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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns members of a joint Hindu family and persons described as their bhaubands. Plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 form a joint Hindu family; defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are bhaubands. In 1918 defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 brought Suit No. 457 against defendants Nos. 4 and 5 in the Second Class Subordinate Judge at Baramati for possession of certain immovable property. That suit was decreed at first instance but dismissed on appeal.

In 1921 the plaintiffs (who were not parties to Suit No. 457) brought a separate suit against defendants Nos. 1 to 6 for a declaration that they and defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were joint owners of the property and to recover possession jointly with defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Defendant No. 5 resisted the claim by denying plaintiffs' title and by contending that the appellate decree in Suit No. 457 was binding on the plaintiffs. The lower courts found plaintiffs' title proved, held that the 1918 litigation extinguished the rights of defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 without affecting the plaintiffs' undivided share, and the trial Judge decreed that plaintiffs had an undivided one-third share with joint possession with defendants Nos. 5 and 6.

The Assistant Judge (lower appellate court) varied that decree (relying on authorities that generally disfavour placing a stranger in joint possession). Defendant No. 5 appealed (this second appeal). The present Court considered whether established Bombay rules that allow a purchaser in possession to be declared tenant-in-common (Rule (3) as described in the opinion) had been overruled by Privy Council decisions applying Bengal law, and whether the specific facts justified eviction of defendant No. 5.

The Court ultimately reversed the decree of the lower appellate Court (Appeal No. 308 of 1923) and restored the trial Court's decree. Costs directions were given as described in the opinion. A later application for review (arguing that defendant No. 5 was not a purchaser but had acquired title by prescription under Article 142/Section 28 of the Limitation Act) was considered and rejected.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the principle represented by Rule (3) — that a purchaser in possession of a coparcener's undivided share may be declared to hold as a tenant-in-common with other coparceners (i.e., need not be ejected) — has been overruled or limited by Privy Council decisions (notably Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh and Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser).
  2. Whether, on the facts of this case, defendant No. 5 (a bhauband in long, peaceable possession and protected by a prior decree) ought to be evicted or allowed to retain joint possession with the plaintiffs and other coparceners.
  3. Whether the Privy Council decisions relied upon (which applied Bengal law concerning alienation by coparceners) should be applied with the same strictness in the Bombay Presidency, where a coparcener can alienate his undivided share without the consent of co-parceners.
  4. Whether a person who has acquired title by prescription (extinguishment and transfer of rights under Section 28 of the Limitation Act / Article 142) should be treated, for the purpose of possession disputes, on the same footing as a purchaser in possession arising from a court sale.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • Plaintiffs claimed that they and defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were joint owners and that plaintiffs were entitled to an undivided one-third share of the suit property and joint possession with defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3.
  • Plaintiffs argued that they were not parties to Suit No. 457 (1918) and did not claim under any parties to that suit; therefore the final decree in that litigation did not bind them and did not extinguish their undivided share.

