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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sir Lallubhai Shah, A.C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The property in dispute belonged to plaintiff No. 2 while he was a minor. On 15 May 1905 the minor's mother, acting as his natural guardian, sold the property to defendant No. 1 for Rs. 700, and defendant No. 1 obtained possession. On 2 April 1909 defendant No. 1 sold the property to defendant No. 2, who has been in possession since that date.

Plaintiff No. 2 attained majority on 11 April 1916 and on 13 September 1916 conveyed his interest (together with another land) to plaintiff No. 1 for Rs. 1,500. A suit was filed on 20 December 1918 by plaintiff No. 1 (the assignee of plaintiff No. 2's interest) to set aside the sale made by the mother during the minority, and for possession and mesne profits.

At trial the defendants pleaded necessity for the guardian's sale and limitation. The trial Court found the sale by the guardian was not for necessity and therefore not binding on plaintiff No. 2; it held that the cause of action for the ward accrued on attaining majority and that the suit was within time under its view of limitation (the trial Court held section 6 of the Limitation Act did not apply). The trial Court, however, dismissed the suit as to plaintiff No. 2 and granted possession and mesne profits in favour of plaintiff No. 1.

Defendant No. 2 appealed against plaintiff No. 1 (plaintiff No. 2 was not made a respondent). The appellate Judge affirmed that the sale was not for necessity and that the claim was not barred, applying Article 44 of the Limitation Act. Defendant No. 2 then appealed to the present Court again only against plaintiff No. 1.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the claim by plaintiff No. 1 (the transferee of plaintiff No. 2) is time-barred.
  2. Whether Article 44 of the Indian Limitation Act — which gives a ward on attaining majority the right to sue to set aside transfers by his guardian within three years of attaining majority — can be invoked by an assignee/transferee, or is available only to the ward himself.
  3. Whether section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act (and analogous principles applied in cases concerning section 6) or related case law precludes an assignee from benefiting from the limitation protection afforded to the ward.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Defendant No. 2)

  • The suit was dismissed as to plaintiff No. 2, and therefore as regards plaintiff No. 1 the cause of action accrued at the date of the original alienation (1905).
  • Article 44 cannot apply to an assignee (a transferee) from the minor who has attained majority; consequently plaintiff No. 1 cannot claim the benefit of Article 44.
  • Because plaintiff No. 1 did not bring the suit within twelve years of the alienation, his claim is time-barred.
  • Reliance was placed on prior decisions (including Doraisami Serumadan v. Nondisami Saluvan and cases analogized to section 6 jurisprudence) to support the proposition that an assignee of a minor's interest cannot obtain the limitation benefits available to the ward.

Respondent's Arguments (Plaintiff No. 1, supported by plaintiff No. 2 joining the suit)

  • Plaintiff No. 2 (the ward who attained majority) had a clear right under Article 44 to sue to set aside the guardian's sale within three years of attaining majority, and he joined in the suit; therefore the suit is not time-barred.
  • Section 6 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the present case; Article 44 is a special article that provides the specific remedy and period for a ward who has attained majority.
  • Although the cause of action for setting aside the sale arises at the date of alienation, Article 44 makes the remedy available for three years from attaining majority; the ward's conveyance of his interest to plaintiff No. 1 before the suit does not strip him of the ability to join and sue under Article 44.
  • If the trial Court had formally set aside the sale in the names of both plaintiffs and then recognized plaintiff No. 1's possessory title under the transfer, the plea of limitation could not have been raised; in substance that result is achieved by the decree passed.
  • It was accepted by respondent's counsel that if plaintiff No. 1 alone had sued, Article 44 would not apply to him and he would require limitation protection under the ordinary law (i.e., within twelve years of the alienation).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Doraisami Serumadan v. Nondisami Saluvan Relied on by the appellant for its ratio decidendi supporting limitation against an assignee. The Court noted the appellant's reliance on the ratio but did not adopt it as decisive; it treated it as part of the submissions opposing the application of Article 44 to the assignee.
Rudra Kant Surma Sircar v. Nobo Kishore Smyrna Biswas Used in analogy to the proposition that an assignee of a minor's interest cannot obtain the benefit of section 6 of the Limitation Act. The Court observed that the analogy to section 6 cases does not govern the present question under Article 44 and held that such section 6 jurisprudence cannot be applied against the plain meaning of Article 44.
Mahadev v. Babi Another case cited in the group of authorities concerning limits on assignees claiming benefit of section 6. The Court treated it as part of the body of cases relied upon by the appellant but concluded those authorities did not determine the Article 44 issue in the present facts.
Rangaswami Chetti v. Thangavelu Chetti Also cited with the same analogy to section 6 jurisprudence. The Court acknowledged the citation but found the analogy inapplicable to the Article 44 context of the present case.
Fakirappa Limannn v. Lumanna bin Mahadu (Full Bench) Established that a Hindu minor on attaining majority cannot recover possession of property transferred by his mother acting as natural guardian without suing to set aside the transfer within the period provided by Article 44. The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to support the proposition that a ward, on attaining majority, must sue under Article 44 within three years to set aside such a guardian's transfer; it used this authority as a principal support for allowing the ward's joined claim within three years.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court limited the contested issues on appeal to the point of limitation because the finding that the guardian's sale was not for necessity and was not binding on plaintiff No. 2 was not challenged.

