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  • section of the Administration of Estates Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5,
  • Indian Succession Act, 1925, or by the Civil Procedure Code,
  • sections 229-231 of the Indian Succession Act,
  • section 230 of the Indian Succession Act,
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Citation Codes
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  • section of the Administration of Estates Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5,
  • Indian Succession Act, 1925, or by the Civil Procedure Code,
  • sections 229-231 of the Indian Succession Act,
  • section 230 of the Indian Succession Act,
Smart Summary

Opinion Summary: Rangnekar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition concerns letters of administration for the estate and credits of Dorabji Pestonji Damania, who died intestate in Bombay on or about April 7, 1928. The deceased's next-of-kin included the petitioner (a brother), the deceased's widow Soonabai, and four sisters. The petitioner presented a petition for letters of administration, declared by the brother on June 1, 1928.

The petition stated that Soonabai had executed a letter of renunciation dated May 26, 1928, which was annexed to the petition but not verified. On June 6, counsel for Soonabai informed the petitioner's attorneys that their client withdrew her renunciation and consent and intended to apply for letters of administration. The petitioner filed the petition in Court on June 9. Counsel for Soonabai wrote to the testamentary registrar on June 11 stating that Soonabai had been made to sign the renunciation and that she withdrew it. The petitioner's attorneys replied on June 13 asserting that the renunciation was made freely and, being filed in Court, was final.

The matter was referred to Rangnekar, J. After an appointment, counsel for Soonabai did not appear on the first date and the judge ordered notice calling upon Soonabai to admit execution of the renunciation and notifying her that the petitioner proposed to adduce it in evidence. On July 26 the parties appeared and arguments were heard. The principal question was whether the widow could retract her renunciation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a renunciation of the right to letters of administration made by the widow (Soonabai) is final and cannot be withdrawn.
  2. Whether the widow can be allowed to retract her renunciation, and if so, under what circumstances the court would permit such a retraction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Engineer) relied on section 230 of the Indian Succession Act and cited Brojo Lal Banerjee v. Sharajubala Debi. The petitioner maintained that the renunciation was final.
  • The petitioner's solicitors (Messrs Shamrao, Minocheher & Hiralal) asserted that Soonabai signed the renunciation of her free will and that once filed in Court it was final and permanent.
  • The petitioner also relied on the procedural provisions and English practice referenced by the court to support the finality of renunciations subject to court discretion.

Soonabai (Widow)'s Arguments

  • Counsel for Soonabai (Mr. Framroze Vakil) contended that sections 229–231 of the Indian Succession Act (which deal with renunciation) apply to executors and not to mere administrators, and that there is no corresponding provision in the Act expressly governing an administrator or administratrix.
  • The widow's counsel also argued that the widow had changed her mind and that, in a case of intestacy, she was entitled to retract her renunciation and need not assign any reason for doing so.
  • When the court offered an opportunity for the widow to state reasons for the retraction, her solicitor declined further opportunity and relied solely on the alleged change of mind.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brojo Lal Banerjee v. Sharajubala Debi Cited by petitioner alongside section 230 of the Indian Succession Act (specific principle from the case is not described in the provided opinion). The court recorded that the petitioner relied on this case, but the opinion does not elaborate on the case's contents or otherwise apply any specific holding from it.
Cradock v. Weston Illustrates refusal to permit retraction of renunciation where the renouncers were not deceived or imposed upon, and where inconvenience followed from their own actions. The court relied on this case as authority that a retraction may be refused where the renouncer was not misled and where the circumstances do not make a retractation "fit" — supporting the view that mere change of mind is insufficient.
West and Smith v. Willby Holds a next-of-kin to his renunciation where the renunciation was made to permit a creditor to take administration and was subsequently retracted before grant. Used by the court as additional authority for the proposition that a party will be held to a renunciation and that retraction is not allowed as of right.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by noting that the Indian Succession Act contains no section that in terms prescribes when or why an executor or administrator may renounce — the act of renunciation ultimately depends on personal will because no one is bound to act as administrator or executor against his or her will. Sections 229–231 of the Act set out procedural steps to be followed when a person renounces or fails to accept an executorship, including issuing citations, the form and effect of renunciation (section 230), and the procedure for granting letters of administration when executors renounce (section 231).

