Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 108 of the Indian Contract Act
  • section 108 (Exception 1) Indian Contract Act,
  • section 108 of the Indian Contract Act,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 108 of the Indian Contract Act
  • section 108 (Exception 1) Indian Contract Act,
  • section 108 of the Indian Contract Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff alleged that he borrowed money from defendant No. 1 on two dates in December 1920 (Rs. 2,200 on December 24 and Rs. 300 on December 28) on the security of six named shares (Emperor Edward Mill Nos. 2472 and 878; Colaba Mill No. 3375; Tata Hydro Ordinary No. 1740; Crescent Mill Nos. 13552 and 3185). The plaintiff owned Crescent Mill Share No. 13552 but it stood in the company's register in defendant No. 1's name. At the time of the loan the plaintiff handed defendant No. 1 the six share certificates and blank transfer forms (the transfer form for one share already appearing in defendant No. 1's name).

On June 11, 1923 the plaintiff purported to redeem the shares by paying Rs. 2,632-13-0 to defendant No. 1. After about a month defendant No. 1 returned three share certificates (the two Emperor Edward Mill shares and the Colaba Mill share) and stated that he could not find the other shares and transfer forms.

Defendant No. 2 was the brother of defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 3 was the banker of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and had dealings with them; the plaintiff claimed that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had wrongfully given the remaining shares to defendant No. 3 and sought their recovery.

After institution of the suit, defendant No. 1 died and his heirs were brought on record. The widow (named defendant No. 1(b)) did not appear; other heirs denied knowledge or alleged the widow was the sole heir. Defendant No. 2 disclaimed involvement and denied being an heir. Defendant No. 3 pleaded that he purchased the shares bona fide for consideration, denied notice of the plaintiff's mortgage, and contended that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting title because he had handed signed blank transfer forms to defendant No. 1.

The trial Court made findings of fact (set out below), passed a decree in favour of defendant No. 3 against the estate of defendant No. 1 (as represented by the widow) for Rs. 1,825 and costs, dismissed the suit against other defendants (without costs), and the District Judge confirmed that decree. The appellate court (Macleod, C.J., and Coyajee, J.) modified the decree as described in the Holding below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a registered owner of shares, by handing over share certificates and blank transfers signed by him to another person, makes a representation that such person is entitled to deal with the shares so that an honest purchaser from that person obtains a good title (i.e., whether such acts operate as an estoppel against the registered owner).
  2. Whether defendant No. 3 was protected as a bona fide purchaser for value under the first exception to section 108 of the Indian Contract Act (that is, whether he purchased in good faith and without notice of the plaintiff's rights).
  3. Whether the plaintiff was estopped from asserting ownership of the Tata Hydro share and the Crescent Mill share No. 3185 against defendant No. 3.
  4. Related factual question framed by the lower Court: whether defendant No. 3 had purchased the shares from defendant No. 1 in circumstances which did not raise a reasonable presumption that defendant No. 1 had no right to sell them.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff)

  • The plaintiff asserted that he had lent the money on the security of six shares and that he was the registered owner of at least some of those shares (notably the Tata Hydro share and one Crescent Mill share) and was therefore entitled to recover the shares wrongfully disposed of by defendants.
  • The plaintiff alleged that after repayment the defendant No. 1 returned only three shares and said he could not find the others, implying wrongful disposal.

Defendant No. 3 (Respondent)

  • Maintained that he had purchased the shares bona fide and for consideration from defendant No. 1 and had no notice of the plaintiff's mortgage.
  • Asserted that Crescent Mill Share No. 13552 stood in the name of defendant No. 1 in the Company register, and relied on estoppel arising from the plaintiff's negligence in handing over share certificates with blank transfer forms signed by him to defendant No. 1.
  • In evidence, defendant No. 3 said he understood Ismail (defendant No. 1) to be the owner when he purchased the shares on December 22, 1920; he acknowledged seeing two transfer forms bearing the plaintiff's signature and one bearing defendant No. 1's signature, and he did not apply for registration or claim dividends for about fifteen months.

Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and Heirs (as presented in the record)

  • Defendant No. 2 denied involvement in the transactions and denied being an heir.
  • Heirs of defendant No. 1 denied knowledge, some alleging the widow was sole heir; the widow did not appear.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fazal v. Mangaldas Referred to as an authority on the subject of estoppel arising from handing over share certificates and transfers (cited via Kanga J.). The court noted this as one of the authorities on the subject; it was referenced but the court did not rely on it to displace the effect of France v. Clark and Fox v. Martin as the controlling authorities mentioned in the opinion.
Vadilal v. Manekji Referred to as an authority in the appellate Court's judgment on the same subject. Mentioned as an authority; the opinion records that these authorities were referred to by Kanga J., but the court's decision turned on other cited cases (France v. Clark and Fox v. Martin) and the particular facts.
Colonial Bank v. Cady and Williams Contains dicta (by Lord Watson and Lord Herschell) suggesting that a registered owner who hands over certificates and blank transfers may be estopped if the recipient disposes to an honest purchaser. The court observed that those dicta were obiter and noted they were not followed in Fox v. Marlin / Fox v. Martin; the court treated those dicta as not controlling.
Fox v. Marlin (also cited as Fox v. Martin in the opinion) Represents a line of authority (together with France v. Clark) that does not support the broad proposition that handing over certificates and blank transfers automatically estops the registered owner. The court regarded Fox v. Marlin / Fox v. Martin (and France v. Clark) as the strongest cases in favour of the appellant's position and treated them as controlling unless directly overruled; this influenced the court to answer the estoppel question in the negative for the shares in question.
France v. Clark Authority relied on (and followed in Fox v. Marlin/Fox v. Martin) for the proposition that a broker's deposit or similar acts may not give title to third parties against the registered owner. The court treated France v. Clark as a controlling precedent that supports the view that handing over blank transfers does not automatically estop the registered owner; until such decisions are overruled the court answered the estoppel question negatively.
Hone v. Boyle An Irish case which reached a contrary conclusion to France v. Clark / Fox — i.e., held that the owner could be estopped. The court noted it as a contrary authority but did not adopt it; the existence of conflicting authorities reinforced the need to decide based on the applicable controlling decisions and the facts.
Fuller v. Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co. Held that a registered owner was estopped from asserting his right to shares against a defendant who had dealings with the plaintiff's broker; transfer form was endorsed on the share certificate in that case. The court recorded the decision but observed that the endorsement on the certificate may have influenced that outcome; it did not treat Fuller as determinative for the present facts.
23 Bom. L.R. 1144 Authority cited by the District Judge in support of the proposition that delivery of certificates and signed blank transfer forms to a broker may estop the owner against a bona fide purchaser without notice. The appellate judges noted the District Judge relied upon it, but they held that the District Judge misapprehended the third defendant's case and evidence; therefore they did not consider that reliance sufficient to support the broader conclusion of estoppel in this matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate judgment (Macleod, C.J., with Coyajee, J. concurring) focused on the legal effect of a registered owner handing share certificates and blank transfers to another person, and whether that act estops the owner as against a subsequent purchaser from that person. The court analysed (and distinguished) prior authorities and applied the facts of the case to the relevant legal principles.

Key points in the reasoning:

  • The District Judge's conclusion that the defendant No. 3 was protected rested substantially on the fact that defendant No. 1 was a share-broker by trade; the District Judge inferred that a purchaser could reasonably assume the broker had authority to sell.
  • The appellate court observed that defendant No. 3 never pleaded that he bought the shares believing defendant No. 1 to be a broker empowered by the owner to sell. In evidence defendant No. 3 said he thought defendant No. 1 was the actual owner.
  • Two of the transfer forms bore the plaintiff's signature and one bore the signature of defendant No. 1; defendant No. 3 made no attempt for nearly fifteen months to register the transfers with the Company or to claim dividends — facts which the court considered to undermine his claim of bona fides.
  • The court treated the question — whether the handing over of certificates and blank transfers signed by the registered owner makes a representation to the world that the recipient is entitled to deal with the shares — as dependent on precedent. It concluded that, in light of France v. Clark and Fox v. Marlin / Fox v. Martin (authorities that protect the registered owner in similar circumstances), the answer must be that handing over blank transfers does not by itself create an estoppel in favour of a purchaser from the recipient.
  • The court further reasoned that defendant No. 3 might have been protected had he purchased the shares from defendant No. 1 acting as a broker on behalf of a disclosed owner; that protection would arise under section 108 of the Indian Contract Act. But defendant No. 3 did not, and could not, establish that factual basis: he purchased from a person he knew not to be the registered owner and did not act to register his title or claim dividends, nor did he plead purchase from a broker empowered by the owner.
  • The court emphasised that while defendant No. 1 (though not the registered owner) could have filled in the transfers, got himself registered, and then conveyed title to a bona fide purchaser, defendant No. 3 could not acquire rights that defendant No. 1 did not in fact have at the time of sale. Nor was defendant No. 3 justified in presuming that defendant No. 1 had authority to sell.
  • Consequently, with respect to the Tata Hydro share and one Crescent Mill share (No. 3185) that stood in the plaintiff's name, there was no estoppel and defendant No. 3 was not protected by section 108; a decree for return (or payment in default) should be entered against him. With regard to the Crescent Mill share that stood in defendant No. 1's name in the company register, defendant No. 3 was justified in retaining that share.
  • Coyajee, J. agreed and emphasised that the District Judge's findings were vitiated by a misapprehension of the third defendant's case and evidence; the third defendant's conduct (delay in registration, not claiming dividends) further undermined his claim to bona fides.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate Court modified the earlier decree. It held that defendant No. 3 is not protected by the first exception to section 108 of the Indian Contract Act in respect of the Tata Hydro share and one Crescent Mill share (No. 3185); accordingly a decree should be passed against defendant No. 3 for the return of those share certificates with properly executed transfers or, in default, for payment of their value. The Crescent Mill share that was already registered in defendant No. 1's name need not be returned to the plaintiff.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The plaintiff (appellant) is entitled to recovery of two shares (Tata Hydro and Crescent Mill No. 3185) from defendant No. 3 (return of certificates with executed transfers or payment of value in default).
  • Defendant No. 3 may retain the Crescent Mill share (No. 13552) which stood in defendant No. 1's name in the Company register at the time of purchase.
  • The appellant is entitled to his costs in proportion throughout.

The opinion does not state that it is laying down a new, general precedent; rather it applies existing authorities (notably France v. Clark and Fox v. Marlin / Fox v. Martin as identified in the judgment) and the specific facts of this case to reach its conclusions.

Decree modified.

Signed: J.G.R (per the opinion).

    Abdul Vahed v. Hasanalli Alibhai Ghasia

    Macleod, C.J:— The plaintiff in bis plaint, alleged that he borrowed from the 1st defendant Rs. 2,200 on December 24, 1920, and Rs. 300 on December 28, 1920, on the security of the following shares:—

    Emperor Edward Mill Shares Nos. 2472 and 878.

    Colaba Mill Share No. 3375.

    Tata Hydro Ordinary Share No. 1740.

    Crescent Mill Shares Nos. 13552 and 3185.

    Crescent Mill Share No. 13552, though belonging to the plaintiff, stood in the name of defendant No. 1 in the Company's register. Certificates of the six shares with blank transfer forms signed by the plaintiff for the other five shares were handed to defendant No. 1 at the time of the loan. On June 11, 1923, plaintiff redeemed the shares by payment of Rs. 2,632-13-0 to defendant No. 1, who after about a month returned the Emperor Edward Mill shares and the Colaba Mill share with the respective transfer forms, and stated that he could not find the other shares and transfer forms.

    Defendant No. 2 was the brother of the defendant No. 1 while defendant No. 3 was the banker of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and had dealings with them.

    Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 appeared to have wrongly given the shares to defendant No. 3 and plaintiff claimed to be entitled to recover them from the defendants or one of them.

    Defendant No. 1 died after the institution of the suit and his heirs were placed on the record.

    Defendant No. 1(b) the widow did not enter an appearance; the other heirs, while denying all knowledge of the suit transactions, alleged that the widow was the sole heir. Defendant No. 2 denied that he had anything to do with the suit transactions, or that he was an heir of defendant No. 1.