Defendant No. 5's Arguments

  • Defendant No. 5 denied plaintiffs' title and contended that the appellate Court's decree in Suit No. 457 was binding on the plaintiffs or at least relevant to the rights in the property.
  • It was asserted (by Mr. Thakor, on review) that defendant No. 5 was not a "purchaser" but merely someone who had defeated an ejectment claim in the prior suit by reason of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 failing to prove possession within twelve years under Article 142 of the Limitation Act (i.e., that his position was that of an intruder or non-purchaser). This contention was rejected by the reviewing judge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balaji Anant Rajadiksha v. Ganesh Janurdan Kamati (1881) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 499 Sets out the position that a purchaser in possession may, in certain cases, be declared entitled to hold as a tenant-in-common with other coparceners (i.e., need not be ejected); cited as authority for Rule (3). The Court noted this authority as foundational for Rule (3) and treated it as still applicable within the limits appropriate to the Bombay Presidency; it was not treated as conclusively overruled by Privy Council decisions.
Pandu Vithoji v. Goma Ramji (1918) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 472 Holds that where a purchaser sues for possession, the case falls under the rule that a stranger should not be placed in joint possession (i.e., supports refusal to grant joint possession to a purchaser suing for possession). The Court observed Pandu Vithoji did not directly consider Rule (3) and that Heaton J.'s remarks disapproving Rule (3) were effectively obiter; Pandu Vithoji was distinguished on its facts (purchaser suing for possession).
Ishrappa v. Krishna Referenced in association with early rulings concerning purchasers and coparceners. Cited among authorities supporting the general principles outlined in the opinion; no detailed separate application beyond being part of the cited line of Bombay cases.
Bhiku v. Puttu (1905) 8 Bom. L.R. 99 Supports that a coparcener who has been excluded may obtain joint possession with a purchaser who has obtained possession of the joint family property (supports Rule (2) as described in the opinion). Used to show a line of Bombay authorities recognizing that joint possession with a purchaser in possession can be awarded to an excluded coparcener; informs the Court's discretion in allowing joint possession in appropriate cases.
Babaji Lakshman v. Vasudev Vinayak (1876) I.L.R. 1 Bom. 95 Earlier Bombay decision cited as authority that a purchaser in possession need not be ejected but can be declared tenant-in-common. Cited as part of the body of Bombay decisions (forming Rule (3)) which the Court considered still capable of application in appropriate circumstances.
Kallapa bin Girmallapa v. Venkatesh Vinayak (1878) I.L.R. 2 Bom. 676 Similar to Babaji Lakshman — supports declaring purchaser in possession to hold as tenant-in-common. Referred to as one of the precedents forming the basis for Rule (3); used to show historical practice in Bombay.
Dugappa Shetti v. Venkatramnaya (1880) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 493 Another authority supporting the principle that purchaser in possession need not be ejected and may be tenant-in-common. Cited among decisions showing that courts have sometimes refused to oust a purchaser from possession and declared him tenant-in-common.
Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh (1877) I.L.R. 3 Cal. 198 (Privy Council) Privy Council decision applying a partnership-analogy principle in Bengal: purchaser at execution-sale acquires the interest sold but other coparceners may seek ejection; held that a purchaser may not obtain joint possession and the excluded coparcener may be entitled to possession. The Court analysed this Privy Council decision closely and held it was decided in the context of Bengal law (where a coparcener cannot freely alienate his undivided share) and therefore its strict application may not be appropriate in Bombay; it did not accept that Deendyal Lal conclusively overruled Rule (3) in the Bombay context.
Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser (1883) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 626 (Privy Council) Privy Council authority related to Deendyal Lal, cited as limiting the purchaser's ability to retain possession. The Court considered this decision together with Deendyal Lal and concluded that these Privy Council rulings rested on Bengal law distinctions and did not necessarily mandate the same result in Bombay cases.
Naro Gopal v. Paragauda (1916) I.L.R. 41 Bom. 347 Held that a purchaser in possession had only acquired "a right to partition not a right to possession prior to partition." Noted by the Court as an authority reaching a view inconsistent with Rule (3) when considering purchaser's rights; the Court considered it but treated the broader line of Bombay authorities as not conclusively displaced.