Although these sections are framed in terms of executors, the court examined whether administrators are thereby entitled to act contrary to the procedures and practice established for executors. The court invoked Rule 609 of the Rules of the High Court in Original Jurisdiction, which directs that in matters not provided for by that Chapter or by the Indian Succession Act, 1925, or the Civil Procedure Code, the practice and procedure of the Probate Division of the High Court of Justice in England shall be followed where applicable. The court also referred to Rule 590, which contemplates the case of an administrator renouncing a right to letters of administration.

On that basis the court concluded that English law and practice regarding renunciation are applicable. The court drew on Tristram & Coote's Probate Practice to observe (i) that renunciation is an act whereby a person entitled to probate or administration waives it, (ii) that an executor or administrator may renounce, and (iii) that English practice does not distinguish between executors and administrators in the right to renounce. The court further relied on authorities and reference works (Tristram & Coote and Halsbury's Laws of England) to set out the principle that renunciation is generally final and can only be retracted by leave of the court in a fit case; the retracting party must show that the retraction benefits the estate or those interested.

The court then applied these principles to the facts: Soonabai's renunciation was dated May 26, 1928, and filed in Court on June 9, 1928; an apparent retraction was communicated on June 6. The court observed that the widow's counsel declined an offer of an opportunity for the widow to state reasons for retraction and relied only on the assertion that she "changed her mind." The court held that a mere change of mind is not a proper ground for allowing a retraction and that no fit case had been shown. Additionally, the court noted that the widow had earlier executed a writing in favour of the petitioner in April, before the renunciation, and the petitioner had acted on that writing — making disbursements, recovering outstandings, and performing acts of administration — before filing the petition.

Taking the authorities and the facts together, the court concluded that the widow should not be permitted to retract her renunciation. The renunciation was therefore treated as final and admitted, and the court found no need for further proof of execution of the renunciation document.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the widow, Soonabai, cannot be allowed to retract her renunciation of the right to obtain letters of administration. The renunciation was declared final and admitted; no further evidence of its execution was necessary.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner is at liberty to proceed further with his petition for letters of administration.
  • Costs: The costs of all parties were ordered to come out of the estate.
  • Scope: The opinion applies established principles (including English probate practice adopted under the Court's rules) that renunciation is generally final and retractation is permissible only by leave of the court in a fit case. The court found no fit case here; the opinion does not assert the creation of a novel legal precedent beyond applying these stated authorities and principles to the facts before it.

Disposition

The court directed that the petitioner may proceed further in the matter. Costs of all parties were to be paid out of the estate. Counsel was certified.

Attorneys recorded in the opinion: for petitioner — Messrs Shamrao, Minocheher & Hiralal; for Soonabai — Messrs Ardeshir, Hormusji & Dinshaw. Order accordingly.

    Manchersha Pestonji, In Re

    Rangnekar, J.:—

    This is a petition for letters of administration of the property and credits of one Dorabji Pestonji Damania who died intestate in Bombay on or about April 7, 1928. The said deceased left him surviving as the only next-of-kin the petitioner, his brother, his widow Soonabai, and four sisters. The petition was declared by the brother on June 1. In paragraph 4 of the petition it was stated that the said Soonabai, the widow of the deceased, had by her letter of renunciation dated May 26, 1928, renounced her prior right to the letters of administration of the property and credits of the deceased. The letter by the said Soonabai was annexed to the petition, but it was not verified.

    It appears that on June 6, 1928, Messrs Ardeshir, Hormusji and Dinshaw for the said Soonabai informed the petitioner's attorneys stating that their client the said Soonabai withdrew her renunciation and consent, and that the petitioner should not proceed any further with his petition. They further stated that they were instructed to apply for letters of administration by the said Soonabai.