    Defendant No. 3 said that he had no knowledge of the transactions between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. He purchased the shares from defendant bona fide and for consideration. Crescent Mill Share No. 13552 stood in the name of the defendant No. 1 in the Company's register and plaintiff was estopped from claiming the other shares because of his negligence in handing them with blank transfer forms signed by him to defendant No. 1 thus enabling him to misuse them.

    The trial Court found on the issues:

    1. That defendant No. 1 (b) was sole heir of defendant No. 1.

    2. That defendant No. 2 was not liable.

    3. That the plaintiff borrowed in December 1920 Rs. 2,500 from defendant No. 1 on the security of the six shares mentioned in the plaint.

    4. That plaintiff repaid the amount due to defendant No. 1 and received back the three shares mentioned in para. 5 of the plaint.

    5. That there was no conspiracy between defendants Nos. 1, 2, and 3 in connection with the three shares in dispute.

    6. That defendant No. 3 was a bona fide purchaser for value of the suit shares without notice of the plaintiff's mortgage and passed a decree against the estate of defendant No. 1 as represented by his widow, defendant No. 1(6) for Rs. 1,825 and costs.

    He dismissed the suit against the other defendants but without costs. He considered that defendant No. 3 in allowing the shares to stand in the names of the original registered owners until the suit was instituted, thus allowing them to draw the dividends, acted with remissness which might have induced the plaintiff to suspect fraud on his part, though such was not the case.

    The District Judge confirmed the decree.

    He appeared to think that the fact that the 1st defendant was a share broker was sufficient to justify the 3rd defendant in thinking that defendant No. 1 had a right to sell the shapes, and plaintiff was estopped from asserting his ownership against a bona fide purchaser for value. He failed to notice that defendant No. 3 never pleaded that he purchased the shares from defendant No. 1 under the belief that he was a broker empowered by the real owner to sell the shares. In his evidence he said that Ismail sold the shares to him at his shop on December 22, 1920. He understood Ismail to be the owner of the shares when he purchased them. Two transfer forms bore the plaintiff's signature and one the signature of defendant No. 1.

    With regard to one Crescent Mill Share No. 13552, as defendant No. 1 was the registered owner, the 3rd defendant was justified in thinking that he was the owner and he cannot be ordered to return it. With regard to the other Crescent Mill share and the Tata Hydro share he cannot rely on the defence that there is an estoppel against the real owner.

    How far the act of a registered owner of shares, who hands over the share certificates with transfer forms signed by him in blank to another person, estops him from asserting his title against a third party who has bought the shares from that person, must depend on the particular facts of each case as it arises.

    The authorities on the subject are referred to by Kanga J. in Fazal v. Mangaldas, and in the judgment of the appeal Court in Vadilal v. Manekji.

    Certain dicta of Lord Watson and Lord Herschell in the Colonial Bank v. Cady and Williams(3) have been relied upon by the respondents as an authority for the proposition that when a registered owner of shares hands over the share certificates and blank transfers to another person, whether for safe custody or for sale, and that person disposes of the shares to an honest purchaser, the owner is estopped from asserting his title to the shares, but it is admitted that those dicta were obiter and were not followed in Fox v. Marlin, which is the strongest case in favour of the appellant. A registered holder of shares instructed a broker to sell them for him for cash and signed a blank transfer which he handed to the broker with the share certificates. The broker deposited the certificates and transfers with his banker as security for an advance to himself. It was held following France v. Clark that the banker had no title to the shares as against the registered holder. Hone v. Boyle is an Irish case in which the contrary was held, and in Fuller v. Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co.(4), the registered owner of shares was held estopped from asserting his right to them against the defendant with whom the plaintiff's broker bad deposited the shares for security for his amount. But in that case the transfer form was endorsed on the share certificate and that fact may have influenced the Court to decide against the owners.

    The questions thus may be put in this form. Does a registered owner of shares, by handing over the share certificates and blank transfers signed by him to another person, make a representation to the world that such person is entitled to deal with the shares, so that any honest purchaser from that person obtains a good title to the shares? In my opinion, until the decisions in France v. Clark and Fox v. Martin are directly overruled, the answer to that question must be in the negative.