Hanmandas Ramdayal v. Valabhdas (1918) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 17 Discussed whether it was competent for a coparcener to sue a purchaser for his share without suing for complete partition; mentions Privy Council holdings that auction purchasers in possession may be ejected and only entitled to declaration. Cited for the proposition (via Kemp J.'s remarks) that Privy Council had held auction purchasers could be ejected and were primarily entitled to a declaration; Court treated those remarks as part of the debate but not decisive in Bombay context.
Maharaja of Bobbili v. Venkataramanjulu Naidu (1914) I.L.R. 39 Mad. 265 States that the Privy Council decided the alienee in possession is liable to be ejected at the instance of coparceners. Referred to as an instance where Privy Council reasoning was applied; the Court considered differences of local law before applying such reasoning in Bombay.
Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh (1879) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 148 (Privy Council) Privy Council case examining Bengal law and endorsing the analogy to partnership shares for execution-sale purchasers; discusses how sale of an undivided share should be treated. The Court relied on Suraj Bunsi to show the Privy Council's reasoning was adapted to Bengal law and partnership analogies, and to argue that the same strict rule need not apply in Bombay.
Udaram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji (1875) 11 B.H.C.R. 76 Shows how the remedy against an undivided share is to be worked out by the holder of a decree in the debtor's life-time; referenced in Suraj Bunsi. Referred to by the Court to illustrate the manner in which sales/attachments of undivided shares may be administered and the possibility of arrangements with coparceners; used to question a blanket application of Privy Council authority to Bombay.
Bhirgu Nath Chaube v. Narsingh Tiwari (1916) I.L.R. 39 All. 61 Referenced for the proposition that a purchaser in possession is not in "unlawful possession" and therefore not liable to pay mesne profits. Cited to support equitable considerations against ejecting a purchaser in peaceful possession.
Banwari Lal v. Mahesh (1918) I.L.R. 41 All. 63 Referenced alongside Bhirgu Nath Chaube on the question of mesne profits and lawful possession. Used to support the point that an alienee in possession is not necessarily in unlawful possession; relevant to the Court's reluctance to order eviction in certain circumstances.
Gangabisan v. Vallabhdas Cited in the context of purchasers in possession not being in unlawful possession. Mentioned as corroborative authority for the view that equitable considerations may prevent ejectment of a purchaser in peaceful possession.
Naranbhai v. Ranchod (1901) I.L.R. 26 Bom. 141 Shows that whether a coparcener should be decreed joint possession under Rule (2) may be left to be decided "on the merits". Used to support the proposition that each case should be decided on its facts and merits rather than by mechanical application of a rule.
Mahabalaya v. Timaya (1875) 12 B.H.C.R. 138 One of the older cases cited as part of the series where courts refused to oust purchasers in peaceful possession. Cited among the precedents forming the foundation for Rule (3) as applied in Bombay practice.
Waranbhai v. Ranchod (1901) I.L.R. 26 Bom. 141 Another Bombay authority in the series dealing with possession and partition issues. Referred to as part of the disciplinary line of Bombay cases recognizing joint possession or tenant-in-common declarations in appropriate factual situations.
Muhammad Mumtaz Ali Khan v. Mohan Singh (1923) I.L.R. 45 All. 419 (Privy Council) Described the effect of Section 28 of the Limitation Act as extinguishing a party's right and transferring it to another who has acquired title by prescription. Cited by Fawcett J. to support the proposition that defendant No. 5 had acquired a title by prescription and therefore could be treated, for practical purposes, much like a purchaser in possession.
Dalip Rai v. Deoki Rai (1899) I.L.R. 21 All. 204 Cited in support of the legal effects of extinguishment and transfer of rights by limitation. Used by the reviewing judge to corroborate the conclusion that defendant No. 5 acquired title by prescription.
Hargovandas Lahhmidas v. Bajibhai Jijibhai (1889) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 222 Cited concerning effects of limitation and transfer of rights. Referenced by the reviewing judge in support of treating defendant No. 5 as having acquired title by prescription.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out three principles (Rules (1)–(3)) as they apply in the Presidency: (1) a stranger-purchaser out of possession should not be given joint possession but left to a suit for partition; (2) an excluded coparcener may obtain joint possession with a purchaser in possession; and (3) a purchaser in possession need not be ejected and can be declared a tenant-in-common.

