioned in the Court-fees Act, 1870, Schedule II, Article 17, relates to land or an interest in land of which the value has been determined by rules under the preceding section, the amount at which for purposes of jurisdiction the relief sought in the suit is valued shall not exceed the value of the land or interest as determined by those rules. It appears that no rules have been framed by the Local Government under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act, and in the absence of such determination the value will have to be determined judicially by the Court according to the decision in Dayaram v. Gordhandas. It was observed (p. 79):—

    “There is no express provision in the Suits Valuation Act making the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction prima facie determinable by the plaintiff in any suit which can be valued lower for the computation of court-fees.

    “On the other hand section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act seems … to indicate that the principle adopted by the legislature for valuing a suit mentioned in Schedule II, Article 17, which relates to land or an interest in land is that the value of such a suit for purposes of jurisdiction shall be governed by the value of the land or interest in land.”

    In the present case it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the declaration sought by the plaintiff does not relate to any property worth more than five thousand rupees within the meaning of section 25 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act. In the plaint the plaintiff states that this suit for a declaration is instituted in the Bagalkot Court because the plaintiff lives at Bagalkot and because the legitimacy of the defendant would affect the right to the property which is now in the plaintiff's possession and situate in Bagalkot. The declaration, therefore, sought by the plaintiff was in reference to the property which was in the plaintiff's possession, and it is common ground that the land in the possession of the plaintiff is worth more than Rs. 5,000, and that even the share to which the defendant would be entitled in case he is held to be a legitimate son would exceed in value Rs. 5,000.

    In Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the practice in the Bombay Presidency of valuing a prayer for a declaratory decree at Rs. 130 as being the value on which the fee nearest to Rs. 10 would be leviable was illegal and misconceived, and that it was contrary to the scheme of the Court-fees Act that there should be any valuation of such a suit. It was observed (p. 516):—

    “This practice has no warrant in law, but has been followed from a misconceived notion of what caution requires. But never was caution more misplaced, and their Lordships feel strongly that they ought not to allow the true facts to be distorted out of deference to an erroneous practice. And here it may be noted that the Rs. 130 cannot have been treated as the measure of the fee, for on such a value Rs. 9-12-0 and not Rs. 10 would have been paid.”

    Though the plaint in that case prayed for a declaration together with consequential relief, it was held that no consequential relief could have been prayed, and that the injunction which was prayed was demurrable in the sense that no cause of action was disclosed which could have supported this relief. The suit, therefore, was treated simply as for a declaration with regard to the property involved in the suit, and it was observed as follows (p. 516):—

    “If regard be had to the real as distinct from the imputed value of the property, the suit was properly instituted in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge, and if any part of the fee payable and paid was a fixed fee under Schedule II of the Act, then the notional value of the property or any part of it could not displace its real value for the purposes of jurisdiction.”

    It would, therefore, follow from the remarks of the Privy Council that in a simple declaratory suit it is the real value of the property and not the notional value that would determine the valuation for jurisdiction apart from the valuation for purposes of the court-fees. In the present case the notional value of Rs. 200 which was put as being the value on which the increased fixed court-fee of Rs. 15 would be leviable would not determine the valuation for purposes of jurisdiction, but the real value of the property, the subject-matter of the suit, likely to be affected by the declaration must be taken to be the value for the purposes of jurisdiction.

    The same view was taken in the case of Vasireddi Veeramma v. Butchayya, which turned upon the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction on the terms of section 12 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, and it was held that a suit for a mere declaration of the factum and validity of an adoption, without any consequential relief regarding lands or houses likely to be affected by the declaration, has, for purposes of jurisdiction, to be valued on the basis of the market value of the lands or houses likely to be affected by such declaration and not either according to plaintiff's pleasure, or according to the valuation under the Court-fees Act as if it were a suit for possession of such lands or houses.

    It would also appear from section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act that in a suit mentioned in Schedule II, Article 17, which does not ask for a consequential relief and relates to land or interest in land the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be governed by the value of the land or interest in land. According to the allegations made in the plaint to which I have referred, the declaration was sought in respect of the lands in the plaintiff's possession. The case of Bai Machhbai v. Bai Hirbai can be distinguished on the ground that there was no dispute in that case with respect to land or interest in land, as it was a suit brought by one Mahomedan widow against another widow for a declaration that the adoption made by one of them was invalid, and that the adopted son was not a party to the suit and no question relating to land or interest in land arose in that case. If, however, the decision in Bai Machhbai v. Bai Hirbai be considered to have decided that in a declaratory suit the valuation for purposes of jurisdiction is to be determined by the valuation based on the Court-fees Act, the remarks of the Privy Council to which I have referred are inconsistent with that decision. We must, therefore, follow the decision of the Privy Council in Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao, and hold that in the present case the Bagalkot Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, and that the First Class Subordinate Judge at Bijapur had jurisdiction to entertain the suit under section 25 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, XIV of 1869.

    We think, therefore, that the order passed by the lower appellate Court in form is correct, and though we confirm the order of the lower appellate Court returning the plaint to be filed in the proper Court, we think that the proper Court is not the Second Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Athni but the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Bijapur. Costs of this appeal will be costs in the suit.

    Barlee, J.:—I agree and I have nothing to add.

    Order modified.
    J.G.R
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    Shivasangappa Irsangappa Kuppasad v. Muchkhandeppa Irsangappa Kupasad
    (Jul 8, 1931)