The Court began by restating Article 44: a ward who has attained majority can sue to set aside a transfer made by his guardian within three years from the date of attaining majority. The Court invoked the Full Bench decision in Fakirappa Limannn v. Lumanna bin Mahadu to show that a ward must sue under Article 44 within the prescribed period to recover possession from transfers effected by his mother acting as natural guardian.

The Court acknowledged two interrelated difficulties raised by the appellant: (1) whether Article 44 can apply to a suit by a transferee/assignee, and (2) whether once the ward has transferred his interest the ward's own right to sue is lost so that the transferee must rely on ordinary limitation rules (twelve years from alienation). The Court expressly stated that it was "not by any means clear" that Article 44 would apply to a suit filed by a transferee; it observed that Article 44 refers to a suit by a ward who has attained majority.

However, the Court considered the specific facts: plaintiff No. 2 (the ward) joined in the suit with plaintiff No. 1 (the transferee). The Court concluded that, on these facts, the ward's right under Article 44 remained available and that the ward could join in a suit to set aside the sale within three years even though he had previously conveyed his interest to a transferee. Key elements of the Court's analysis were:

  • The cause of action to set aside an improper guardian alienation arises at the date of the alienation, but Article 44 creates a particular remedy available to the ward within three years from attaining majority; the Court did not equate cause of action accrual with the Article's remedial period.
  • The ward's conveyance to a third party before suing does not extinguish his ability to maintain a suit under Article 44; until the sale is set aside the sale remains effective as regards his title, such that his interest is still subject to the result of a suit to set aside the guardian's transfer.
  • Where the transferee's direct claim to possession (as transferee) would be time-barred, the transferee benefits effectively if the ward, who still retains the remedial right, joins the suit and succeeds in having the transfer set aside.
  • The Court noted that if the ward's right at the date of transfer were only a "mere right to sue" (and thus arguably not transferable under section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act), that circumstance would not defeat the ward's own continuing right to sue in person; in any event the Court did not need to decide whether the right to sue is transferable because the ward did join the suit.
  • The Court rejected the appellant's attempt to draw an analogy from section 6 jurisprudence of the Limitation Act: it held that section 6 of the Limitation Act (and cases founded upon it) did not govern the interpretation of Article 44 and could not be applied against the plain meaning of the special Article.

The Court therefore found no principled objection to the ward joining with his transferee to sue under Article 44 in order to save limitation, and concluded that on the facts the claim was not barred.

The Court also observed that it "may be" technically incorrect that the trial Court dismissed the suit as to plaintiff No. 2, but in substance the sale had been set aside and possession ordered to plaintiff No. 1, who was entitled to possession if the sale could be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The decree appealed from is substantially right; the Court confirmed the decree and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • Plaintiff No. 1's claim (as assignee joined by the ward, plaintiff No. 2) is not time-barred on the facts of this case.
  • The substantive effect is that the guardian's sale is treated as set aside in substance and possession was rightly ordered to plaintiff No. 1, subject to the sale being set aside.
  • The appeal by defendant No. 2 is dismissed and the decree in favour of plaintiff No. 1 is confirmed (with costs awarded against the appellant).

Broader precedential implications: The opinion explains and applies Article 44 in the specific factual context of a ward who has conveyed his interest but joins as plaintiff in a suit to set aside the guardian's sale within three years of attaining majority. The Court did not announce a definitive rule on whether Article 44 would always or generally apply to suits brought solely by a transferee; it expressly declined to decide that question and confined its conclusion to the facts before it.

Decree confirmed. Appeal dismissed with costs.

J.G.R.