The pivotal question was whether Rule (3) had been overruled by Privy Council decisions (notably Deendyal Lal and Hardi Narain Sahu). The Court examined those Privy Council decisions and related Calcutta cases and observed that they were decided in the Bengal context where coparceners' powers to alienate undivided shares are more restricted than in Bombay. The Privy Council's adoption of a partnership-analogy principle in Bengal (that a purchaser at execution-sale cannot introduce a stranger into the firm without consent) was therefore considered context-specific.

The Court reasoned that because Bombay law permits a coparcener to alienate his undivided share without consent of co-parceners, the partnership analogy underpinning the Privy Council rulings does not operate with the same force in Bombay. Consequently, the Court doubted whether the Privy Council would apply their principle with the same strictness in Bombay and observed that the Privy Council decisions did not amount to a declaration that no court could ever allow a stranger-purchaser to remain in possession.

The Court therefore concluded that the principle in the Privy Council decisions should be given effect in proper cases but not necessarily in all cases; the Bombay courts retain a discretion to allow an alienee to have joint possession with a plaintiff coparcener. Each case must be decided on its facts and merits — a position supported by earlier Bombay decisions such as Naranbhai v. Ranchod and the authorities assembled under Rule (3).

Applying these principles to the present facts, the Court found that defendant No. 5 was a bhauband in long, peaceable possession, supported by a civil Court decree against some of the coparceners. The Court agreed with the view that there were no sufficient grounds to evict defendant No. 5; therefore the trial Court's decree (which awarded the plaintiffs an undivided share and joint possession with defendants Nos. 5 and 6) was to be restored.

On the application for review, Fawcett J. addressed the contention that defendant No. 5 was not a "purchaser" but merely an intruder saved by limitation. He concluded, on statutory and authority-based grounds (Section 28 / Article 142 and Privy Council authority in Muhammad Mumtaz Ali Khan v. Mohan Singh), that the rights of defendants Nos. 1–3 had been extinguished and transferred to defendant No. 5 by prescription — in effect equating his position to that of a purchaser. Given that defendant No. 5 had obtained peaceable possession and a court's support for his title, Fawcett J. saw no sufficient reason to alter the prior opinion and rejected the review application.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court reversed the decree of the lower appellate Court in Appeal No. 308 of 1923 and restored the decree of the trial Court (which declared plaintiffs to have an undivided one-third share and awarded them joint possession with defendants Nos. 5 and 6). The application for review seeking to disturb that position was rejected.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that defendant No. 5 is not evicted; plaintiffs retain an undivided one-third share and joint possession as decreed by the trial Court. Costs were allocated as set out in the opinion.
  • The Court clarified that Privy Council decisions from Bengal do not necessarily and automatically displace the established Bombay practice embodied in Rule (3); rather, those Privy Council principles are to be applied with regard to local legal differences (especially differing rules on coparceners' power to alienate) and subject to the Bombay Court's discretion.
  • The Court emphasized that no sweeping change or binding overruling of the line of Bombay authorities was intended; each case should be decided on its own facts. The opinion did not purport to lay down a new general rule binding subordinate courts beyond the discretionary approach affirmed in the judgment.

This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Bhau Laxman Dhor v. Budha Manku Dhor

    1. The following principles seem to me to have been laid down, so far as this Presidency is concerned :-

    (1). A stranger-purchaser of the undivided share of a coparcener in a joint Hindu family, if out of possession, should not be given joint possession with the other co-parceners but should be left to his remedy of a suit for partition: Balaji Anant Rajadiksha v. Ganesh Janurdan Kamati (1881) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 499, 504; Pandu Vithoji v. Goma Ramji (1918) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 472, s.c. 21 Bom. L.R. 213; and Ishrappa v. Krishna .

    (2). On the other hand, a coparcener, who has been excluded, may obtain joint possession with such a purchaser, who has obtained possession of the joint family property: Bhiku v. Puttu (1905) 8 Bom. L.R. 99 and the prior rulings there cited.

    (3). The purchaser in possession need not be ejected in a suit for recovery of possession brought by an excluded coparcener, but can be declared to be entitled to hold (pending a partition) as a tenant-in-common with the other coparceners: Babaji Lakshman v. Vasudev Vinayak (1876) I.L.R 1 Bom. 95; Kallapa bin Girmallapa v. Venkatesh Vinayak (1878) I.L.R. 2 Bom. 676; and Dugappa Shetti v. Venka-tramnaya (1880) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 493; of Balaji Anant Rajadiksha v. Ganesh Janardan Kamati (1881) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 499, 503, 504.