    The petition was filed in Court on June 9, and on the 11th Messrs Ardeshir, Hormusji and Dinshaw wrote to the testamentary registrar as follows:—

    “We are instructed to state that our client was made to sign a writing of renunciation and consent which the petitioner was trying to file in Court. We on our client's behalf have already written to the petitioner's attorneys stating that our client withdraws her said writing of renunciation and consent.”

    On June 13, Messrs Shamrao, Minocheher and Hiralal, the petitioner's attorneys, wrote to the testamentary registrar with reference to the letter of Messrs Ardeshir, Hormusji and Dinshaw of the 11th instant stating that the said letter of renunciation was signed by the said Soonabai of her free will, and the same being filed in Court was final and permanent.

    On July 2, the petitioner's solicitors, after setting out the facts already referred to above, requested the testamentary registrar to refer the matter to me. Accordingly, an appointment was given to them and also to the solicitors of the said Soonabai. The latter did not appear on the date fixed, and after hearing the petitioner's solicitors I ordered a notice to issue calling upon the said Soonabai to admit execution of the said letter of renunciation and intimating to her that the petitioner proposed to adduce the same in evidence.

    On July 26 all the parties appeared before me, and arguments on the present notice were heard. Mr. Framroze Vakil, who appeared for the said Soonabai, stated that the widow had changed her mind, and that it was not necessary for her to assign any reason for retracting the said renunciation, as this being a case of intestacy, she was entitled to change her mind and to retract the letter of renunciation. A note of the admission made by the learned solicitor was taken down. On these facts, the question which arises for consideration is whether the renunciation is final and cannot be withdrawn, and whether the widow can be allowed to retract the same. Mr. Engineer, on behalf of the petitioner, relies on section 230 of the Indian Succession Act, and on Brojo Lal Banerjee v. Sharajubala Debi.(1) Mr. Framroze Vakil argues that sections 229-231 of the Indian Succession Act, which deal with the subject of renunciation, are applicable only in the case of an executor and not in the case of a mere administrator, and that there is no corresponding provision in the Act with regard to an administrator or administratrix.

    Now there is no section in the Act which in terms lays down as to when and why an executor or administrator can renounce, and obviously for the simple reason that the act of renunciation is one which depends on the will of a person. No one is bound to act as an administrator or executor against his will. Section 229 up to 231 are sections which lay down and deal with the procedure to be followed when a person renounces or fails to accept the office to which he is entitled.

    Thus section 229 says that when a person appointed an executor has not renounced the executorship, letters of administration shall not be granted to any other person until a citation has been issued, calling upon the executor to accept or renounce his executorship. Section 230 provides for the form and effect of renunciation of executorship. Section 231 lays down the procedure to be followed where an executor renounces or fails to accept an executorship within the time limited for the acceptance or refusal thereof, and provides that the will in such a case may be proved and letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed may be granted to the person who would be entitled thereto.

    It is true that in terms these sections apply to the case of an executor. The question is whether that by itself would entitle an administrator or administratrix to act contrary to the practice and procedure laid down in these sections.

    Rule 609 of the Rules of the High Court in its Original Jurisdiction provides that in cases not provided for by this Chapter, that is to say, Chapter XXXI, or by the rules of procedure laid down in the Indian Succession Act, 1925, or by the Civil Procedure Code, the practice and procedure of the Probate Division of the High Court of Justice in England shall be followed so far as they are applicable and not inconsistent with this chapter and the said Acts.

    Rule 590 contemplates the case of an administrator renouncing his right to obtain letters of administration of the property of a deceased person.

    I think, therefore, that the principles of the English law would apply in the present case.

    In Tristram & Coote's Probate Practice, 16th Ed., at page 266, “renunciation” is defined as the act whereby a person having a right to probate or administration waives or abandons it. Then, the position with regard to a legal personal representative is stated in these terms (p. 268):—

    “An executor, or an administrator with the will annexed, or an administrator, may renounce the administration with the will annexed, or administration, which he would be entitled to take in his representative capacity. And such renunciation will be a sufficient waiver to admit other interests to administration, if the renunciant be the sole representative of his own deceased. If there be another qualified representative, the latter must renounce also.”