    Hanmant Gurunath Kulkarni v. Ramappa Lagamappa Ilager

    Sir Lallubhai Shah, A.C.J:— The facts which have given rise to this second appeal are these. The property in suit belonged to plaintiff No. 2 while he was a minor. His mother, as his natural guardian, sold it to defendant No. 1 for Rs. 700 on May 15, 1905. The defendant No. 1 obtained possession. On April 2, 1909, he sold the property to defendant No. 2, and defendant No. 2 has been in possession since then. Plaintiff No. 2 attained majority on April 11, 1916, and he conveyed his interest in these lands, with another land, to plaintiff No. 1 for Rs. 1,500 on September 13, 1916. The present suit was filed on December 20, 1918, by plaintiff No. 1, who purchased the interest of plaintiff No. 2, to set aside the alienation made by the mother of plaintiff No. 2 during his minority, and for possession and mesne profits.

    The defendant No. 1 pleaded that the sale by the guardian of plaintiff No. 2 was for necessity, and that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred. Defendant No. 2 raised the same pleas.

    The trial Court found that the alienation by plaintiff No. 2's mother to defendant No. 1 was not for necessity. In dealing with the question relating to the alienation by the guardian during the minority of plaintiff No. 2, the Court observed that the alienation was not binding on plaintiff No. 2, and must be set aside.

    As regards limitation, apparently the point was first given up, but ultimately it was taken at the close of the case, and the trial Court allowed that point to be taken. On that question the trial Court found that the cause of action arose on the minor's attaining majority, and that any suit to set aside the transfer could be brought Within three years from that date. The Court was of opinion that section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act did not apply to such a case, and held the suit to be within time. Instead, however, of setting aside the sale formally, the Court passed a decree in favour of plaintiff No. 1 for possession and mesne profits. He dismissed the suit as regards plaintiff No. 2.

    Defendant No. 2 appealed against plaintiff No. 1 only. Plaintiff No. 2 was not joined as a party-respondent to the appeal. The same two questions were raised before the Court of appeal as to limitation, and as to necessity for the alienation by the mother of plaintiff No. 2. The learned Assistant Judge, who heard the appeal, found that the sale by the mother was not for legal necessity, and that it was not binding on plaintiff No. 2. The learned Judge was further of opinion that the claim was not barred as the cause of action accrued to the minor only on his attaining majority, and that as the case was governed by Article 44 of the Indian Limitation Act, the suit was not barred. The decree of the trial Court was confirmed.

    Defendant No. 2 has appealed to this Court against plaintiff No. 1 only. In the appeal the finding that there was no necessity for the sale by the guardian, and that it was not binding upon plaintiff No. 2, is not challenged.

    The only point urged in support of the appeal is that the claim of plaintiff No. 1 is time-barred. It is urged that the suit is dismissed as regards plaintiff No. 2, and as regards plaintiff No. 1 the cause of action really accrued on the date of the alienation; that Article 44 of the Indian Limitation Act cannot apply to an assignee from the minor who has attained majority, and the claim not having been filed within twelve years from the date of the alienation, so far as plaintiff No. 1 is concerned, the claim is time-barred. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon the ratio decidendi in Doraisami Serumadan v. Nondisami Saluvan.

    On the analogy of the view taken in Rudra Kant Surma Sircar v. Nobo Kishore Smyrna Biswas, Mahadev v. Babi and Rangaswami Chetti v. Thangavelu Chetti, that an assignee of a minor's interest cannot get the benefit of section 6 of the Indian. Limitation Act, it is urged that the assignee of plaintiff No. 2's interest cannot get the benefit of Article 44 of the Indian Limitation Act.

    On the other hand, it is urged that whatever may be the difficulty in the way of plaintiff No. 1 claiming possession after setting aside the sale, as plaintiff No. 2 joined him in the suit, and as plaintiff No. 2 had clearly a right under Article 44 within three years from the date of attaining majority to have the sale set aside, there is no reason why the claim should be treated as time-barred. It is also pointed out that the relief as to setting aside the sale should have been granted to both the plaintiffs by the trial Court and that possession might have been allowed to plaintiff No. 1 in virtue of the sale deed in his favour. It is urged that if the decree had been in that form, it could not have been suggested that the claim was time-barred. But as the decree passed in substance is to that effect, there is really no scope for the plea of limitation. It is further urged that section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act has nothing to do with the present case, that Article 44 is a special Article which gives to a ward on his attaining majority the right to sue to set aside the sale within three years from the date of his attaining majority, and that though the cause of action for setting aside the sale may arise from the date of the alienation, the particular remedy open to the ward, who has attained majority, contemplated by Article 44, is open to him for three years from the date of his attaining majority. It is not disputed before us by the learned pleader for respondent that if the suit had been filed by plaintiff No. 1 alone, Article 44 would not apply to that suit, and he would have to show that his right to set aside the alienation was within time according to the law of limitation apart from that Article, i.e, within twelve years from the date of the alienation.