    2. The question is, whether Rule (3) has been overruled by the Privy Council decisions in Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh (1877) I.L.R. 3 Cal. 198, p.c. and Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser (1883) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 626, p.c.. In Pandu Vithoji v. Goma Ramji (1918) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 472, s.c. 21 Bom. L.R. 213 the point did not really arise, because the purchaser was there suing for possession, so that the case fell under Rule (1). But Heaton J. in his judgment refers to these two Privy Council cases, and says he does not think that " any stranger should ever be placed in joint possession of joint Hindu family property " (p. 475), so that it may be taken he disapproved of Rule (3). Similarly, in Naro Gopal v. Paragauda (1916) I.L.R. 41 Bom. 347, 356, s.c. 19 Bom. L.R. 69 he held that a purchaser in possession had only acquired "a right to partition not a right to possession prior to partition." In Hanmandas Ramdayal v. Valabhdas (1918) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 17, 27, s.c. 20 Bom. L.R. 472, 480 Kemp J. says (p. 27):-

    It has been held by the Privy Council in the oases referred to by my Lord the Chief Justice [viz, the two already mentioned ] that where he [an auction purchaser]... obtains possession the other coparceners are entitled to sue to eject him and that all that the auction-purchaser is entitled to in such a suit is a declaration that he is entitled to the share of the coparcener against whom the decree has been passed.

    3. These remarks are also obiter dicta but show that the question of the validity of Rule (3) has been raised in this Court. In Madras it has been definitely held that

    " the Privy Council has decided that the alienee in possession is liable to be ejected at the instance of the coparceners who are not bound by the alienation"
    : Maharaja of Bobbili v. Venkataramanjulu Naidu ( 1914) I.L.R. 39 Mad. 265, 269.

    4. I have carefully considered the two Privy Council cases in question, as also the similar case of Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh (1879) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 148, p.c.. They are all cases of Court-sales of a coparcener's share in Bengal, where the law as to the right of a coparcener to alienate his undivided share is different from that in Bombay and Madras, as pointed out in Suraj Bunsi's case at pp. 166 and 167. In Bengal one coparcener has not authority, without the consent of his co-sharers, to mortgage or sell his undivided share in a portion of the joint family estate, in order to raise money on his own account, and not for the benefit of the familyi In such a case the principle applicable to the seizure and sale of a share in a trading partnership at the suit of a separate creditor of one of the partners, viz., that " the partner could not himself have sold his share so as to introduce a stranger into the firm without the consent of his co-partners, but the purchaser at the execution-sale acquires the interest sold, with the right to have the partnership accounts taken in order to ascertain and realize its value," which their lordships in Deendyal Lal's case (at p. 209) held " ought to be applied to shares in a joint and undivided Hindu estate," was one which obviously could properly be applied. But does it follow that it applies equally to the case of a coparcener in Bombay, who can alienate his undivided share without the consent of his coparceners? In such a case the analogy of a partnership-firm, where one partner cannot introduce a stranger into the firm without the consent of his coparceners, does not operate, at any rate, to anything like the same extent. Accordingly, I venture to doubt whether (if the question directly arose with reference to the decision on which Rule (3) is based) the Privy Council would apply the principle with the same strictness to Bombay, Again in Deendyal Lal's case their lordships only decided that, on the above principle, they "ought not to interfere with " a decree giving the excluded coparcener possession of the whole property; and it may legitimately be doubted whether, if the decree had been one leaving the purchaser in possession of a half-share, they would have interfered, apart from the doubt whether the plaintiff's mother was entitled to a share. It should be noted that in Suraj Bunsi's case (at pp. 167-169) their lordships referred with approval to Sir Michael Westropp's judgment in Udaram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji (1875) 11 B.H.C.R. 76 showing inter alia how the remedy against an undivided share is to be worked out by the holder of a decree in the debtor's life-time; and this covers the observation of Sir Michael Westropp at p. 83 that " the sale should be conducted on the same principle as the attachment, unless by arrangement with the coparceners, which would often be advantageous to every body concerned, the sale were confined to a particular portion of the family estate." A stranger-purchaser might get possession with the consent of the then coparceners: surely the Privy Council would not say that, on the suit of a coparcener, subsequently born, the purchaser should be ejected, and merely be given a declaration of his right to obtain a partition. Equitable considerations may come into play against ejecting him; and it must be remembered that he is not in ' unlawful possession ' and so liable to pay mesne profits: of Bhirgu Nath Chaube v. Narsingh Tiwari (1916) I.L.R. 39 All. 61; Banwari Lal v. Mahesh (1918) I.L.R. 41 All. 63; and Gangabisan v. Vallabhdas . The Privy Council decision does not, in my opinion, amount to saying that in no ease can the Court properly allow a stranger-purchaser to remain in possession, nor to an implied overruling of the view taken in Balaji Anant Bajadiksha v. Ganesh Janardan Kamati (1881) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 499 that Rule (3) can be given effect to by this Court and those subordinate to it, though it is " as far as it can go with prudence." There are no decisions (as opposed to obiter dicta in which Balaji's case is not considered) binding us to take the contrary view; and I do not, therefore, think it necessary to refer the question to a Full Bench, The principle of the Privy Council decision should be given effect to in proper cases; but, in the view we take, it is not necessarily applicable to all cases, and the Court has a discretion to allow the alienee to have joint possession with the plaintiff' coparcener. Each case (as to the propriety or otherwise of allowing the purchaser to retain possession) should, I think, be decided on its own facts, just as the Court in Naranbhai v. Ranchod (1901) I.L.R. 26 Bom. 141, 143, s.c. 3 Bom. R. 598, left to be decided "on the merits" whether the plaintiff coparcener in that case should be decreed joint possession under Rule (2). In the present case, I agree with my learned colleague, that there are no sufficient grounds for evicting defendant No. 5, who is a bhauband and has been in long possession, supported by a civil Court decree against Borne of the coparceners,