    In this case if the 3rd defendant could have said that he had purchased the two shares from the 1st defendant acting as a broker on behalf of his client, he would have been protected by the provisions of section 108 of the Indian Contract Act which is the section far more applicable to the case than section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act.

    But he bought them from the 1st defendant who, to his knowledge, was not the owner. It is true that the 1st defendant was entitled to fill up the transfers in his own name and get himself registered with the Company as the holder, and if he had done that and then transferred the shares to an honest purchaser, the plaintiff would have no right to recover the shares from such purchaser. The right, which the 1st defendant had, as between himself and the plaintiff, could not, in my opinion, be transferred to the 3rd defendant, so as to bind the plaintiff, nor do I think was the 3rd defendant justified in presuming that the 1st defendant, who was not the registered owner, had a good title to deal with the shares. The fact that he made no attempt to get the dividends from the 1st defendant certainly tends to throw suspicion on his bona fides, even though his explanation about his not getting himself registered as owner with the Company be accepted. If he had lodged the certificates with the Company for transfer, the holder would have received notice and would at once have objected to a transfer without his consent. A pledgee of shares, although he may get them transferred to his name as against his pledgor, would not be entitled to sell them without notice.

    In my opinion, therefore, there is no estoppel with regard to the Tata Hydro share and one Crescent Mill share, nor is the defendant No. 3 protected by section 108 of the Indian Contract Act, so that a decree should be passed against him for the return of the share certificates with properly executed transfers and in default for payment of their value.

    The appellant will be entitled to his costs in proportion throughout.

    Coyajee, J.:— I am of the same opinion. The main question arising in this case is whether the respondent (3rd defendant) is entitled to protection under the first Exception to section 108 of the Indian Contract Act. Accordingly, the learned District Judge raised the following appropriate points for determination, viz.:—(1) Whether defendant No. 3 had purchased the shares from the 1st defendant in good faith and under circumstances which were not such as to raise a reasonable presumption that defendant No. 1 had no right to sell the same. (2) If so, whether the plaintiff is estopped from asserting his ownership against defendant No. 3. The Judge answered both the questions in the affirmative, for the reason that “the plaintiff having delivered to a share-broker the share certificates with transfer forms signed by him, except in regard to one share which already stood in defendant No. 1's name, he was estopped from asserting his ownership against defendant No. 3 who had purchased the shares bona fide for value without notice, see 23 Bom. L.R 1144”. The judgment clearly shows that these conclusions were very largely influenced by the fact that the 1st defendant was a share-broker by vocation. The 3rd defendant, however, never alleged that he purchased two out of the three shares from defendant No. 1 under the belief that he was a broker empowered by the registered owner to sell those shares. On the contrary he said in his evidence: “I understood Ismail (i.e, defendant No. 1) to be the owner of the shares when I purchased them. Two forms bore plaintiff's signature and one defendant No. 1's signature. I did not question Ismail about the two forms bearing plaintiff's signature”. With that knowledge he purchased the three shares on December 22, 1920. One of these shares stood in the name of defendant No. 1 himself, whereas plaintiff was admittedly the registered owner of the other two shares. For nearly fifteen months the 3rd defendant made no application to the Company for registration of the transfer. The Company's register continued to show the plaintiff as the owner of the two shares. And the 3rd defendant made no attempt whatever to claim the dividends. When, early in 1922, he applied to the Company to register the shares, the plaintiff objected, and instituted the suit which has given rise to this second appeal. In my opinion, the findings of the lower Coart are vitiated by the fact that they are based upon a misapprehension of the 3rd defendant's case and of his evidence.

    For these reasons, I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that the 3rd defendant is not protected by section 108 (Exception 1) Indian Contract Act, and that in the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff is not estopped from asserting a right to the Tata Hydro share and the Crescent Mill share No. 3185.

    Decree modified.
    J.G.R
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Abdul Vahed v. Hasanalli Alibhai Ghasia
    (Oct 5, 1925)