    Turning to the forms of renunciation given in this standard work, Form No. 301, at page 1019, shows clearly that a legal personal representative or a person entitled to letters of administration can renounce his right to letters of administration of the estate of a deceased person.

    It is clear, therefore, that according to the English law and practice as regards the right of renunciation, there is no distinction made in the case of an executor or an administrator.

    The next question is, when can a renunciation be retracted? The principles as to this are laid down in Tristram & Coote at page 273 of the same Edition as follows:—

    “The renunciation of an executor may, as a general rule, be taken to be final, he not being permitted to retract it except by permission of the court, and this permission will not be given without regard to the fifth section of the administration of estates act, 1925 (15 & 16 geo. 5, c. 23)….

    “The court may permit a retractation of an executor's renunciation ‘in a case fit for it,’ and of this the court is the sole Judge.

    “A retracting executor must therefore be prepared to show that his retractation is for the benefit of the estate, or of those who are interested under the deceased's will.”

    In Cradock v. Weston, which is cited in Tristram & Coote at page 275, Dr. Bettesworth refused to allow the retraction under the following circumstances as stated by Dr. Cottrell:—

    “John Cradock died intestate, leaving four children. Upon the renunciation of three of them, administration was granted to a creditor. The other child appeared and the grant was revoked. Then his brothers retracted, and asked for administration to one of themselves. The court said: ‘The persons renouncing had not been deceived or imposed upon in their renunciation, and if any inconvenience followed they must thank themselves for it.’”

    Similarly, in West and Smith v. Willby, where the next-of-kin had renounced in order that a creditor might take and one of them retracted before the grant was made, the Court held him to his renunciation.

    The following statement as to the law and practice on this question appears in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XIV, paragraph 261:—

    “The court may, in a proper case, allow one of several executors to withdraw his renunciation for the purpose of taking a grant: but when all the executors have renounced and letters of administration have been granted, a renunciation cannot subsequently be withdrawn, nor will the withdrawal be allowed merely on the ground that the executor has changed his mind. A renunciation cannot be withdrawn without the leave of the court, and the renouncing executor must show that his retractation is for the benefit of the estate or of those interested under the will.”

    In my opinion, therefore, the same principles would apply in the present case. Now it is true that here the renunciation was made on May 26, 1928, and filed in Court on June 9, and it is true that it was retracted on June 6. Even then the question is whether the widow can be allowed to retract her renunciation? The authorities to which I have referred show that no person has a right to retract, but may be allowed to retract his or her renunciation in a fit and proper case. No such case is made out before me. And when I offered to give an opportunity to the widow to state her reasons, her learned solicitor stated that he did not desire to have any further opportunity, and that the only ground on which he based his contentions was that the widow had changed her mind. The case referred to in paragraph 261 in Halsbury clearly shows that a mere change of mind would not be a proper ground on which a renunciation once made can be allowed to be retracted. I must, therefore, hold that the widow cannot be allowed to retract her renunciation in this case merely on the ground that she has changed her mind.

    Apart from this, it appears that she had passed a writing in favour of the petitioner in April, long before the letter of renunciation, on the faith of which the petitioner had made diverse disbursements, had recovered outstandings, and otherwise carried out various acts of administration before the present petition was filed.

    On the facts of this case, therefore, I am of opinion that this is not a fit case in which I should allow the widow to retract her renunciation. My answer to the only question raised now is that the widow cannot be allowed to retract her renunciation. The renunciation is, therefore, final. The renunciation is admitted, and therefore, in my opinion, no further evidence is necessary as regards it, and no further proof as regards the execution of the letter of renunciation is needed.

    In the result the petitioner will be at liberty to proceed further in the matter. Costs of all parties to come out of the estate. Counsel certified.

    Attorneys for petitioner: Messrs Shamrao, Minocheher & Hiralal.

    Attorneys for Soonabai: Messrs Ardeshir, Hormusji & Dinshaw.

    Order accordingly.
    S.K.B
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    Comments

    Manchersha Pestonji, In Re
    (Aug 9, 1928)