    5. The decree of the lower appellate Court, in Appeal No. 308 of 1923, is accordingly reversed, and the decree of the trial Court restored. Appellant to get his costs of this appeal and Appeal No. 308 of 1923 in the lower Court from respondents: but the lower Court's order as to the costs of Appeal No. 312 of 1923 to stand.

    Coyajee J.

    1. Plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, form a joint Hindu family. Defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6, are their bhaubands. Plaintiff No. 1, defendant No. 1, and Daji (father of plaintiff No. 2) are the sons of Manku Devji. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the grandsons of Manku's brother Appa.

    2. In the year 1918 defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, brought Suit No. 457 against defendants Nos. 4 and 5, in the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge at Baramati, for possession of certain immoveable property. The suit was decreed by that Court, but was dismissed on appeal, Plaintiffs then brought this suit in 1921, against defendants Nos. 1 to 6, for a declaration that they and defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, were joint owners of the said property and to recover possession of the same jointly with defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The claim was resisted by defendant No. 5 who denied the plaintiffs' title and contended that the appellate Court's decree in Suit No. 457 was binding on the plaintiffs. Both these defences failed in the lower Courts. They held the plaintiffs' title proved; and that finding must be accepted in this second appeal. As to the other contention it is sufficient to say that these plaintiffs were not joined as parties to Suit No. 457 of 1918, nor do they claim under any of the parties to that suit. In the opinion of the lower Courts, therefore, the only effect of the final decree in that litigation was to extinguish the rights of defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, in the suit-property and to leave unaffected the plaintiffs' undivided share therein. The trial Judge then passed a, decree declaring that the plaintiffs had an undivided one-third share in the suit property and awarding them possession of that share jointly with defendants Nos. 5 and 6. On appeal, the learned Assistant Judge varied that decree for the reasons, and in the manner, following.-

    It is an established principle of Hindu law that a stranger should nob be placed in joint possession with coparceners in the joint family : Pandu Vithoji V. Goma Ramji (1918) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 472, 475, s.c. 21 Bom. L.R. 213. That ruling and another in the same volume at page 17 lay down that in such cases the stranger should be allowed to file a suit against the members of the joint) family for a general partition of the entire family properties. In is in evidence that there are other properties owned by the joint family of plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 to 3. Following those rulings, I hold that plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the plaint property as against defendants Nos. 5 and 6, who may file a suit for general partition of the entire property of the joint family of plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 to 3 and then obtain possession of what property may be awarded to them.