    On a consideration of the arguments, it seems to me that on the facts of the case, the claim made by the plaintiff is not time barred. It is clear under Article 44 that a ward, who has attained majority, can sue to set aside a transfer of property by his guardian within three years from the date of his attaining majority. In fact it has been held by a Full Bench in Fakirappa Limannn v. Lumanna bin Mahadu that “a Hindu minor on his attaining majority cannot sue to recover possession of property transferred by his mother acting as his natural guardian during his minority without suing to set aside the transfer within the period of limitation provided by Article 44 of the Indian Limitation Act”. Therefore, if the alienation by the mother was to be set aside, the ward had to sue under Article 44 within three years to set aside the sale. He has in fact done so, and it is difficult to see how the claim made for setting the sale can be said to be time-barred, so far as he is concerned. The fact that he conveyed his interest in the property to plaintiff No. 1, before he filed the suit, does not mean, in our opinion, that he has no interest in maintaining the suit to set aside the alienation. It would be difficult to apply this Article 41 to the case of a transferee from the ward. We are not by any means clear that Article 44 would apply to a suit filed by a transferee from the ward. It is, however, not necessary on the facts of this case to decide the question. It is enough to point out the difficulty of applying Article 44 to a simple suit by a transferee of the ward. The Article refers to a suit by a ward who has attained majority. Assuming, without deciding, that Article 44 would not apply to a suit by a transferee, it does not follow that where the ward joins with the transferee in suing to set aside the sale, the ward cannot do so, if the suit is brought within three years from the date of his attaining majority. We do not say that the cause of action in the case of a suit under Article 44 by a ward arises on his attaining majority. The cause of action for setting aside an improper alienation by the guardian of a minor arises from the date of the alienation. But the remedy contemplated by Article 44 is open to a ward for three years from the date of his attaining majority, and that remedy is not lost, in our opinion, by the mere fact that he purports to transfer his interest in the property, such as it is at the date of the transfer, to a third party. At the date of the transfer by the plaintiff No. 2, he had a right to sue to set aside the sale. Until it was set aside, the sale was good, so far as he was concerned, and his interest in the property was subject to the result of a suit. In order to make his transfer to a third party effective where the transfer is effected, as in this case, at a time when the claim of the transferee as such for possession was time-barred, he had to sue to set aside the sale, and to establish his title to the property by showing that the sale was not binding upon him. We see no objection on principle in the ward joining in a suit to set aside the sale, though as a result of setting aside the sale, the property would go to his transferee. Though in one sense the benefit goes to the transferee, the transferor gets the full benefit by way of consideration for the transfer of the property. If the right of plaintiff No. 2 at the date of transfer to plaintiff No. 1 be held to be a mere right to sue it cannot be transferred under section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act: and his right to sue would continue in spite of the transfer.

    section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act has nothing to do with this case, and we do not think that the cases relating to section 6 can help us in deciding the point that arises here. The analogy of section 6 relied upon by the learned pleader for the appellant cannot be applied against the plain meaning of the Article and it hardly applies to the facts of the present ease.

    No doubt it may be said in this case that the suit is substantially by the transferee, and that plaintiff No. 2 is joined only to save limitation, even though he had no interest in the suit. We agree that plaintiff No. 2 is joined to save limitation, but we are of opinion that it is open to the parties to save limitation by adopting that course in view of the provisions of Article 44. We are satisfied that the plaintiff No. 2 was entitled to sue to set aside the sale in spite of the transfer in favour of plaintiff No. 1. Though the point is not wholly free from difficulty, after giving the best consideration to the arguments on either side, we have come to the conclusion that on the facts of this case the claim is not barred.

    It may be that it was not strictly correct for the trial Court to dismiss the suit as to plaintiff No. 2. But in substance the sale is set aside and the possession ordered to be given to plaintiff No. 1, who is undoubtedly entitled to possession, if the sale can be set aside.

    The decree appealed from is substantially right. We confirm it and dismiss the appeal with costs.

    Decree confirmed.
    J.G.R
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    Hanmant Gurunath Kulkarni v. Ramappa Lagamappa Ilager
    (Sep 29, 1924)