    3. Defendant No. 5 has brought this second appeal. His main contention is that, in the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs were not entitled to deprive him of his long possession, and that the decree passed by the trial Court was right, I see much force in that contention,

    4. Defendant No. 5 is a divided bhauband of the plaintiffs; he has acquired a title to a portion of the property belonging to the joint family consisting of the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3; he has now been in possession of that property for some years; and his possession is sanctioned by a decree of the Court, He is, no doubt, not entitled to exclusive possession of that property. In the circumstances, it was open to the plaintiffs to sue for a complete partition; or to claim their share in this particular parcel of property, if the other coparceners did not object (as in Naro Gopal v. Paragauda (1916) I.L.R. 41 Bom. 347, s.c. 19 Bom. L.R. 69), or to sue for joint possession with defendant No. 5 (as in Dugappa Shetii v. Vtnkatramnaya (1830) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 493; Waranbhai v. Ranchod (1901) I.L.R. 26 Bom. 141, s.c. 3 Bom. L.R. 598; and Bhiku v. Puttu (1905) 8 Bom. L.R. 99). The present suit however, is an attempt on the part of the plaintiffs, in association with their copar-ceners, defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, to evict defendant No. 5 who has long been in possession and whose possession is supported by the decree obtained by him against those coparceners. In Balaji Anant Rajdiksha v. Ganesh Janardan Kamati (1881) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 499, Westropp C.J. said (at p 503):

    In certain cases, in which the purchaser of a co-parceners's share has peaceably obtained possession. Division Benches of this Court have refused to oust him, and have declared him entitled to hold as a tenant-in-common with the other co-parceners. Such were Mahabalaya v. Timaya (1875) 12 B.H.C.R. 138, Babaji Lakshmon v. Vasudev Vinayak (1876) I.L.R. 1 Bom. 95 and Kallapa bin Girmallapa v. Venkatesh Vinayak (1878) I.L.R. 2 Bom. 676. In all of these oases the suit was instituted by the co-parceners, other than he whose share had been sold, against the purchaser in possession, and the plaintiffs sought to oust him from that possession.

    5. In Bhiku v. Puttu (1905) 8 Bom. L.R. 99, Batty J. referred to several decisions of this Court bearing on the subject and said (at p. 105):

    But in along series of decisions it has also been laid down that though the separate possession claimed cannot be given without partition, in such cases a co-parcener, joint tenant or tenant-in-common may obtain possession in common with a purchaser who has obtained separate possession without partition of specific undivided property in which such co-parcener has an undivided unascertained share.

    6. The respondents (plaintiffs) have, however, relied on the view expressed in Pandu Vithoji v. Goma Ramji (1918) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 472, s.c. 21 Bom. L.R. 213. The facts of that case were these One Vithu and his son Pandu owned the property in dispute as a joint family property. In 1913 Vithu sold the whole property to plaintiffs, who then brought a suit to recover possession of the property from Pandu. The contention of Pandu was that the sale by his father was not binding on him and did not affect his share in the property. His defence succeeded and the trial Court passed a decree granting the plaintiffs joint possession of half the suit property, namely, Vithu's share, along with Pandu. The decree was confirmed on appeal. In second appeal, H eaton J. referred to the judgment in Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh (1877) I.R.4 I.A. 247, s.c. I.L.R. 3 Cal. 198 and said (p. 476):

    I think myself I cannot do better than follow the very words used in framing the decree of the Privy Council. The plaintiff obviously cannot obtain full possession of the property which is what he sues for, for he is not entitled to such possession. He ought not to be allowed be have joint possession for that as I have explained is contrary to reason and authority. The most that he can get is a declaration

    7. It will be seen that it was a suit brought by the purchaser of the interests of one co-parcener to obtain possession of the property sold to him. On those facts, it may be conceded that the purchaser was not entitled to claim either exclusive possession or joint possession with the other members of the family. There is much to be said in favour of the view that the Court will not place a stranger by force in joint possession with members of a Hindu family. But the position is different where he has peaceably obtained possession, and has been long in possession, and a coparcener other than he whose share has been sold sues to eject him. Such coparcener is not left without a remedy. None of the cases referred to by Westropp C.J. in Balaji Anant Rajadiksha v. Ganesh Janardan Kamati (1881) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 499 and by Batty J. in Bhiku v. Puttu (1905) 8 Bom. L.R. 99, 105, 106 were considered in Pandu v. Goma. And their lordships' judgment in Deendyal's case does not lay down the Rule that a purchaser from one coparcener can under no circumstances be allowed to remain in possession as a tenant-incommon with the other coparceners. In Hanmandas Ramdayal v. Valabhdas (1918) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 17, s.c. 20 Bom. L.R. 472 which is the other case referred to by the Assistant Judge, the main question was, whether it was competent to one member of a joint Hindu family to sue a person who had purchased a particular parcel of family property for his share therein without suing for a complete partition; it was held that it was not a valid objection to the suit that the plaintiff claimed only a partial partition.

    8. For these reasons I agree in the order proposed by my learned colleague.

    Fawcett, J.

    1. In this application for review it is contended that the Court has overlooked the fact that defendant No. 5 was not a "purchaser" in possession of a share of a joint family property, but was merely a person who had succeeded in defeating the claim of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 to eject him in the previous suit of 1918, on account of their failure to prove possession within twelve years under Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act.

    2. It is true that the previous cases cited in Rule (3), at the beginning of my judgment, are oases of purchasers of the undivided share of a co-parcener at a Court auction; and that the Court should be careful about extending that rule beyond its recognised limits. The question can no doubt be legitimately raised whether it is proper to treat defendant No. 5 as a person on the same footing as a " purchaser," who has peaceably obtained possession of a co-parcener's share and who is allowed to remain in joint possession under the rulings in question.

    3. It was contended by Mr. Thakor that defendant No. 5 should be regarded as a mere intruder, and that the lower appellate Court wrongly described him as

    " a stranger who had acquired title to the interests which defendants Nos. 1 to 3 had in the joint family property."
    I do not agree with that contention. It is clear that, under Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, not only has the right of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 in this property been extinguished, but it has also been transferred to defendant No. 6. This is how their lordships of the Privy Council described its effect in Muhammad Mumtaz Ali Khan v. Mohan Singh ( 1923) I.L.R. 45 All. 419, 425, P.C., and many authorities could be cited to the same effect: of. Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XIX, Article 316 at page 155; Dalip Rai v. Deoki Rai ( 1899) I.L.R. 21 All. 204, 207 and Hargovandas Lahhmidas v. Bajibhai Jijibhai ( 1889) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 222, 227; and other cases cited in Rustomji's Law of Limitation, 3rd Edn. pp. 631, 632. In other words, defendant No. 5 has acquired a title (viz., that of defendants Nos. 1 to 3) by prescription.

    4. Technically that makes him a "purchaser" in the legal acceptation of that word in English law, For prescription is one of the six ways of acquiring a title by "purchase": see Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 796, and Wharton's Law Lexicon, 10th Edn. p. 626. He has the backing of a Court's authority for his title, just as much as a purchaser at a Court's auction; and he has equally had to pay for that authority though in another way, viz., in legal costs over and above what he was awarded against defendants Nos. 1 to 3 in the litigation of 1918-20.

    5. Why should he not then be treated as on the same footing as a " purchaser " in its more ordinary sense ? In the present case, I can see no sufficient reason. In para 10 of the appellate Court's judgment in the prior litigation it is stated that admittedly he had been in possession for a number of years; and he is still in possession. He obtained that possession peaceably. He is not shown to have been a mere trespasser without any shadow of right for his possession. The attempt of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 to show that it was permissory failed. And finally he is not a member of a different caste or community, but a bhauband of the plaintiffs, who owns property adjoining the plot in dispute.

    6. I can see, therefore, no sufficient ground for altering my previous opinion that he ought not to be evicted in the circum-stances of the case; and I reject this application.

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    Bhau Laxman Dhor v. Budha Manku Dhor
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